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RUY FREYRE DE ANDRADA

COMMENTARIES

1647

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

COMMENTARIOS DO GRANDE CAPITAM RVY Freyre de Andrada.

EM QUE SE RELATAM SUAS PROEZAS DO
Anno 1619. em q̃ partio deſte Reyno por Geral do mar
de Ormuz, & Coſta da Perſia, & Arabia ate ſua morte.
Tirados de humas relaçoẽs, & papeis verdadeyros
por induſtria de Paulo CraesbeecK.

DERIGIDO AO SENHOR LOVRENÇO SKYTTE
Senhor de Kongzbroo, & Sãtra. Aſsiſtente pella Rainha de
Suecia na Corte de Portugal, &c.

Felix Caetano da Sa

EM LISBOA.
Com todas as licenças neceſſarias.
Por Paulo CraesbeecK, & a ſua cuſta Anno 1647.

TITLE PAGE OF ORIGINAL EDITION OF 1647

[*Frontispiece*

THE ARGONAUT SERIES

EDITED BY SIR E. DENISON ROSS
AND EILEEN POWER

COMMENTARIES OF
RUY FREYRE DE ANDRADA

In which are Related his Exploits from the Year 1619, in which he left this Kingdom of Portugal as General of the Sea of Ormuz, and Coast of Persia, and Arabia, until his Death

Edited with an Introduction by
C. R. BOXER
Socio da Associação dos Arqueologos Portuguezes



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1930

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TO

EDGAR AND VICTORIA PRESTAGE

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PREFACE

THE *Commentarios do Grande Capitão Ruy Freyre de Andrade*, first published at Lisbon in 1647 by Paulo Craesbeeck, has never (so far as I know) been translated into any language, nor has it had a subsequent edition in Portugal. Copies of the original edition are extremely rare, and the work is less known than many manuscripts.

The book deals with a period singularly interesting to English readers as it describes at length the operations leading up to the capture from the Portuguese of the celebrated city and island of Ormuz, in the Persian Gulf, by an Anglo-Persian force.

Hence the publication of an English edition of this work should be of interest and value to all those who are concerned with the history of the rise of our Indian Empire; the more so since up till now there has been no account available in print of the Portuguese version of the affair; and it is always interesting to know what was taking place " on the other side of the hill."

It is not certain who was the author of the *Commentarios*, but it was probably the publisher Paulo Craesbeeck, who claims to have composed the volume from various "trustworthy papers." Unfortunately however these papers are anything but reliable in many places, since their version of what occurred is often contradicted, not only by the English accounts, but by other contemporary Portuguese authorities. But even making due allowance for this, the commentaries do contain a great many details which are not to be found elsewhere, and they throw a flood of light on the siege of Ormuz. A work like this offers the temptation of almost unlimited annotation, but I have endeavoured to keep myself within bounds, and have only included such quotations from English and Portuguese sources as are necessary either to confute or to confirm the more dubious statements of the Portuguese Chronicler. Amongst the Appendices I have included several unpublished Portuguese documents, but the most valuable material is to be found in the journal of Edward Monnox printed in Appendix X., who was present throughout the operations. Purchas has printed an abridged version of this journal in his "Pilgrims" [*cf.* 1910 ed., vol. x.], but he omitted a great deal of it, and that not the least interesting part, so the publication of this journal in full provides a very interesting supplement to the Portuguese account.

Sir E. Denison Ross asked me to undertake this work for the "Broadway Travellers" Series early in 1928, but the Hakluyt Society had also made arrangements for Professor Edgar Prestage, Professor of Portuguese History and Literature at the University of London, to translate it for their series about the same time. However, Professor Prestage on learning that I had already collected a considerable mass of unpublished material relating to the subject in the India Office at London, very kindly waived his claim, and the council of the Hakluyt Society equally courteously stood aside in favour of the "Broadway Travellers." I originally meant to translate the volume into contemporary seventeenth-century English, but I fear this is one of the good intentions that has perished by the way, although I hope that the general style of the book smacks more of the seventeenth century than our own age. Translation is a thankless task at all times, and in this case it was not helped by the flowing and watery style favoured by the Portuguese writer, whose punctuation moreover was capricious in the extreme. Nor were his shortcomings helped by the carelessness of the proof reader and the negligence of the printer, but I trust that those who are able to compare this translation with the original will not find it altogether wanting.

Whilst not doubting that the work would have been better done by the hand of so accomplished a Portuguese scholar as Professor Prestage, yet I trust that the amount of material I have collected from printed and manuscript sources, will render this book a useful contribution to the long and glorious history of both England and Portugal in Asia.

* * * * *

In the preparation of this work I have received much encouragement and assistance from various friends, to whom I take this opportunity of rendering my thanks. To Sir William Foster and to Sir E. Denison Ross I owe a great debt for their interest and advice prior to my actually commencing the work. Capitão de Fregata Quirino da Fonseca and Mr. R. C. Anderson have given me valuable help in wrestling with some of the more knotty points of seventeenth-century Portuguese naval technicalities, and have saved me from committing several blunders; those which remain in this connection are my own. To Miss Anstey of the India Office for her careful and conscientious copying of Monnox's Diary printed in Appendix X. Senhor Frazão de Vasconcellos has been of very great assistance to me in directing my researches in the Archives at Lisbon, whilst he has been indefatigable in supplying biographical details of the chief Portuguese officers concerned. In this connection I have also received aid from Senhor Laranjo Coelho, the erudite Director of the Tonne de Tombo in Lisbon. But to none am I under a greater obligation than to Professor Prestage, who has not only stood aside in order to let me produce the book, but who has been of invaluable help in elucidating some of the obscure words and phrases which are to be met with in the original text.

C. R. BOXER.

LINCOLN,
January 31, 1929.

INTRODUCTION

"'The sword of the Lord and of Gideon' had served the Portuguese very well as a motto for acquisition; but in the contemptuous neglect by them of the arts of peace, and in the absence of any genius for colonization, it did not facilitate retention."—CURZON, *Persia and the Persian Question.*

THIS sweeping, if eloquent, statement is often quoted by writers on the history of the Persian Gulf as a perfect summing-up of the reasons for the expulsion of the Portuguese therefrom. It would be idle to deny that it contains a considerable amount of truth, yet it does our Lusitanian predecessors but scant justice, and makes no allowance for the spirit of their age, or for the difficult positions in which they often found themselves. It is not unusual to taunt the Portuguese with a complete lack of genius for colonization, but this is only another way of saying that their methods are radically different from our own. The nation which built up the state of Brazil, without that ruthless extermination of the native Indians which only too often disgraced our own record in North America, may have something to teach us after all. The faults of the Portuguese during their rule in the Persian Gulf were neither few nor small, and their access to and fall from power in particular were disgraced by senseless massacres of the inhabitants which nothing can excuse, but it should not be forgotten that during their tenure of power in the Gulf they kept it free of the curse of Piracy (save for a few isolated Turkish raids) as we have done since the eighteenth century, and that tyrannous in many ways as they undoubtedly were, they allowed no one else to misrule, and in some respects their

Government was lenient and broad-minded. Travellers of all nations have testified to the abounding prosperity of Ormuz under their rule and the flourishing state of the trade carried on therein; whilst even allowing for some exaggeration in certain of the accounts, the immense booty gained by the Anglo-Persian force on the capture of the city in 1622 clearly shows the wealth of Ormuz even in its decline, and proves that the occasional observation of some travellers that Ormuz was not so prosperous as it had been under native jurisdiction was merely the time-honoured plaint of "things are not what they were." For ourselves, the fall of Ormuz marked the dawn of a new and decisive era in the history of our Indian trade and gave promise of the brightest hopes for the future—hopes which if they were sadly disappointed at the outset were realized in due course to the full; for it cannot be gainsaid that the capture of this island laid the foundations of that preponderating influence in the Persian Gulf which we have possessed ever since.

To the Portuguese, on the other hand, the blow was indeed a bitter one, and largely contributed to accelerate their inevitable ruin; yet in the darkest hours of the decadence of their power, there were some who were not found wanting in the hour of trial, and whose heroic actions worthily upheld the prestige acquired by their "conquistador" ancestors of the early sixteenth century. Nor is the story of the taking of Ormuz Castle merely an echo "of old unhappy far-off things, and battles long ago," for the direct consequences of this act are with us to this day, and the story of the operations previous to the capture of the place affords several illuminating examples of the dangers which arise from the neglect of the Principles of Warfare, whether by land or sea.

At the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese had been established as the paramount power in the Persian Gulf for over a hundred years, yet the great Shah Abbas I. had not been long on the throne of Persia before he began to cast covetous eyes upon the rich Lusitanian territories, whose chief centres at this period were Ormuz, Muscat and Bahrein. The war with Turkey occupied most of his attention for a considerable period after his accession in 1587, but with the recapture of Nehavend and Tabriz, the Osmanali had been fairly driven out of the N.W. Persian Provinces by 1605, and the Shah was in a better position to turn his arms against his Christian opponents. As early as 1602 the Khan of Shiraz had wrested the valuable pearl-fishery of Bahrein, off the North Arabian coast, from the hapless " King " of Ormuz, who was a vassal of the King of Spain and Portugal,[1] in time of peace, and although the Shah disclaimed complicity in this affair, yet the island was not restored to the Portuguese. The Persians followed up this aggression by continually filching away portions of the dominions of the King of Ormuz on the mainland, and finally, in 1607, they occupied two wells near Bandar Abbas (Gombroon or Comorão) from which Ormuz drew much of its water, and although they subsequently retired on payment of some customs dues which they alleged were due to them, yet they retained two small forts that they had built close to the Portuguese mud fort on the shore. This, incidentally, was in a very weak state of defence, the walls being in a ruinous condition, whilst there were few cannon in the fortress. Despite the fact that from 1600 onwards successive Viceroys and captains had written home concerning the aggressions of the Shah, and the ill-preparedness for war of the forts of Ormuz and Gombrun, no steps were taken to amend matters before it was too late, although the King wrote repeatedly that this was to be done; hence it is not surprising that when the Khan of Lar laid siege to the Fort of Gombrun in 1615, with an army said to amount to 14,000 men, it fell after a trifling resistance.[1] A fleet under Miguel de Sousa Pimentel, which the Viceroy had despatched to its relief, arrived just too late, and Pimentel retired to Muscat without making an effort to restore the situation.[2]

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[1] At that period (1580-1640) under one crown.

By the loss of their fort at Gombrun, the Portuguese were deprived of their last foothold on the mainland and the Persians became yearly more aggressive. It was with the idea of patching up a peace with Persia that the King decided upon the despatch of an embassy to the court of the Shah in 1614. The Ambassador selected was a certain Spanish nobleman named Don Garcia de Silva y Figueroa, partly in consequence of a request from the Shah that no more friars should be sent him as ambassadors, but some gentlemen of note "for he would better know how to treat with such an one, and His Majesty would be better served, because a religious man out of his cell was like a fish out of water." This Envoy's instructions were to arrange a treaty with the Shah, whereby the monopoly of the Persian silk trade would be granted to the Portuguese, and he was also to press for the restoration for Bahrein, Gombrun and other territories claimed by the Portuguese Monarch through the alleged rights of his vassal king of Ormuz. The Shah was not (apparently) loath to grant the monopoly of the silk trade to the Portuguese, since in 1616 he despatched Sir Robert Sherley[3] to the court of

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[1] Over the loss of Bahrein and Gombrun, and the abortive preparations made for the recovery of the same, see the *Livros das Monçoẽs* series, Lisbon, 1880-93 *passim*, and especially Tomo I., pp. 11, 13, and 322-31, Tomo II., pp. 100-5, Tomo III., pp. 173-4, and Tomo IV., pp. 151-3.

[2] Pimentel had been in China in 1613 as commander of a force of galleons destined to protect the Japan trade against Dutch aggressions. He had committed many enormities whilst stationed at Macau.

[3] Robert Sherley, together with his brother Anthony, were two great English adventurers of the seventeenth century. Arriving at the Court of Shah Abbas in 1598, they took service with the Persian monarch and rendered him many and important services in diplomacy and war. They both undertook extensive missions to Europe, Robert from 1608-13 and again from 1617-27, being knighted on his first visit to England in

Madrid with the object of concluding a treaty by which the whole monopoly of the silk trade would be given to Portugal (the object being to divert its transit by way of Turkey), provided that the Portuguese would send yearly a fleet with spices, pepper, Indian goods, and specie in payment thereof. Sherley actually succeeded in concluding an agreement on these lines, and the King wrote to Don Garcia de Figueroa, and to the Captain of Ormuz, on the 14th March, 1619, informing them of this; he added, however, that the actual carrying out of this agreement was to be made entirely dependent upon the restoration of Bahrein and Gombrun by the Shah to the King of Ormuz.[1] This agreement never became operative, because when Don Garcia de Silva y Figueroa demanded the restoration of the disputed territories at his final interview with the Shah at Ispahan in 1619, the latter flew into a rage and swore that, so far from restoring what he had already taken, he would drive the Portuguese from their Fortress at Ormuz; at the same time he ordered a *farmān* to be made out, granting the sole trade in silks by the sea route to the English. Don Garcia having been thus unsuccessful in his mission left the Persian court for Ormuz, whence he embarked for Goa in April, 1620.[2]

As early as 1613 the Portuguese began to take alarm at the prospect of their English rivals opening a trade with Persia and interfering with their own monopoly of commerce in the Gulf. The English at this time had their hands full at Surat, whilst subsequently King

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1611 by James I. His wife was a Circassian, and he himself was Master-General of the Persian army during the Turkish campaigns of 1602-05. [*V.* Sir A. Wilson, *Persian Gulf*, pp. 128-142.]

[1] For details of this abortive agreement and the King's observations thereon see *Livros das Monçoẽs*, Livro 11, folios 126 7, and Livro 12, folios 140-150. [India Office, Port. Records.]

[2] After a previous unsuccessful attempt and a narrow escape from shipwreck, D. Garcia y Figueroa finally left Goa for Portugal in 1623 on board the ship *São Thomé*, but died on the voyage, off the Azores His *Comentarios* were published in two vols. at Madrid in 1903.

James I.'s Ambassador to the great Moghul, Sir Thomas Roe, opposed the extension of their trade to Persia. But the East India Company's Factors at Surat were wiser and resolved to despatch a ship thither in 1616, and accordingly the first English vessel, the *James*, was despatched from Surat to Persia. The Portuguese attempt to intercept the vessel proved abortive, and in 1619 a factory was established at Jask which became the centre of the company's commercial activities in Persia for the next three years.

Despite the arrival of Robert Sherley in Lisbon in 1618, and the agreement concluded with him in the following year, the King seems to have thought that the prospect of obtaining a satisfactory peace with Persia was not very good, because he decided upon the despatch of a strong naval expedition to Ormuz in the spring of 1619, with the dual object of forcibly ejecting the intruding English "corsairs" from the Persian Gulf and of protecting Ormuz against a possible invasion by the Persians in the event of the treaty not being ratified. The officer selected to command this expedition was a certain Ruy Freire de Andrade, who was described by one of his English rivals as "a proper tall Gentleman, swarthie of colour, sterne of Countenance, few of words, and of an excellent spirit." The force placed under his orders consisted of two galleons and three urcas [hulks in the contemporary English] carrying a total force of 178 guns and more than 2,000 men, between soldiers and sailors.[1] Since his voyage to Ormuz is fully described in the course of this work (pp. 1 to 14), it is only necessary to state here that he reached Ormuz in June, 1620, after a long and painful voyage, during which he had lost one urca by shipwreck off the Kerimba islands of the East African coast, as well as several hundreds of men who had perished from the privations they had undergone during the detention of a part of the squadron at Moçambique in the winter of 1619.

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[1] For Ruy Freire see Appendix XI., Personalia. His orders for the expedition are printed (for the first time) in Appendix I., pp. 211-218. Other documents dealing with his outward voyage will be found in Luciano Cordeiro's *Dois Capitães da India*.

On arrival at Ormuz, Ruy Freire made several additions and alterations to his force, and then sailed to Jask in November, 1620, with a view to intercepting the English ships which were expected to arrive there in December with their annual cargo of goods for Persia. His force comprised two galleons, one urca, and a pataxo or pinnace carrying over 1,000 men; shortly after this squadron had taken up its station off Cape Jask, three strange ships hove in sight on December 16th. These were the *Hart* and *Eagle* of the East India Company's outward bound fleet together with a Portuguese prize which they had taken. Ruy Freire at once weighed in pursuit, and as the English thought it likely that he would overhaul them, they turned off the prize and steered for Surat. On their way thither they fell in with their two consorts the *London* and *Roebuck* under Captain Shilling, and the united force then headed for Jask Roads determined to try a bout with the redoubtable *Pride of Portugall*, who had sworn upon the Sacrament in Lisbon to root out the English and their trade from the Gulf. The rival squadrons came in sight of each other off Jask on Christmas Day, but battle was not joined until the 27th, when the Portuguese suffered a heavy defeat after the action had raged for nine hours without intermission. On the next day the wind was in favour of the Portuguese, but they made no attempt to interfere with the English who stood in to Jask, and after landing their goods took on board about 520 bales of silk. Ruy Freire remained in the offing, and on January 1st, 1621, he received a supply of men and munitions which had been sent him in some frigates, or small craft, from Ormuz. Thus reinforced he again prepared to give battle, but contrary winds and gales prevented the action from being fought until January 7th, when the English attacked their adversaries and utterly routed them after a stubborn contest.[1]

The Portuguese confess to a loss of 160 dead and 200 wounded in this last action alone, whilst the English losses amounted to only eight all told, including Shilling, who died of his wounds some days after the last action. The disproportion between the respective fleets is truly amazing and can only be accounted for by the extraordinarily poor gunnery of the Portuguese, for that they did not lack courage (in the first fight at all events), is clearly shown by their standing up under such heavy punishment for so long despite the fact that they were inflicting little or no loss on their opponents. Their heavy casualty list on the last day's action is accounted for by the fact that Ruy Freire foolishly persisted in fighting at anchor and with his vessels linked to each other with hawsers, with the natural result that when the fire of the English cut one of these hawsers " 3 of Ruy Frere his 4 galliones ley bord and bord one foule of another, not a man scarse appearinge in the one of them and verie seldom a shott cam from them." [V. Appendix X., p. 301.] Ruy Freire was a brave and resolute officer by the admission of his own enemies, but he evidently experienced difficulty in getting his men to fight after the hammering they had received in the first engagement, and whilst his courage cannot be called into question, yet his faulty tactics were largely responsible for the humiliating discomfiture of the Portuguese, to which the poor quality of the crews (mostly *Gujarāt* and half-caste seamen) no doubt chiefly contributed.[1]

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[1] Senhor Luciano Cordeiro in his interesting and valuable *Como se perdeu Ormuz*, pp. 34-40, accepts unquestioningly the version of the *Commentarios*, and besides giving the English losses as over 200, he also, like the *Commentarios*, attributes Ruy Freire's ill-success to his fleet being scattered by a storm, during which the English slipped into Jask and escaped with the silk. This was evidently the excuse sent home by Ruy Freire or his supporters, and the best comment thereon is in Monnox's words—" Now if this was a storme it was onlie the thundringe of our shott that was so terrible bothe to this brave Captain and his associates that he nor they durst not looke oute of their shipps holds to see what weather it was." [*V.* Appendix X., p. 301.] Besides the accounts given in Appendices IX. and X., the English versions printed by Foster and Purchas, [*v.* Bibliography] supply a complete refutation of Senhor Cordeiro's arguments.

Be this as it may, Ruy Freire made his way back to Ormuz unmolested, since the English had exhausted nearly all their powder and shot and in consequence of Shilling's death deemed it best to return to Surat. After refitting his shattered Armada as best he could, Ruy Friere turned his attention to the second object for which he had been sent out by the King, *i.e.*, the task of securing Ormuz from the possible Persian invasion. The Royal orders for this purpose included an instruction to build a fortress at the eastern extremity of the island of Kishm, or Qishm, presumably in order to protect some wells that were situated there and which would take the place of those lost at Gombrun in 1615. Ormuz is a sterile and waterless island and dependent for its water-supply on the neighbouring coasts and islands, so at first sight the plan seems to be a practicable one, but in reality it was an unfortunate move, as Kishm was claimed by the Persians and the construction of a fortress there would naturally form a valid *causus belli* for the Shah, and involve an open rupture with Persia—a thing which was not at all desirable at that time, since the Dutch and English aggressions gave the Portuguese authorities at Goa sufficient trouble and anxiety, without their having another dangerous enemy on their hands. Furthermore, so long as the Portuguese held the command of the sea in the Gulf (as in despite of their defeats off Jask they still did), they could always land and obtain water under the protection of their ships and fleets wherever and whenever they wished; whilst once their command of the sea was lost, it would be of little use to have a fort dominating the wells at Kishm when they could not transport the water to Ormuz unmolested. All these considerations and many others equally valid were pointed out to Ruy Freire by the aged Fernão de Albuquerque, then Governor of India, and by Dom Luiz de Sousa, the veteran Captain of Ormuz Castle;[1] but the hot-headed Ruy Freire, by producing the Royal orders to build the fort on Kishm, overruled these objections in the Council held at Ormuz to discuss the affair, and supported by the King of Ormuz he persuaded the council to undertake the Expedition. No doubt the arrival of the two galleons *Todos os Santos* and *Nossa Senhora de Victoria* from Goa in May helped to confirm him in the resolution which he had taken.

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[1] Unfortunately the Portuguese accounts of the actions off Jask in 1620-21 are extremely meagre. Faria y Sousa barely mentions the fight as having taken place, and I know of no other contemporary version except that of the *Commentarios*. When last in Lisbon I made extensive researches amongst the MSS. of the Torre de Tombo and Bibliotheca Nacional for an account of the battle, but without success.

On the 7th of May, 1621, Ruy Freire left Ormuz for Kishm at the head of an expeditionary corps of some 2,000 " veteran " Portuguese soldiers and 1,000 Ormuzian Lascarins, embarked in thirty galliots, a galley, the urca *Nossa Senhora de Conceicão* and the pataxo *Sao Lourenço*. This fleet anchored off the eastern point of the island on the same evening, and the men were disembarked at daybreak on the following morning; the Persians attempted to oppose the disembarkation with a force of 3,000 men who were speedily driven off with great slaughter, and Ruy Freire at once set about the construction of the Fort which he built " of a great height and thicknesse, with halfe-Moones and Flanckers very artificially, which in five moneths and a halfe hee had finished; a thing wonderfull in so short a time to be effected," as a contemporary English account puts it.

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[1] The King had repeatedly written to Goa ordering that the fortifications of Ormuz were to be strengthened, and was assured in reply that steps were being taken to effect this. He does not appear to have been satisfied with this answer, as in a letter dated March 5, 1620, he ordered proceedings to be instituted against D. Luiz de Sousa. [*Livros das Monçoẽs*, Livro 12, folio 95.]

The Persian force which was occupying the island was speedily reinforced from the mainland when the news of the Portuguese landing reached Gombrun, and Ruy Freire soon found himself closely besieged by a powerful force variously estimated as anything from 9,000 to 25,000 men. The siege was opened on the 20th of June by Imām Qūlī Khān,[1] who had been placed in charge of the operations by his uncle the Khān of Shiras. A full description of the long and eventful siege of Kishm Fort, which lasted from June, 1621, till February, 1622, will be found on pp. 38 to 110 of the present work, so it is unnecessary to go into the details of the siege here; it will suffice to say that Ruy Freire held his own and wrought immense havoc all along the neighbouring Persian coasts by means of the plundering flotillas of light craft that he sent out from Ormuz and Kishm at intervals, and which burnt and sacked nearly all of the ports and villages between Kung and Jask.

The chief object of these destructive raids, which were conducted with wanton barbarity and disgraced by the slaughter of all women and children who were found, was to destroy the local shipping in order to prevent the Khan of Shiras from collecting a sufficient number of craft by which he could transport his forces over to Ormuz, and also to impede the passage of reinforcements from the mainland to Kishm, and to stifle the pearl-fisheries.

Needless to say, however, this barbarous method of procedure only served to render the wretched inhabitants more bitter against the Portuguese, and despite all the efforts of Ruy Friere, they succeeded in hiding up the creeks and rivers a large number of boats (400 according to the English account) which they voluntarily produced when the time came for the invasion of Ormuz, " for the Arabians could wish all the Portugals throats cut by the reason of their great hinderances in burning of their Boats and Townes, and Slavery which they daily did sustain."

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[1] I am aware that most English writers have described Imām Qūlī as the Khan of Shirás, and that some contemporary writers also describe him as such. Monnox, however, always makes a difference, as do some others. See further on this question, p. 45 *n*. 1.

Nevertheless, although this needless barbarity largely defeated its own object, yet Ruy Freire still held command of the sea and was thus enabled to reinforce the fort to Kishm with men and munitions from Ormuz as often as he pleased. The Persians, on the other hand, had lost heavily in their numerous unsuccessful assaults on the fort, and at length began to see that they would not be able to take this stronghold until they or their allies held the command of the sea, and accordingly they decided to compel the English to assist them in their operations against the Portuguese.

At this juncture a fleet of nine English ships arrived at Jask on the 24th of December, 1621, from Surat. This squadron was under the joint command of Richard Blyth and John Weddell in the *London* and *Jonas* respectively, the Vice-Admiral being Nicholas Woodcock in the *Whale* and the Rear Admiral Isaac Stevenson in the *Dolphin*; the remainder of the force was composed of the ship *Lion*, and the four pinnaces *Shilling*, *Rose*, *Robert*, and *Richard*. At two consultations which had been held at Surat on the 24th and 30th of November, 1621, prior to the sailing of the squadron, it had been resolved to act against the Portuguese not only defensively but also offensively, this decision being grounded upon the commissions granted by King James I. and by the President and Council at Surat.[1]

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[1] The latter, however, repudiated the action of Weddell and Blythe in besieging Ormuz, and asserted that their commission contained no authority for them to do so. A copy of the original commission is included in Monnox's MS. Journal in the India Office, but this portion

Accordingly as soon as the Fleet reached Jask, the Khan of Shiraz at once applied to the commanders for assistance against the Portuguese, hinting broadly that should they refuse his request, their trading privileges would be withdrawn and the silk confiscated. Blyth and Weddell were in a quandary. They must have felt that their force was more than sufficient to cope with Ruy Freire's four galleons at Ormuz, but on the other hand, to risk an attack upon the Fortresses of Kishm and Ormuz was to hazard considerable loss in any case, and quite possibly utter defeat. Again, the idea of joining a "heathen" power against a Christian state whose relations with England were peaceful in Europe, whatever might have been the case in India, was one which was repulsive to many of those present, and the readiness with which on a not dissimilar occasion, King James had executed Ralegh at the request of Gondomar did not augur too well for those of his subjects who chose to break the peace with Spain. On the other hand, the war in which the Persians had involved themselves with the Portuguese had been largely brought about by the favours granted to the English merchants, and if these refused to aid the Persians it would in all probability have meant the loss of their silks and the destruction of the trade which had so painfully been built up and from which so much was expected. The question was long and earnestly debated, but eventually, largely owing to the efforts of Edward Monnox, the Company's indefatigable agent in Persia, it was resolved to grant the Khan's request and to remove once for all the Portuguese supremacy in the Persian Gulf by co-operating with the Persians in their attack on Kishm and Ormuz. This decision was come to at Kuhistak on January 5th, 1622. An agreement was quickly drawn up with the Khan, the terms

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of the journal is so damaged as to be undecipherable. From the Summary given by Purchas (x., p. 342) it seems that they meant the squadron to confine its attacks to Portuguese shipping.

of which are summarised on page 257 of the present work, and the fleet prepared to set sail. But before it could do so, the commanders experienced considerable difficulty in getting their men to join them in this expedition, as they practically all refused to serve "alleaging it was no merchandizing buisinesse, nor were they hired for any such exploit." However, by means of threats and persuasions (including the promise of a month's extra pay) they were eventually induced to do so. At first sight it may seem somewhat strange that the men should be reluctant to have "t'other odd bout" with the Portuguese, whom they had already trounced so soundly at Jask a year before, but this reluctance was not unnatural in view of the fact that if they were maimed or killed, neither they nor their families would receive any compensation.

Leaving Kuhistak[1] on the 29th January, 1622 (after having taken the silk on board in case the Persians should attempt to play them false), the fleet stood over to Ormuz hoping that the galleons would come out to fight them. The Portuguese, by their own account, had decided to send them out, but the signal agreed upon to recall Ruy Freire from Ormuz to assume the command of them miscarried, and owing to the faint-heartedness of the "almirante" Luiz de Brito they declined to accept the challenge and made no move. The English therefore proceeded on the 2nd of February to Kishm, "where we arrived in fit time to save both the lives and reputations of the Portugals, not able long to hold out against the Persian siege, and willing rather to yield to us."[2] At first the Portuguese "weived us with naked swords; yet one more wiser then the rest, hunge out a napkin or white cloth, whereupone in

[1] Not Jask, as stated by Sir A. Wilson and most other writers. The fleet had moved to Kuhistak as the roads round Jask were unsafe for the silk caravans owing to the depredations of the Portuguese and robbers.

[2] Most other writers are agreed that Ruy Freire could have held out much longer, as he could always obtain relief from Ormuz up till the appearance of the English fleet.

Christianlike compassion Edward Monnox was sent on shoare to parlie with them." He was duly admitted to Ruy Freire " And beinge sett togeather in the courte of guard, the sayd Rufrero began with a longe storye of the antient love and amytie betwene the two nations, English and Portugalls, and the noble acts that the English had done in asistinge the Portugalls to expulse the Moores out of their countrye; to which the said Monox replyed hee came not to treate of busynisses of such antequitye, but hee came to treate of sattisfaxione and revenge for the warre begun and attempted by himselfe, the their present Rufrero, against our last years fleete in the roade of Jasques, to the losse of worthy commander and our Kings sworne servante, besydes other of His Majistis subjects." Ruy Freire retorted that whatever he had done, had been in accordance with his orders—" And after much otheir conference to the like efecte, which would be over tedyouse in this place to relate,[1] the sayd Monox replyed, notwithstanding hee deserved smale favour at our hands, yet oute of a Christyen feelinge of their present estate, we weare willinge [to] shewe them mercye and to free them from the hands of the Pertians and Moores." Ruy Freire was disposed to these conditions, but demanded that the same terms should be extended to his Moslem Ormuzian auxiliaries. This Monnox at first declined to do, as by the terms of the treaty with the Persians they were entitled to all the Mohamedan prisoners, and that therefore these auxiliaries would have to be surrendered to the Khan. " Then sayd Rufrero: ' Rather then wee will doe that, wee will ende our lives togeather '; which answer of his seemed to be utered with such vehemencie as if he resolved to doe as hee spake; which Monox perceaveinge, tould him hee would goe unto the Pertian Generall, named Emoumelybeage [Imām Qulī Beg] and solicite him in there behalfe; with whom hee soe fare pravayled" as to obtain a promise that their lives would be spared, provided that they were not allowed to go to reinforce the garrison of Ormuz. "But Mr. Monox retorninge to the castle to acquent Rufrero with what he had don, he absolutely refused any such agrement." Upon this the English commenced a bombardment of the fort from their ships, during which they fired over 1,000 rounds and killed about thirty-five of the enemy. But they did not make very extensive breaches in the walls of the fort, so that they resolved to land some heavy guns and batter it from the shore. This they accordingly did, and soon demolished most of the adobe fortress walls, whereby the enemy "was content to listen to a second parley, wherein wee for the gayninge of the castle were content to suffer them to departe souldyerlike with bagge and baggage."[1] Ruy Freire had indeed made strenuous efforts to induce his men to follow him in a last sally upon the enemy, but the garrison, although forward enough in slaughtering defenceless women and children during the raids on the neighbouring villages, and although they had bravely defended the fort against the attacks of the numerous but ill-armed Persian army, had not heart enough to resist a numerous and well-equipped European enemy, the more so since the latter heavily outgunned them. They therefore mutinied against Ruy Freire (largely at the instigation of their priests) and surrendered the place to the English, delivering up Ruy Freire and one or two of his Captains as hostages for the fulfilment of the conditions, whilst the luckless

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[1] For a letter of Ruy Freire to the English on this subject dated February $\frac{1}{11}$, 1622, see Appendix X., p. 304. The *Commentarios* give a demonstratably false and unreliable account of these negotiations between the English and Ruy Freire, for the true course of which see the English commander's letter of February 17, 1622, printed in Foster, vol. 1622-3, pp. 31-5.

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[1] The English had only five casualties in the short siege of Kishm. One of them was a Dutchman named Abraham, "but the man whom wee shall finde the greatist misse of is Mr. Baffin, that was killed outright with a muskit on shoare, plyinge a peece of great ordenance against the Castle." For a detailed account of the celebrated Polar navigator's death, see p. 96 note 2.

Moslem auxiliaries were handed over to the Persian Khan who "formerly had promysed them mercie, but falsely murthered them most unhumanly." Both sides violated the terms of surrender, for the English besides handing over the auxiliaries to the Khan, also disarmed the Portuguese soldiers (who amounted to under 300 out of the 2,000 with which the fort had originally been garrisoned), whilst the majority of the Portuguese proceeded to Ormuz instead of to Sohar and Muscat, as had been agreed upon in the first instance.

After the occupation of the fort on the 11th of February, 1622, the fleet stood over to Gombrun, leaving four Englishmen at Kishm to represent the Company's share of the joint occupation amongst the 600 soldiers of the Persian garrison. At Gombrun they were royally feasted by the grateful Khan of Shiras, as the English had obtained for him in eight days what he had failed to secure in as many months. He was anxious that Ruy Freire and some of his Captains should be delivered up to him so that he could present them to the Shah, but Blyth and Weddell had other designs and despatched him to Surat on board the *Lion*, in company with the pinnaces *Rose* and *Richard* carrying other prisoners, writing the President and Council—"Wee send you herewith for a present Captain Rufrero, with six more of his principall captaynes and gentlemen, which we refer to your disposure, wherin we knowe you will be careful of our poore afflicted countriemen who suffer messerable bondage under their ensultinge enymies to the sothwards."[1]

On Saturday, February 19th, the remaining six English ships accompanied by an enormous Persian flotilla of small craft carrying some 3,000 men, set sail for Ormuz and anchored at a distance of some six miles from the Castle on the same evening. The next day the Persians under the command of the Imām Qūlī Khan, were landed without incident and marched towards the city. No attempt had been made to prevent their disembarkation, and only a feeble attempt to make a stand was made by the Portuguese in the town itself; a small party barricaded themselves in the Maidan or market place, " but the Persians soone made way, and the Portugals like so many sheepe tooke their heeles into their Castle." The Persians and English then occupied the City, and it was agreed between them that the English should bombard the galleons drawn up under the Castle from their ships and a battery on land, whilst the Persians were to attack the Castle from the City.

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[1] This refers to the crew of the *Unicorn* captured near Macao, in June, 1620. The English contemplated exchanging Ruy Freire for these captives, and although he subsequently escaped (see pp. 174-7), yet he wrote to the Factor at Surat saying "he had pawned his honnor . . . to send us ther Vize Royes mandate for all our peoples inlargmente." [I.O., O.C. 1047.]

A full description of the siege of Ormuz from the Portuguese side is to be found on pp. 116-170 of this work, whilst the best contemporary English version—that of Monnox, who was present throughout—is printed in full for the first time in Appendix X., pp. 254 *et seq.* A careful comparison of these two sources will elucidate all the details of the operations, and it is unnecessary therefore to do here anything more than give a brief summary of the chief events of the siege.[1]

The part played by the English was described by Weddell, Blyth and Monnox in a letter to the Company at Surat as follows. " Our endeavors, both from the shore with our ordinance and other stratagems of fire, hath beene cheefely to bring destruction to his armado, which one after another (blessed be God) wee have effected in such sorte that wee have seene the ruyne of five galliounes, one galley, and soe many friggotts that wee left them destitute wholly of those helpes, eyther for their escape or other." Meanwhile a continual bombardment of the Castle walls was kept up ashore, and the Persians mined to such good effect that on March 27th a part of the bastion of *Santiago* was blown up; the breach thus made "proved somewhat difficulte and bad to enter; yet the Persian gave a very resolute assault thereunto, but it was soe well defended by the Portugalls that the Persians were forced for that time to retire." The Persians then resorted to sapping and mining once more, by which means two or three more breaches were made in the *Santiago* bastion, but no assault was made on them before April 27th.

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[1] For other contemporary English accounts see Foster, vol. 1622-3, pp. 76-78, and the narratives of Pinder and Wilson, printed in Purchas, vol. x., which work also contains an abridged copy of Monnox's journal of the siege. Purchas's version is only about half the length of the original, which therefore contains much new matter in Appendix X. of the present work. The most valuable Portuguese sources for the siege are the documents printed in Cordeiro's *Como se perdeu Ormuz.*

On the 6th of April the Portuguese attempted to open negotiations for a truce with the Persians, and both parties endeavoured to negotiate without knowledge of the English, but the wily Monnox was soon on the spot, and the Persians were thereby compelled to admit the English commanders to the conferences. The Portuguese emissaries were despatched to Gombrun to acquaint the Khan of Shiras with their desires, and attempted to bribe him to raise the siege, telling him (or so the Persians alleged) that the English were willing to make peace; the Khan, however, was not convinced by their offers, which were probably only made to gain time, and Monnox observes that "the Persian is well acquainted with Portugale lies, for he hath had them of all Culours, and soe comon that now the Persian is as expert in that facultie as themselves." Although the Portuguese envoys remained at Gombrun for some time longer, the negotiation did not interfere with the progress of the siege, and the Anglo-Persian bombardment and mining continued with few interruptions.

Shortly after the capture of the City, the Portuguese had sent away some twelve or thirteen frigates to Muscat with "their women and impotent people," and two other frigates had successfully run the English blockade and got into the harbour with a few supplies. They had come under the command of Dom Manoel de Sousa, son of the late Dom Francisco de Sousa who had been Captain of the Fortress until his death in January, 1622. Dom Manoel had come to fetch away his Mother and some other ladies; on board of his frigate were placed besides those women he came to fetch, the Crown Prince of Ormuz and jewels and money estimated by some writers at a million in gold.[1] These two frigates tried to slip out on the night of April 29th. That on board of which was Dom Manoel succeeded, but her consort was driven back by the guard-boats and captured by them on the following night when making another attempt.

Meanwhile the Persians, being liberally supplied with powder by the English, mined to such purpose that they rendered the breaches already made more practicable, and finally delivered their second assault on the *Santiago* bastion—" which was done with at least 2,000 souldiers, who very resolutely ranne up the breach into a part of a Bulwarke which they might wholly have possessed that very instant, had they not at first made such haste to runne their resolution out of breath; insomuch that onely eight or ten Portugals and a few negros, made them onely with their Rapiers to give ground and to retire themselves unto the very outward skirt of the Bulwarke." Here the Portuguese raked them from the neighbouring bastions " in such sort that they sent some scores of them to carrie newes unto their prophet Mortus Ali [*sic*] that more of his Disciples would shortly be with him." Nevertheless the Persians hung on to the lodgement which they had effected in the Santiago bastion, and on the following two days succeeded in gaining not only the whole of the disputed bastion but a portion of the outer wall, which position they maintained in spite of fierce counter-attacks of the defenders led by Dom Gonçalo da Silveira.

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[1] The English commanders in a letter to Surat, dated May 15th, stated that the escape of this frigate would " diminish the Company's share by £15,000 or £20,000." The vessel got away owing to the Portuguese knowing and using the pass-word employed by the boats on watch, which was simply " Inglez-Englishman."

The end was now at hand, for from their position on the bastion of Santiago, the Persians could shoot into the courtyard and houses in the fortress proper, and were thus enabled to pick off the defenders at their leisure. Deserters from the garrison informed the besiegers of the sorry plight in which the defenders were placed, for the small quantity of water left in the cisterns had become so brackish and salt, that it infected all who drank it with "the Flux." For victuals they had only rice and salted fish "two very good preperatives to a cup of good drinke if they had it." It was obvious that the Castle could hold out no longer, and that the next assault would end in a general massacre of the garrison by the enraged Persians, who were eager for a chance to avenge the thousands of their compatriots who had perished in the Kishm campaign. Accordingly, on the 1st of May the Captain of the Castle, Simão de Mello and his second in command, Luiz de Brito, applied to the English for their protection, as result of which a two days' truce was obtained from the Persian General for the purpose of negotiating a surrender of the Castle to the English, which actually took place on May 3rd, 1622, when the Gates were opened to the victors.

The siege had cost the English only twenty men, but the Persians lost over 1,000 in slain alone. The garrison, on the other hand, had suffered heavily from war and disease,[1] and of the 3,000 odd survivors who were charitably shipped away by the English to Muscat, the vast majority were women and children.

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[1] Wilson, an eye-witness, described the situation in these terms, "... terrible contagious heat that in my dayes I never felt the like, and such sents of Dead bodies lying in the streets without heads, being unburned, and Cats and Dogs eating them, within Oast end [=Ostend, which stood a celebrated three years' siege twenty years earlier] was never the like seene, with infinite many Flies," etc.

Monnox is not sparing in his stricture on the way in which the siege was conducted, and draws a vivid picture of the disorderly scenes of loot and pillage which occurred on the capture and sack of the City and Castle. The English complained bitterly that in the first instance the Persians "took 10 parts to their one and in regard to the Castle have acted still worse which the company's servants could not prevent, the Persians being so much the stronger;" yet they confessed that such spoil as came to their knowledge was fairly divided. Numerous details are given by Monnox of instances of the suspected and real frauds practised by the Persians, but he has to admit that the English Captains did not preserve discipline and that their men were guilty of many "inhuman disorders." The share of the plunder actually secured by the Company in the City had to be sold for about £12,000 in consequence of the small number of buyers available. Nor did the Company obtain much more out of the Castle, for they only got 10 cannon out of over 200 pieces of ordnance that were in the Castle, most of the remainder being sent as trophies to Ispahan and Lar, whilst much of the plate and goods which the English did amass was stolen by the Persians.

On the other hand, there is not the slightest doubt that private individuals benefited immensely. Woodcock, the Master of the *Whale*, was accused of having "lighted upon a friggott that was stealing away, loden with pearles and inestimable treasure, above a million of royalls for his part only." That this was founded on fact is conclusively shown by Monnox's account of this shameful transaction, by which Woodcock secured this treasure from the Portuguese second in command, Luiz de Brito (see pp. 289-291). Purchas in his published abridged version of Monnox's journal has omitted this incident, probably because it reflected little credit on the English, but as Monnox points out, it was the discovery of this deceit by the Persians which led to their subsequently embezzling the treasure of the Vizier of the King of Ormuz, which a Portuguese writer estimates at 600,000 ducats. Woodcock was not the only one who acted in this way, and it is probable that nearly everyone in the expedition obtained a picking for himself,[1] even though the Company's interests suffered somewhat.

As regards the actual conduct of the siege by the Persians, Monnox frequently comments on their lack of military knowledge and technical skill, "such that I cannot but wonder that one of the wonders of our age Shah Abbas should send over an Armie so weakly provided of money, arms, munition and all necessarie furniture." The English were frequently forced to supply the Persians with powder for their mines and otherwise render assistance, and if it had not been for this help the Persians would speedily have been forced to raise the siege. Even the English commanders, however, were so lax, that Monnox feared that a bold sally by the garrison,[2] or the sudden appearance of a relieving squadron from Goa, would force the besiegers "to singe a new songe, or els I will say we have bin more fortunat in the success then prudent in our proceedings. I would that those whom it conserneth more neerly then it dooth me, would leave lookinge after a little paultrie pillage in Ormus and looke to this busynes of greater consequence."

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[1] In August, 1623, the Spanish Ambassador complained to King James I. that the *London* had brought home spoils to the value of £500,000, and that even the dishes used by the crew were of silver, stamped with the arms of many noble families of Portugal. [*V.* Foster, *op. cit.*, p. xii.]

[2] Mr. Hannay in his interesting article on the taking of Ormuz in *Blackwood's Magazine*, 1925, states that the Portuguese never made any sorties, but not only the Portuguese writers but also the English admit that they did. "The Portugalls sallyinge out twice were by the Persians forced to retire." [Letter of R. Smythe, purser of the *London*, $\frac{6}{16}$·4.22.]

Nor was the threat of the appearance of a relief force so very remote. The news of the fall of Kishm and the siege of Ormuz had reached Goa on March 23rd, 1622, and the Governor of India, Fernão de Albuquerque, had hastened on the preparation of a relieving squadron composed of seventeen light vessels carrying 447 men under the command of Constantino de Sa e Noronha, which had been preparing in the river for some time. Men and money were raised by all and every means, the old Governor even compelling some of the wealthy ecclesiastical corporations to disgorge, whilst he took 100,000 *cruzados* from the coffers of the Casa da Misericordia in Goa. De Sa, however, did not show himself unduly hurried, and when his fleet had been scattered by a storm shortly after leaving Goa on April 2nd, he put in at Tiwai and Muscat on the Arabian coast in order to await the stragglers. Whilst at the latter place, he was joined by Ruy Freire, who had made his escape from the English at Surat under romantic circumstances, and was now intent upon returning to Ormuz to retrieve his reputation. They left Muscat on or about the 7th of April, but after sailing for two days met with the ships containing the survivors of the siege of Ormuz; de Sa prepared to attack them, believing them to be English vessels, but "comeinge to parley with them and thereby trulie understanding his owne and countrie peoples unfortunate successe, like dogg that has lost his tayle, addresses him selfe towards Muscatt where he remayned many dayes."

Nevertheless, despite this caustic remark it is highly probable that if de Sa had not been so dilatory, or if Ruy Freire had been able to command the relief force and fallen upon the careless Anglo-Persian besiegers, that Monnox's words "The dishoner wilbe more to our selves and nation than some of us doe dreame off," would have been verified. As it was, however, the English commanders were enabled to write to the Factors at Surat—"And as God hath blessed our endeavours in procuringe you this fayre waye, soe wee hope the same God will blesse you and your endeavours, that you may safely walk therein to the advancement of His glory and to the accomplishment of our masters longe wished for designes in their most hopefull trade of Persia, which by noe other way nor means could ever have beene brought to any perfection."

Admittedly the Company not only gained no immediate profit from the capture of Ormuz, but actually lost money over it, as a result of having to pay about £20,000 in bribes to King James I. and the Duke of Buckingham,[1] in order to secure a formal pardon for their offence of piracy—for legally the taking of Ormuz from a friendly nation in time of peace amounted to that. Nevertheless it is not accurate of many writers to say as they do, that "no material gain came to the English in this action,"[2] for, although they were deprived of any share in the possession of Ormuz by the Persians, yet they did secure freedom from customs dues and exceptional privileges in the Persian trade. But above all it must be realized that unless they had acted as they did, they would never have broken the power of the Portuguese in the Gulf, and their own factories would always have been exposed to the ravages of Ruy Freire's fleets, whilst the flourishing port of Ormuz would have absorbed far more trade than their own obscure factories at Jask and Gombrun. It is quite true that the disaster stung the Portuguese to a belated display of energy which caused the English considerable loss and inconvenience for a time, but this was a purely temporary phase, and when it had passed away, the solid fact remained that the English were and have since continued to be the paramount power in the Persian Gulf—surely in itself no mean result for the "ill-governed and ill-ordered proceedings" of Edward Monnox.

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[1] For a description of this incident, *vide* Foster, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii-xiv.

[2] Sir A. Wilson in *The Persian Gulf*, p. 149.

It is rather curious to note that many of the Portuguese witnesses at the inquiry into the responsibility of Fernão de Albuquerque for the loss of Ormuz,[1] affirmed that the Castle was surrendered whilst still intact. This is quite incorrect. The account of the *Commentarios* in this respect is fully borne out by all the contemporary English versions, as well as by the accounts of the Governor and officers of the Fortress themselves. It is fully established by all these accounts that the bastion of Santiago was wholly in possession of the Persians, who had also demolished part of the outer wall and the bastion of São Pedro, whilst their mines had reached as far as the cisterns. The English versions show clearly that the fortress could not in any case have held out for more than a day or two longer at the most, irrespective of whether the provisions were exhausted or no. All the Portuguese versions concur in stating that the loss of the Fortress was chiefly due to the obstinacy of the Governor Simão de Mello, who declined to clean out the moat, which was choked up with debris at the base of the Santiago bastion, and flood it; had he done so they aver that the fortress would never have fallen, and it certainly would have been far more difficult for the Persians to have reached the Castle walls with their mines. It is doubtful, however, if this would have delayed the surrender very much longer, as in all probability it would have been brought about within a few days by the appalling sanitary conditions which existed in the hapless Fortress. Famine and thirst had wrought fearful havoc amongst the 3,000 odd men, women and children of various races who were cooped up within the narrow walls, whilst the utter lack of hygienic precautions had caused virulent outbreaks of dysentery and enteric fevers from which scores were dying daily. Nevertheless, although further resistance was well-nigh hopeless on May 1st, yet there were some bold spirits, chief amongst them Dom Gonçalo de Silveira, the real hero of the defence, who voted for slaughtering the women and children in order to save them from the hands of the licentious Persian soldiery, after which the garrison would sally out to meet their deaths in a last desperate battle. But the majority of the garrison were made of less stern stuff than these desperados, and preferred to entrust themselves to the mercy of the English, by whom they were treated with a Christian charity which is truly astonishing in that age and on that occasion.[1]

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[1] See the Papers printed in L. Cordeiro, *Como se perdeu Ormuz*, at the end of his work. An inquiry into the loss of the fortress in 1622-3 ended in Ruy Freire and Constantino de Sa being absolved from all blame, and an attempt was then made to find a scapegoat in the person of the deceased Governor of India, Fernão de Albuquerque, whose heirs were sued for damages by the Government. Not unnaturally this law-suit eventually petered out in 1640.

Up to the last few days, therefore, we can safely say that the garrison, on the whole, had fought both hard and well, whilst the defence was a very creditable one. But the laying up of the galleons was an act of inexcusable cowardice apart from being tactically unsound, since if the English held the command of the sea unchallenged, the most desperate resistance on the part of the Castle could only serve to prolong its ultimate fall. It was at sea and not on land that the issue of the campaign was decided, and the death-knell of the Portuguese dominion in the Persian Gulf was sounded on the day the galleon *São Pedro* drifted out to sea a blazing wreck, fired by the English fireships, and not when on St. George's Day, April 23rd [O.S.], the Portuguese flag fluttered down from Albuquerque's castle and the Red Cross of St. George was hoisted in its place. It must have been with sore hearts that the Portuguese saw the ruin of their proud Fortress, but even if certain episodes of the siege had been characterized on both sides, more by hard lying than by hard fighting, yet some amongst the defenders had shown that if they could no longer conquer, they at least knew how to die, and of them it could still be said with truth—

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[1] See the letters printed in Appendix X., pp. 302-7, expressing the thanks of the grateful Portuguese. Lest some critics should think that they were written at the dictation of the English, I would point out that some of them were written at Muscat after the refugees had arrived there, whilst another is in the hand of Amaro Rodriguez, Captain of Sohar.

> And you shall judge which is the nobler thing,
> Lord of the world to be, or these men's King.
>
> Camoẽs, *Lusiadas*.

* * * * *

The story of the siege and taking of Ormuz forms the most interesting part of the narrative of the *Commentarios* for Englishmen, and the rest of the story need not detain us long, the more so since the further exploits of Ruy Freire in the Persian Gulf, bold and dashing as they were, could not affect the situation to any great extent. The Portuguese still had power to sting as they repeatedly showed, but they could no longer inflict a vital injury on their European enemies. The loss of Ormuz had snapped the chain of Portuguese Fortresses along the East African and Asiatic seaboard in its strongest and richest link. Not unnaturally strenuous efforts were made to retake it in the ensuing years by Ruy Freire and others, but these came to nothing in 1623 and 1624 through want of sufficient men and munitions, and when Ruy Freire was on the verge of success in 1625, the opportune appearance of a strong Anglo-Dutch fleet at Gombrun forced him to raise the siege. But if he could not recapture the place, he blockaded it so closely with his squadrons of light galliots and "frigates" that no trade with it was possible, and it soon fell into such a state of rack and ruin that it was no longer worth the trouble of retaking.

The news of the disaster which reached Madrid at Christmas, 1622, naturally caused intense annoyance and indignation there, but the English Ambassador managed to smooth things over until the arrival of Prince Charles and Buckingham on their madcap expedition after the Infanta of Spain gave the Court something else to think about, whilst the subsequent outbreak of war with England rendered further negotiations unnecessary. The King also repeatedly wrote to the Viceroy of India, Dom Francisco da Gama, fourth Count of Vidigueira, instructing him to use every effort to retake the island by force, and when this proved to be impossible, he ordered him to try bribery.[1]

The English, on the other hand, well knew that their capture of the place would expose them to reprisals by the Portuguese, and soon after the victory Weddell and Monnox wrote that "for it is very certayne the next yeare if not before, wee shall have all the force of Indya upon our necks; and if wee can but hould it oute and give them the repulse but once more, wee shall not need to feare ourselves to be the absolute masters and comanders of these seas," which proved indeed to be the case.

Nothing effective could be done by the Portuguese in 1622-3 as all the galleons and ships sent out from Lisbon failed to reach their goal with two exceptions, but in September, 1624, a strong fleet safely arrived from Portugal and the Viceroy pushed forward preparations for equipping a powerful force to send to reinforce Ruy Freire and Dom Gonçalo de Silveira who were harrying the Persian and Arabian coasts with fire and sword.[2] As a result of his efforts a squadron of eight war galleons left Goa and Bassein for Ormuz early in the New Year of 1625; they were under the command of Nuno Alvarez Botelho, "a stout and expert souldier," who, unlike most Portuguese sea officers, took especial care to have only Europeans on board his galleons, and furthermore had special regard to the training of the gunners and sailors in his ships.[1] The result of his wise measures was clearly seen when he encountered an Anglo-Dutch squadron of slightly superior strength near Gombrun in February, 1625; although the fleets were fairly evenly matched, as they had been at Jask in January, 1621, yet the results were totally different. Instead of suffering a decisive defeat, the Portuguese were able to force a draw in the first two battles and suffered no diminution of their honour in the third. Both sides claimed to have won "t'other odd bout," but whilst the Portuguese undoubtedly came off the worst as regards losses in men and material, that their morale was in no way impaired is clearly shown by the fact that when Botelho, after refitting at Muscat, sailed to Surat with four storm-galleons and publicly challenged the five Anglo-Dutch ships lying at anchor to fight him "shippe to shippe or altogether," they did not dare to do so. Even an unfriendly contemporary Englishman had grudgingly to admit "that if anything can be said in praise of the Portugalls, it is their better resolution showed now than in former times," though we must perforce agree with him when he adds that "but as for their present profit so far as I can perceave it is nothing at all." For neither the blows dealt by Botelho to the united Anglo-Dutch fleets, nor the destruction of the English ship *Lion* in

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[1] For letters of the King concerning the measures to be adopted for the recapture of Ormuz see the MSS. *Livros das Monçoes*, copies of which are in the India Office at London, and especially Livros 18, 19 and 20. The King endorsed the acquital of Ruy Freire and de Sa, who were appointed to the supreme command in the Persian Gulf and Ceylon respectively.

[2] An amount of these operations to be found printed in L. Cordeiro's *Dois Capitaẽs da India*, 1828.

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[1] An interesting light is thrown on the undisciplined and inefficient state of the Portuguese soldiery in India, the majority of whom were half-castes at this period, by the Bishop of Cochin, Fr. Sebastião de São Paulo, who wrote: "They consider it an honour rather to fly than to fight; punishments are not enforced and military discipline is brought to nought." As for the galleons, they were "built rather for pageantry than for combat," and were very expensive in building. [*Livros das Monçoẽs*, Livro 16, folio 106, letter dated Colombo, November 13, 1621.] A few years later the Viceroy wrote that the India-born Portuguese were "weak, untrustworthy and fit for nothing." The wonder is that Ruy Freire and Botelho accomplished what they did, with such poor material.

November, 1625, by Ruy Freire off Gombrun, had availed to do more than seriously inconvenience the Anglo-Dutch trade, and lasting effect there was none.

Whilst Botelho was riding off the bar at Swalley waiting for the allies to accept his challenge, three strange ships hove in sight. He at once put to sea in pursuit of them and found them to be three English ships *Lion*, *Palsgrave* and *Dolphin*, outward bound from England. Although the odds against them cannot be termed excessive, the English decided to run for it, and made all the sail they could whilst " the ships at Swalley most baseley lay still." The *Palsgrave* and *Dolphin*, after keeping up a running fight for many hours with three of Botelho's galleons, in which they gave and received considerable damage in their hulls and spars, shook off their pursuers during the night, and (fearing lest if they proceeded to Surat or Persia the Portuguese might overtake them) altered their course to southwards, eventually fetching up at the Comoro islands off the East-African coast. Meanwhile the *Lion* being a " slug," was overtaken by the galleon *São Pedro* and boarded; the Portuguese soon gained possession of the poop, and killed the Master, Richard Swanley, and several of his officers and men. The situation appeared desperate, but the English by dropping an anchor at the stern brought the ship up so suddenly, that the cables and grappling irons connecting her to the Portuguese galleon were broken, and the galleon, drifting on with the fast-flowing current, was soon lost in the darkness. There were, however, a swarm of " frigats " round the *Lion*, and some sixty Portuguese on the poop who could not be dislodged, but barrels of gunpowder were placed aft under the deck, and the Portuguese " blown to their parent the devill." The commanders of the frigates lost their heads at this juncture and the *Lion*, hoisting sail, was able to make her way to Gombrun. Ruy Freire's squadron of galliots was hovering in the neighbourhood and the Factors therefore decided that she should be sent over to Ormuz to anchor under the protection of the Castle guns. No sooner had she weighed anchor to proceed thither, than she was attacked by Ruy Freire's squadron; an English writer of that period had contemptuously stated that these frigates or galliots "were no more to be regarded than butterflies," but although powerless against capital ships when there was a wind for them to manœuvre with, they could be very dangerous in a calm and when commanded by an officer of the courage and experience of Ruy Freire. On this occasion they evaded the English broadsides as far as possible and boarded the ship "thwart the halse," in doing which they received but little damage from her bow-chasers. They plied their "fireworks" so vigorously that the *Lion* was soon ablaze from stem to stern, and those of the crew who survived to be taken prisoners were, with one exception, barbarously beheaded by Ruy Freire, who sent their heads wrapped up in silk to the Factors at Gombrun, with a message saying that this execution was a reprisal for the massacre of the Ormuzian auxiliaries whom the English had handed over to the Persians on the surrender of Kishm. The fortunate survivor was one Thomas Winterbourne, the ship's cook, who had performed many kindnesses for Ruy Freire in his former captivity on board the *Lion*, and "whom God grant never worse fortune," as the old Chronicler quaintly puts it.

* * * * *

Shortly after this episode Ruy Freire made a peace with Persia, whereby he obtained permission to erect a Factory and Fort in the port of Kung, and leave for the Portuguese to trade there on the same conditions as the English at Gombrun. This establishment lasted well into the eighteenth century, and at first attained a considerable prosperity. But the loss of Muscat in 1649-50 finally broke the Portuguese power in the

Persian Gulf and the trade at Kung dwindled into insignificance. In 1624 he had despatched Gonçalo de Silveira to assist the Turkish Pasha of Basra against a Persian invasion, and this led to the foundation of a trading centre in that port, in which a body of Carmelite monks also settled a mission. Dom Gonçalo broke up the threatened Persian invasion and actually sailed up the Euphrates with his little squadron as far as Babylon. From 1625-1630 Ruy Freire harried the Arabian shores of the Gulf with fire and sword, conducting successful expeditions against El-Katif and Bahrein. After proceeding to Goa in 1630 to take part in an abortive expedition which the Viceroy, the Conde de Linhares, was endeavouring to fit out against the Dutch Fortress of Paliacat,[1] he returned to Muscat where he continued the work of improving those massive fortifications which still survive. In 1632 he contracted a severe fever, of which he died in September, 1633.

He was buried in the Church of Saint Augustin at Muscat (now by the irony of fate the residence of a Moslem Imām), in a simple, unmarked grave, and where, as his biographer observes, there was not even a friendly hand to write at least

" Here lies a man."

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[1] Although in every royal letter from 1623 to 1631 the King urged upon successive Viceroys that the recovery of Ormuz was to be their paramount consideration, after 1631 it was stated that it was to take second place to the expedition against Paliacat. [*Livros das Monçoẽs*, 22-33 *passim*.]

AUTHOR'S DEDICATION

To the Senhor Lourenço Skytte, Lord of Kongzbroo, Sätra. Agent for the Queen of Sweden at the Court of Portugal, &c.

I determined to offer to Your Worship this voyage of Ruy Freyre de Andrada to India, in which are related his valerous deeds and those of his companions. The subject, being strange, is worthy of being seen by Your Worship as an experienced traveller who has journey'd oft to many parts of our Europe; whilst the actions, being those of Portuguese, can expect to meet with the approbation of your Worship, as a Swede, the first that the most Serene Queen Christina, first of the name of that Crown, sent to these parts. And moreover, as one who is a supporter of the present state in which the happy Accession of the King our Lord, Dom Ioão IV., has placed this Kingdom. And thus these being the most remarkable causes which amongst others have formed my resolve, I hope that Your Worship may accept the offering with interest, as a thing which pertains to him both by nature, experience and study. And may you prize the worth of these heroic works, as an example of the former practice of the Portuguese, which they crowned with the final act of regaining their Liberty which is so acceptable to Your Worship whom God preserve as you deserve. Lisbon 27 of January 1647.

PAULO CRAESBEECK.

LICENCES

I have seen these Papers which deal with the deeds performed in India by Ruy Freyre de Andrade, whose name alone sufficed to terrify the Persians, and there is nothing in them which is against our Holy Faith and good manners, nay, it appears to me to be a very edifying & pleasurable story and one which in these times will serve as a great incentive for Portuguese to perform similar and even greater martial exploits against the enemies of their natural King and of the Liberty of their country. Thus showing that they are not of lesser worth than were their progenitors, and who will seal their valour with their blood and strength, so that with them may be eternised the Lusitanian name, because of this generation and Portuguese Nation is likewise verified what is said of it in Ecclesiasticus chap. 44: Cum semine eorum permanent bona hæreditas Sancta Nepotes eorum, & in testamentis stetit semen eorum, & filij eorum propter illos vsque in æternum manent, &c. By which it seems to me to be worthy of being printed without delay in this Convent of our Lady of Conquest of Mt. Carmel of Lisbon, 22 of March 1643.

D. FREY GASPAR DOS REYS.

This treatise concerning the heroic deeds of the great captain Ruy Freyre de Andrade does not contain anything against the Faith or good manners, but tells of the great military exploits performed by him and other worthy captains who accompanied him in these enterprises, all worthy of being held in remembrance and before our eyes, in order that the valiant Portuguese who so stoutly oppose the foes of this Crown, may be urged to still greater efforts in imitation of the bravery and valiance of so illustrious a captain, and hence it appears to me to be worthy of printing. S. Domingos of Lisbon 7 of April '643.

M. FREY IGNACIO GALVÃO.

The reports having been seen, this book can be printed, & after being printed it must be returned to the Council for comparison with the original, & to be licensed for publication; and without this it cannot be circulated, Lisbon 14 of April '643.

FREY IOÃO DE VASCONCELLOS   PERO DE SYLVA.
FRANCISCO CARDOZO DE TORNEO   DIOGO DE SOUSA.

Has permission to be printed, Lisbon 9th November, '643.

THE BISHOP OF TARGA.

The usual Licences and those of the Holy Office having been seen, this book can be printed, and it cannot be published without first being returned to the Tribunal to be taxed therein, Lisbon 19 of July '646.

MENEZES. RIBEYRO.

This conforms with its original in this convent of Carmel of Lisbon, 30th of January 1647.

D. F. GASPAR DOS REYS.

Seeing that this conforms it can be published, Lisbon 1st February 1647.

FR. IOÃO DE VASCONCELLOS.
PANTALEÃO ROIZ PACHECO.
DIOGO DE SOUSA.

This book is taxed at [*blank*] reis in paper, Lisbon 6th February 1647.

COELHO. MENEZES.

BOOK THE FIRST

OF THE GREAT DEEDS OF THE RENOWNED

CAPTAIN RUY FREYRE DE ANDRADE

DURING THE TIME IN WHICH HE WARRED IN THE EAST

CHAPTER I

Departure of Ruy Freyre from Lisbon, and events of the voyage until reaching Mozambique.

THE Monarchy of Portugal being weakened by the mysterious attenuation of the generation of its native Kings, and the unjust succession of Philip III King of Castile, powerful English and Dutch fleets infested those seas of the Orient upon which the sublime standards of the Lusitanian quinas[1] had set a seal (for more than 100 years) to the general emulation, displaying their special virtue as well in the most remote parts as in the centre of their domain.

They caused a considerable loss by hindering the exportation of the fine Persian silks, which called forth the attention of the Council of this Crown; it ordered a Fleet to be fitted out for the purpose of freeing its commerce in both the narrow straits of the Sea of Arabia,[1] whilst chastising the impudent foreign intruder, and suppressing (as always) the arrogant sectaries of the Alkoran.

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[1] Quinas—the Arms of Portugal, 5 shields in the form of a cross, each shield containing bezants symbolising the five wounds of Christ, and (counting the bezants of the middle shield twice), the 35 pieces of silver for which Our Lord was sold. These arms are popularly, but inaccurately, supposed to have been assumed by Affonso Henriques in consequence of a celestial vision on the eve of the celebrated battle of Ourique in 1139. *Vide* Professor Edgar Prestage in *Chivalry*, London, 1928, pp. 148-150.

Ruy Freyre de Andrade[2] was elected Captain-Major of this enterprise for which two galleons and three urcas were equipped; the Capitanea[3] was the galleon *São Pedro* with fifty-four pieces of artillery, and more than 600 armed men; the Almirante was Dom Ioão de Almeyda, nicknamed O Xareta,[4] in the galleon *São Martinho*; the urca *Nossa Senhora do Populo*, of which was Captain Francisco de Mello; the urca *Nossa Senhora da Concepção*—Captain Francisco de Mesquita, and lastly the urca *Sancto Antonio*, Captain Balthezar de Chaves.

They carried 2,000 soldiers, with which they left Lisbon on the 1st April 1619 directly for Ormuz.

After they had sailed for eight days, a strong tempest forced out of their course the Almirante galleon and the urca *Populo* together with the accompanying Brazil Fleet, thus leaving the Capitanea with the urcas *Concepção* and *Sancto Antonio* continuing on their voyage, in the course of which, on a certain morning, they sighted so great a number of sails that the topman of the Capitanea was unable to count them all.

The Captain-Major immediately gave orders for a

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[1] The Strait of Ormuz in the North, and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb in South of Arabia are the two intended.

[2] See Personalia, Appendix XI.

[3] In Spanish and Portuguese fleets of the period the flag or Admiralship was termed the "Capitanea," the Vice-Admiral or second in command's ship the "Almiranta," and the next senior "Vice-Almiranta." The commander in chief was called either Captain-General, or more usually General, and corresponds to the English Admiral, whilst "Almirante" and "Vice-Almirante" are equivalent to Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral respectively. This distinction should be carefully borne in mind by the reader, as otherwise this fact is somewhat confusing.

[4] Xareta literally means "boarding-nets," which were obstacles then used to entangle intending boarders. I cannot explain the significance of this peculiar nickname.


Lisbon
(7.4.19)
Tanger
Mazagão
Pekin
Baghdad
Ispahan
Ormuz
(20.6.20)
Delhi
Mecca
Muscat
Jiwai
Hugli
Canton
Macau
Diu
Damão
Aden
(20.4.20)
Goa
Cochin
São Thome
Colombo
Manilla
Malacca
S. Jorge da Mina
S. Paulo de Loanda
Benguella
Mombasa
(9.3.20)
Batavia (Du.)
Moçambique
(17.9.19)
São Lourence I
(Madagascar)
Sofala

etch Map, showing Course of Ruy Freire's Voyage from Lisbon to Ormuz, 1619-1620.

(Principal Portuguese possessions underlined.)

square flag to be hoisted (signal for the urcas to join him), to furl the mainsail, to clear the galleon for action, to prepare the artillery and allot the men to their stations; likewise he ordered the same to be done in the urcas, awaiting the oncoming multitude of sails as if it was an equal force, when at 2 o'clock in the afternoon there approached a pataxo of 10 guns, decked out in red with a square flag of the same colour, which discharged a blank shot in the direction of our Capitanea to which she replied, to their prejudice, with a shot of 24 lbs. calibre which passing through the pataxo from one side to the other, slew 5 of her men. She struck at once, and the crew complaining of the damage they had received said that they were Castilians and that the sails were those of the Fleet which was on its way to the [West] Indies. The Captain-Major sent to answer them that their own inadvertence was the cause of their loss, as they had come on his weather wearing no signal or device by which they might have been recognised, and that they had summoned us to yield although knowing [that we were flying] the royal standard. The pataxo went to give an account of the answer to the capitanea of her squadron, which from our Capitanea could be seen in the distance, dipping its flag, giving sea-room, firing salutes of artillery, and performing all the other military and nautical courtesies, gave to us notable advantages, whilst our Armada reciprocated in the same way, and so each pursued its own course.

The Armada passed the Line, and 4 degrees on the S. side the two urcas (which were better sailers) asked leave to push on, because they were making much water and it was hard work to keep them going; the Captain-Major granted it, giving them an order to wait for him (together with the others that had been separated) in Moçambique until the 16th of September, and if he had not arrived by that time they were to proceed to Mombaça to winter in that port.

After the urcas had been dispatched, the Capitanea met with the ship *N. Senhora da Boa Nova*, Capitanea of the India-Fleet, of which Dom Francisco de Lima was Captain-Major; Ruy Freyre asked him for some men, since the greater part of his own were sick, and he expected to encounter the English in the Strait of the Red Sea or at the Cape of Iasques; he sent him 60 men and some refreshment, and Ruy Freyre in thanking him wrote to the Conde do Redondo, then Viceroy of India, informing him that his Majesty was sending him to construct a fortress in Queixome and to prevent the English in the Strait of Ormuz from taking the silks which the King of Persia provided for them, the which he could not do without help from India both of galleons as of men, since the armada which he was taking was of little strength, because owing to the hurry in which they had left, it had not been possible to prepare more ships in the Kingdom.

After the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre had parted from Dom Francisco de Lima, whilst in sight of the Cape of Good Hope he was attacked by a Dutch ship which summoned him to strike, playing upon him with 44 large guns, to which our Capitanea replied with all those which it carried, and the struggle was waged with such fury that no advantage was discernable on either side for many hours, at the end of which one of our shots severed the Dutchman's foremast at the round-top, with which it at once went by the board, as also did the mizzen-mast, so that the vessel was completely disabled; it was now so dark that the guns could no longer be used, so that the Captain-Major ordered the Master to keep the ship hove-to until the dawn, when they could force the enemy ship to surrender, which remained in sight during the first quarter of the night and for half of the second watch; but when the day dawned nothing else was seen on the sea than some drifting planks, boxes and corpses, which was taken for a sure sign that the vessel had foundered;[1] the galleon continuing on its voyage, when near the islands of Congoxa was struck by so severe a storm that it was thought impossible to reach Moçambique, and so Ruy Freire ordered the ship's boat to be fitted out with men, arms and provisions, and selecting as captain Luis Martins Feo, the Sergeant-Major of the Armada, dispatched him with orders to the Almirante galleon and urcas of its company, telling them of his arrival and the place where he then was, because the time he had appointed for them to await him was running short; however, no sooner had the boat left, than such fine weather came on that the boat arrived at Moçambique on the 17th of September and the Captain-Major on the following day.

CHAPTER II

Of how the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre arrived at Moçambique and concerning what happened to him there.

The Capitanea cast anchor off the islands of São Iorge on the 18th of September and saluted the Fortress of Moçambique, of which was Captain Diogo de Castilho who immediately sent a boat alongside, in which came Dom Gonçalo da Silveira[2] who had embarked in the almiranta with Dom Ioão de Almeyda who had died off the Cape of Good Hope.

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[1] This is extremely interesting if true; in the course of a long and exhaustive study of the naval wars between the Portuguese and Dutch in Asia from 1600 to 1663 I have only come across one other instance of a Portuguese vessel sinking a Dutch ship *by gunfire alone*; this was the vessel which was sunk by the *Nossa Senhora de Nazareth* off St. Helena on June 18th 1613. In all other instances of Dutch ships being destroyed by the Portuguese, they were either burned by "fire-works" or taken by boarding. I have hitherto not been able to trace this Dutch ship.

[2] *Vide* Appendix XI—Personalia.


Bay & Island of Moçambique
Reference
Buildings
Reefs
Anchorage
Scale
0
1000
2000
Metres
N
W
E
S
Rio Mossoril
(Old Convent)
Ft. São Sebastião
São Jorge
São Tiago

Bay and Islands of Moçambique, 1:80,000 Metres.
(Based on Macleod *De Ooſt-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azie*, 1928, vol. i., p. 64.)

And as Dom Gonçalo was a very popular fidalgo, the crew of the galleon had elected him their captain by common consent; and this was approved of by the Captain-Major who asked him if he would accept the post of almirante, which Dom Gonçalo did, and then related to him how his galleon had arrived at Moçambique almost a wreck, without a rudder, and with 12 spans of water in the hold, whilst the urcas *Populo* and *Concepçao* had gone for Mombaça, notwithstanding his demands that they should stay with him for the repair of the galleon and the better security of their voyage. The Captain-Major replied to him that he would give orders on disembarking, concerning the repair of the galleon and what else might appertain to the Service of His Majesty.

With this Dom Gonçalo returned ashore, and the Captain-Major disembarked on the following day; he was received by the Captain of the Fortress, Comptroller of the Treasury, Inspectors and factor, to all of whom he showed the Order with which His Majesty was sending him to Ormuz, telling them that the greater part of the Armada was at Mombaça, and the almirante galleon here without a rudder, and that he intended to go on; by which, in conformity to the order he showed them, they might state what would appear to them to be most advantageous to the Service of His Majesty and of the Fortress of Ormuz. They made answer that he should go to winter in Mombaça where he already had 3 urcas, and in the meantime the galleon could be repaired in such a manner that it could rejoin him at Mombaça with the first westerly winds.

With this resolution adopted, having watered and taken in some refreshment the Capitanea was on the point of setting sail when the urca *Concepçao* appeared and cast anchor without saluting the Capitanea; the captain Pero de Mesquita immediately embarked in the ship's-boat and came on board where the Captain-

Major was awaiting him at the top of the gangway; being asked for news of the urca *Populo* which had gone in his company, Pero de Mesquita replied that he was sorry to be the bearer of such tidings as he carried, which were that the urca had been lost off the islands of Quirimba on a sandbank more than 12 leagues at sea from the mainland, without him being able to render assistance owing to the heavy seas that were running in which he narrowly escaped a like fate.

The Captain-Major was very sensible of the loss of this urca because it was of great burthen, and he was likewise without news of the urca *Sancto Antonio*, whilst the galleon *São Martinho* was unmanageable; in consideration of which it appeared good to him to winter in Moçambique, so that he could send to salve the artillery and whatever else could be saved from the wrecked urca: accordingly he advised the Captain of the Fortress and Veador da Fazenda of his decision, asking the latter for a pangayo at the cost of the Royal Exchequer, which was immediately prepared, and in it he sent Phelippe d'Affonseca with orders to learn of the men that had been lost, and with instructions obliging the Captains and casados of the Islands to render all possible assistance in salving whatever could be got out of the urca.

Phelippe d'Affonseca went on his voyage coasting along the shore, because pangayos are craft fastened with coir in place of nails, and have sails of matting, in consequence of which they cannot face big seas, albeit they run to 60 or 70 tons burthen. He passed the river of good signs, and the craggy peaks, a land noteworthy for the size of the hills which are the houses of ants which live therein. He arrived at Quirimba of which place Francisco Vieyra was Captain, who on receiving the letters of the Captain-Major, proferred his person and goods to the Service of His Majesty, saying that as soon as the winds would allow of it, he would use every endeavour to salve the artillery and whatever else he could. And passing the Island of Iboo—in which the Vice-Roy Lourenço de Tavora had wintered with all his Fleet[1] with which he had left this kingdom as it was fertile, fresh and a great trading place—he learnt in it that the people of the lost urca were at Machelue, where he found the Captain Francisco de Mello, and the Master and Pilot with all the officers; he showed them the order which he had to seize them, which they readily obeyed, since they were confident that they were in nowise to blame for the fortuitous accident of the shipwreck. He sent all the crew of the lost urca to Moçambique in 3 pangayos supplied with provisions which he had hired for 400 cruzados; he then proceeded in quest of the wreck to the shoal whereon it was lost, which is all of hard rock, and not marked on our maps, wherein the Cosmographers show great carelesness as it is a dangerous place by reason of its being much frequented, and there is a channel in it through which galliots and small ships may pass.

He reached the urca, and exercising much industry and skill, he salved therefrom 6 guns, 4 anchors, some rigging, sails, arms, powder, and all the munitions, with which he returned; he was forced by stress of weather to put in at the island of Lupullulo which is situated over against Cape Delgado in a great gulf; it is a land measuring little more than half a league in circuit, inhabited by Kaffirs who are so addicted to trade that (along all the coast of Moçambique and Mombaça) it is called "New China"; the people have a King whom they serve, and are so little acquainted with the use of fire-arms that on seeing Phelippe de Affonseca fire his musket at some pigeons they went to tell the King of it, who—greatly astonished—came to see how it was employed; he took the musket, and examining the making of the gunlock in a perplexed manner he asked Phelippe de Affonseca to fire a shot with it at a sheep, at the same time sending for a fire-brand to light it with; Phelippe de Affonseca seeing this excused himself from using it, and fired and killed the sheep, which caused them to regard him as a sorcerer, whilst they acquired such a dread of the musket that if one was seen near at hand nobody would appear in the streets. These Cafres, like all the other natives of the coast of Moçambique and Mombaça, do not use flints and tinder, but make a fire by rubbing some sticks together.

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[1] In the early part of the year 1609, with the galleon *Sancto Antonio*, the urcas *São Jacintho* and *David*, the pataxo *São Jose* and the caravel *Nossa Senhora de Monserrate*. Although as a result of his stay here Ruy Lourenço de Tavora informed the King of its suitability as a calling-place for ships, the Monarch replied that his vessels must winter in either Moçambique or Mombasa (where they would be under the protection of the Forts) and not elsewhere. [*Livros das Monçoes*, vol. i., p. 400.]

Phelippe de Affonseca left this island and arrived at Moçambique with all that he had salved from the shipwrecked urca. The Captain-Major ordered the Captain and officers of the urca to be put in prison from which they were released in a few days and let free; the work of repairing the galleon was nearly finished, whilst it was now January and 7 months since their arrival in Moçambique; the soldiers were suffering such great hardships that there were days in which as many as 15 or 20 died of hunger, without ever any order being issued for them to be paid, whilst the Captain-Major in this great need had sold his plate and whatever effects he had brought from the Kingdom; and seeing that the Factor of the Revenue gave him no assistance, nor could do so, and that more than 400 men had died, he borrowed the necessary money and took upon himself to send the urca *Concepçao* with Amaro Rodriguez as Captain and Custodio Favacho as pilot, to the island of São Lourenço, so that it might take in a supply of meat, rice and Indian Corn, which they did in great abundance and with great dispatch.

At this time there arrived a pangayo from Mombaça with letters from Simão de Mello, captain of the Fortress, and from Bathezar de Chaves, captain of the urca *S. Antonio*, who advised the Captain-Major of his arrival, and of the Trials he had endured on the voyage, the ship being stranded for 40 days on the point of the island of São Lourenço and would undoubtedly have been lost but for the assistance rendered by Simão de Mello and the casados of Mombaça; the Captain-Major rejoiced greatly to hear this news of the safety of the urca, because he had imagined that it had been forced to put back to the Kingdom, and he replied to Balthezar de Chaves that he was hastening the preparations for his departure; shortly after the pangayo had been dispatched, the armada was ready to sail.

CHAPTER III

Of how Ruy Freyre left Moçambique, and of what happened to him until he arrived at Ormuz.

On the 3rd of March 1620 the armada set sail and ran along the coast to Quirimba where Ioão Barbosa sent the Captain-Major 6 more pieces of artillery which had been saved from the wreck, and thus he arrived at Mombaça where he was detained for 3 days whilst the urca was awaiting the spring-tides without which she could not leave; this done, and all the people being embarked, he proceeded in the direction of Cape Guardafui, and on the 20th of April reached the Red Sea, or Sea of Mecca as it is sometimes called by reason of the great number of Moors who frequent it: anchoring off the inner side of the Cape, he sent the urcas on up the Strait to see if they could find any of the ships which are accustomed to come every year from India laden with immense riches. When the urcas had left, the galleons fell in with 5 ships, in one of which came four Jesuit Fathers from Dio who were going to Prester John[1] disguised in Moorish dress because they did not wish to be known, by reason of the toils they endure on such journeys in cultivation of the Catholic Faith that their evangelical doctrine has produced in such barbarous regions. They related how the war with Mangalor went, with the loss of our army in which had been slain Luis de Brito and Francisco de Miranda Henriques, both fidalgos of great repute in the Service of his Majesty and dreaded by the Moors. The Captain Major dismissed the Fathers and gave licence to 3 of the other ships to accompany them in freedom; and he ordered the crew of a ship belonging to the Queen of Olala to be beheaded, as she was also in arms against us, and transferred the cargo to the galleons, leaving in it some bulky merchandise and a prize-crew of soldiers and mariners to sail it.

Five days later the urcas returned with 3 ships that were provided with passports, which the Captain-Major retained, and continued on his voyage along the coast of the Strait in search of some watering-place because there was lack of water, and if they obtained some they could lie in wait for the ships which usually go to India about the middle of August from Mecca, Aden, Suéz and other parts of the Strait. Here they took a galliot of 25 rower's-benches with 3 guns in the prow and 4 small cannon on each side, which was manned by 80 mohameden Malabar warriors who were on a privateering cruise as they confessed, and this was the more certain because they carried nothing else on board but powder, shot and provisions; the Captain-Major ordered the elder men to be beheaded, the youths to be placed in irons, and the galliot to be burnt after transferring its cargo.

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[1] As the Portuguese still designated the Abyssinian ruler. For a good description of Abyssinia and its relations with Portugal during this period see Balthazar Telles, *Historia Geral da Etiopia a alta ou do Preste João*, and Fr. João dos Santos *Ethiopa Oriental*, Lisbon, 1609 and 1891. Relics of the Portuguese are still extant in the shape of massive castles at Gondar and elsewhere.

He reached the brook of Teue,[1] it being now three days since any water-ration had been distributed, whereby the crews were reduced to such a state that the sails could not be handled, as no man was able to move owing to the pangs of thirst; this water-meadow is very fruitful being stocked with thorn and fruit trees whose blossoms render it very agreeable; they rested thereon for 10 days, and then provided with the necessary water they left for Muscat where they arrived in due course: the Captain, who was Miguel de Lima, at once came alongside with boats laden with biscuit, rice, salted fish, melons, scales, provisions and refreshments for their further voyage, the which they continued on, sailing along the coast until they anchored off the point of Turumbaque within sight of Ormuz.

CHAPTER IV

Of how Ruy Freyre arrived at Ormuz; took in hand the matter of the Fortress of Queixome; imprisoned Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra, and fitted out the Armada for the Cape of Iasques.

On the 20th of June the Armada arrived off the Point of Turumbaque which is one league distant from the City and Fortress of Ormuz, and on the very next day there came on board Dom Francisco de Sousa,

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[1] "Teue" is Taiwī, 70 miles South of Muscat. An English vessel watered there in June 1621, and the master called the place "Teewee." They obtained water "but a littele brackishe, and verye good refreshinge, fishe and fleshe and fruites greate store; but most intollerable hoote." [*V.* Foster, vol. 1618-21, p. 285.]

Captain of the Fortress, and Manuel Borges, Comptroller of the Exchequer, both of whom were amazed at the sight of the living corpses into which the men had been turned by the famine endured when wintering at Mozambique and the rigours undergone during a 15 months' voyage; being reduced to envy the natural covering of brutes, by their not having wherewith to cover themselves in their misery, so that the merciful release of Death was all that they had longed for. After the Captain and Comptroller of the Fortress had visited the Captain-Major and Armada, they agreed that it was not mete that such should be seen in a land where foreigners of most nations of the world were to be found, in a far better condition than they were, and that no one of the soldiers should go ashore without first being paid so that they could straightway clothe themselves; this was carried out without delay, with the assistance also of the Brotherhood of Mercy with their customary zeal and of the Chapter of the Cathedral. The payments made amounted to 45 patacas [a man], and the condition of the men changed so greatly, and they became so healthy, that they were improved out of recognition.

When the Armada was anchored in this port, and the crews so altered, the King of Ormuz accompanied by his Guazil, the Captain of the Fortress, and the Comptroller of the Exchequer came to visit the Captain-Major who received them with great salvoes of artillery, quarter-clothes spread, flags flying, and general demonstrations of joy throughout the Armada; however, no sooner had they boarded the galleon than the weather became so violent that for five days it was impossible for the King to return ashore. The Captain-Major gave up his cabin to him and lodged himself with the other Portuguese in the Gallery; a splendid table was always maintained, at which the King (with great scrupulousness) asked the Captain-Major to excuse his attending, because neither he nor his suite could partake of ham or sausages. The storm having abated they returned ashore, and thus the Captain-Major ordered the anchors to be raised, and they anchored under the Fortress which he saluted with all his artillery; the men disembarked, and were supplied with many comforts, whilst each soldier was given 6 patacas additional pay for 3 months, which more than sufficed them for bread, meat and rice.

The Captain-Major wished to commence forthwith the work of the Fortress of Queixome, as his Majesty had ordered him, and thus it was decided that when the dispatch-galliots left in August, information would be sent to Fernão de Albuquerque[1] (who had succeeded as Governor on the death of the Conde do Redondo) of how the Armada had arrived from the Kingdom, and concerning the posture of affairs in Persia; and further, that while awaiting the Governor's orders, the galleons and some fustas would be fitted out to go to Cape Iasques, in order to prevent the English from obtaining the silks which they traded for in Persia to the detriment of the State of India in general and of Ormuz in particular.

Whilst the Fleet was being prepared for the voyage, the Captain-Major wished to arrest some mutinous soldiers by reason of the brawls they made, and when they fled for refuge to the House of the Almirante Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra he connived at the business on his account; however, the soldiers failing in their duty, so numerous were the complaints that were made of their excesses, that he wrote to Dom Gonçalo asking him to do him the favour of not harbouring them in his house, as it was not right that he should shelter such unpunished rogues.

Dom Gonçalo took umbrage at this Letter and quarrelled with the Captain-Major so bitterly that the latter went to his house and removed him from his command, after which he put him in irons in gaol and sent him prisoner to Goa.

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[1] Vide Appendix XI—Personalia.

At this time there arrived from the Kingdom dispatches for the Armada of the Strait, in an urca of which was Captain-Major Ioão Borralho, whom the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre, and the Captain and officials of the Fortress, asked to take charge of the galleon *São Martinho* with the post of Almirante; to which he replied that he was ready to serve his Majesty in a rowing-boat without oars, how much the more then in the galleon? which he at once proceeded to inspect, and gave orders for her to be refitted with the speed which the occasion demanded. There had wintered in the Fortress a pataxo of the King's; this pataxo was very strong, and was armed with four and twenty great bronze cannon, by reason of which the Captain-Major asked for it in place of the urca *Sancto Antonio*; his request was granted, and forthwith the Captain Francisco Ribeyro (who had come therein with succour to that Fortress by order of the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque) sent to unload its cargo and transfer it to the urca, from which were removed all the bronze cannon, thus leaving only 4 guns in it for its defence: Captain Balthezar de Chaves then assumed command of the pataxo, and since the month of November had already set in, the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre de Andrade in accordance with the orders that he brought from the Kingdom, and seeing the armada was ready to sail, gave orders that all the men should embark—amongst whom were many unpaid volunteers.

The galleon *São Pedro* (Capitanea) carried 64 large guns, 400 veteran soldiers and 200 seamen. The galleon *São Martinho* (Almirante) had 48 large guns, 250 soldiers and 120 seamen. The pataxo *São Lourenço* (which had been substituted for the urca) had 24 large guns. The urca *Nossa Senhora da*

Concepção of which was Captain Pero de Mezquita, was armed with 22 great cannon. Besides these there were three galliots, whose captains were Francisco de Brito de Euora, Antonio Leitão, and Francisco de Camara. The Armada carried 1,000 veteran soldiers, beside mariners, and volunteers who embarked at their own expense, with all of whom it set sail on 15th November.

CHAPTER V

Of how the Armada arrived at Cape Iasques, where it received news of the English ships, and of what happened until it encountered them.

Wafted by favouring winds, the Armada reached Cape Iasques [Jask] within a few days, and cast anchor in 20 fathoms off the point of the Cape, opposite a Pagoda. The Captain-Major immediately dispatched a terranquim (light craft with 10 oars on each side) to Cinde [Sindh] with letters to the Captain thereof, in which he gave him an Account of how he was there awaiting the English, and instructing him to warn all merchant ships that might be in that port on their way to Ormuz to sail straight to Mazcate instead, because there was a risk of the English coming to espy the roadstead of Cinde on their way along the coast to Cape Iasques, and that in Mazcate they would find orders what further to do.

He sent the same instructions to Gaudel in another Terranquim, telling both of them that if they met with or had sight of the English, they were to reconnoitre the strength of their ships and inform him thereof by press of sail and hard rowing. Furthermore, in one of the five Terranquins that Francisco de Brito brought with the galliots, he sent two trusty soldiers to a factory which the English have in Iasques, with orders diligently to collect information as to whether the English ships were coming, and when they were expected.

They arrived at Iasques where they were well received by the Persians, and being in the market-place dissembling their mission under pretence of buying provisions, the English sought them out and invited them to their houses with great affability and compliments (in the Spanish tongue which they formerly used all over India);[1] the soldiers gratefully accepted the proffered hospitality, when the Factor told them that he was glad to see our galleons anchored in that Bay, because he was waiting until Christmas for the arrival of their ships, in which was coming the greatest Captain of the English Crown with whom the Senhor Dom Ruy Freyre (as they termed him) would have a valiant encounter; and he added that if they would come to the Factory, they would do him a favour by taking a letter with a little refreshment from himself to the Captain-Major. They replied that they would willingly do so, and some hours later the Englishman sent on board six cows, twenty sheep, one hundred fowls, and a bundle of silks amongst which was a wide-topped bonnet of green velvet (like the natives of that Cape wear), embroidered with gold and seed-pearls and lined with marten's fur. And being thus dismissed, they came on board of the Capitanea where they gave the Captain-Major a full Account of how they had proceeded on their mission, and gave him the present and the accompanying letter which read as follows:—

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[1] A somewhat extraordinary statement. Portuguese was then to a great extent the commercial lingua franca over all Asia and remained so down to the end of the seventeenth century, whilst Dutch and English ships at this time frequently carried instructors in the "Portugal" language. It is however worthy of note that the letters which passed between the English and Portuguese prior to the surrender of Ormuz (April-May 1622) were mostly written in (hybrid) Spanish. There would be no point in using Spanish in commercial intercourse, as Spanish influence was limited to their sole Asian dependencies of the Philippines and Moluccas.

"The person of Your Lordship is as renowned in the World as in India, and arouse in myself (as a soldier) the esteem due to so great a Captain: I beg of Your Lordship to wear this bonnet on the day in which you encounter our Fleet, whereby my General may know the valiant Captain with whom he fights."

The Captain-Major was greatly pleased with the present, which he immediately requited with some better provisions of the Kingdom, together with a white hat garnished with gold on the inside of the brim, having a diamond hat-band, a plume, and a clasp of rubies made in Ceylon—a thing of excellent value, workmanship and appearence. He replied to the letter in the following terms:—

"I appreciate the favour that Your Lordship does me, and accept the bonnet on condition that the General whom I await in this Port, wears this Hat when we meet."

The soldiers returned with the reply and then came back saying that the English were expecting their ships to arrive very soon; on the 16th of December there arrived with the dawn three English ships which were coming to take the cargo of silk; the Captain-Major ordered the bastard-trumpet[1] to be sounded, which was the appointed signal for the Armada to weigh anchor, which the ships accordingly did, and put out to sea with all sails set in pursuit of the enemy, and the urca *Concepção* in the van was almost within cannon-shot of them.

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[1] Lit. "trombeta bastarda." I have not been able to ascertain the proper meaning of this word, but the instrument was no doubt some form of an exceptionally deep bass trumpet, and its sound seems to have formed the usual signal for weighing anchor and so forth in the Portuguese Asiatic squadrons of that time. It was probably adapted from some Mohamedan or Moorish instrument.

Night fell, and the Captain-Major gave orders as to the course to be steered since he knew the route they were taking; the ship's-Lanterns were lit on board of the Capitanea and Almiranta, as was likewise done in the English ships, so that the galleons were able to follow them; the Enemy, considering the risk they would run in battle (being only two ships together with a pataxo of ours, which they had taken going from Dio to Ormuz laden with cloths), as soon as the distance and time allowed of it, took off the Englishmen who were aboard the pataxo, extinguished her lantern, and lit another on a plank which they threw into the Sea, and altering their course sought safety in flight.

The urca *Concepção*, being the lightest, came up with the pataxo in the first quarter of the night and fired two guns at her, whereupon she struck and those on board called out that they were Portuguese; it was brought to, and the urca sent her boat alongside to find out what ships those were which had accompanied the pataxo, and whether they had taken anything from her; the crew answered that they were two English ships, and that they had not taken anything more than what was carried on the deck. The Captain-Major gave orders to turn back towards the land, and they anchored off the same point of the Cape whence they had started; here he asked the crew of the pataxo if they lacked anything for their voyage to Ormuz, and when they answered biscuit, water and meat, he gave them some, and setting sail they left.

CHAPTER VI

How the English ships arrived, and our Armada went to encounter them, and of the battle which ensued.

The Captain-Major Ruy Freyre (in not leaving the port in which he was) obeyed the order with which his Majesty had sent him to that Strait. Upon

Christmas Day 1620 when the armada was dressed with flags, he saw a terranquim sailing along the coast with its flags flying, and it was recognised as the one which he had sent to Chaul to watch for the Enemy ships, its Captain being Pero Gomes Azevedo, and by the demonstration with which it came it was realised that he was bringing tidings of those ships; having saluted the Capitanea, he came on board and related how there came sailing along the coast five ships of great strength, whose Admiral-ship carried 66 guns, the vice-admiral-ship 58, the Rear-Admiral 46, a pataxo 36, whilst the other vessel was a pataxo belonging to the Captain of Muscat which they had taken in the Gulf on its way to Chaul;[1] he was able to state all these details because he had gone in Moorish guise and so got up very close to them, and thus it behoved the armada to put itself in order because they would appear before nightfall.

Whilst the Sun was setting, the ships hove in sight with the sea-breeze; the Captain-Major immediately gave orders to fire the sailing-gun, and set the foresail and topsails; he then sailed close-hauled towards the ships, all of whom were now in sight; he arrived within cannon shot with the Capitanea dressed in red, and displaying the Royal Flag at the stern; he fired a blank shot at the flagship to which the Englishman replied with 3 blank rounds; our Capitanea repaid him by discharging a heavy gun of the lower tier amidships with a 30 lb. cannon-ball that passed right through the English Flagship, to which the latter responded with another shot that severed a strand of the main-stay of our Capitanea, and as night had fallen the artillery duel now ceased.[2]

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[1] The *Nossa Senhora de Merces*, of 200 tons, Captain Francisco Miranda, laden with dates and horses. It was subsequently prepared and used as a fireship.

[2] The English version of this skirmish states: "Our fleet . . . being faire within shot the Vice-admirall of the enemye shot one peece

The English furled their sails (signal of wishing to renew the fight next day) and the Captain-Major ordered the same to be done in our Armada; having cast anchor, he embarked himself in a terranquim and visited all the galleons, charging all those therein to confess themselves and communicate, and to beware of fireships, all of which was immediately carried out, and after breakfast at daybreak on the following morning, the crews were distributed at the round-tops and their various stations; the Capitanea discharged a gun, and forthwith the shalms were sounded and afterwards a bastard-trumpet, with which the armada got under sail.

Our Capitanea came dressed in red, with the Royal Standard of the Quinas at the mainmast-head and another at the quarter with the figure of Our Lord Jesus Christ, crucified,—the battle-flag of Portugal—and with many other banners, flags, ensigns and broad pendants: in her wake came the pataxo *São Lourenço*, and astern of the pataxo the urca *Nossa Senhora da Concepção*; in the rearguard came the almirante galleon with the Royal Standard at the foremast-head, and at the quarter a crimson one of the Most Holy Sacrament.

In this order our armada bore down upon the Enemy, who were steering towards us with their flagship dressed and flying the Royal Standard[1] with the Red Cross at the mainmast-head, and at the quarter

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of ordinance to discemble a salutation, and within a little space after that their admirall did the lyke; whereunto our fleet were silent, past neere them and tact about againe (being now almost night), all our shipps in battle array makinge their course as seemingly to boare them out of the roade; and so stood off to seawards for that night." [Account of Robert Jefferies, one of the Persian Factors.]

[1] The English could not, or at least should not have flown the Royal Standard. The flag of the E.I.C. was the cross of St George, and the first English vessels to fly the Royal Standard in the East were those of the "interloper" Squire Courteen in the next decade, and then (apparently) with the view of intimidating the Dutch. In view of the context it seems probable that the Portuguese writer thought that the national was the Royal flag of England.

a pennant with the arms of their general, whilst the remainder displayed their pavesades, standards and banners.

The two flagships now lay less than a musket-shot apart, with their mainsails furled, and mizzen and spritsails brailed up, appearing from their size to be like two great islands in the sea, when the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre appeared on the centre of the half-deck, dressed in rose-coloured camlet with the bonnet which the English factor had given him on his head; one page carried his sword and buckler, whilst another bore a flagon of wine and a goblet. Presently the English general came to the middle of the spar deck of his Flagship, dressed in scarlet in-grain and wearing the hat that the Captain-Major had given him and which his factor had sent him that night; being thus in view of each other they conversed about the hat, and the Englishman taking a flagon in his hand, poured out some wine into a cup, and nodding towards the Captain-Major said to him that he drank his health; the Captain-Major replied in the same fashion, and goblet in hand, summoned him to strike to the King of Portugal; whereupon the Englishman retorted by telling him to strike to the King of England, and then they both threw their cups into the sea on the side confronting each other; then at the sound of a low boatswain's pipe the English fired a discharge of artillery.[1]

Our Condestavel who was a great soldier and well versed in the use of artillery, had asked the Captain-Major, as a favour, to let him conduct the fight in his own way; the Captain-Major asked him in what manner? and the Condestavel told him that the English would not come very close in firing their first broadside, because their ships were fastened with Treenails and unable to resist big guns, by reason of which he had decided to change the weight of the cannon-balls and to use in the first broadside only shot of 12 to 15 lbs.; and since many of them would fall in their ships without doing much harm, the English would be induced to come closer where they could then be badly damaged by the heavier shot.

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[1] Unfortunately none of the English accounts make any mention of this chivalrous display by both sides. It is, however, fully in keeping with Ruy Freire's knightly character and quite possibly did actually occur.

The Constable's opinion having been approved of the battle began, and the sky was soon covered with the smoke from the discharges of artillery; the English seeing that our shots had little effect, sailed so close to our galleons that they bore straight down upon them, but our artillery having been already loaded with chain-shot, bar-shot and heavy cannon-balls, fired so deadly a broadside that it brought down the English flagship's foremast above the top besides her mizzen and the upper works on the poop, so that she was so maltreated that she went about and fell away to leeward;[1] another ship at once bore down and stood by to protect her, which vessel was immediately attacked by Balthezar de Chaves in his pataxo with such vigour that she was likewise cut up; in this manner the battle was waged the whole day long, and with such valour on both sides that no further advantage was gained by either party beyond the great damage that the English had already received, and the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre seeing that it was late, and being desirous of preventing them from entering the port, he himself (fighting the while) sailed thither and anchored therein with the armada, in spite of the enemy's efforts to prevent him.

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[1] See Richard Swan's account of the action in Appendix IX for the English explanation of this manœuvre.

CHAPTER VII

Concerning the Resolution of the English. Plan of battle through which our Armada was driven away from the port, and the English enabled to lade the silk and depart.

Our Armada was anchored in view of the Enemy, who, considering how impossible it was to take the silk as we occupied the port, set fire to the prize from Muscat they had with them and launched it on the armada, from which danger the Capitania miraculously escaped.[1] In the dead of night the Captain-Major embarked himself in a terranquim, and went round the Armada to ascertain its condition after the battle and to help in what was needful. He found that there were 25 killed and 49 wounded, amongst the slain being the Almirante Ioão Borralho and the Captain Pero de Mesquita, whose loss was much felt, because Pero de Mesquita was a great soldier and the almirante one of the bravest and most zealous Captains of his Majesty's Service in all the State of India, and thus the Captain-Major ordered that his body should be placed in a hogshead of salt and taken to Ormuz, where he could be buried with the honour he deserved; in his place he appointed Fernão Rebello, a veteran Captain in India and a very valiant soldier, and he approved of the election which had been made in the urca of Manoel Ribeiro as its captain; having given orders for the repair and preparation of the Armada so that it could finish off the Enemy on the following day, he returned to his ship.

The men rested themselves after the arduous toil of the battle, which had lasted from 5 o'clock in the morning until 7 at night; at daybreak after the soldiers had fed, the Capitanea fired a sailing-gun, at which our Armada steered towards the English, who belied in the order in which they came the damage that they had received; their flagship remained above wind and the more ours tried to bear up to her the more she evaded us, and similarly with the others, for they all steered seawards with the land-breeze and when the wind shifted they tacked towards the port, avoiding meeting our galleons by these manœuvres.[1]

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[1] The English account says the prize "most likely beeing both too soone fired and forsaken of those which had it in charge, proved altogether a fruitlesse project, driving cleere of all ther ships, to their rejoycing, our disgrace, and our imployers losse." Another account adds "soe she burned with 24 horses and her loading of datts." Other accounts say that there were 40 horses on board.

Whilst this was going on, a man was seen swimming at a great speed towards our Capitanea, from whom (so soon as he was picked up) it was learnt that he was one of the Portuguese who had been in the Mazcate pataxo which the English had taken. The Captain-Major asked him how they did after the battle, and what their plan was; he thereupon related to him the great damage that our artillery had wrought in them, and how the General, Pilot, and boatswain had been killed in their flagship, and three other Captains, and in their 4 ships were slain 70 men and 120 wounded,[2]

[1] The English account says the opposite. "After dinner wee waied with the seaturne, intending to assault them, but we presently had a gust of wind and raine against us which inforced us to an anchor, insomuch that certaine blacks detained abord for our service, after their heathenish superstition were perswaded that the Portingalls had brought with them from Ormuz a witch to bring them continuallie a faire wind."

[2] This was the sheerest nonsense. In all the engagements the English only lost 3 men slain outright, two mortally wounded (including Shilling the commander) and 3 others severely wounded. "Our worthie Admirall in the beginning of our second fight received a great and grevious wound through his left shoulder by a great shotte, which hurt hee with such courage and patience underwent that gave great hope to us all of his most wished recoverie; but having besides the former wound, two of the uppermost ribbs on the left side broken, this day about noone he departed this life, shewing himselfe, as ever before a resolute commander, so now in his passage through the gates of death a most willing, humble, constant and assured Christian. His bodie was interred at Jasques the 9th current with all the solemnitie, decencie and respect the time and place afforded."

and that their design was to see if they could fetch the silk with launches during the night, and if that failed they were going to venture all in order to gain the port and destroy the armada, for which purpose they would reinforce their two biggest ships with all the best artillery to break through our galleons, whilst the others were to do them all the damage they could from afar.

For twelve days the Captain-Major manœuvred with our Armada against the Enemy without their daring to face him, and realising that the crews were becoming exhausted with constantly weighing anchor and furling and unfurling sails, and that His Majesty had sent him to defend the port, it appeared to him (and to all the others) that it would be wisest for him to remain anchored therein, where the Enemy would find him if they wished to seek him out; he accordingly ordered Francisco de Brito de Evora narrowly to watch the coast and mouth of the River so that the English could not land.

He forthwith gave orders for the galleons to be moored in order that they might fight at anchor, against the opinion of the Master and Condestavel who had both always held the contrary view that the battle should be fought under sail. They anchored having two springs in each of their anchors leading into the galleon through the stern ports; this being done, they speedily passed a hawser from one galleon to another, and in this manner they were joined to each other, the Almirante being posted in the rear.[1]

The English seeing the sorry plight into which our Armada had put them, and realising that there was little time left for them in which to take the silk, fitted themselves out in the way described by the fugitive Portuguese swimmer, and at sunrise on a certain Thursday, 7th of January 1621—the wind being so faint that the sea scarcely stirred—two great ships bore straight down upon our armada, coming so close that when the English Flagship went about her poop nearly touched the prow of our Capitanea.

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[1] The idea was to form a sort of floating wall, with the two heaviest galleons *São Pedro* and *São Martinho* posted at either extremity to form, as it were, two bulwarks, whilst by means of the springs in their anchors the galleons could (in theory) be veered round to bring their broadsides to bear in the required direction. The English countered these tactics by a similar stratagem (see next note).

The English Vice-Admiral anchored at the other end of the Armada, and whilst the two flagships engaged in an artillery duel, the enemy vice-admiral fighting with our almirante cut the latter's cables, so that she came drifting down upon the pataxo *São Lourenço*, and as there was no wind with which to set the sails, she ran foul of the pataxo and urca in such a manner that these could no longer make use of any of their guns save only the two bow-chasers, and the almirante astern could not bring a single gun to bear; the English on the contrary could use all their artillery, from which our Armada received great damage, without having the whole day long a breath of wind to enable it to seperate.[1]

The struggle lasted until it was suspended with the fall of night, our armada being forced out to sea by the weather which had come on in the meantime; the galleons were making much water through the holes made in them by the cannon-balls, which however were soon repaired; and on the Captain-Major ordering a list of the casualties to be drawn up, they were found to amount to 160 killed with 200 wounded.

For five days the fleets ran before the storm, and when it abated ours returned to Cape Iasques, where it found that the English had already laden the silk and departed with it.[1]

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[1] At first only the *London* and *Hart* could engage the Portuguese, the other two ships being unable to come up for want of wind. "Theye did ply us verry hard untill such time as wee could laye out a kedger to bringe our broade side to beare uppon them; and then (God be praysed) theye hadd the overthrowe, with much spoyle of theire ships and masts."

CHAPTER VIII

How Ruy Freyre arrived at Ormuz, and commenced with the work of the Fortress of Queixome.

The Captain-Major Ruy Freyre leaving the port of Iasques secure (albeit at so great a cost), sailed along the coast of Persia to the Fortress of Ormuz where he arrived within a few days. The galleon *São Martinho* came dressed and decked out with black flags, and the whole Armada cast anchor without firing a salute, thereby showing the grief which was felt at the death of the Almirante Ioão Borralho, who was subsequently buried in the Carmel Church with the funereal honours and military pomp due to so honoured and valiant a Captain.

The wounded were disembarked and charitably cared for, both in the private houses of the citizens as in the Hospital which was the cleanest, best equipped and most charitable that there was in all India. The Captain-Major immediately sent to unrig the galleons and other vessels of the Armada, so that they could be careened and repaired as necessary; this work was speedily performed by reason of the vast quantity of marine stores that there always was in the Fortress of Ormuz, in addition to what the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque had sent.

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[1] Robert Jefferies (*op. cit.*) says the galleons went off with " . . . their masts by the board, their hulls rent and shattered, and in such sorte that wee hard not any newes of any of them since then, and doe verilye thinke that in the following storme some of them were sunke. God graunt them lyke successe whenever they pretende lyke disturbance to our quiet trade. And to Almightye God be the glorie for this happie victorye. Amen."

He now began to deal with the matter of the Fortress of Queixome in accordance with the written orders previously given to him by His Majesty. The Captain Dom Francisco de Sousa wrote thereof to the King of Ormuz, who was accustomed to come to the Fortress when matters of state arose; the reception that the Captains gave to him (being the same ever since King Dom Manoel of glorious memory exempted them from vassalage to the Persian Monarch because of his alliance with them) was after the following manner;—

When the King came to the Fortress, there went before him a Moor riding on a camel with two great gilded copper kettle-drums which he played upon, and close behined him came another with four smaller ones; next came two Moors on horseback, holding two guidons of green taffeta fringed with gold and studded with silver crescents; following these were two Moors mounted on two richly-caparisoned Persian Horses, and carrying canes which are the emblems of Justice. Behined there came two musicians playing upon some instruments like our charamelas, and immediately after them followed four bastard-trumpet players, preceeding the King's Pages who were richly dressed.

The King himself wore a cloak of woven-stuff coloured crimson, green and gold with half sleeves, and a doublet of the Phillipine pattern, breeches of rose-coloured velvet, with shoes stockings and garters after the Portuguese fashion; he was girt about the waist with a sash of silver-wash, and in his girdle he wore a scymetar embossed with gold and jewels, whilst upon his head was a crimson and gold Persian silken Turban; he was riding a spirited dapple-grey Arabian charger, with saddle and trappings of beautiful gold embroidery, and bridle and bells of the same metal as likewise was the rest of the harness; the head and mane were decked out with knots of silken ribands and a large plume of crimson feathers was ſtuck in the brow-band. The Prince rode on his left hand, which is the moſt honourable with them, and his Guazil on the right, and behined came all the cavalcade and courtiers who were escorting him.

When he reached the fortress the drums ſtruck up on the parade-ground, and there emerged a company of soldiers who formed up along the bridge as a guard of honour.

The King dismounted at the Gate of the Fortress in order to avoid giving the Captain of the Fortress a pretext to hold his ſtirrup, (which he was otherwise bound to do by his orders), and walked on to the bridge where the Ensign came out to meet him in the middle, and dipped his flag five times, (for which the King invariably gave him 100 patacas every time he came to the Fortress), and the Company did not leave the bridge until he had returned. Entering the main gate, he found awaiting him there the Captain of the Fortress with the senior vreador who was holding the two keys of the Gate in a silver salver, the which he presented to him on bended knee; the King took them and gave them to the Captain who handed them to the Alcaide-Mòr, and after this they all moved on, the King walking shoulder to shoulder with the Captain.

In this manner the King came to the Council which had been assembled to treat of the buisiness of the Fortress of Queixome, and when all the members thereof were seated, Ruy Freyre, who spoke firſt, said as follows;—

"His Majeſty charged me, in conformity with the Order with which I left the Kingdom, and this letter which arrived laſt month, (and so saying, he unbuttoned his doublet and drew out the Letter and Order) to keep the English from taking the port and silk of Iasques,—as I endeavoured to do with my valerous soldiers,—and then to proceed with all possible dispatch with the construction of a Fortress in Queixome; to which buisiness all other matters of these Straits were to be subordinated, and for which I am now ready by reason of the great service that will be rendered to His Majesty thereby, and because of the benefit that will result therefrom to this Kingdom and Fortress of Ormuz." And kissing the royal Order and Letter he handed it to the King, and the King passed it to the Captain of the Castle who took it, and after he had read it, gave his opinion as follows:—

"I have served and lived in India for so many years that I have now as much knowledge of its affairs as a native, and similarly as Captain of this Fortress I have obtained a very great experience in the matters appertaining thereto, and although His Majesty has recommended unto me the upkeep of the galleons and the construction of a Fort in Queixome, yet withal, as a Christian and his loyal vassal, I say that this work should not be begun nor carried out; for although the barreness of this island, in addition to the notorious lack of water, prevents it from subsisting of itself, and altho' if the fort in question was built in Queixome it would ensure us the necessary supplies, yet if the work was begun it would mean the end of the peace with Persia, and we would have another powerful enemy on our hands at a time when the power of the State of India has fallen so low. For this reason, I suggest that His Majesty should be informed of the grave objections that there are to this enterprise; and the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque has pointed out these same objections to Ruy Freyre, telling him that he should not involve himself in this business without first ascertaining wether the fort would have the wherewithal to defend itself, and wether the Castle of Ormuz was in the state in which it ought to be on the occasion of so rash and hazardous an undertaking. And lest anyone should imagine that I am consulting my own private advantage in counselling the keeping of the peace, I hereby offer my sons, my life and my goods to the Service of His Majesty in this Enterprize."

Thus spoke the Captain; and the King of Ormuz,—who would be the most affected by any unfavourable issue—then said;—

" The Preservation of Peace is the life and soul of Empires, and the Captain's opinion in favour thereof is the fittest and most expedient; however, all the coasts that the Persian possesses are mine by right, and moreover the island of Queixome is equally mine —albeit the King of Persia sold it to the King of Portugal—so that the Fort can be erected in it without causing discord, for the island being really mine he sold it at no little profit to himself; and if tyranny should so far eclipse justice that the Persian opposes this work, I have men and money wherewith to defend it for the King of Portugal, in company with his valliant vassals, against the power of the whole world. Likewise for the future we will be spared the shame of the Governor of Comorão being able to lay siege with two negros to this Fortress of Ormuz whenever he wishes, forcing it by the necessity which we have of his provisions to condone his insufferable insolencies, the which will be put a stop to with the erection of the fort in Queixome which is a most fertile island; by which means this Castle of Ormuz will be indipendent of all necessities, and for which I offer myself, and for which my Estates are ready with money and men."

All those present signified their approval of the King's opinion and of the reasons with which he justified it; forthwith orders were given to beat the drums, hoist the flags, pay the men, and fit out 30 galliots, one galley, the urca *Concepcão* and the pataxo *São Lourenço*, in which were embarked 2,000 veteran

Portuguese soldiers and 1,000 Ormuzian Moors, all of whom left for the island of Queixome on the 7th of May.

CHAPTER IX

How the Armada arrived at the island of Queixome, and how the men were disembarked and the Fortress constructed.

The island of Queixome is situated off the coast of Persia at a distance of ½ a league from the mainland and 3 from the Fortress of Ormuz; it is most fertile, abundant and temperate, being extremely productive of corn, cattle, and fruits of all kinds, and possessing most excellent waters; it is 18 leagues in circuit, and inhabited by Ormuzian and Persian peasants.

When the Armada reached it, it cast anchor off the place where the Fortress was to be erected, but not very close to the land, because there were already there some 3,000 Persian musketeers guarding the beach in their trenches.

On the following day, which was the 8th of May, after all the soldiers had confessed and comunicated, the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre ordered them all to embark in the galliots; two of which being taken in tow by the pataxo, and two others by the urca, they proceeded to anchor in six fathoms in a position from which they could bombard the trenches, whilst 1,000 Portuguese arquebusiers and 500 musketeers with 1,000 Moors of the King of Ormuz, were disembarked on a sandy beach, where they were opposed by 1,000 Persian Cavalry, who were speedily forced to evacuate the beach by the damage they received from our artillery at sea; the disembarkation having been carried through without hindrance, a splendid detachment was formed, of which Dom Ioão da Silveyra, a veteran fidalgo of India, was appointed Colonel, whilst the Captain-Major took command of the vanguard, and Dom Manoel de Azeuedo of the rear-guard; in this formation they marched along the beach to the enemies' trenches, which were being heavily bombarded by the Armada, and on arriving close to them the detachment halted, which was the signal for the galliots to make for the shore, the which was not necessary however, because the Persians who were occupying the trenches abandoned them and fled.

The Captain-Major did not wish to pursue them, and he therefore gave order to continue the march to the place where the trenches were dug, and entering therein they encamped in the redoubts, constructing tents out of the sails; they also disembarked many hogsheads, with which they constructed a rampart on the landward side that enclosed the encampment from sea to sea.

As soon as the rampart was made and the outworks secured—which entailed general and arduous work—the Captain-Major sent to the Armada for great masts and planks of timber, with which four very strong bulwarks were made, being nailed up and filled in with earth to a height of 24 feet, and having walls of 8 span's breadth made of stone and a fine blue clay that binds like lime, and faced with stone and lime; 3 pieces of artillery of 24 lbs: calibre were mounted in each bulwark. The construction of the walls was begun forthwith, they being made of the same stone and clay, 5 spans thick, with a facing of stone and lime, and provided with balkries and loopholes; likewise a moat was dug, measuring 24 feet in depth to the striking of water, and 20 paces broad.[1]

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[1] Thomas Wilson, a surgeon on board the English Fleet which took Kishm Castle in 1622, describes the founding of the Fort by Ruy Freire as follows: "Hee brought the frame thereof ready made in his ships and got it a shore with great resistance, but so many as would not yield unto him, hee put to the Sword, and so many as would serve him he allowed meanes. Now the place where this Castle was to be erected, was about certaine Wels of fresh water the which was

When the work was in this state and the necessary store-rooms had been built, the Captain-Major received a warning that Abadulacão was coming with 6,000 Persians to besiege the Fort. He immediately alloted the bulwarks, he himself remaining in that of "Madre de Deos," which was the nearest to the sea, whilst that of "Spirito Sancto" which was the next to it on the landward side, he entrusted to Diogo Pereyra de Macedo, and the third called "Santiago" to Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo, and the other, "Sancto Antonio" by name, which, on the landward side corresponded to that of "Madre de Dios," he gave to Balthezar de Chaves; the Powder-magazine was entrusted to Manoel Cabaço, the parade-ground to Fernão de Barros, and three buttresses that the wall had between the bulwarks were allotted to three Captains of proved worth. He sent some spies to the encampment of the Enemy, who returned with the news that they were advancing at a distance of 2 leagues from the Fortress, and within three hours they were seen covering a hill which was opposite it.

Forthwith the artillery on the bulwarks commenced to play, and to the sound of the drums, the Captain-Major sent out a lusty detachment with orders to make a show of themselves, who proceeded as far as a small grove of palm-trees, situated at a distance of 500 paces from the fort. The Persian general on seeing the order and discipline of our men, and the sea covered with so many sails, and the formidable strength of the fort, thought the less of the forces with which he was about to undertake the siege.

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for the use of Ormus, because upon that island there was none. Now for the building of this Castle they pulled downe a fine Towne with Churches and Tombes, onely for the stones, some of which he burned and made Lime, and with the other he made the Castle wall of a great height and thicknesse, with halfe Moones and Flanckers very artificially, which in five moneths and a halfe hee had finished: a thing wonderfull in so short a time to be effected and with a great deepe drie Moat round about." [*V.* Purchas, vol. x., p. 334.]

Shortly before nightfall the detachment returned, firing a great salvo of musketry, whilst the spies and some soldiers on guard sallied out.

The Captain-Major wrote to the Captain of the Fortress of Ormuz concerning the state in which the fort then was, and the strength with which the Persian had come against it, and a careful watch was kept that night both on the bulwarks as on the edges of the moat.

CHAPTER X

How the Persians encamped; and of two assaults that our men made upon them.

UNDER cover of the shades of night, the Persians took up a position in a palm-grove which was situated at a distance of 500 paces to the N.W. of our fort; they fortified themselves therein with strong ramparts on the side confronting the fort, and in some quarries situated on the N.E. side, connecting these positions to the little Palm-grove by means of some deep trenches on the landward side.

At daybreak they fired off at us a salvo of arquebuses, accompanied by much screaming and shouting; the fort and armada replied thereto with all the available artillery, killing many of their men and destroying most of what they had built during the night; withal they railed at us with many gibes, we did not sally out from the walls but fought ensconced behind them.

It seemed fit to the Captain-Major to satisfy them, and since the Captain of Ormuz had already sent him reinforcements of men and supplies in response to his requests, with which the fort was in a better state of defence, the question of making a sortie (as the Persians so ardently desired) was debated in council, as a result of which it was ordered that at daybreak on the following morning, a force of 1,000 Portuguese and 400 Moors of the King of Ormuz, divided into two squadrons, would deliver an assault upon them; and forasmuch as the Ormuzians were dressed in the same fashion as the Persians, it was ordered that they should wear white arm-bands whereby they could be distinguished; Balthezar de Chaves and Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo were appointed Captains of the two regiments, the former being ordered to advance along the beach as quietly as possible to the little Palm-grove, because at that spot the trenches were few and the parapets low, and it would be easy to effect an entrance, in doing which all who were met with were to be put to the sword.

Sebastião Pereyra was ordered to proceed in the direction of the quarries, and go straight against the trenches there, taking good heed how he went because they were made level with the ground, with deep pits, and our men were to jump down into them, giving no quarter to any of the enemy they encountered. And when they heard a bastard-trumpet sound in the bulwark of "Spirito Sancto," and a cannon discharged, they were to return,—unless the progress of events ordained otherwise. The Captain-Major likewise sent to inform the sea-captains of what was arranged, because otherwise if they heard the noise of the attack and did not know what was happening, they might discharge their artillery to the great detriment of our men.

The sally-parties set out with this order, in accordance with which Sebastião Pereyra reached the enemy trenches without being perceived and fell upon the Moors with such fury that they had neither time nor opportunity to escape, so that 600 of them were slain (besides many others who were wounded) and their heads immediately cut off. Balthezar de Chaves reached the little palm-grove, whence most of the Moors had gone to reinforce the defenders of the quarries, and he wrought so much destruction amongst those that remained in defence of their trenches, that those who were able to escape did so at the price of leaving much spoil behined them. The signal of retreat was twice sounded from the bulwark before Balthezar de Chaves obeyed it, much against his will, having lost out of all his squadron only 2 Ormuzian lascarins who were killed in error, whilst Sebastião Pereyra had lost one Portuguese soldier killed and three wounded.

When the squadrons had returned, the Captain-Major sent to the galliots for some oars which were stuck into the ground outside the moat, and the heads taken from the Moors were hung therefrom with cords.

When the day broke the enemy seemed to be as numerous as ever, despite the great numbers they had lost in the attack, thanks to the large reinforcements they had received, whilst they endured with great courage and scorn the continual salvos of artillery and musketry from the walls and bulwarks, which always wrought great damage amongst them. This bombardment lasted for six whole days, but did not suffice to stop the enemy from continually drawing nearer.

The Captain-Major called another council in which it was agreed that we should make another assault upon them, and on the very next night a force of 2,600 men was formed and divided into three squadrons consisting of 1,600 Portuguese, and 600 Lascarins under the orders of Hali Camal, captain of the King of Ormuz: All the Portuguese confessed themselves and communicated before midnight, and at 3 o'clock in the morning they set out with muffled drums and arms in their hands.

The vanguard was under the command of Dom Manoel De Azevedo, and with it were Capitain Ioão Pereyra de Macedo, Captain Manoel Cabaço, Fernão de Barros, Bras Rodriguez Banha, Pedro Alvares, and the men of the King of Ormuz. The rearguard was commanded by the Captain-Major who had with him Dom Ioão da Silveyra, Balthezar de Chaves, Diogo Pereyra de Macedo, Hieronymo Tavares, Lourenço Alvares Chamorro, Dom Manoel de Sousa, Fernão Rebelo, Pero Gomes de Azevedo, and Miguel Botelho the Sergeant-Major of the Fortress of Ormuz.

The vanguard on arriving at the quarries found the trenches there unoccupied, and word was passed to the Captain-Major that there were no Moors in that neighbourhood, whereupon he gave orders to advance to the little palm-grove in which place also nobody was to be found; they stayed there until the light of the following day revealed the countryside better, when a spy came and told them that the Persians were posted behind a hill, which appeared to be little more than ½ a league distant. Everyone was in favour of proceeding thither in quest of them, which was accordingly done, and our army reached the hill and halted within sight of the Enemy, who was seen advancing in very good order with 3,000 infantry and 800 cavalry.

However the sun scorched so fiercely in that place, and our men were so exhausted by the overpowering heat, want of sleep on the previous night, and the fatigue of the march, that they could not accept the battle thus offered them. The Captain-Major therefor ordered the retreat to be sounded, which was effected in such good order, that when the Enemy cavalry twice charged our rearguard, the musketeers wrought such havoc amongst them that they were compelled to retire, leaving many horses in our hands and their riders dead upon the field.

CHAPTER XI

Of four spies that were taken from the Persians; of the news that they gave, and for what reason Dom Manoel de Azevedo left for Ormuz with all his Company.

As the fortress was exposed to the hindrance of the enemy, the reach of the wall was raised to a height from which our weapons could be employed with greater effect; and no sooner had this been done, than the spies brought news that large reinforcements for the enemy were coming over from Persia. The Captain-Major at once issued a proclamation forbidding anyone, under pain of severe punishment, going outside the fort beyond a certain limit, which he proceeded to fix forthwith.

Now the heat was intense, and as there were no other quarters than tents made of light fustian, and since the North-East wind was blowing (which the natives of that coast call " Ferim " because it scorches like fire when it blows), Phelippe de Affonseca and two other soldiers, his comrades, all three rashly decided to go to the quarries, in order to pass the heat of the day there. They accordingly took their weapons, and proceeded there seperately in order to escape notice; they had been there two hours when they saw two Moors coming towards them with two mule-loads, and going out to meet them they asked them who they were, and where they were going to? They answered that they were native peasants of that island who were going with those two loads containing grapes, figs, damsons, melons and scales to sell them at the fort, but that if they wanted to buy their wares they would refrain from going there. The soldiers hearing the names of the fruits of our Europe in a clime so different, joyfully bought them from the sellers and sat down in a little cave to enjoy them, telling the Moors that if they would bring some more they would find them there; they accordingly withdrew, promising to return speedily with two more loads,—either because they were satisfied with their good sale, or because of the intention which they were concealing behind it.

Whilst the soldiers were enjoying eating the fruit, someone went to the Captain-Major and spoke to him about the proclamation against breaking bounds, which the soldiers had transgressed in their escapade. He, being desirous of inflicting the punishment due, called out the soldiers from his quarters and from two others, and scoured the countryside in quest of them, coming eventually to the grotto in which the soldiers were seated.

Phelippe de Affonseca went out and met the Captain-Major, who told him that he regretted that it was he upon whom—as a warning to others—he would have to execute inflexibly the punishment which he had decreed.

De Affonseca made answer that he remembered that Adam had broken the Law of God for the sake of an apple, in a paradise wherein he was able to enjoy as much fruit as his heart could desire; whilst they had broken bounds in an idle hour for the sake of so many and different ones, (pointing to the fruits that they had spread out on the leaves), and chiefly because of the shelter afforded by this spot against the scorching heat of the sun. The Captain-Major—already somewhat mollified—asked him whence they had obtained the fruit, or from whom, and when the soldiers told him, he expressed regret that they had not seized the Moors, to which they replied that they were due to come back with fresh loads, whereupon the Captain-Major gave them 10 patacas, and said that as the Moors had promised to return, they were to wait for them until nightfall and on their arrival they would take them to the Fort.

The Captain-Major then departed, and at eventide there came four Moors with four loads of fruit, and the two who had previously come advanced and said to the soldiers that since they had paid them so well they had brought two others; the soldiers answered that they might come to the fort, and that they would pay them there, to which the two Moors replied that they would gladly do so, because their companions wished to see it and also the Portuguese, by reason of their great strength and fame; they arrived at the Fortress where the Captain-Major was awaiting them, and he said to the Moors that he had been informed that they were spies, for which reason he demanded that they should reveal to him the intention with which they came, in which case he would promise them their lives, but if they attempted to conceal the truth, he would behead them all.

They answered that they were native peasants of the island, and that they had come for no other reason than to sell the fruit which they had brought there; they refused to say anything else, and it being ascertained for certain that they were spies, the Captain-Major ordered three of them to be beheaded consecutively in the presence of the others, which caused the fourth and last of them to offer in exchange for his life to tell what the rest had denied, adding that he would remain prisoner as a hostage until the truth of what he said was known: the Captain-Major promised him his life, as well as money and a vessel wherein to sail to any place he might choose.

He confessed that the oldest Moor of all four was Captain of a force of 2,000 cavalry, who had come in that disguise in order to see the fort and the strength thereof, and that the Cam [=Khān] of Xiras had 25,000 men at Lara in readiness to send them to the General Abadulacão his nephew,[1] of which number

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[1] Lara is presumably Lar, the capital of the coastal province of Laristan. The Persian commander Abadulacão was the Imām Qūlī

8,000 archers were already in the island, and that they were now only awaiting the coming of the new moon. On hearing this, the Captain-Major ordered the prisoner to be handed over to Camal, the Captain of the Lascarins, recommending him to treat and guard him well, and forthwith sent word to Ormuz of the siege which he was expecting.

It was necessary to provide the moat with some walls, which work was immediately put in hand, everyone joining therein: now Dom Ioão da Silveyra[1] distinguished himself greatly in this, as in all other opportunities that the Service of His Majesty afforded him, so that the great heat and continual toil brought upon him some severe fevers. The Captain-Major sent him together with his retinue to Ormuz, where he had a better chance of being cured; however within a few days they terminated those of his life and he died there.

At the same time, it so happened that two soldiers stabbed their Ensign, and took refuge in the quarters of Dom Manoel de Azevedo; when the Captain-Major heard of this he went to the quarters, seized the soldiers, and ordered their hands to be nailed to the gates of the Fortress; Dom Manoel was deeply chagrined at the scant respect shown to him by the Captain-Major, who had formerly served under him in the North, when Dom Manoel de Azevedo had

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Khan or Imām Cūlībeg of the English accounts, in which his name appears in the fearful and wonderful guises of Einam Culibeg, Emoumelybeage and Emangoly-Chawn. Herbert (1627) calls him the actual Khān of Shīrāz, and is followed in this by Sir W. Foster and Sir Arnold Wilson, but it seems to me from Monnox and Weddell's contemporary letters that Imām Qūlī Khan and the Khan of Shirāz were two distinct personages, and that this Portuguese statement is therefore correct. Imām Qūlī commanded in the field at Kishm and Ormuz, whilst the Khān remained on the mainland, successively at Lar, Minab, and Bandar-Abbas.

[1] See Appendix XI—Personalia.

been Captain and Governor of Chaul;[1] and being a veteran fidalgo much respected in all India, annoyed at this affront, he ordered some terradas to be procured, and embarking therein with all his goods and the soldiers of his Company he set sail for Ormuz; the loss of these two fidalgos and their men was much felt within the fort of Queixome.

CHAPTER XII

Of how the Captain-Major Ruy Freire sent Miguel Botelho with five and twenty galliots to hinder the crossing of the Persian Army; and how he despatched Ioão Ferrão de Castelbranquo against the City of Congo, and with what result.

The Captain-Major applied himself most assiduously to the work of fortifying the moat, which formed the chief strength of the fort, because the Persians are very expert miners and engineers, in which qualities they surpass any other nation;[2] they were likewise continually adding to the great strength with which they had come against the fort, as we were informed by our spies, in confirmation of what their spy (who had been captured with the fruit as related above) had told us.

Accordingly, the Captain-Major sent Miguel

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[1] In the year 1613. Ruy Freire's services under Dom Manoel de Azevedo (whom he relieved as Governor of Chaul) are narrated in Faria y Sousa, *Asia Portuguesa*, Tome III., Parte III., Cap. I.; cf. also Danvers, *Portuguese in India*, ii., p. 165. Dom Manoel had taken part in the unsuccessful attack of the Viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo upon Nicholas Downton's ships *New Year's Gift*, *Hector*, *Merchant's Hope* and the *Solomon* in Swalley Hole in January 1615. He had left Goa for Ormuz in April 1621 with 2 galleons (*Todos os Santos* and *Nossa Senhora de Victoria*) carrying 278 men.

[2] Mr. Hannay in his account of the siege of Ormuz (*V. Blackwood's Magazine*, 1925) considers that the mining skill of the Persians was gained in their wars with the Turks, and that probably Turkish deserters or prisoners of war superintended the digging operations at Ormuz.

Botelho to hinder the passage of the enemy with twenty-five galliots, whose captains were Hieronymo Tavares, Sebaſtião Pereyra de Macedo, Antonio Palha, Lourenço Alvres Chamorro, Luis Martins, Bras Rodriguez Banha, Pero Gomes Azevedo, Manoel Cabaço, Luis Serrão, Ioão de Andrade da Gama, Manoel de Sousa, his brother Pedro Alvares de Caſtelbranquo, Diogo de Macedo, Gaspar Pereyra Paes, Francisco de Affonseca, Antonio Leytão o Camara and others, together with some Portuguese terranquims; his orders were to take up a position extending from the point of Lafeta[1] to opposite Saramião, the galliots being ſtationed a cannon-shot apart from each other with the terranquis in the middle, and he was not to let any vessel pass to either side of the coaſt, but burn or sink them all after putting their crews to the sword.

After the armada had departed, there remained in the harbour 6 galliots, two pataxos, the galley, and ten terranquis; and leſt the shores of Persia should deem themselves secure, the Captain-Major ordered Ioão Ferrão de Caſtelbranquo, a married man of Ormuz, to proceed to the city of Congo[2] and wreak all possible havoc therein; for this purpose he was given the six galliots, in which 200 veteran Portuguese soldiers were embarked, and the terranquis with the men of the King of Ormuz under the command of Hali Camal, a native Moor of Persia, who had entered the service of the King of Ormuz because the Shah had ordered him to kill his father and his two brothers, (whereby he was so infuriated againſt the Persians that

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[1] Lafetá is presumably Laft, which is the point on the island of Kishm which lies closeſt to the Persian mainland. It is halfway up the weſtern coaſt of the island. Saramião may be identical with Sidan juſt opposite on the mainland.

[2] Bandar Kongo or Kung some 4 miles N.E. of Lingeh. The Portuguese subsequently (*c.* 1625) acquired a foothold therein and the ruins of the old Portuguese Fort and Cuſtoms-House are ſtill (1928) extant. [*V.* Sir A. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf*, London, 1928, p. 154.]


N
E
S
W
LARISTAN
Bandar Abbas
Minab
Hormuz I.
Larak I.
Kohistak
Kishm I.
Qishm I.
Kung
C. Ras Musandam
Limah
Dibah
Khor Fakkan
Jask
Khasab
Ras al Khaimah
OMAN
Sohar
HAJAR
Muscat
Quryat
Tiwi
Kalhat
Sur
C. Ras al Hadd
TRUCIAL
QATAR
Bahrein I.
Scale
50
0
50
100
150 miles
(1 inch = 63.13 miles)

Map to illustrate the Operations of Ruy Freire in the Persian Gulf, 1620-30.

his favourite reward was the life of whosoever of them was captured).

Ioão Ferrão took his departure, and at sunset he arrived off the City which is seven leagues diſtant from the fortress. The Persians made no account of our armada, because of the self-confidence with which they always lived in respect of the Portuguese (as well as of any other nation); withal they maintained outpoſts on the shore, but the soldiers were careless, and the townsmen confiding in their care, laid themselves down to sleep undiſturbed.

Ioão Ferrão disembarked with 150 Portuguese and the same number of Lascarins, under their Captain Hali Camal, and leaving the remainder of the force to guard the ships, they advanced through some gardens without meeting any opposition. The city was unprovided with walls, but it had a fortress manned by 2,500 Persians and that ſtronghold was heavily garrisoned by reason of its being on the sea-shore and so close to Queixome.

Our men ravaged the environs with fire and sword, slaying all those whom they met with, without anyone being able to resiſt or escape from them; they attacked the fortress from a house which was situated at the foot thereof, but could not effect an entrance by reason of the height of the walls, and the lack of preparation: they entered the bazar, which is the ſtreet wherein the merchants reside, and finding nobody there, they siezed all the treasures they found in it. They broke into the houses, where the soldiers enriched themselves with the booty, burning what they could not carry away; they then withdrew to the harbour, where they found three galliots of 25 rower's-benches apiece, and more than 300 terradas which they set on fire, whilſt in the greater part of the city they had burnt 6,000 houses, and two of our soldiers were lost in one of them without their being able to save them owing to the great conflagration and smoke, and thus enriched with the spoil they returned to Queixome.

CHAPTER XIII

How the Captain-Major finished the Fortress, and sent two Terranquis to scour the coast of Arabia, and of what happened to them therein.

The rumours of the expected siege increased daily, whereby it became necessary to see to the work of repairing and improving the defences of the Fort, which, although it was situated less than 100 paces from the sea, still needed strengthening in order to secure disembarkation being made without the Enemy being able to hinder it.

Accordingly the Captain-Major ordered a wall to be built from the bulwark of "Sancto Antonio" to the sea, not straight but somewhat in the direction of the South-East, being eighteen feet high and five spans thick, and terminating in a fine bulwark at the water's edge; from the bulwark of the Captain-Major was built another flanking wall of the same dimensions and proportion, both walls being provided with a ditch extending to the sea, so that the Fortress was now enclosed like an island by the moat which surrounded it from sea to sea. There was one door in the corner of the bulwark of "Sancto Antonio" and another in the corner of the bulwark of the Captain-Major, built in the angle of the wall, and provided with steep staircases, and there was a curtain-wall on the outside which formed a rampart for each door, and beneath it was the staircase which descended into the moat, so that it was possible for the two doors to be opened without this being seen from the outside, and thus one could descend into the moat and walk about in it to wherever one wished. In this manner any reinforcements that might arrive, could be disembarked and got into the fort, without the Enemy being able to do them any harm.[1]

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[1] Wilson (*v.* p. 36, note 1) describes this as follows: "He had erected on the Castle 12 Pieces of great Ordnance, to the great annoy-

When these works were finished, a spacious cavalier-bastion [=bulwark with an artillery platform] was constructed next to the bulwark of "Sancto Antonio," in order to defend the roadstead against any ships or fleet which might appear; this work was carried out so thoroughly that within a few days eight bronze guns of 30 lbs. calibre were mounted thereon, and thus the fort was now sufficiently prepared for the expected siege.

The Captain-Major sent to ask the Veador da Fazenda of Ormuz for two terranquis to send to ascertain the situation on the Arabian coast, because it was rumoured that Iulufar[1] was in revolt; the terranquis came equipped and supplied with provisions for two months, and he appointed Phelippe de Affonseca as Captain of one and Gaspar Pereyra Paes as Captain of the other, with orders to go and ascertain the condition of the fortress of Iulufar, and to scour the coast of Arabia to learn the state of affairs therein.

The terranquis traversed the twelve leagues of the Gulf, and arriving off Cape Mosandão[2] they put into Camuça,[3] where they learnt that the Cities of Rames[4]

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ance of the Persian Armie, which had almost beleagured it round; onely a small passage which they had towards the Sea, on either side of it beset with Pallesadoes for the better going to their Boates and Frigots in safetie, though scarce able without great perill."

[1] Julfa, now known as Ras al Khaima, lies on the Trucial Oman coast of Arabia, some 50 miles S.W. of Cape Ras Musandam. Sir Arnold Wilson describes the town as "built on a sandy spit enclosing a deep, narrow bay protected by a bar. Vessels drawing 14 feet cannot approach within 2½ miles of the shore." The place became a notorious haunt of piracy during the eighteenth century, and was finally destroyed by a British expedition from Bombay in 1809, in consequence of the pirates capture of the E.I.C. brig *Minerva*. For details see Wilson, pp. 200-205.

[2] Ras Musandam.

[3] Kumzar, which lies at the northernmost extremity of Ras Musandam.

[4] Rams on the Trucial Oman coast, a few miles N. of Ras a Khaima. Also a pirate stronghold in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. [*V.* Wilson, *op. cit.*]

and Iulufar were in revolt, and coasting along to the mouth of the Bay of Caçapo[1] they saw two large sails out at sea; Captain [Af]fonseca attacked them, boarding the one in which he met with the most resistence; with praiseworthy valour he forced it to surrender, after killing most of the crew, and found in it two venerable old men who he learnt were the Sheikes of Rames; they were taking a valuable gift of carpets and horses to the Shah, to whom they were going to offer their friendship, but they now asked him to take them to the Captain-Major, in order that the latter might dispose of their lives as seemed best to him.

Whilst Captain Fonseca was capturing this terrada, Gaspar Pereyra did the same to the other one, which was carrying a cargo of horses; they beheaded all the Moors they found in them except the two Sheiks, and taking the terradas in tow they returned to Queixome, where the Captain-Major was astonished at seeing them coming back within five days when he had allowed them two months for their work; and he asked them the reason for their haste and what news they brought of Rames?

Phelippe de Affonseca replied that he could best find that out from the Sheiks themselves, and related to him what had passed; the Captain-Major gave him the praise that he deserved, and in the name of His Majesty granted him the terrada with all that was in it.

Soon the Sheiks appeared, without their turbans, and with some towels tied round their necks,[2] and as soon as they entered the presence of the Captain-Major, they threw themselves at his feet and begged him to spare their lives, proferring all their treasures in exchange for them.

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[1] Khasab, some 18 miles S.W. of Ras Musandam. It is the modern Elphinstone Inlet where a cable station was once established which was soon abandoned owing to its occupants being driven to death or madness by the extreme heat. It has the reputation of being one of the hottest places in the world.

[2] ". . . sem turbantes, e com hũas toalhas lançadas ao pescoço." It is not quite clear what *towels* had to do with all this. Presumably some token of submission was intended, similar to the burghers of Calais who were forced to appear before our King Edward III. with ropes round their necks. (See further, p. 57.)

The Captain-Major sent for Miragonadim, the Captain-Major of the men of Ormuz, who on his arrival, condoled with the Sheiks and told them that their lives were in the hand of the Captain-Major, to whom they could appeal and treat concerning their ransom, should he wish to accept one. The Captain-Major asked them questions about the matters of Iulufar and the state of affairs on the coast, and after they had informed him thereof, he sent orders for them to be kept as prisoners and well-guarded. They negotiated about their ransom through Miragonadim, and it was finally agreed that they should pay 120,000 patacas.

CHAPTER XIV

How the Captain-Major sent a force for the ransom of the Sheiks and against Iulufar; and of the surrender of the fort and the capture of Cogenedim.

Owing to the capture of the Sheiks, the coasts of Arabia remained quiet, altho' Iulufar was in rebellion,—however as this city had no King it was easy to take or reduce it; accordingly the Captain-Major ordered three galliots which had come from the River of Lafetá to be fitted out, and likewise ordered four 30 lb: guns from the galleons to be placed in each of them. Hieronymo Tavares was placed in command of them together with ten terranquis containing soldiers of the King of Ormuz.

When this Armada was ready to leave, the Captain-Major informed the Sheiks that it was going to Iulufar, so that they could take the opportunity to write to the city of Rames telling it to hand over to the armada the ransom which had been agreed upon; they therefore sent a servant with letters to the Governors which they had left there in their place, ordering them to hand it over to Hieronymo Tavares, whom the Captain-Major ordered to proceed ſtraight to the bar of Rames, and to set the servant of the Sheiks ashore there with orders to proceed as quickly as possible to rejoin the Fleet in Iulufar; meantime he was to send an order to Cogenedim (appointed Captain of that city by the King of Ormuz whose near kinsman he was) summoning him to deliver up the Fortress together with the Persians who were in it, and not to rebel againſt his lawful King, and promising him pardon if he did so; if nothing was settled within 24 hours, he was to disembark, and land the artillery to bombard the Fortress, putting everything to fire and sword.

Hieronymo Tavares faithfully carried out the order which was given to him, and on reaching Iulufar he sent to Cogenedim the ultimatum which he had brought. The Moor replied that he had ample powder and shot wherewith to fight againſt double his ſtrength, and that he would await him on the beach in the morning whereby he should not fail to disembark. Hieronymo Tavares received the answer and forthwith assembled the council, with the other Captains and Hali Camal, to decide what plan they should adopt; it was resolved that they should land and fortify themselves in the great Mosque, which was the fitteſt place to batter the fortress from, and that all the people whom they met with should be put to the sword.

On the following day they disembarked in a sandy plain where the Mosque was situated, without the enemy attempting to hinder them, and after placing therein a sufficient number of men to garrison it, Hieronymo Tavares ordered the remainder to break into the suburbs of the town and burn them, putting all they might find therein to the sword, which was accomplished without any opposition or hindrance. After the men had returned to the Mosque they made two platforms over against two bulwarks, and another one in the Mosque itself, and mounted the artillery thereon, from which the fortress soon began to receive very great damage, its walls being demolished and many of the garrison slain; with this, the enemy's pride was somewhat abated, and the native inhabitants began to beg Cogenedim to give up the fight, since the only end they could expect from it was that which they had seen their houses and goods undergoe.

The bombardment did not cease, and neither did the lamentations with which the natives implored that they should be surrendered, for which purpose they boldly hoisted a white flag in the Fortress, and sent a Moor to the Captain with a letter containing the following conditions of surrender:

1. That all goods which were in the Fortress should be delivered up to their owners.

2. That the Persians were to be given a free passage with everything they could carry away and with their arms, and lighted matches [in their mouths].

3. That a general Pardon from the King of Ormuz should be given to all the native inhabitants.

4. And that in this manner, he, Cogenedim, would evacuate the fortress and deliver himself up to the mercy of the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre.

These conditions were read out and debated in the Council, where it was decided to grant those which related to his own person and that of the native inhabitants, and in the Name of the King of Ormuz and of the Captain-Major the Council would do what they asked; however with regard to those touching the Persians, these latter were to leave without their arms or turbans, barefooted, and with cords round their necks, carrying away neither money nor more clothes than what they were dressed in; they might accept these terms, or remain in arms, and their decision must be made within the space of three hours, without any further arguments, because any Moor who brought them would be beheaded.

The Persians were greatly averse to accepting these conditions, and strenuously opposed the surrender, but as they were in a minority, and the natives attributed to them the losses they had received, they insisted that the Captain should open the gates of the Fortress, since there was no other remedy. This being agreed upon, they sent to inform Hieronymo Tavares that they accepted his proposals, wherefor they desired him to tell them when he wished to take possession of the Fortress; to this he answered that Cogenedim was to come forth at once with his arms, apparel and servants, which he did, and after he had come Tavares ordered him to be lodged with two pages under the awning of his galliot; he also ordered that no Portuguese should approach the Fortress nor leave his own quarters, and calling Hali Camal he told him to go to the fort with his men, and bring out the Persians as had been agreed upon in the terms of surrender.

Hali Camal did as he was bid, and brought 600 prisoners, without any opposition, who were forthwith embarked under strong guard, whilst the Fortress was entrusted to Hali Camal with a garrison of 200 soldiers, in the name of the King of Ormuz; furthermore, in addition to the usual salary that the former Captains had enjoyed, he was granted an extra 200 cruzados, and he was also ordered not to maltreat the native inhabitants in any way, but rather to favour them.

Tavares had not yet received an answer from the Governors of Rames concerning the ransom of the Sheiks, but as the affairs of the Strait did not permit of further delay, he re-embarked the artillery, and, having taken leave of Hali Camal, set out for Queixome.

CHAPTER XV

Of what passed between the Captain-Major and Cogenedim,[1] *and of how he liberated the Persians who came from Iulufar and sent them against Bramy.*

Hieronymo Tavares on his arrival was received with the honours that his noteworthy services had deserved; whilst the Captain-Major ordered Cogenedim to be brought as a prisoner, albeit treated with the respect that was due to him as nephew of the King of Ormuz, and likewise ordered that the Persians should be disembarked.

Cogenedim came without his sword, and with a towel round his throat which reached to his knees, (sign of captive noblemen in nearly all the East, whereas those of lower degree come without their turbans and wearing the towel with a knot tied in it). The Captain-Major said to him that His Lordship could remove the badge of shame from his neck, and take his sword; and calling a Page, he sent him for a sword mounted with silver inlay on gold, and gave it to Cogenedim, telling him that he pardoned him in the name of his uncle the King of Ormuz, the crime he had committed, on condition that he would serve in this fort during the time that the war continued; this he promised to do, and then they both sat down, for hitherto they had remained standing. At this moment the captive Persians arrived at the gate of the Fortress, without their turbans and with cords around their necks; the Captain-Major went to an embrasure which projected over the gate, and as soon as they saw him they prostrated themselves on the ground, beseeching him to pardon them since they had committed no crime or treason in serving their own King.

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[1] In the actual Portuguese text Miragonadim is the individual named in this heading and chapter, but it is clear from the context that this is a misprint and that Cogenedim is intended.

The Captain-Major freely pardoned them, and ordered them to be given embarkation to wherever they wished, adding that if they chose rather to stay and serve him in that Fort they would receive the same pay as all the other soldiers did. Filled with gratitude for the manner in which he had treated them, they said that they wished to remain in the Service of his Majesty, wherein the Portuguese would see the loyalty of the Persians, who so scrupulously observe the homage which they give and the service to which they pledge themselves, for they are most celebrated in this respect.

The Captain-Major ordered their arms to be given back to them and asked Cogenedim to accept the command of that squadron, and perform such services to the King his uncle with it that should obliterate the memory of the past. And in order to display the terror of his arms along all that coast, as he had already done in most of it, he sent Sebastião de Macedo against Bramy (a Persian port opposite to the Fortress of Ormuz), which he laid waste with fire and sword, destroying people, goods, and houses, burning two galliots and more than 300 terradas on the beach, without there being so much as a single rope which was not consumed; Cogenedim was present in this assault together with the men he had brought from Iulufar, in which action he behaved like a great Captain and valiant soldier.

After Sebastião de Macedo had returned with such a signal victory, the Veador da Fazenda of Ormuz came to pay the soldiers their quarterly payment, bringing with him Amaro Rodriguez who was on his way to take over the fort of Soàr,[1] being one of the oldest and most distinguished soldiers that India knew of; the Captain-Major gave him ten soldiers and a galliot, with which he returned to Ormuz to provide himself with the necessary supplies.

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[1] Sohar lies about 130 miles N.W. of Muscat. Originally taken and sacked by the great Affonso de Albuquerque in 1507, it afterwards relapsed into intermittent native control, until retaken by the Portuguese in 1616, with the same barbaric slaughter of its hapless inhabitants as had disgraced its first capture.

After the 15th of June 1621[1] had passed, there arrived a spy with news of how Habadulacão was coming against the fort with 25,000 Persians, all of whom were very desirous of taking the field against the Portuguese. The Captain-Major forthwith proceeded to embark 400 families of the native inhabitants of the island together with their flocks for Ormuz, and Arabia, lest they should suffer the horrors of war through remaining loyal to the Portuguese.

CHAPTER XVI

How the General Habadulacão arrived with the Persian Army and besieged the Fort; of the assaults which he made, the loss he received, and the manner in which he entrenched himself.

THE General Habadulacão had promised to the Khan of Xiràs (the second personage in the great Kingdom of Persia) that within ten days he would capture the fort of Queixome and bring the Portuguese under his rule, since for each one of them he mustered 100 Moors, swearing that he would not only take them prisoners, but forcibly convert them to his false Mohamedan sect.

With this assumption, he arrived within view of the fort on the 20th of June 1621,[2] and with flying colours, and to the sound of drum and trumpet he surrounded it from sea to sea, at a distance of about ¼ of a league; the fortress was decked out and dressed with many flags on the ramparts and bulwarks, but showing no other concern or fear of the enemy, in order to tempt them to come within range of the artillery; the enemy, seeing the few bulwarks and limited circuit of the fort in which (as it seemed) we could freely defend ourselves, considered the battle already won, and thus they came charging on with many war-cries and volleys of musketry. However, as soon as the Captain-Major saw them at a distance at which none of our shots could fail to take effect upon them, he ordered the artillery on all the bulwarks to be discharged, the which wrought great havoc amongst them without damping their ardour, because their General resolutely ordered them to continue the attack and sounded the advance,—saying that he would finish with the buisiness once and for all; this rendered them so exposed and close to the fire of our muskets, that we had killed 3,000 Persians by nightfall, when the battle ceased, only three Portuguese and five Lascarins being slain on our side.

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[1] 1622 in the original text, but as Kishm fell in January of that year, and Ormuz in the following May, 1621 must be the real date.

[2] Likewise 1622 in the original. A palpable error.

As soon as night had fallen the Captain-Major allotted the necessary stations in the quarters. He also sent eight soldiers to certain posts outside the fort, ordering them to fire off their arquebuses and retire to the fort if they should see the enemy advancing. He likewise charged the sentinels to be especially watchful and guard against surprises, and further enjoined all the soldiers outside and inside of the fort, not to discard their arquebuses from their hands.

The Persians retired to below the quarries where they were safe from our artillery, and they spent the whole night in repairing their trenches and strengthening their ramparts as far as the little Palm-grove. When day broke they opened fire on the fort with two great cannon, and numerous volleys of musketry, as a result of which bombardment they killed eight of our men and wounded twenty-five.

Early on the following night they advanced to storm the fort; the soldiers who were outside the wall promptly gave the signal and sounded the attack, upon which everyone hurried to his appointed station and 300 Lascarins lined the parapet of the moat.

On came the Persians until they reached the moat, when this obstacle forced them to halt in a position so exposed to the fire of our weapons, that not a single shot which was fired at them from the fort failed to find its mark. They then fell upon the entrances to the moat, but they found therein some veteran soldiers who defended them with amazing courage. The struggle continued by the light of the blazing powder-pans, and the artillery fire, and the continuous fusilades of musketry which lit up the surrounding district.

Thus passed this troubled night in the strife of so terrible a battle. The dawning day finally dispelled the obscurity, and the enemy thereupon retired, less 700 of their number that our bullets, fired at random, had not missed; our losses amounted to 38 dead between Catholics and Ormuzians, and more than 80 wounded. The Persians asked for a truce to collect their dead, which was granted to them. The Captain-Major immediately sent word to Ormuz of what had passed, and of how greatly the fort was in need of men.

The past assaults had cost the enemy 3,700 Persians killed besides many others wounded, which made them resolve not to try any more assaults, but rather to accomplish their design through the industry of their cunning stratagems, because (as they said) no other nation is so open-hearted as the Portuguese; they therefore fortified themselves in three mosques which were situated close to the quarries, where the artillery of the fort could do them no damage, and the assistance thus afforded was most advantageous; they also made in the palm-grove such high and strong intrenchments that they afforded support for the heaviest artillery. They kept the cavalry behined the hill and threw up some banks in front of it which protected them.

CHAPTER XVII

Of the great assault that Captain Balthezar de Chaves made upon the Enemy's Camp, and of a miraculous Occurence that two Persians came to relate in the Fort, and of what passed therein.

When the Captain of Ormuz had received the message of the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre, he responded by sending him 300 Portuguese and 500 Ormuzians, 200 barrels of powder, and 4,000 powder-pots[1] already filled. On the arrival of this relief, the Captain-Major resolved to make an attack upon the Enemy, for which purpose he ordered 400 Portuguese to be armed with bacamartes,[2] and as many Lascarins with swords and bucklers; a bacamarte is a sort of firearm much used all over India, having a barrel 3 spans in length, a flint-gunlock, and firing bullets of 2 or 3 ounces, 50 of them being rammed down in a single charge; so that one shot from it wreaks as much havoc amongst a crowd of people in a street as would a swivel-gun.

Balthezar de Chaves was appointed Captain of this Enterprize, with orders that the whole squadron should march in a single body, without being discovered, to the little palm-grove, and that they should storm the trenches and ramparts sword in hand—keeping the firearms for the decisive moment of the battle. He gave the Lascarins their mark of distinction whereby they might be recognized, and the Captain-Major strongly impressed upon both the necessity for bringing back the dead and wounded to the fort as the happy issue of the attack; the signal for withdrawl was to be the discharge of two guns from the bulwarks of "Sancto Antonio" and "Santiago," followed by the sounding of two bastard-trumpets.

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[1] "Alcanzias." These were a cross between the later hand-grenade and those pans filled with gunpowder which were in general use with the Portuguese colonial forces. Their dexterity in the use of these and other "fireworks" is mentioned in Monnox's narrative. (*V.* p. 263.)

[2] A kind of blunderbuss.

They left with these orders, and on reaching the enemy's trenches they entered them killing some sentinels, whilst their army, confiding in their vigilance, was peacefully sleeping, and thus our men were afforded the opportunity of making cruel havoc amongst the Persians in the first onset. The sound of their cries awakened those who were in the trenches opposite the fort, and as these came flying heedlessly back for refuge they were killed like the others.

The Captain-Major of the Persians, who was stationed in the little Palm-grove, although he had heard neither arquebus nor musket-shots, nor seen anything else than the flashes of the powder-pots, came rushing out with all the force that he had in that part to where the clash of swords was sounding; and when the rival squadrons joined in battle they fought with a well-nigh incredible courage, for 400 Portuguese performed such great exploits with the sword against 20,000 valiant Persians, that if all the nations of the world had not [at one time or another] been witnesses of their valour, it would have been impossible to have had the presumption to transcribe this particular exploit of theirs.

This huge body of Moors was in such good order that it seemed to Balthezar de Chaves that this was the opportunity in which to use the bacamartes, and thus he gave them a volley with so fortunate a result, that they retired in disorder; Balthezar de Chaves then withdrew victorious, the Ormuzian Lascarins and the Persian mercenaries from the fort having distinguished themselves so greatly, that they deserved especial mention of the deeds they had performed in this assault, and of the more than natural loyalty which (although so alien in faith) they had showed to us.

Our men retired with 6 wounded soldiers, whilst the enemy, who had lost 1,400 in slain alone, set to work to repair the damage which their trenches and ramparts had received; so soon as it was light they hoisted a white flag, and on the fort replying with another, two Moors came to the moat and sent to ask the Captain-Major for leave to come and speak with him.

He granted them leave to do so, and ordered them to come in to the parade-ground of the fort, where, with the other Captains, he was awaiting them. They told the Captain-Major that Habadulacão their Commander-in-Chief and the chief Persians, asked him to do them the favour of showing them a woman, who had accompanied the Portuguese in the attack of the previous night, so full of light that the very sight of her had so dazzled them that they could neither take up their weapons nor move, and that she was accompanied by a man on horseback who leapt about between the trenches, wreaking great havoc amongst the men who opposed him,—whereas a man on foot and by day-light could not walk securely in that place by reason of the numerous holes and the roughness of the ground.[1]

The Captain-Major made answer that their fear must have been the explanation of what they said, unless it was perchance a pretext for some plot. The Moors replied affirming as eyewitnesses what they had already related, using oaths which are regarded as inviolable amongst them, and thus they importuned the Captain-Major to do them the favour they asked of him, and that he would not send them away without showing them what they so much desired to see; the Captain-Major swore that there was not a single woman nor horse within the fort, and that there was nothing mysterious about his quarters, and that wether they came to reconnoitre as enemies or with the intention that they had stated, he would let them search up to the moats so that they might disabuse themselves. This was done to the satisfaction of the Moors, who regarded what had happened as supernatural, and one of them absorbed in the consideration of so mysterious an occurence, heaving a deep sigh said: "O God of the Christians remember me and hold me in your care." The other Moor admonished him and told him to be careful what he said, but the latter only repeated it fearlessly, foreswearing the Mohamedan sect and disputing the buisiness with his companion as if he had not been a Moor, until he finally said outright that he told him to hold his tongue as he knew very well how Mohamed had lived and died, the falsity of his sect and the blindness in which his followers lived, committing all kinds of foul deeds beyond the limits of the most depraved appetite; and thus leaving the bystanders astonished, they asked leave to depart because they were already at variance with each other, using threats and altercations.

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[1] This is obviously intended for a vision of the Virgin Mary and Saint James—this latter being the patron saint of Portugal in battle; the Portuguese war-cry at this period was "Santiago" (St. James). Similar visions are reported as having occurred on other occasions, and noticeably during the Dutch attack on Macau, 24th June 1622. [*V.* my *Ataque dos Holandeses à Macau em* 1622. Relação inédita de Fr. Alvaro do Rosario, Lisboa, 1928.]

The Captain-Major brought for them two silk and gold turbans, measuring 24 ells each one, and giving these to them, dismissed them, sending two soldiers with them as far as the moat; as soon as they reached their trenches the white flags were taken down and the bombardment recomenced on both sides.

CHAPTER XVIII

Balthezar de Chaves attacks the port of Costaque; the Enemy press the siege, and the Captain-Major orders their artillery to be spiked; writes to the Governor of India concerning the state of the Fort; Dom Manoel de Azevedo leaves for India.

The Captain-Major continuing to prosecute the war with undaunted spirit, he sent Balthezar de Chaves to the port of Costaque[1] with 300 Portuguese and 400 Lascarin Archers under the command of Mamude Xà, Captain of the King of Ormuz, in 5 galliots and 12 terranquis. They disembarked in the port, cut down the palm-trees, burnt the City and razed the fortress in which were stationed 1,000 Persians, who, after killing some of their own men who took to flight perished fighting valiantly; Balthezar de Chaves performed incredible exploits, as likewise did the Captains Dom Gonçalo da Sylveyra,[2] Ioão de Andrade da Gama, Francisco Galvão, Manoel de Affonseca, Antonio Mourão, the Pilot Furtado and the others, all of whom performed deeds worthy of meritorious emulation, and so they retired enriched with booty, although with five Portuguese and nine Lascarins less; and setting sail they arrived at the fort of Queixome bringing the enemies' flags trailing in the sea to the great terror of the Persians.

The Captain-Major at once gave orders for the plunder—which was of considerable value—to be sold by public auction; and dividing the proceeds down to the very dead, he handed over the portion

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[1] Kubistak on the Bibyan coast of Persia, opposite Larak Island and about 100 miles N.W. of Jask. It was here ("in Costack Road") that on the 26th of December 1621 (O.S.) the Anglo-Persian agreement for the capture of Ormuz and war against the Portuguese was concluded.

[2] This must be a mistake. D. Gonçalo da Silveira was still at Goa whither he had been sent under arrest in October 1620 [*V.* pp. 16 and 17.]



SHAB ABBAS THE GREAT, 1587-1629
(*Reproduced from Sir Arnold Wilson's "Persian Gulf"*)

which belonged to the deceased Portuguese to the Priests, wherewith to say Masses for the repose of their souls, whilst the portions which fell to the Lascarins he ordered to be placed in deposit, and sent to inform their fathers, brothers, and relatives thereof, to whom it was subsequently handed over to their great satisfaction; likewise he distributed many honours and rewards to all the soldiers, with the result that both infidels and Catholics with equal zeal risked their lives in the Service of His Majesty.

The Persians boldly persisted in prosecuting the siege of the fort, since they considered that the gaining of those earthen walls from the Portuguese would be a greater achievement than the capture of Constantinople from the whole Ottoman Power.[1]

They had already approached to within seventy paces of the moat, so that our men were forced to have their Arquebuses ready by night and day, and to keep a continual watch, toiling incessantly on very scanty rations, and being scorched by the heat; above all, they received great hurt through the loopholes of the wall from the muskets of the Persians, (who are so dextrous in shooting them that they fire at the smallest object without missing their mark), by which means they killed some of our men: the Captain-Major repaired this damage by ordering the inside part of the wall to be covered over and closed in with strong planking, in such a manner that the soldiers could freely use their muskets at the loopholes without being seen by the Enemy, to whom they were in the dark.

The Persians were provided with two pieces of artillery, with which they wrought great damage, both in the sea to the galliots and terradas, as on land to the bulwarks and walls of the fortress, to which they were coming closer and closer. The Captain-Major resolved to stop their progress by spiking their guns, for which purpose he ordered a terranquim to go to the River of Lafetá to tell Capitain Miguel Botelho to send him 300 veteran soldiers in three galliots out of the 30 that he had there; and lest the enemy should take alarm when they saw these reinforcements coming, he sent four galliots that were in the Bay to Ormuz.

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[1] Prior to 1600 the Turks held much of the Persian provinces of Tiflis, Tabriz and Nehavend, but Shah Abbas in his successful wars with the Porte, which he waged at intervals from 1602 to 1627, recovered all the lost provinces and more territory besides.

Miguel Botelho received the order, and calling Hieronymo Tavares, Manoel de Sousa and Antonio Mourão de Oliveyra, Captains of three galliots, he sent them to the Captain-Major with the 300 picked soldiers, who reached the fortress on the 7th September, and it was decided that they should attack the Enemy on the following day which was that of the birth of Our Lady. From the Eve thereof until the hour of the assault, they were occupied in confessing and communicating themselves, and they asked of God in a devout Litany the good issue of the enterprise. When this was finished, the Captain-Major called Pero Gomes Azevedo and gave him four cast-iron nails and a hammer, strongly urging him to spike the cannon that was bombarding the fort from the vicinity of the quarries, whilst to Phelippe de Affonseca he gave some other nails and a hammer, entrusting him to do the same with the gun that was in the little palm-grove. After the men had been divided into two squadrons under the command of Balthezar de Chaves and Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo, they fell upon the enemy, who valiantly stood their ground against the great volleys of our musketry; however Balthezar de Chaves falling upon them with the irresistable shock of his forces, stormed their trenches and cleared their redoubts, leaving them strewn with corpses; the two soldiers Pero Gomes Azevedo and Phelippe de Affonseca distinguishing themselves by the coolness with which they spiked the enemy's guns amidst the fire and sword of the heat of the conflict, and thus they returned laden with many weapons and much loot that the enemy had left behined for them to choose from.

October had now begun, which was the monsoon wherein the ships went to Goa, in which the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre wrote to the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque concerning the state of the fortress in the following words:—

> "I have made the fortress in this island of Queixome, as his Majesty ordered me. I have taken the ports, burnt the cities, and razed the fortresses on the sea-borders of Persia, and thus hindered their cafilas, and freed the water-supply for the fortress of Ormuz. They have besieged me with 25,000 men, who are for these few soldiers the same as if they did not exist; withal Your Lordship should send me as many men as you can, besides powder, shot, and provisions, for then the very Shah in Ispahan will not deem himself secure."

He sent the letter to the Captain of Ormuz, who added thereto for the Governor a very extensive relation of all that had occured, and when the ship was on the point of sailing Dom Manoel de Azevedo went to Dom Francisco de Sousa, Captain of Ormuz, and asked him for leave to go to India, saying that he would give an account to the Governor of the reasons why he had left the Fortress of Ormuz. The Captain and the Veador da Fazenda were astonished at his resolve, and endeavoured to dissuade him from it, with reasons that were appropriate in their opinion, as in the Service of his Majesty, the which did not make him alter his plan; the Captain therefore said to him that the ship together with all the capital on board was at his disposal, however that, in accordance with what conformed to the service of his Majesty during a time in which that Strait was so involved in wars and stood in such need of such competent persons as himself, if he would not yield from his proposal, that papers should be drawn up concerning it, and these should be sent to the Governor, so that he might proceed as the case should deserve. Dom Manoel thanked the Captain for the offer of the ship, and answered that as far as the papers were concerned, he would sign them; after he had parted, he went to hurry his goods on board the vessel, and the Captain sent the Ouvidor with a Secretary to him, to order him not to leave his galleon and the fortress, making the protests against him as the business required; these were drawn up and Dom Manoel signed them (probably) not imagining that they would cost him so dear, as in its place we shall say.[1]

CHAPTER XIX

Of the warning that was received about a mine; of the method by which the Captain-Major repaired the Fortress, and how Miguel Botelho destroyed Saramião.

THE Enemy's encampment was again reinforced by so many men, that they did not miss the numbers that we had killed. Our spies brought news of a mine which they were making to break into the fort, and the Captain-Major was greatly concerned thereat, because he did not know the place where it would emerge. At this time there were 30,000 men at arms in the Enemy's encampment, and these were continually being reinforced.

The Captain-Major endeavoured to strengthen the fortress in such a manner, that the soldiers could fight with less risk and hindrance; he therefore ordered a wall of stone and lime of 4 spans breadth to be made at a distance of 10 spans behined the old wall, connecting the two with buttresses of the same width in proportion, so that after the spaces had been filled up the wall was rendered very strong and spacious; in this manner he built it all round, adding nine spans to the height of the old wall, which served as a parapet, in which loopholes were cut obliquely, behined these being strong sentry-boxes enclosed on all sides, and open on the bottom, in such a fashion that one could throw a powder-pot through the opening without any hindrance.

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[1] The writer however never refers to D. Manoel again.

When this important addition was finished, he took in hand the fortification of the moat, since it was held for certain that the enemy would run their mine between the bastions of "Espirito Sancto" and "Santiago," because we could not bring our artillery to bear on this part, and thus they were determined to fortify themselves in it, and to enter into the fortress with mantlets: for this reason the Captain-Major every day sent four Companies of the Guard to take station in the moat from the bulwark of "Espirito Sancto" to that of "Santiago," with orders that they should always be provided with dimmed lights, and have their ears against the outside wall, so that if there was any digging, or any noise, they would at once perceive it.

The soldiers were very greatly fatigued by the works that they did from sunrise to sunset, and from watching in the moat, where they always had their feet in water, during the bitter cold of December, having neither wish to eat nor time to sleep; and so strenuous were their duties that it would seem impossible for human forces to bear such excessive toil, owing to which many of the soldiers sickened,—the watch and station in the moat causing them greater ill than the arms of the Enemy. For this reason the Captain-Major sent to clean out the moat, and to build a roof from the foot of the wall to the outside curtain-wall, the intervening space being 8 spans broad, and as soon as it was enclosed, it was filled in and levelled with the ground and thickly planted with chevaux de frise nailed to planks firmly embedded in the ground. Loopholes were cut in the moat's wall at a height of 6 spans on the outside; likewise four stairways were made with underground passages for the entrance of the sentries that were posted in the moat, and for them to be succoured by when necessary.

As a result of this advantage, he ordered the Companies which were stationed in the moat to be withdrawn into the fort to the great relief of the men; and, with a view to stopping the enemy receiving reinforcements and not extinguishing the fire with which he had wasted all the coast of Persia, he wrote to Miguel Botelho to proceed with all the Armada against the fortress of Saramião, wherein the Persian had his magazines of the weapons and provisions which were expended by his army.

Miguel Botelho received the letter, and putting the contents in Council, and the resolution thereof into effect, he went with 30 galliots and ten terranquis against Saramião at daybreak. The Fortress was so well garrisoned, and the Persians so confident, that they sallied out to receive our men on disembarking, never doubting that none would escape the edge of their scymetars; however, the artillery of the Armada facilitated our disembarkation, and thus our men landed on the shore, where they formed up unhindered in two squadrons, one of 400 Portuguese selected by the Captain Miguel Botelho, and the other of 300 Ormuzians and 150 Portuguese commanded by Antonio Palha, all drawn up in good order, together with a body of 300 sailors, each one with his axe, carrying also 20 scaling-ladders, so large that four men abreast could ascend each one of them. Miguel Botelho ordered Captain Antonio Palha to attack the environs of the town, and said that he with his own squadron would conquer the fortress or die.

When this order had been given, they went marching each one for his own part, and Miguel Botelho on reaching the foot of the fortress planted the scaling ladders, whilst the Persians strove to prevent our ascending with shots from falcons, swivel-guns and muskets, but our men vieing with each other in mounting the most dangerous place stormed it, putting all they found therein to the edge of the sword.

The Persians in the suburbs bravely defended themselves against Antonio Palha, but on seeing the fortress stormed they sought safety in flight, leaving our men masters of the Fort and environs, wherein they spent two days in loading the spoil which filled 20 galliots, and in cutting down many orchards within a distance of ½ a league from the town; they burnt the houses and razed the fortress, and when the men had all embarked without anyone being missing, Miguel Botelho returned to anchor in his former station, from whence he wrote to the Captain-Major of the result of the victory, and sent him the 20 galliots laden with spoil, which the Captain-Major despatched to Ormuz, to be handed over to the Veador da Fazenda, advising him that it was time to pay the troops; and this they immediately did in Ormuz to those of the galliots, and sent them back with provisions for the others, and money to pay the men of the Fortress.

CHAPTER XX

How the Captain-Major sent Balthezar de Chaves against the port of Iasques, and of a duel that took place in front of the Fortress.

The Captain-Major did not cease to inflict on the Persians the punishment which their faithlessness had deserved, and because Iasques was a factory of the English and a place of much importance, he sent thither Balthezar de Chaves with eight galliots whose Captains were Pero Gomes Azevedo, Diogo Pereyra de Macedo, O Camara, Bras Rodriguez, Ioão de Andrada da Gama, Francisco Conçalves, and Francisco Antunes with 300 Portuguese, together with 400 Ormuzians in 20 terranquis, reminding Balthezar de Chaves that it was to the honour of this crown that not one stone should remain upon another in that City and Factory.

Balthezar de Chaves left, and one Monday, the 21st of December, the Moors in the neighbourhood of the little palm-grove hoisted a white flag, and all climbed upon the tops of their trenches; when the Captain-Major was informed of this, he ordered all to be ready for whatever might occur, and proceeding to the bulwark of "Santiago" he ordered another white flag to be hoisted in it, at which, so soon as this was seen from the encampment, there came out from the trenches a well set-up Moor armed with chain-mail which reached down to his knees, girdled with a sash of blue and gold; on his head he had an octagonal morion of black and gold which could be clearly seen despite the turban that was twined around it; he carried a shield inlaid with golden flowered-work, and a scymetar garnished with overgilded silver in a scabbard of green velvet.

He came up to the edge of the moat, and said that he was a lineal descendant of their prophet Mahomet, and that he had been drawn from Ispahan by the fame with which the valour of the Portuguese was celebrated throughout the world, in order that in that field, with those arms which he bore, he should prove whether he was mistaken or not against anyone who should come out to meet him, adding that the reward of the victor would be the weapons and head of the vanquished, and that he had leave from the great Abadulacão, his Captain-general, and a safe conduct from the Persian Camp on his behalf. This Moor, as was subsequently known, was one of the bravest and proudest that there were in the enemy's camp.

Many adventurers offered themselves to the Captain-Major, and he himself was so desirous to undertake the enterprize, that by not wishing to cause dissensions amongst them, nor his post permitting him, he was undecided whom to select for accepting the challenge, when Phelippe de Affonseca, a youth of 18 and a native of Lisbon, came to him and said that he should save his valiant Captains and soldiers for greater enterprizes than this, and begged him to give him leave to take up that challenge on his account, wherein he swore to demean himself as a good Portuguese. The Captain-Major appreciated the action of Phelippe de Affonseca and answered him that the selection must needs fall upon one of greater age than his—however, that he should not be discontent, because Time and the Service of His Majesty would afford further opportunities for him to make amends for this one.

When this soldier had been dismissed, he went (without thinking of anything else other than his honourable desire) to the Captain-Major's room, wherein it was not difficult for him to enter, and dressed himself, as secretly as he could, in a coat of mail, putting a morion on his head; and taking a shield and rapier, he sallied out, without his intention being perceived until he was seen in the field, at which the Captain-Major was much annoyed.

The Moor seeing the resolution with which the soldier was advancing upon him, attacked him with the same, both showing such valour and skill with the rapier and scymetar that no advantage was discernable on either side for a long time, at the end of which the valiant Moor fell with a sword-thrust through the throat, and with his own scymetar Phelippe de Affonseca cut off his head and returned with it and his opponent's arms, in the sight of all the onlookers.

He came to the mouth of the Fortress moat where the Captain-Major was awaiting him, to whom he asked pardon for the fault which he had committed without his leave, adding that he was persuaded that he had gained the victory by virtue of the Captain-Major's arms that he had borrowed. The Captain-Major embraced him, praising him in the terms that so valiant an exploit had deserved, and taking him to his quarters, he sent for the Provost-marshal of the Fortress to take him as prisoner to the Powder Magazine, and ordered the Chaplain to be called to confess him, since he was to be hung forthwith, because he was determined that no one else should break the rules and regulations which should have been kept inviolably; likewise he ordered Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo (who was serving as Sergeant-Major of the Fortress) to take him to his galliot and to hang him from the yard-arm. All the Captains and soldiers of the Fortress assembled and besought the Captain-Major to pardon him, to which he was already inclined, and thus he appreciated their intercession, and having sent for him, he admonished him, and armed him knight with the weapons that he had taken from the Moor, and after giving him those with which he had taken up the challenge, he sent him to his quarters accompanied by those who had protected him.

Meanwhile Balthezar de Chaves had reached the river of Iasques at 11 o'clock of the night, and having disembarked without being perceived less than half a league below the City, he formed up his men; and leaving in the galliots as many as were necessary for what should occur, he sent them to the front of the City with orders to bombard it with their artillery so soon as they arrived, so that the Moors should rush to the beach, where we would not disembark; but our men guided by the Ormuzians, (who knew the country well), could fall upon them from behind more safely in the assault. He also warned the men of the Armada to stop shooting when they saw a torch on the beach.

The Armada arrived, and being unperceived until it had opened fire, the first discharge caused so great a panic in the City, that everyone without concerning themselves with anything else than trying to save their own lives, forsook their houses and fled inland with the women and children, where they perished at the edge of the swords of the Portuguese. Balthezar de Chaves seeing the buisiness in this state, ordered the drums to be beaten for attacking the City and the English Factory, in which neither age nor sex were spared, and after being sacked, it was fired and reduced to ashes. He then ordered 400 sailors with axes to be disembarked, who cut down the palm-groves and orchards, and they found many cattle in the fields; there were 2,000 inhabitants in the City, of whom only 500 escaped, without any of our men being either killed or wounded; having embarked, they set sail and arrived at the fortress with the news of so fortunate a victory.

CHAPTER XXI

How the Captain-Major sent to the Cape of Iasques to watch for the English Fleet; of the cruelty with which the Persians used ten Moors, that they had taken in a terranquim of Ormuz; of the punishment that was given them; and of how he went to Ormuz to prepare the Armada to meet the English.

The Monsoon was approaching in which the English Fleet usually came to Cape Iasques for the silks that the Persian gave them to the great detriment of the custom-house of Ormuz; for this reason, the Captain-Major fitted out two terranquis for a two months' voyage, making Domingos Pirez Vieyra Captain of one and André Coutinho of the other, with orders to keep a strict look-out off the point of the Cape, putting out to sea every morning to see if they could sight any ships, and if they saw them they were to come and advise him of it.

After the terranquis had left, the Captain-Major received advice of how the Persians from the fortress of Congo[1] had taken a terranquim with 10 Lascarins from Ormuz, whom they had taken to the fort, where they had killed them, and cut their bodies up in slices, making a public proclamation that all might come and buy the flesh of those traitors, and gratify on them their hatred of the Portuguese who had drowned those unhappy shores in blood.

The Captain-Major sent Miragonadim to pick out 400 Lascarins, and wrote to Miguel Botelho to punish that deed with the greatest severity, exhorting Miragonadim to tell him what had happened; likewise he sent 1,500 axes in order that not a single palm-tree or garden should remain undestroyed.

Miragonadim embarked with his picked men in 20 terranquims and arriving at the river he gave the letter to Miguel Botelho, magnifying the atrocity to him as the Captain-General had directed. Miguel Botelho gave an account thereof to the Captains of the Armada and when they were ready for the attack, they all set sail.

They reached the shore of Congo at daybreak, there being 3,000 Persians in the fortress, who as soon as they saw the Armada, came out to hinder the disembarkation. They stood up to the volleys of artillery as if the lives they were losing were of no value, so that the battle raged until 11 o'clock with great loss to the Persians, who then betook themselves to their last refuge in the Fort, abandoning the beach.

Our men disembarked, and planting 30 scaling-ladders against the walls of the Fortress, they stormed it, without being stopped by the countless kinds of missiles that they rained down upon us from the walls and towers, with which they killed 14 Portuguese and two Lascarins.

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[1] Kung, *v.* p. 47, note 2.

During the struggle of this escalade, the enemy opened a gate on the landward side to escape through it by flight, but Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo took it from them, and entering into the Fortress by it, not one Moor was left alive; The Ormuzians avenging themselves on them with excessive cruelty for that which those of their own people who had been taken in the terranquim had suffered there; and having quartered some and stuck them on the battlements, and cut up the others in the streets, they razed the palm-trees and gardens, and after having collected many cattle and the spoil that they found in the fortress, they fired the town, which did not cease burning for many days; Miguel Botelho returning with the Armada to his station, sent Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo and Miragonadim to the Captain-Major with the news and with the answer.

The Captain-Major made ready to go to Cape Iasques to hinder the furnishing of silks to the English, and to prevent cloths from being taken from India to Persia through the strait, the which could not go by land, since the great Moghul had taken the ports of Caudar from them, and refused to allow the cafilas to pass. The Captain-Major therefore entrusted the command of the Fortress to Balthezar de Chaves and went to Ormuz where he was received with the applause that his valour had deserved. He forthwith took measures for the fitting-out of the galleons, which were the galleon *São Pedro* in which the Captain-Major had come from the Kingdom, the galleon *Todos os Santos*, which they made Capitanea, (because it had been the flagship of the Viceroy Dom Hieronymo de Azevedo on the coast of India when he had attacked the Dutch [*sic!*] at Surat), the which mounted 60 large cannon of bronze,[1] the ship *Victoria*, which was an impregnable castle with 64 pieces of bronze of the same calibre, the galleon *São Martinho*, the urca *Concepção*, and the pataxo, and the *São Lourenço*.

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[1] This galleon, *Todos os Santos*, was apparently an India-built vessel of 1,500 tons and was reckoned "stout, capacious and very handy." It had been the flagship of the Viceroy (D. Jeronimo de Azevedo)

When these had been inspected by the Captain-Major, Veador da Fazenda and the Factor, it was found that they required less overhauling than had been thought, and the work was immediately put in hand and finished in a few days, thanks to the abundant supply of equipment and tackle that there was in the Fortress of Ormuz.

The galleon *Todos os Sanctos* was made Capitanea, the ship *Victoria* Almirante, whilst the galleon *São Pedro* was given to Balthezar de Chaves, *São Martinho* to Manoel de Sousa, the pataxo to Fernão de Barros, and the urca to Diogo Pereyra de Macedo; when these Captains had been appointed, the galleons were handed over to the masters to rig them, they being already provided with seamen and provisions for the voyage. Meanwhile two ships arrived from India, bringing letters from the governor Fernão de Albuquerque, as well for the King of Ormuz as for the Captain of the Fortress Dom Francisco de Sousa, and one for the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre de Andrade, as follows:—

"When these two private ships were laden and on the point of leaving, there was given me Your Worship's letter of the 14th of August in which you advised me of the state of affairs in those parts and of the fort which you went to build at Queixome; likewise the Captain Dom Francisco de Sousa and the

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in his abortive effort against the English ships under Downton in Swalley Hole 1614-15. It was large enough to accommodate with ease 230 European men-at-arms besides the crew. This galleon, *Todos os Sanctos*, left Goa for China in 1615 under the command of Francisco Lopes Carrasco, who was going as Captain and Ouvidor of Macau. It was apparently stationed there in 1616, and wintered at Malacca in 1617 under the command of Fernão da Costa. The English versions allow it only 45 guns "of Brasse, the least whereof was Demiculvering."

Veador da Fazenda wrote to me of the same. I foresaw and warned Your Worship of all that has come to pass, and it would have been just and right of you to have considered it before putting that work in hand, and not to be so presumptuous with your 30 years, which the world had not yet dreamed of when I had already spent many years in his Majesty's Service with much experience of those parts), as to persuade yourself—so I am given to understand—that you could improve upon what my 70 wrote to you of, warning you of so grave a matter, and one so responsible for the great toils and dangers to which that Fortress with all the rest of the Strait is exposed. Especially when his Majesty's Order, (at least as expressed in the letter which was written thereon after that Armada had left the Kingdom), allowed latitude in the execution of it, and enjoined consideration for the time and circumstances; and even if it had not been so, neither for that would we be absolved from doing so, and from proceeding therein as was most convenient for the Service of His Majesty."

When these letters had been received, a Council of State was convened in the Fortress, at which the King of Ormuz was present. The matter being propounded, Ruy Freyre said that the galleons were ready to sail and prepared to go and await the English, and that the voyage should no longer be delayed.

The King of Ormuz, who had the first vote by reason of his great talent, was not of the opinion that the galleons should leave and that the Captain-Major should forsake the fortress of Queixome, because if (as it was said) the Khan of Shiras was coming against it, there were neither galliots to prevent his passage across nor reinforcements to send to the fortress; likewise although they could send to call him from Cape Iasques, yet it would be better for the Armada to remain in Ormuz without its hazarding itself against the English, the strength of whose ships and forces was probably greater; and, above all, in that case these garrisons would be denuded of men, so that if the enemy attacked them in this condition, loss must needs follow, which would greatly affect us however little it might be; furthermore even if the English should take the silk this year, they had done so for the past ten years without anyone opposing them, when that Kingdom was less threatened and the State of India was more powerful: lastly, if they should come against Queixome, the galleons would be in a better position to attack them from the shelter of their own ports, for all of which reasons the Captain-Major ought to return to Queixome to continue the war against the Persians, whilst the galleons would be ready for whatever might occur.

All approved of this opinion of the King, even though the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre thought it would be a surer plan to go to Cape Iasques, since if the English were crushed, they would be unable to take the silk and would lose their voyage, and the Persians the confidence that they had in them; however the contrary view prevailed and was drawn up in writing, and the Captain-Major returned to the Fortress of Queixome.

CHAPTER XXII

How Balthezar de Chaves fell upon the fortress of Lafeta and destroyed it, and of the great attack that the Captain-Major made against the Enemy's ramparts and trenches.

WHEN the Captain-Major returned to continue the war, in which there was never a pause, he perceived that Lafetá was a large and wealthy place, and the port whence many vessels laden with men and provisions passed over from the continent to replenish the Persian encampment; he therefore sent Balthezar de Chaves to attack it with a force of 800 Portuguese in 20 galliots together with Miragonadim and 700 Ormuzians in 30 terranquins; when the Armada was provided with all the necessary things for its purpose, he wrote to the Captain of Ormuz of the measures he had taken, and lest the Persians should attack the fortress seeing so potent an armada leave it, he ordered the Captain to send him all the Portuguese soldiers that he could spare wherewith to garrison the Fortress until the Armada should return, and he wrote the same to the King of Ormuz, and they both assisted him with the best men they had, because these volunteered without being compelled to go.

When the fortress was garrisoned, he notified Balthezar de Chaves, who set sail with the Armada flaunting its flags and banners in sight of the enemy's encampment. Within a few days he reached Lafetá, where his arrival caused little concern on land, because besides having there the best men that there were in all the Persian Coast, its Captain was a Moor so arrogant, that he said that he would have preffered to have seen there all the Power of Portugal rather than the scanty force which came in that Armada.

As soon as it was night, Balthezar de Chaves put himself in his terranquim, and visiting all the galliots, he took their Captains with him to Miragonadim's terrada, where it was agreed that the men should be embarked in the terranquins, (leaving as many as were necessary in the galliots) and that they should be landed on a small sandy beach situated to the North East, where they could disembark dry-shod since the banks of the river were very steep. Likewise, at the same time that the terradas and terranquins should depart the galliots were to row against the fortress and bombard it as heavily as they could.

These things having been decided on, they were duly carried out, and the galliots steering for the shore, began to play their artillery; forthwith 2,000 well-armed Persians sallied out to prevent the disembarcation, however since the boats were very small and the water was deep, our men landed and joined battle with the enemy on the beach, both parties fighting with such fury that no advantage was discernable on either side. Our musketry volleyed out upon the enemy, but despite their many dead, the living refused to give ground, being constantly reinforced from the fortress. Balthezar de Chaves performed such incomparable exploits, as likewise in emulation of him did Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo, Hieronymo Tavares and Pero Gomes Azevedo, that it seemed impossible that the resolution with which the Moors disdaining death fought on, could last so long.

Elsewhere, Miragonadim with his Ormuzian Lascarins had brought matters to such a pitch, that the Persian Captain was forced to throw the whole of his reserves into the battle in order not to lose the pretension with which he had sallied out to prevent our disembarkation. The battle raged in this manner from 3 o'clock in the early morning until two in the afternoon, when their Captain fell slain by a musket ball; this caused such dismay amongst them that they fled from the battlefield and retired to the fortress, where, without concerning themselves about the women and children they had therein, entering by one gate they fled out by the other, and being concerned only to save their own lives, they did not pause in their flight until they had gone a league.

Balthezar de Chaves seeing that the opposition which he was expecting from the Fortress was now as thoroughly disposed of as that which he had encountered on the battlefield, ordered Miragonadim to plunder and burn the environs with his men, whilst the sailors armed with axes were to raze the palm-groves of the surrounding district, and the cattle—which were many—were to be put in the ships; entering into the fortress, he found it filled with women, children and old men unable to bear arms, all of whom were ruthelessly put to the sword, exercising upon them the barbarity that Reasons of State permitted in this War. There were likewise found 32 pieces of artillery, many store-houses of planks, corn, vegetables and numerous other provisions, all of which were immediately burnt, as likewise were 3 galliots and 300 terradas, there not being left ashore or in the port a single vestige of a building or a ship. Of our men 10 Portuguese and 26 Lascarins were killed, and 52 wounded. When all the men and the booty had been embarked, Balthezar de Chaves set sail, and arrived victorious at the fortress of Queixome.

As soon as the men were disembarked, because work was more natural to them than rest, they suggested an attack on the Enemy. The Captain-Major summond Balthezar de Chaves, who assisted him with inexhaustable energy, and told him to attack the Persians that night with the men that came in the Armada, as well as those that had come from Ormuz before they returned thither; and that all should sally out from the mouth of the moat with their matches ready and hidden so that they could not be seen, and that marching along the sea-shore they should ascend to the top of the quarries and charge the Moors from behined, who being over-confident had only lightly guarded that part; and they should burst into all the trenches because thus it would be impossible for any Moor of those between us and the fortress to escape, nor should they halt there, because the whole force of Persia united should not suffice to stop us.

They left with this order, and reached the place which had been indicated to them, where the enemy considering it impossible for us ever to reach there, were so negligent that the first they felt of our men was when they perished on the points of our rapiers. Those who awoke fled from the place where the assault was being made, but only to jump from the frying-pan into the fire, losing their lives in this medly, together with their arms and other booty with which our men retired heavily laden.

[Later] our spies came and told us how the general Abadulacão had ordered the sentinels who were on duty that night to be beheaded, and that 600 Moors had been killed in the attack besides more than 1,000 wounded; and of our men only 18 Portuguese and 30 Ormuzians had been killed, most of these last in error, owing to the difficulty of distinguishing them in the darkness of the night.

CHAPTER XXIII

How Simão de Mello arrived from India with the Succour-Fleet, and Domingos Pirez with news of the English Armada; of the death of Dom Francisco de Sousa, the Captain of Ormuz, and of his successor.

WHILST the Persian was continuing the siege of the Fortress at the cost of so much of his blood, Simão de Mello[1] arrived with the Succour-Fleet, as the Governor had informed Ormuz, and with him came Luis de Britto, and Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra whom the Captain-Major had sent to India by reason of the dissensions related in Chapter IV;[2] after firing a great salute of artillery, the fleet anchored in front of the Fortress, when the Captain-Major sent Balthezar de Chaves and Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo to congratulate him on his arrival.

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[1] *Vide* Appendix XI—Personalia. This relief force left Goa on the 24th of November 1621 and reached Ormuz in the following December. The force consisted of 299 men on board 10 small vessels. [*V.* Appendix VI.]

[2] Although he had been sent under arrest to Goa in October 1620, he would appear to have soon been released by the Governor, Fernão de Albuquerque, since he served on board a galley in a fleet off the Malabar coast from January to May 1621 (*v. Dois Capitães da India*, Doc. XII., pp. 35-6). He and Ruy Freire would seem to have composed their quarrel, and henceforth we find them acting wholeheartedly together.

Simão de Mello got into the terranquim in which these two Captains came and went ashore with them, where the Captain-Major was awaiting his disembarkation with all the Captains and healthy soldiers that there were in the fortress; thus accompanying him, he conducted him to his quarters, where Simão de Mello after giving a full account of all the News of the Kingdom and of India, handed him a packet of letters from the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque, in which he answered those that the Captain-Major had written to him in October, congratulating him on his numerous victories, and on the valour with which he was resisting so obstinate a siege; he likewise informed him how he had sent 500 veteran Portuguese soldiers in that fleet, as well as two ships laden with rice, meat, and butter, and 600 barrels of powder and shot, adding that he was preparing another Armada under Constantino de Saa,[1] and that when the treasure of his Majesty was exhausted, he would be ready to expend his own in the expenses of that war, and in what else might be necessary for his Service.

When this Letter had been read the Captain-Major told Simão de Mello to send him 100 barrels of powder together with some butter and meat, of which the fortress stood in need, and then go to Ormuz to careen the Armada and effect some necessary repairs.

After Simão de Mello had left, there arrived Domingos Pirez Vieyra, who had gone to Iasques to watch for the English ships; he brought news that they were coming for Ormuz, sailing along the Persian Coast, and that they were nine in number, five of more than 60 guns each, and the other four with 26 to 30, adding that they were already off the islet of Bombarca.[1]

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[1] *Vide* Appendix XI—Personalia.

As soon as the Captain-Major received this news, he sent it by means of the same Domingos Pirez Vieyra to the Captain of the Fortress of Ormuz Dom Francisco de Sousa, writing to him and to the Veador da Fazenda that they should inform him with all the speed that the occasion demanded of what they wished him to do, since he was ready for anything. He likewise wrote to Francisco de Britto (who was Almirante of the Armada) that since the ships which came from India would be first sighted from that fortress rather than Queixome, as soon as the English should appear he was to fire three shots from the heaviest guns that there were in the galleon, and then five more after a short interval, because on hearing this warning he would come and reinforce him forthwith.

Domingos Pirez reached Ormuz and gave the letters and news of the English Fleet to the Captain Dom Francisco de Sousa who at once propounded them in the Council, wherein the King of Ormuz being experienced and prudent said that the Enemy had entered the Strait for their own total perdition, unless his opinion was very much mistaken; this opinion was that as soon as the fleet was sighted, they should send for the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre de Andrade to go against it with the six galleons that were ready there, and for a further reinforcement they should send for the 30 galliots that were in River Lafetá and the galley that was in the Fortress; it was scarcely possible that the Enemy could escape from all these, and even if they did, it would be in such a miserable state that they would lose their prestige in the flight, whilst the Persians seeing the foundation of their design (which was the English alliance) come to nought, would be thankful to accept peace on any terms; he added that if the contrary should happen, they might regard Queixome as lost, and implore God to remember Ormuz, which they should proceed to fortify immediately, since he was ready to help with his person and goods in all that might be necessary.

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[1] The ships were the *London* (Captain Richard Blythe), *Jonas* (44), (Captain Weddell), *Whale* (Master Woodcock), *Dolphin* (Master Stephenson) and *Lion* (45), (Master Beversham). The four pinnaces were the *Rose* (John Johnson), *Richard* (Robert Davis), *Shilling* (Wm. Pinder), and *Robert* (Thos. Beaumont). The *London* and *Jonas* were the joint "admirals," and the *Whale* was Vice-Admiral and the *Dolphin* Rear-Admiral ship. [I.O., *Persia Records*, vol. i.]

No one offered any objection to so wise an opinion, and the work of strengthening the fortifications of the fortress was begun forthwith. The Captain Dom Francisco de Sousa like the most conscientious official personally took part in the work, notwithstanding the drawback of his advanced age; the continual work brought upon him some malignant fevers of which he died in five days. With his death a mysterious rumour arose amongst the people, both old men and children saying with one voice (what appeares to have been a true prophecy) "when the Captain is dead, Ormuz is doomed."

This fidalgo was extremely popular with everyone, and thus there was general sorrow at his death; he was protector of the soldiers, most valiant, prudent, disinterested, and so generous that during the time in which he governed the fortress of Diu, besides his term in Ormuz where he died, there was no case of want which he did not relieve from his own pocket.

He was buried in the Convent of the bare-footed Carmelites, whither went all the Infantry Captains dressed in black, their Companies carrying their arms reversed, colours trailing the ground, and muffled drums; as soon as the bier came over the moat, the bulwark of "Santiago" fired three guns, and that of "São Pedro" four, which being seen from the galleons, the Capitanea fired seven guns, the Almirante nine, and each of the others eleven; the King of Ormuz accompanied it together with the Nobles of his Court, and all the Moors and Christians in general, the poor of both nations openly showing the sorrow they felt at the loss of so illustrious a benefactor.

When Dom Francisco de Sousa had been buried, the King, Veador da Fazenda, Ouvidor Feytor, Alcaide Mòr, Simão de Mello and all the other Captains and gentlemen returned to the Fortress, where they had to elect a Captain in substitute, until the Governor of India being informed of what had happened could give orders as to who was to be provided with the Captaincy. This matter being propounded in Council, Simão de Mello got up and said "Gentlemen, The Governor of India in the Name of His Majesty and by virtue of this grant, bestowed upon me the succession to this fortress in the event of God taking unto himself Dom Francisco de Sousa; I have taken the oath of allegiance for it, by reason of which you should give me the possession of it." And kissing the grant, he gave it to the King who handed it to the Ouvidor for him to read it, and seeing the terms of it, they gave him the post and handed him the keys of the Fortress; they then considered that the successor had been wisely chosen, because Simão de Mello was a fidalgo very well known in India by the great services he had rendered His Majesty, both in the governorship of Mombaça, where he had killed three Moorish Kings, as in other honourable posts which he had occupied, wherein he had acquired that credit which he was destined to lose in this.

When he had assumed the office he went to the bulwark of "São Pedro," lodging himself in the Cathedral, because the widow of Dom Francisco de Sousa was still in the houses of the fortress with all her household goods. Work on the fortifications ceased imediately, and no further trouble was taken for the security of the City and fortress; when he was spoken to about it, he replied that there was no need to fear, because all the power of the World could not look the fortress of Ormuz in the face, still less the Persians from whom they could feel easy and secure. He wrote to the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre of how matters were, and proffered his assistance in effusive terms.

CHAPTER XXIIII

How Andre Coutinho arrived with news of the English ships; how the Captain-Major sent him to Ormuz, and the ships arrived off the Fortress, saluted it, and anchored; and of what was agreed upon in Ormuz for the defence of the Fortress.

The grief felt at the death of Dom Francisco was sharpened by the loss that the fortress of Ormuz suffered through the removal of his prudence and valour, for although there were still many fidalgos who were serving his Majesty in that Strait, they were only youths, and thus both in them and in others there was lacking the age and experience necessary for dealing with and disposing of the critical events that occur in war. In Queixome the continuous assaults and batteries ceased neither by day nor night. The English ships had been sighted, albeit without their being seen very clearly, and the Almirante Francisco de Britto had made the signal which the Captain-Major had appointed, although so badly that everyone in the Fortress of Queixome thought it was a salute, and not a warning of which they were to take heed, so that everything was preparing the way for the misfortune which followed.

Andrè Coutinho arrived in the other Terranquim in which Domingos Pirez had gone, and as it was midnight and the sea very rough, he swam ashore and came to the fortress, where those on watch asked him who he was; he answered that he was Andrè Coutinho whom the Captain-Major had sent to Cape Jasques, and that they should inform him with all speed that he was there. The sentries hesitated, and Andrè Coutinho seeing that there was peril in delay, beat upon the gates, whereon the Captain-Major came thither to a loophole of a baſtion which was over the doors, and asked who was beating; Andrè Coutinho replied that it was he, and begged him to order the gates to be opened as it was urgent.

The Captain-Major at once ordered the gates to be opened, which was done, and on André Coutinho's entering he asked him what the news was; to which he replied that he had come in company with the English ships, which were nine in number and all of great ſtrength, although four of them had less artillery than the others; and that they were accompanied by many terradas and terranquins from all the neighbouring rivers, so that it scarcely seemed possible that he should have escaped [being seen by reason of] the lights that were lit in many of them.

The Captain-Major answered him cheerfully "The more the merrier," but withal he began to pace up and down by himself, pondering upon the burden he bore on his shoulders, in view of the reinforcements that were coming to join the 30,000 men already in the field againſt the fortress, without his having therein anyone to whom he could entruſt his poſt, for all the Captains who possessed sufficient talents were commanding in the galleons; whilſt if he took command of the Armada the fortress would remain indefensable, since once the Moors knew he was out of it they would press the siege with redoubled vigour, and the few who were inside it would not suffice to defend it againſt such increased odds; on the other hand, if he did not go out with the Armada againſt the enemy, without doubt these would anchor off Queixome where they would land men and artillery without his being able to ſtop them, since the Persian was maſter of the field, and thus the fort would be in dire peril;

all this he expounded to Simão de Mello in a letter that he immediately wrote to him, in which he asked him to advise him what to do with the brevity that the occasion required, since he had not made him the signal to embark as they had formerly agreed upon. And giving the letter to Andre Coutinho he urged upon him the importance of bringing back the answer with equal speed. André Coutinho replied " Senhor, the going will be quick but the return impossible, owing to the numerous craft which together with the ships cover the Strait;" adding that he begged him to excuse him, but that in his opinion it seemed that it would be best for the Captain-Major to embark in the terranquim, leaving his batôn erected in the middle of the fortress because the Portuguese were so brave and loyal that beneath the shadow of that emblem they would die in defence of the faith and the fortress, whilst being in the Armada he would be able to succour Queixome, and that he should remember that there was still time to embark and that afterwards he might wish to do so but would not be able to. The advice of André Coutinho did not seem bad to the Captain-Major, but he did not wish to risk it without orders, as had been justly agreed upon in so important a matter; furthermore, it seemed to him that the enemy were not coming so speedily but that he would have time to embark if he received orders to do so, and thus he dismissed Andre Coutinho, who swam to the terranquim in which he then left for Ormuz.

At daybreak the English fleet was sighted accompanied by more than 600 Persian terradas, sounding many bastard-trumpets; all were rigged out in red, and arriving within a musket shot of the fortress they anchored and saluted it, the Admiral firing three blank rounds, the Vice-Admiral five, and each of the others seven; the fortress replied with all the artillery that there was on that side, and thus the siege was continued with the bombardment from the 9 ships and all the terradas by sea, and with showers of arrows, bullets and other missiles by land. The bombardment ceased with nightfall, when in the direction of the fortress of Ormuz, countless flashes of guns, powder-pots and fireworks were seen for the space of two hours, through the midst of which André Coutinho proceeded until he reached Ormuz. Simão de Mello, so soon as he received the letter and learnt that the Captain-Major had remained in Queixome, threw his hat on the ground and exclaimed " Ormuz is lost," and turning to Andre Coutinho he said, " I will give you the habit of Christ with an annuity of 100 cruzados from the Custom-house at Goa, and in the name of His Majesty I hold the proofs of your birth as passed, (whatever your quality may be), provided that you return forthwith to Queixome, and bring back the Captain-Major in that terranquim, for which purpose you may choose all the soldiers and sailors and take all the munitions and fireworks that you consider necessary."

André Coutinho made ready and left at 5 o'clock in the evening; he met with a squadron of terradas and fought valiantly against them, but the enemy were in such overwhelming numbers that despite his bravery he could make no headway, and thus he was forced to put back to Ormuz, where the noise of the continuous bombardment of Queixome could be heard distinctly.

Everyone was going about dismayed, being undecided what they ought to do, whilst Simão de Mello, as soon as he knew from André Coutinho of the critical state of the fortress of Queixome, determined to withdraw the galleons further within the shelter of the fortress of Ormuz; calling the Council, he said that in view of the carelessness displayed by the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre as if he wished to lose both himself and the fortress of Queixome, besides putting that of

Ormuz in dire peril, it seemed to him that it would be best for his Majesty's Service for the galleons to withdraw beneath the shelter of the artillery and garrison of the fortress. The King opposed this, saying that he was astonished that a veteran Captain and one so versed and experienced in war, should propose such a base action, because if the galleons were to be withdrawn into the port, with what could they attempt to succour Queixome? adding that in his opinion they should sail forthwith, and that they should be entrusted to either the Almirante Francisco de Britto (who was already on board), or to Dom Gonçalo da Silverya, and that if there was lack of men, they should beat the drums and issue proclamations to the effect that all married and single Portuguese should embark within six hours under pain of death, and that if anyone displayed reluctance he should be hanged forthwith; because if the Fortress of Queixome was lost, all the forces that were besieging it would at once fall upon Ormuz, in which he was more concerned than the King of Portugal. He likewise urged that they should open that stretch of the moat which lay beneath the bulwark of Santiago, so that the sea should flow from one side to the other; also that the trench which had been begun, should be completed, and finally that they should not lay the blame upon the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre since there was no one more resolute or prudent, and that they could clearly see the risk he was running in so boldly defending for the honour of Portugal four earthen walls against such powerful enemies.

There were not lacking fortuitous objections to this view, but withal the opinion of the King was approved of, and carried out.

CHAPTER XXV

How the English disembarked their artillery and fortified themselves on land; and how the general Abadulacão came against the Fortress, and of what happened to him.

THE toil in the fortress of Queixome was unbeareable, by reason of the continual use of arms by day and ceaseless vigils at night, besides the work of repairing the damages caused by the artillery, curing the wounded, and burying the dead, but withal they were united in steadfastness and the loyalty of each was doubled.[1]

The English seeing this, and in view of the fact that they were comitted against that fortress by the contract they had with the Persians and the money they received from them, disembarked one night 18 guns of 24 to 40 lbs: calibre, making one platform on the side of the quarries, and another further inland, and a third near the little palm-grove. At dawn next day they opened a heavy bombardment from all sides,[2] not excluding the ships, four of which they reinforced with the heaviest artillery that they had in the others, and which also made a heavy bombardment from the sea; they spent the whole day in battering the fortress, and since it was of little strength (as we have already stated), they succeeded in razing all the parapets; the following night was spent in repairing them, the Captain-Major being the most forward in this work.

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[1] This is nonsense. From the moment that the English appeared the majority of the men were in favour of surrender, and it was only the firmness of Ruy Freire that enabled even a show of resistance to be kept up for a few days.

[2] It was in the course of taking ranges during this bombardment that the celebrated polar navigator William Baffin was killed. "Master Baffin went on shoare with his Geometricall Instruments, for the taking the height and distance of the Castle wall, for the better leavelling of his Peece to make his shot: but as he was about the same, he received a small shot from the Castle into his belly, wherewith he gave three leaps, by report, and died immediately." [*Purchas his Pilgrims*, 1905 ed., vol. x., p. 339.]

This task was finished at the begining of the waning of the moon, when those engaged on the work had some time to rest from their toil and get something to eat, which was a little rice soaked in water and a small portion of salted fish; no sooner had this been eaten at the break of day, when the sentinels gave the alarm for everyone to take up arms and repair to their posts. This was because Abadulacão seeing the state to which the fortress had been reduced by the previous day's bombardment, called his Captains and said to them that already the Portuguese had no shelter behined which they could fight protected, and that therefore they should attack them at daybreak;—remembering to satisfy themselves in the blood of the Portuguese, for the rivers of their own which had flowed in that battlefield as in all Persia, and that they should attack resolutely and courageously, since their advantage assured them of victory, and their death of salvation.

Animated with this exhortation the Moors sallied forth, making the field resound with their cries, and with the rattling of great volleys of musketry and arrows with which they attacked the fortress on all sides;—it was already repaired as best as could be done at such a time, and they received so great hurt from our artillery which was all loaded with musket and arquebus shot, that the resolution with which they continued their efforts was really admirable, for they never heeded their numerous killed and wounded but advanced over them and succeeded in jumping across the moat and reaching the foot of the wall. However the powder-pans, stones, and other missiles were so numerous, that some burnt and others buried alive remained dead in the moat, whilst those that delayed to get out of it on one side or the other, were killed from the dug-outs by the soldiers who were posted on guard thereof; so much so, that although on this occasion they succeeded in planting ladders against the walls, yet none of them put foot on them.

The struggle ended at nightfall, otherwise all the Persians might have been killed, of whom as it was more than 4,000 were slain, besides those wounded, who as it was afterwards learnt, were more numerous; our Portuguese were so encouraged by this success that if they had received any help, or material for defence and repair of the Fortress, it would have been impregnable in their hands; In this assault we only had a few wounded, and the damage received from the artillery was very little and was repaired forthwith, whereby the men had some space for respite.

However the Enemy staking their last throw on the bombardment, opened it at dawn next day from all sides, with such fury that at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon the repairs were in the dust, the walls and bulwarks demolished, and the artillery dismounted,[1]—our Portuguese performing such heroic deeds that to attempt to detail them in writing, would be as bold as they were in actual fact.

Abadulacão seeing the state to which the fortress was reduced, and that the Portuguese could neither defend themselves therein nor await a second bombardment, and that he had occupied all the places by which they might be succoured, (although until then no attempt to do so had been made from Ormuz), and furthermore that the Portuguese would surrender themselves to the English who were Europeans like themselves, and that they would shun him since he was a Moor, and the Persians having received such great loss,—considering all this, he called his Captains to whom he stated the above, and added that it was better and to the greater honour of all, that seeing the fortress was in such a state, and that it would be easy to storm it since it was all demolished, they should revenge themselves upon the Portuguese for the shedding of so much Persian blood, which had flowed along all those shores, wherein neither women nor children were left alive, and the cities and towns had all been burnt; that now they had the opportunity, of which they could avail themselves with little risk, adding that he would be the first to draw the sword, since the matter cried aloud for vengence, and death to them was life.

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[1] When the fort was taken the English found in it "17 Pieces of Ordnance, [viz.:] one Brasse Cannon Pedro, two Brasse Culvering, 2 Iron Demiculvering, 4 Brasse Sackers, 2 Iron Minion, 6 Iron Falken" (Pinder).

CHAPTER XXVI

How the General Abadulacão attacked the fortress a second time, and how the English proposed an agreement.

The Persian Captains being heartened by the words of their General Abadulacão made another speech to their soldiers, who hearing it, drew their scimetars, buckled on their shields, and attacked the fortress like madmen, without waiting for further orders. Our Portuguese who on such occasions do not know how to turn their backs upon the foe,—and the more so since they had such a Captain as was Ruy Freyre,—received them so bravely, that on the two parts where the Persians scaled the walls they were forced to descend with greater speed. This action lasted for the greater part of the day, until Abadulacão withdrew with less élan than he had come, and leaving many dead, which, as we afterwards learnt, exceeded 2,000 besides those wounded.[1]

On the following day in the morning, the English hoisted a white flag in one of the batteries—the fortress being already repaired but not in such a fashion that it could endure 2 hour's bombardment; the cannonade, which had already begun, now ceased, and a drummer came out from it with another white flag, whilst another one of ours went out to the battlefield and took from him a letter of which the superscription in Portuguese ran as follows:—

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[1] This seems to be pure fiction. None of the English accounts ever mention any assaults as having been made by the Persians after the English had landed their guns and opened their batteries. Nor

To the General Senhor Dom Ruy Freyre de Andrada beseiged in the Fortress.

Senhor Dom Ruy Freyre, General of the Sea and Land of Ormuz and its Straits, and of the Red Sea,—Your Lordship must clearly see the state in which that fortress is, the lack of help, and the impossibility of remedy; likewise to defend yourselves with some hope of eventual relief is bravery, but it is only folly to die without it, in power of the Persians who are awaiting the end of this buisiness in order to glut themselves with Portuguese blood. Hence if Your Lordship wishes to surrender to us on terms, we will give you free passage to Ormuz, or wherever you wish, whilst if Your Lordship will not accept these terms, 1,000 Persians and 4,000 English will make them tomorrow with the sword. We give you twenty-four hours to make your decision.

When the letter had been read in public, there began to be spread around some opinions about the matter which were abhorrent to such generous souls; and the Captain-Major seeing the irreparable damage of the Fortress, called the Captains and soldiers and said to them,—" Gentlemen who consider your honour in all occasions and contingencies, is it not nine months

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do any other of the Portuguese documents or books which I have consulted give any reason to believe that there was anything more than a feeble resistance in the last days of the siege of Kishm fort.

since you have sustained this siege with the valour of your arms, spreading the terror of your immortal names? Will you reck now of the evident danger, and of the value of your lives? Were the shots and swords to which until now you offered up your lives, of another kind or temper? Was ever death terrible to one who glorying in it, was resolute to die? Let the English in Europe and the Persians in Asia say that we perished heroically, and not that we yielded and surrendered like cowards and weaklings, and since they say that there is no room for us in the World, let us sally out from this fortress and let the swords decide the issue!" So saying, he tied on a helmet, picked up a shield and set out for the gates of the fortress, followed by all as excitedly and cheerfully as if they were going to a certain victory.

At this moment however the Priests stepped across their path telling the Captain-Major to forebear in the name of Jesus Christ, and to remember that he had died upon a cross for them, and that he was a Christian, and that they were going to lose their souls like infidels, and to squander their lives which God had not given them to throw thus recklessly away; adding that if they proceeded with their idea, they would die excomunicated, since it was nothing less than distrusting his Mercy, and that they should at once ask pardon of God for their distrust, and that since they were still within the fortress they should not sally out from it; for to defend it until death was a brave and Catholic action, whilst to die as they had decided was barborous thoughtlessness.

This admonition cooled the enthusiasm with which they were going, however on considering the irreperable damage in the fortress, and seeing themselves without hope or remedy, and that the danger could not now be avoided as they had struggled manfully on until their strength had collapsed, and that in accepting life and liberty in such a state they would be doing a service to God and to his Majeſty, and by the facility that was offered them of going to the fortress of Ormuz, whereon the Enemy had caſt their eyes as being their chief objective, they began to say that they would answer the letter, but that if the terms were not very favourable to them, they were ready to finish as they had begun.

CHAPTER XXVII

How the Portuguese replied unto the English.

THE soldiers were resolved to answer the English, to which the Captain-Major would not consent, but on this occasion the ſtate in which they saw themselves forced them to disobey him, and they wrote to the enemy as follows:—

Answer to the English.

We the soldiers of this Fortress answer Your Honour's Letter,—a thing in which our Captain-Major declines to take part,—and we say that if this Fortress has no walls except those that are in ruins, yet the Portuguese who are within do not lack resolution wherewith to rebuild them, and defend them for ten years. The terms that are to be made to-morrow with the sword Your Honour can at once proceed to execute with twice the force, because we accept them, and unless you grant us ample conditions we will resort to arms.

This letter was carried by a soldier who was insulted and jeered at by the Moors when he passed through their trenches; he reached the quarters of the English by whom he was joyfully received in their fashion of drinking healths; after the letter had been read they immediately answered it, informing the bearer that if he did not wish to return a signal should be made from the fortress, whereon they would at once send to fetch the reply.

The soldier reached the fortress, where all were gathered round the Captain-Major, to whom he made as if to give the letter of the English, but he would not take it, and plucking out a dagger threw himself upon the messenger exclaiming "Oh Traitor! do you expect me to surrender the fortress that you wish to yield?" And without doubt he would have killed him if he had not been prevented. They read the letter and the conditions that it contained were so ignominious that when the Captain-Major heard them, looking up at the sky he said, "Ah Lord! are there not lightning flashes wherewith to consume these traitors, abusers of Portuguese Loyalty?" At this, the soldiers and Captains began to mutiny and to reply that they were not traitors, neither had they displayed treason, weakness, or cowardice, but rather had they defended the Faith and the Fortress of the King with the valour that he had seen; that if he would give them a fortress, and materials wherewith to repair and defend it, they would do so with their former resolution, but since there was no fortress neither the wherewithal to repair it, they did not wish to perish obstinately like brute beasts, adding other more impudent phrases, and finishing up by refusing to acknowledge him as Captain-Major. The latter, when he heard these last words, took a lighted torch, and covertly went towards the powder-magazine, and without doubt would have fired it, if some soldiers who were following him had not taken hold of him: and being helped by others, they siezed the torch out of his hands and carried him off to his tent, where they kept him until the terms of surrender had been arranged, answering to those which the English had sent as follows:—

"We do not agree to the Capitulations which Your Honour sent us, nor are we so straitend that we must accept them, since we are masters of the fort and provided with all that is necessary for 10 years, and powder wherewith to defend it until we blow ourselves up with it, hence the conditions upon which we will surrender are these:—'In the first place the Priests must leave with their images and other things of a religious nature; the Captain-Major armed with all his weapons, and batôn in hand, must be taken to Ormuz together with all the Portuguese soldiers also armed, with lighted matches, cartridges in their mouths, beating drums, the ensigns with their colours, and the Sergeants with their halberds, each one carrying what he can take away with him; likewise all the Christian slaves will accompany the Portuguese, and as for the Lascarins they must be carried to Ormuz or wherever they wish to go, with all their weapons and property: the English must provide ships and refreshments for the passage of all these people for the satisfaction of these conditions.'" These were read in the presence of all, and after they had been signed were sealed up, and the signal with a white flag was made from the bulwark, whereon an English drummer came to fetch them.

CHAPTER XXVIII

How the fleet of rowing-vessels that was in the River of Lafetá arrived, and what passed in Ormuz.

The drummer having left with the letter, proceeded to his quarters. [Now at this time] the Captain-Major Gaspar de Affonseca was in the River of Lafetá [Laft] with 30 galliots and 20 terranquins; when he learnt of the state in which the fortress of Queixome was, by news that had reached him from Ormuz, he came coasting out with flags and banners; he issued orders that 3 galliots and 2 terranquins should attack each ship, with strict orders either to burn the ships or the galliots with them, for it was better that they should all perish with the English than that the fortress should be lost.

The Captain-Major with 4 galliots made for the English Admiral-ship, and Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo with five others for the Vice-admiral, and in this manner they rowed hard against the enemy's ships that began to ply their artillery, as likewise did our fleet; but the enemy were so fortunate that one of their shots struck the Captain-Major in the chest, blowing him into fragments. The galliot immediately stood off covering its poop-lantern (signal of the Captain-Major's death), whilst when the others realised what had happened, they all bore away after the Capitanea and steered for Ormuz, where they arrived within a few hours.[1]

As Captain-Major of that Armada was elected Dom Gonçalo da Silverya, who had come from the Kingdom with the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre de Andrade and who had been promoted to the post of Almirante in consequence of the death of Dom Ioão de Almeyda the Xereta who had died before reaching Moçambique (as already related). The affairs of Ormuz were in a very confused state and the government was very lax, but the Captain never made any effort to help to relieve Queixome or to strengthen the fortress and city as he should have done, beyond holding councils wherein nothing was determined on or carried out. [On one occasion] the Captain Simão de Mello speaking about the situation of Queixome said that although he was a veteran soldier and knew what ought to be done, he would not like to risk making a mistake by following his opinion, whereon the King of Ormuz stood up in the Council where this was going on, and placing his turban on his head, he said to him—"Who does not wish to err ! when by his fault and through his not helping as he could so easily do, the fortress of Queixome is on the verge of being lost. Go at once to help so brave a Captain who with 4 Portuguese has laid waste all the coasts of Persia with fire and sword, and who alone is defending the fortress of the King my brother against such powerful enemies as are besetting him by sea and land, for I will assume the responsibility for the fortifications of this city."

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[1] There is no English account of this alleged action, and in all probability it never took place.

Simão de Mello made answer that his Majesty had entrusted that fortress [Ormuz] unto him, and the galleons and Queixome to the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre, and that he would account to him for the former; adding that withal they should withdraw them within the harbour and reserve the men for what might occur, and that they should inform the Governor of India of the situation in which they were owing to the coming of the English, and that the galleons must not leave until the Governor sent a Captain-General for them. The King retorted that he pledged himself and his Kingdom to answer for any risk that the galleons might run, and to answer to his Majesty for the Fortress of Queixome if it was lost through the galleons going out to fight with the English. Simão de Mello would not assent to any of the courses that the King proposed to him, rather because he did not wish to part with his power than because he did not like to adventure himself therein. The King seeing this said "Gentlemen, Ormuz is lost, since so weak and cowardly a Captain has come to govern it. Your Worships can look after yourselves, for I go to my Palaces since the time has come to defend my crown, and thus I take leave of this council for as long as the war may last, and Your Worship Senhor Simão de Mello may be Captain of this Fortress." Simão de Mello wishing to answer him, the King placing his hand on his dagger said he would not speak to one who was a traitor to the King of Portugal his brother.

Simão de Mello was silenced, and the King withdrew leaving all the members of the Council in agreement with what he had said, without Simão de Mello being able to contradict him; they therefore sent to make a proclamation that all Portuguese of whatever quality they might be should embark in the galleons by two o'clock in the afternoon; and calling Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra they entrusted the Armada to him, who at once went on board the Capitanea and ordered a sailing-gun to be fired, and directed that so soon as a breeze from the land should arise they should set sail for Queixome, where either the galleons must remain in the possession of the English or their ships in our hands. As soon as the King heard the proclamation and learnt of the preparations that were being made to dispeed the Armada, he ordered all his drums to be beaten, and mounted on horseback with all his nobles, ordering his Guazil to proceed to where the Captain and Veador da Fazenda were, and to help them with all the money and assistance that might be necessary, and to send him information of everything that was required as he would assist with his own person; whilst the preparations were being made, all the citizens of Ormuz, giving themselves up for lost, began to place all the goods which they had in their houses within the fortress, going about in such confusion that there was no one who would help in the work of fortifying and strengthening the City, save only the King with his followers, who, without being accompanied by any Christian, did so much that he fenced the whole city round.

CHAPTER XXIX

How the English signed the Capitulations and the fortress was surrendered to them.

The English had received the letter and terms of the besieged in the fort of Queixome, and reflecting upon the uncertainties of war, and that if they delayed the galleons might come out, or the Captain-Major receive some reinforcement, or the garrison might change their minds and refuse to come to any other settlement than that of arms, (because the moat was very strongly fortified and even though the fortress was partly demolished yet it was difficult to scale it), they therefore sent to tell those of the Fortress to send some Captains or other persons with orders to carry out the terms of surrender.

When the besieged received this message, four Captains volunteered for this purpose, who were instructed how they were to proceed in all their dealings with the enemy. These latter received them on their arrival with great courtesy, and after much haggling over the terms they consented to accept them as they had been drawn up in the fortress, and said that on the following day the garrison should be ready to embark for Ormuz with all their things. The terms of surrender having been agreed upon together with all their demands for their own personal safety, the Captains returned with them to the fortress. As soon as the day dawned on the following morning, the Persian army withdrew to more than 400 paces from the fortress, and the English General marched up with five English companies with their colours and drums; when he arrived at the gates of the fortress of Queixome they were opened to him, all the Portuguese being drawn up with their weapons, lighted matches etc: as likewise were the Lascarins. One of the

Captains who had signed the Capitulations came out bearing the keys in a salver, and handed them to him; the Captain-Major then came out dressed in black with his sword at his side but without his batôn, and the English General approaching him said to him very respectfully and courteously, that so great a Captain would not be down cast by the adversities of Fortune; and giving him his hand, asked him to accompany him to his flagship where (as in the rest of the Fleet) he would receive the treatment that so valiant a Portuguese deserved. The Captain-Major answered him never a word, but only followed him.

The English entered into the Fortress and ordered the Portuguese to go out two by two, and as they left they took off them their weapons and everything else that they were carrying.[1] Then going to the Lascarins they ordered them to give up their arms,and to remain within the fortress in order that they might be embarked together with the Portuguese.

The Lascarins seeing that the Portuguese had also given up their weapons, obediently handed over those that they had, remaining in the Fortress as they were ordered to. The English went down to the beach and ordered the Portuguese to embark in the ship's launches which were already there, and after they were all in them, they made a signal to the Persians, who fell like famished wolves upon those brave Lascarins—who were already disarmed—and killed them all, to the number of 800; but not so easily as they had imagined, for the Lascarins killed 300 Persians, since when they saw they were doomed, they threw themselves upon the latter, and with their own swords that they wrenched from their hands they fought like men whose only hopes of Life were in their arms; thus nothing was kept of the Capitulations, and the Enemy were now reproached with having made a bridge of silver.[1]

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[1] "And soe the first of February [O.S.], haveinge dispeeded both Portugalls and Mores, to the nomber of six or seven hundred men, weomen and childrin, whereof 300 were Portugalls, the Pertian generall and wee hand in hand tooke possessione of the Castle, where the culours of both nations weare at one instant sett upp, where they stand, and wee hope shalbe ther mayntayned, to the honour of our natione and perpetuall disgrase to our proud enymies."—(Letter from the Commanders of the Fleet on board the *Jonas*, February $\frac{7}{17}$ 1622.)

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END OF THE FIRST BOOK

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[1] It is not easy to see the allusion of this remark. Apparently there is an obscure proverb "Make a silver bridge for the enemy who turns his back on you"—a "silver bridge" being one easy to cross. Francis Pinder who was in Bandar Abbas at this time wrote: "The Portugalls and Moores haveinge yielded under our protixione, some daye after the Mores were sent on shoare to the Pertian, who formerly had promysed them mercie, but falsely muthered them moſt unhumanly." There can be little doubt that the English knew what was impending all along.

BOOK THE SECOND

CHAPTER XXX

How the news of the loss of the Fortress of Queixome was learnt in Ormuz, and of the preparations that were made there.

THE English Factor who was stationed at Cape Iasques had made an alliance between them and the Persians, whereby they were to aid the latter to drive the Portuguese out of that Strait, in return for which the Persians would give them 600,000 rupees (which amount to 300,000 patacas), half forthwith, and the other half in one year's time, laid out in silks; furthermore, the English were to hand over the fortress of Queixome and employ all their forces against that of Ormuz; if it was taken, the booty would be equally divided, half and half, between the English and the Persians; and the galleons together with all the other ships that might be on the sea, with all the artillery that was in them, would belong to the English, whilst the King and the Guazil together with the other Mohamedan nobles, would be sent by the Persians as a present to the Great Soldan of Persia. If Ormuz was not taken, and if the City was sacked, each party would be allowed to keep what they took therein; and for as long as the English should wish to trade along the Persian coast, all the ports and customs-houses would be free to them, without their having to pay any taxes whatsoever.

When this agreement and the loss of Queixome was known in the Fortress of Ormuz, the Captain immediately mounted his horse and accompanied by the Veador da Fazenda, Factor, and others who assisted him in the councils, proceeded to the Royal Palace,—being still uneasy on account of the words which the King had spoken to him concerning the succouring of Queixome.

As soon as the King heard the drums of the Captain on his way to the Palace, he went to meet him at the entrance-hall, where he found Simão de Mello ready with many apologies for their quarrel on the previous day; this latter said to him "Your Highness must know already of the loss of Queixome and the situation there with the capture of the Captain-Major Ruy Freyre de Andrade," whereon the King answered him that he had also lost his cousin Miragonadim[1] therein, and that what mattered now was to take measures to counteract the calamities that threatened to overwhelm Ormuz. Simão de Mello replied that he had come to seek him for that very reason, since he did not wish to infringe His Majesty's Regulations which laid down that the Governors of Ormuz should hold no Council in that Fortress without his Highness being present thereat in the first place. The King answered that if the council was to be in His Majesty's Service for the good of that City and Fortress, and made to be carried out they would go upstairs, but if it was to be made for conversing and passing the time, then they need speak no further nor bother about any other matters, since the fortress of Queixome was lost, not through the strength of the enemy, nor lack of valour and resolution in the Captain and soldiers who had so bravely defended it, but through the neglect and fault of him who did not succour it when he could so easily have done so.

Simão de Mello pretended not to understand, and they all went upstairs, and opened the Council, in the midst of which there arrived André Coutinho whom Simão de Mello had sent to obtain news of Queixome, who trying repeatedly to make his way thither was

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[1] Cogenedim is presumably meant (see p. 54).



comforme deste [illegible] curso se não ha [illegible] donde não
r vem gardo [illegible] de estreiros [illegible] q não vencerão saida
Deus a V.m. [illegible] de [illegible]

AUTOGRAPH SIGNATURE OF RUY FREYRE DE ANDRADE
(Reproduced from an original letter in the possession of the author)

unable to do so until he found the way clear with the truce resulting from the surrender. Entering the room he said "Gentlemen, the fortress is lost and the Captain-Major prisoner, whilst the soldiers who escaped are coming here in three terradas, except two that have remained in the company of the Captain-Major who gave me this note for Your Worship,"—and drawing it from his bosom he handed it to Simão de Mello, who read it aloud to everyone as follows:—

"Of the Loss of Queixome and my disgrace, Your Worship will give an account to God and to His Majesty, Senhor Simão de Mello. The forces of the enemy are mustering against Ormuz. Your Worship should read the inscription which says *If you see European foemen anchor off this bar, flood the moat, and sleep in peace* on a shield which is at the feet of the great Affonso de Albuquerque. Follow his advice since we have fared so ill with our own."

Ruy Freyre de Andrade.

When the letter was read, Simão de Mello began to snap his finger saying, "If Ruy Freyre surrendered the fortress of Queixome, Simão de Mello will not yield that of Ormuz, because he has proceeded better than him on all occasions." One of those present answered him, "Senhor Simão de Mello, we must not be overproud, since we are not out of the wood yet, and moreover Ruy Freyre has many times measured his sword with the Moors, with a valour that is notorious, and we cannot say as much of him who cannot boast of this, and who has been the cause of his ruin."

In this manner there was spent what remained of the day, without anything being decided upon, after which the Captain retired to sleep as soundly as if his soul had been quite untroubled by any cares, but the enemy did not sleep neither did they let slip the opportunity of preparing their fleets to go against Ormuz. Simão de Mello, getting up next day at 11 o'clock went with the others to speak with the King in his Palace, where the King said to him "Are we awaiting the enemy to surrender this City and Fortress to him, or to defend them from him? If we are to defend ourselves, why has not the moat,—which is at present choked up at the foot of the bulwark of Santiago—been cleared? And why not send to collect the vast supplies of wood which are in the magazines of the Customs-house, Factory, Hospital, and other houses? and why are the fortifications which the Captain Dom Francisco de Sousa began, still unfinished? and why are not the supplies of corn, rice, wine, butter and other provisions collected, of which the shops of the merchants are full—enough to last many men for 10 years? And likewise why not fill the cisterns of the King my brother with the vast amount of water with which all the houses of this city are provided; for all of which we have men enough, and let us not leave all this to the enemy, whose entry we cannot stop, since no fortification has been made in the streets and City; and if what ought to be done was going to be left undone, of what use would it be to propose and agree to things which would never be carried out?"

Simão de Mello said that he would do what his Highness should decide upon, since he had a high regard for his opinion; and that he would give orders for everything to be collected within the fortress, and for the unfinished fortifications to be completed, whilst as for the moat below the bulwark they could clear it at any time they wished, as it was within the moat itself; the galleons should be withdrawn to close under the fortress, and the crews that were in them should be disembarked on land, in order to reinforce the place where the enemy might attempt to land, with a view to preventing them from doing so; finally, he said that the galliots should be reinforced with 50 soldiers each, in order to give battle to the Persian Fleet.

The King, knowing full well the parlous situation in which they were and the impossibility of remedying it, smiled when he heard of these preparations, and misliking the buisiness said,—That the enemies' fleet was already off the point of Cauru, and that if ours did not go out to meet them there was no doubt but that we would have to burn our ships beneath our own fortress. For this reason his desire was that the Armada should leave without delay, whilst a single one of our galliots would suffice to oppose 200 Persian terradas, as these latter had so many times learnt to their cost. As for the English ships, our seven galleons were a match for them, since they were the most powerful and heavily-gunned that there were at that time in India. Furthermore, if the battle was fought at sea, even if we should suffer loss therein, the security of the fortress of Ormuz would be for ever assured, whilst if the contrary was done, its loss and destruction would inevitably follow; whoever was of a contrary opinion was lacking in that faith and loyalty which was due to his own King, and would be the cause of an indelible stain and blemish upon the honour of Portugal, and upon the renowned valour of the Portuguese.

Notwithstanding this so proper resolution of the King, there were various differences of opinion, and after debating thereon, they came to agree with the worst, and it was decided that the galleons should be drawn further within, and the crews that were on board them disembarked. When the King saw this, he asked Simão de Mello to assign him a place in the fortress, where he could withdraw to with his Guazil and household staff and servants. The Castle keep was allotted to him, after which the Council broke up, and the King ordered the Prince and his other noblemen to help personally at the works of fortification with which they had been entrusted. The Captain gave orders for the galleons to be brought in, so they were hauled ashore between the bulwark of "São Pedro" and that of the sea in a depth of 5 fathoms,—a place and posture where they more resembled merchant vessels than galleons of the Portuguese Armadas, once the fear and terror of all the East.

The King ordered all his household and treasures to be taken to the fortress, and whilst they were being brought in, he cast his eyes upon them, not without some signs of tears which revealed his sorrow, and uttered these words,—"Ah Fortress! My ancestors helped to build you, and I cannot enjoy you in peace because the misgovernment of a Captain will lose you."

His foreboding was further increased by the fact that his horse stumbled and threw him heavily on the ground, and as the Moors are great diviners, and attach much importance to omens, they were greatly struck by this, and thus both he and his Guazil impressed by this superstition regarded the loss of the fortress as inevitable.

CHAPTER XXXI

How the Persians and English came upon Ormuz, fought with the Armada of rowing-vessels, and disembarked at Careca.

THE affairs of the Strait were in that posture which we have described, when on the 23rd of February 1622[1] the Persian and English Fleets effected a junction off the point of Caurù.

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[1] The English give the date as February $\frac{10}{20}$ $162\frac{1}{2}$. Simão de Mello says it was the 21st in his account, whilst Manoel Borges de Souza also gives the 20th. In any case it was not the 23rd as in the text.


170
COMO RAN
FORTALEZA
FORTALEZA DE ORMVZ,
Cavallericos
Ribera
Sorgidor
Aloran
Porto
Ilha de Queixime
onde se haze agoada
LARDIMIRA
N.S. de la Pena
S.L.
Casa del Rei
TVRVMBAQVE
Entrada delos Nauios

ORMUZ
(*From a woodcut in Faria y Sousa's "Asia Portuguesa"*)

[*face page* 116

When the Captain Simão de Mello saw this, he at once sent to strip the galleons of all they had within them, and ordered Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra to proceed with the whole of the Armada of rowing vessels to the place where the enemy were, close to the shore, in order to prevent them disembarking in case they should attempt to do so by means of their terradas and terranquins. Meanwhile watch was kept the whole night within the fortress, the citizens being so perturbed that the women and others who were incapacitated from bearing arms by reason of their age or sex, together with the poor and afflicted, paraded the city with great lamentations, beseeching God for mercy and help for themselves and justice upon those who had left them without defence and abandoned,—a spectacle so harrowing that it broke down the fortitude of the bravest.

These demonstrations, (so well grounded considering that their honours, lives and goods were likely to become the spoil of the barbarous enemy), and the profound weeping and wailing of this afflicted multitude foreboded the miserable loss of so wealthy a stronghold. This fear was further increased when at daybreak the sea was seen to be covered with the sails of the Persian Fleet, which (owing to the lack of wind) came towing the English ships in the direction of Caurù, where Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra was waiting with the Armada of rowing-vessels,—the galliots being drawn up close in shore with their prows pointing seawards, ready for whatever might occur.

The Persian Fleet being composed of lighter vessels came on in advance, making as if to land men on the shore, where 600 Portuguese musketeers armed back and front, and equipped with helmets and lances, were drawn up to defend the position together with the King of Ormuz himself, accompanied by all his Princes, nobles and Moors. At this moment Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra descried a great squadron of terradas that were coming from the direction of Comorão[1] to unite with the Persian Fleet which was sailing straight towards the shore; and wishing to join battle whilst they were still seperated, he ordered a sailing-gun to be fired, and to the sound of drums and trumpets steered towards the Persian Fleet, which to the strains of martial music bore straight down upon ours in a very well-formed half-moon, being received with a thunderous salute of cannon-balls.

The half-moon at once closed up enveloping our galliots in the middle, and the struggle was begun on both sides with exceptional fury, and was waged with such violence that it was one of the hardest-fought conflicts which ever took place in Indian regions, and one in which the Portuguese showed great heroism, performing such marvellous exploits, that the Persians gave away before our Armada and drew off from it, whilst ours, seeing this, pursued them firing heavily, despite the fact that the enemy was much stronger than we were.

The other enemy Fleet, which had already joined the English ships, hastily rowed up to reinforce the other squadron which was retiring in good order, and uniting with each other they both turned to attack ours, which wrought such havoc amongst them during the space of four hours which this battle lasted, that their shattered vessels were compelled to retire to the protection of the ships, which were already under sail and plying to windward in short tacks owing to the light breeze that was blowing. Withal our men went following up the enemy with such ardour in the victory that God had placed within their hands, that the day would have been a singularly fortunate one, if it had not been marred by the fatal misfortune which resulted from the fortress (fearing lest our Armada should suffer some damage if it became involved with the enemy, since the two Persian Fleets had united with the English squadron) firing a gun as sign to retire,—signal which Dom Gonçalo, although he heard and understood it, deliberately ignored, pretending not to understand it, since he was so elated with the victory which he was pursuing; and thus without obeying it, he swept the enemy in flight to more than a league from the beach of Ormuz where they had intended to disembark.

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[1] Gombroon as the English termed it. The modern Bandar Abbas. The name Comorão is said by some to be derived from Camarão (Port. for shrimp).

And moreover the King shouted to them not to fire a second shot but to let our Armada follow its course, since without any loss to themselves they had wrought such havoc in their opponents that of their terradas and terranquins some were burnt and others sunk and many of their men slain, whilst the ships were already so unmanageable that each one was steering a seperate course. In despite of this so reasonable opinion, the Captain Simão de Mello ordered the gun to be fired again, and seeing that Dom Gonçalo still did not obey it, fired a third time with ball.

Some of those nearby asked him what was the reason for recalling the Armada, when he saw with his own eyes that it was proving more than a match for the enemy? to which he replied that he did not care to run the risk of the wind freshening when the English ships could fill their sails and attack the armada and destroy it. Balthezar de Chaves answered him in these formal words "Sir, has not each of those galliots 50 oars, a mast, a demi-cannon, and guns and Portuguese within it? Have the ships oars? or are they birds which can swoop down upon the galliots from the air? The truth of the matter is that we are lost through our sins and not by reason of the strength or power of the enemy."

Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra obeyed the third cannon-shot albeit much against his will, and at three o'clock in the afternoon he retired to the point of Caurù where he anchored victoriously without having lost a single one of his men.[1] The enemy Fleets, although they had already lost all hope of disembarking in Ormuz so soon as they saw that ours was withdrawing, gained fresh courage; and the success of their enterprise being facilitated in this manner, the English Flagship fired a gun, and steered in the same direction together with all the rest of their Fleet.

This event clearly showed how God through his mysterious ways permitted that our men should become so blind that they comitted one mistake after another in the conduct of affairs, of all of which the greatest was the first, namely that of not letting the galleons go out; for without doubt, if they had joined battle with the enemy fleets, the hopes of the Persians would have been frustrated and the lie given to the promises of the English, whilst both forces would have been destroyed in that conflict; but Divine Providence wished to use our own errors as the means of our punishment.

As soon as the King and those who were with him on the shore for its defence saw that our Armada was retiring, leaving the sea of which we were masters to our opponents, and that we were losing almost voluntarily, they began to lose heart.

Towards nightfall the Captain ordered that the whole of our Armada should be withdrawn to below the bastion of "Santiago," through which action the beach was left free for the enemy to disembark in, which they did with perfect safety. Yet Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra did not fail to make an attempt to inflict some damage on the foe, for seeing the Persians on shore, he fired a cannon shot, and rowed forward to destroy them, which he would have done without any difficulty, but when he was advancing to execute his design, Simão de Mello ordered a signal to be made for him to retire, which he did; and he was so resentful and disgusted, that on disembarking he went up to the Captain, and said angrily that he would immediately resign his command of the Armada and hand it over to him, since he did not wish to dishonour his person with the name of poltroon and coward. Simão de Mello made answer that he did not accept his resignation nor the transfer of the Armada, of which he (D. Gonçalo) would have to give an account to His Majesty, adding that he should repair on board and that if he would not do so, he the Captain, would inform the King of all that had passed. Dom Gonçalo replied furiously "Senhor Simão de Mello, I did not come to Ormuz to dishonour myself. Your Worship has robbed me of my honour and has been the cause of the enemy, whom I had put to flight, being now within this City; and a very bad witness will I be for your affairs and for the account that will have to be tendered to His Majesty. Therefore I resign the command of the Armada, and for the future I will do nothing except in the rank of a soldier, in which capacity I came to this strait." And without any further discourse he turned his back on him and retired to the post of Balthezar de Chaves which was at the entrance to Careca.

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[1] The whole story of this naval engagement which preceded the Anglo-Persian landing on Ormuz is a baseless fabrication. None of the English accounts make any mention of the landing being opposed. The Commanders in their letter of April 27 1622 (O.S.) write: "The 10th of February last past the Persians, by means of our convey, had safe arrivall upon this island of Ormus, to the number of 3,000 souldiers and piners [=pioneers] or thereabouts; and beinge landed about two myles from the cytty marched directly thither and without any manner of resistance worth the writinge tooke the same. . . ." Furthermore all the Portuguese witnesses at the subsequent Court of Inquiry held at Goa in 1624 into the loss of Ormuz explicitly state that no effort whatever was made to prevent the disembarkation of the enemy [*v.* Cordeiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-265].

CHAPTER XXXII

How the Persians entered the City and sacked it.

Such disorder reigned in the City and Fortress by reason of the bad government thereof, that all within was chaos and confusion, whilst the terrified citizens tried to save the best of their goods and chattels by carrying them into the castle, and the poor and afflicted lamented to Heaven with just cause.

On disembarking the Persians drew up their formation on land in their usual manner, and came marching on the City in very orderly array, without anyone making the least resistence to their entry. Finding this so easy, and not seeing any opposition—quite contrary to what they had imagined,—they broke their ranks and burst in a disorderly manner into the houses of the City to plunder the excessive and inumerable riches that were therein, since it was the most celebrated emporium and wealthiest trading-city of all the East.

The King, who was in his Palace, on seeing this débacle, lost all hope of remedy, and left by a postern-gate together with all his household and familly to take refuge within the Fortress. Meanwhile there were still left at the entrance to Careca Balthezar de Chaves, Diogo Pereyra de Macedo, Hieronymo Tavares, Fernam de Barros, Manoel Cabaço, and Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra with 300 Portuguese who were awaiting the enemy there, since they thought that the other Captains and soldiers would be in the positions which had been assigned to them.

However since everything was undefended, the enemy entered freely as far as the Royal Palace which was situated behined the place where the above-mentioned Captains were. These seeing the Moors so close, and that these latter were between them and the Fortress, whilst many others were in the Bazar, Balthezar de Chaves said to the remainder, "Gentlemen, Today is the day in which our arms give us Life, and in which we will show to the infidels what the Portuguese are worth!" And ordering the charge to be sounded, they sallied out by the broad street below until they reached the Gate of the Palace, which was situated in a square in which there was a Mosque, wherein were many Moors who came out to meet our men, whom they found so courageous, that although they were more than 200 to 1, they were forced to evacuate the street and square, which they abandoned, leaving it filled with corpses that the brave Portuguese had slain with such valour; some of them being cut in pieces with the sword and others burnt with powder-pans and blunderbusses, whilst we had only a few men wounded and none killed. Thus without any of the Persians being able to stop them, this small and heroic party went down through the middle of the Bazar as far as the Misericordia and Palace, until they reached the fortress—all the streets being full of the enemy.

Bras Rodriguez was stationed with 50 soldiers in the houses of the Veador da Fazenda for the defence of that neighbourhood and the numerous goods that were stored in that Customs-house. However, as the enemy found no other defences nor resistence in the City, and since their vast strength was great enough to be divided, they forced their way into the Hospital which was a continuation of the above houses, broke down the walls and burst into the ground-floors, thus placing Bras Rodriguez and his men in great peril in the upper stories. But Antonio Mendez Rapozo throwing down on the ground-floor a barrel of powder with a great quantity of powder-pots, blew up the houses and the Portuguese within them, leaving the Persians burnt and buried in the ruins thereof; and in this manner they were enabled to escape along a ruined wall, (albeit many of them badly burnt by the fire), and retire to the fortress through the midst of the Persian musketry, whilst the one who was the most severely wounded and exhausted was Antonio Mendez Rapozo himself.[1]

When our various parties had retired to the fortress, the City was left together with the unhappy wives, daughters and sisters of the Ormuzians, abandoned to the mercy of the Enemy; it being a pitiful sight to see the lamentations with which the Moorish and Gentile women complained of the neglect that had left them in the power of their enemies.

In the midst of this miserable confusion, a Moorish girl came to the foot of the bulwark of "São Pedro," beseeching for the door to be opened to her. Simão de Mello ordered the wicket-gate to be opened for her, and when she was let in and brought before him and the other Captains and councillors, she said that she was desirous of becoming a Christian, a resolve brought about by the hope of saving her soul and not through fear of death, of which she felt no dread; adding that she also came to warn them on God's behalf to bewail their sins and ask the Lord for pardon of them with true repentence thereof, since if they did not do so, they could rest assured that the great punishment which was decreed against that fortress would fall upon them; and she further declared that as proof of what she had said, she would end her life and entrust her soul to her Creator when she had become a Christian. All the bystanders were amazed at this, and still more, when on receiving the Holy Baptism, she expired immediately on doing so, as the term that she had assigned to her life,—prodigy that caused great consternation amongst everyone.

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[1] Here again the writer had drawn extensively on his imagination. That there was little or no organised resistance to the Persian attack is shown not only by Monnox's account (Appendix X, p. 259) but by the depositions of the Portuguese witnesses at the Court of Inquiry in 1624. One soldier named Domingos Monteiro, who was actually serving in Ormuz at the time, deposed that " . . . he knows, as an eye-witness, that when the enemy landed on the island of Ormuz their disembarkation was not opposed, as it ought to have been. . . ." Other witnesses stated that " it was notorious that the enemy's landing in the island of Ormuz was not opposed, neither were any of the usual precautions of war taken, but on the contrary they evacuated the city and retired to the fortress." [Cordeiro, pp. 236-256 *passim.*]

CHAPTER XXXIII

Of the Fortification that the Persians made in the City.

When Simão de Mello saw that the Persians were masters of the City, he resolved to inform the Governor of India of all that had happened and of the condition that the fortress was in; and on his sending to tell the King of his decision, the latter sent a reply that he took no more notice thereof than a dead man, and that he only wanted to remind his Honour that he had once said that he wished to have his enemies at close quarters, and now he had them so near that within 2 month's time they would eat with him on his verandah. He likewise urged the Captain to bestir himself and clear that portion of the moat, wherein lay their only hope as he had already warned him several times, and he concluded by saying that the best favour that he could do him, and one which he solicited most earnestly, was that he should not count upon him to do anything else other than shoulder an arquebus and do his duty with it like any common soldier.

Whilst this was passing in the fortress, the Enemy seeing that they had mastered the City so easily and that the Portuguese were shut up in the fortress, began to erect platforms for the battery and conquest thereof, which they began to carry out, availing themselves of the vast stores of wood, materials, and tools which our carelessness had abandoned to them. Their energy was still further increased by the rumours which were circulating to the effect that the Khan of Shiras was expected to arrive at Comorão with an overwhelming army of splendid troops, the best, most skillfull and most warlike that there were then in Persia, with the intention of entering the fortress by the moat at the foot of the bulwark of "Santiago," where they had free space to mine. And this was the reason why the King of Ormuz and all the other Councillors warned Simão de Mello to clear the moat—a thing which could easily have been done and with which the Castle would have been rendered impregnable against all the power of the Universe;—but he with wanton carelessness did not trouble to do so.

The Persians on the contrary did not neglect to fortify themselves, barricading the ends of the streets that led to the parade-ground in front of the fortress, filling up with rubble the houses in that quarter, blocking up the windows and opening loopholes in them from which to ply their artillery. In the Customs-house they constructed a magnificent platform whereon they planted ten guns of 24 to 40 lbs calibre, that extended to the houses of the Veador da Fazenda, which were close to the sea and built with very strong walls. They had taken the Hospital and the Monastry of Sancto Agostinho, and on a quay 21 feet long which was close to it, they constructed a battery near the Chancel, overlooking the sea, on which were placed 8 guns of 24-40 lbs calibre, wherewith they made a heavy and continuous bombardment against the galleons, although they also suffered much damage from them. The Hall of the Customs House in which the Tribunal sat was blocked up, and great and strong parapets were built upon it, whereon were mounted 12 guns, which bombarded the bastion of "São Pedro" and the Captain's houses. A strong wooden pallisade 18 feet high ran from the Customs-House to the Misericordia. In this same Church of the Misericordia was built another platform with eight guns which maintained a heavy fire upon the bulwark of the "Bell of Santiago." They also fortified the houses of Luiz de Magalhães and those of Gil do Prado, but they did not place any artillery in either of them. They likewise barricaded the great Bazar street with a strong rampart of thick beams and shards, by which they were somewhat protected from our artillery. In the houses of the Master of the Horse which were close to the Captain's stable, they made a very strong bulwark wherein they placed the most, best, and heaviest artillery, and men, that they had, since it was situated opposite that of "Santiago," through which they intended to enter the fortress.

When these fortifications were finished, a heavy bombardment was opened therefrom against the fortress, under cover of which they drove their approaches up to the moat of the Castle by means of trenches and gabions, so that they suffered but little from our artillery.

The galley and some galliots were drawn up on shore beneath the ramada,[1] for owing to the hurry and confused state of affairs, no orders had been given for their disposal, and it had been better for us to have burnt them than let the enemy do so. The Captain therefore resolved to make a sortie, for which purpose he ordered Francisco de Britto of Evora with 50 soldiers armed with swords and bucklers, pistols in their belts, and blunderbusses, accompanied by 20 Lascarins with lances, powder-pots and hand-grenades to march straight upon the Harbour-Master's Office (which they could do without being perceived owing to the cover afforded by the ramada and the shadows of the galliots); whilst the Lascarins were to remain here and set fire to the place, our soldiers were to make every possible endeavour to reach the bulwark which, as we have said, ran from the Customs-house to the shore, and make a sudden, violent assault thereon.

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[1] There is no exact English translation for "ramada" that I know of. It was a kind of roof or shelter of planks, branches and foliage, etc., placed over small vessels drawn up on a beach, to protect them (apparently) from the sun.

With this order, they left by the wicket-door in the principal gate of the fortress, and reached the Harbour-Master's Office where they left the Lascarins with the fire-works; and passing the trenches without being perceived, they arrived at the appointed place and fired such a deadly volley with their blunderbusses into the Persians, that not one was left alive of the many who were stationed there. Our men had intended to advance further, but they found the trenches so deep and dangerous that if the enemy had seized their arms they would have been unable to return; and thus they retired to set fire to the galliots and to the houses of the Harbour-Master and of the Dockyard Superintendent not leaving anything unburnt, and after performing this exploit so safely that they had no dead or wounded, they withdrew to the Fortress.

The intense heat and the corruption of the provisions owing to their having been a long time in the Royal Mazagines, were the cause of numerous diseases within the Fortress, of which many people died. For this reason the Captain ordered the galleons to be beached near the Traitor's gate, where, being at the waterside they could be launched when necessary; and thus they beached three of them, leaving four ready for what might occur, and distributed their crews amongst the bastions. He then sent to advise the Governor of India of what was happening, informing him of the state of affairs and that only by his coming to their relief could Ormuz be saved; but it was necessary for him to come speedily and with a great force in view of the strength with which the enemy held the fortress besieged. He added that his numbers were diminishing not only through the war but by diseases, and that unless help was forthcoming he would lay upon His Lordship the responsibility of giving an account thereof to His Majeſty, because it was untenable in it's present ſtate, and he would fulfill his duty by dying in the defence of it.

With the letter which contained this advice, he sent Phelippe de Affonseca in a light terranquim, to take it to Muscat to Miguel de Lima who was Captain of that fortress, with another for him in which he asked him to send the former one to the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque without delay. And together with these letters he gave him 6,000 Patacas so that he could bring with him on his return medicines for the sick and wounded, besides sheep, chickens and refreshments; and in addition he gave him unlimited credit in case he should need more money.

CHAPTER XXXIV

How the galleons were scuttled, and what else happened in Ormuz.

THE bombardment that the enemy opened from the Santo Agoſtinho wharf againſt the place where the galleons were (which we have already described), was so intense and continuous that there was every likelihood of their being sunk; in view of this, the Captain Simão de Mello assembled the Council, wherein it was agreed that in order to evade such a loss and risk, all the guns that were on board them should be taken out and ſtored in the fortress, whilſt the ships themselves were to be scuttled below the baſtion of "Esperito Sancto," since they would be safer there. This resolution was carried out, and the galleons were ſtripped of their artillery and tackle, all of which was dumped on shore near the Traitor's poſtern-gate; the galleons were then scuttled, being buried for ever, to the great grief and sorrow of all who saw the deſtruction of such powerful vessels. The Armada of rowing-vessels,—which if wiser counsels had prevailed could have saved those two fortresses,—was likewise left a prey of the waves and of our misfortune.

As soon as the English saw the galleons in that condition, they approached without danger to themselves, and dropped anchor at a musket-shot from the galleon *São Pedro*, that had been the Capitanea in which Ruy Freyre had left the Kingdom, and which had escaped the fate of the reſt because the seamen who were in her refused to allow her to be treated like the others, without heeding the orders and proteſts that were made to them on this matter. Nay rather, on seeing the English ships close to them, they boldly gave them such heavy broadsides that they forced them to sheer off from where they were, with great loss of men; the galleon fought in this manner for seven days, bringing some of the enemy ship's maſts by the board, and putting their flag-ship in particular in such a ſtate (as it was loath to leave the place where it had anchored) that finally the long-boats of the other ships had to come and tow it away, after which it lay on the careen for many days.[1]

All this time the seamen of the galleon fought so well that the enemy were unable to capture it, until seeing that all their powder was finished they embarked in the ship's-boat, and setting fire to the galleon which was burnt up within a short space, they withdrew to the fortress, where they were duly received with the congratulations that so heroic an exploit had deserved by everyone except the Captain, who imprisoned them all, and would have hung some of them if he had not been prevented from doing so by their supporters and well-wishers.

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[1] The English commanders in a joint letter dated Ormuz April $\frac{6}{16}$ 1622 say that the *São Pedro* was "deſtroyed by a ſtratagem of fyre on March 3 [O.S.] about 3 of ye clock by our 3 bardges and the *London's* pinnace—viz. The *London's* pinnace layd her athwart ye [halse ?] ye *Jonas* Bardge upon her larboard bough; ye *Wale's* bardge upon her ſtarbourd qter; and ye *Dolphin's* bardge upon her larbourd qter; cominge neere them they were haled by ye Portugalls; but having order not to Answere, but presently to bourd her, was by them well observed and manfully performed. And . . . within lesse than ½ a qter [*sic*] of an hower she was all of a lighte flame" [India Office Persia Records, vol. i. This account is confirmed by those of Monnox and Manoel Borges de Sousa, *v.* Appendices X and IV, besides those printed in vol. x. of Purchas, 1905 ed.]

The King of Ormuz reflecting upon the fortune of the one galleon which had remained, and upon the voluntary destruction of the others, and the distance of the enemy from the Fortress (which could do them no harm with its cannon save only indirectly and in a few places), regarded the loss of the Fortress as inevitable; he therefore entered the Council Chamber (which until then he had not done since his retirement) and meeting with Simão de Mello, the Veador da Fazenda Manoel Borges, and others of their party, he said to them that he had come to ask the Captain to give him 6 galliots so that he could embark himself and what remained of his treasures in them for Goa, since he saw the fortress in such a condition that only a miracle could save it, and that if he went in person he would be of no little use in that city in order to raise money and men therein, which would be useful for either the relief or restoration of Ormuz as the case might be.

Simão de Mello replied that he was astonished that His Highness should wish to absent himself from that fortress, when his presence alone encouraged the soldiers, and inspired by his dauntless mien, there was not a man who was wanting in resolution. Furthermore, His Highness being, as he was, the King of Ormuz, what would all the State of India and its Governor say, when they saw him forsake his own country? Whilst he could not refuse to give him a ship, yet he could scarcely allow him to take it, since the fortress of the King of Portugal would be exposed to inumerable perils in the event of the absence of His Highness. These reasons induced the King to change his mind, and he thought that it was more fitting for his prestige and royal Estate, not to leave the fortress; only he stipulated that the Captain should send his Guazil to Goa with his treasures which abounded in many riches, both his own and those inherited from his ancestors, besides those of many private individuals; however neither did this come to anything.

Whilst these matters were being considered the enemy was attempting to approach nearer to the fortress, but Simão de Mello (who was now being aroused from his negligence by the recent events) not wishing to allow them to do so unhindered, entrusted 300 men divided into 6 companies to Balthezar de Chaves, one of the best, stoutest and most practised Captains, that there was in that time.

The Captains of the 6 companies were Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo, Antonio Mourão de Oliveyra, Domingos Pirez Vieyra, Manoel Cabaço and Antonio Palha, whilst Balthezar de Chaves himself likewise had his own company. He made a stirring speech to these officers, directing them to attack the platform which was next to the Misericordia; and in particular he entrusted Simão Gomes, Vicente Carrasco, Diogo Lopez and Thomé de Caceres with the task of spiking all the guns on that platform, with the tools which he gave them for that purpose.

Having taken leave of the Captain at 11 o'clock of the night they all marched forth in good order, with their helmets concealed lest the enemy should see them, and reached the trenches without being perceived by the Moors who on feeling the sharp points of the Portuguese sword-thrusts took to flight in the direction of the platform, whilst our men pressed on after them without receiving any hurt from the cannon and musket balls through which they passed; when however our men reached the platform, the English and Moors defended it with the valour of despair, which was not withal enough to resist the courage and determination of our men, who entered it by force of arms, making those of the enemy who were able to escape the edge of their swords cast themselves headlong from the parapets; this gave them the opportunity to spike the artillery and retire victorious, taking with them everything that they had found in that post.

On the very next night Phelippe de Affonseca arrived from Muscat where he had left the letter for the Governor of India (which we have already mentioned), and brought back with him besides the terranquim in which he had gone, two more laden with corn, sheep, hens, jars of eggs in oil, oranges, dates and so forth, as he had been ordered; he also brought letters for the King, Simão de Mello and Ruy Freyre from the Governor of India, which were joyfully received and which were practically all of the same tenour, dealing with the defence of Queixome and with the reinforcements which he had sent and those he was now fitting out.

In that addressed to the Captain Simão de Mello it was added that if the English should enter the Strait, he was to send out our Armada against them and that if there was no Captain-Major for it, he himself was to take command of the galleons and fight with the ships, entrusting the Fortress to the King of Ormuz; furthermore, if he was reduced to the last extremity and the enemy victorious, he was to set fire to the galleons and perish with them, because, if all were burnt together, we would be left with the glory of destroying the enemy; The Armada of rowing-vessels was to be ready to finish off what he had failed to do in this enterprise.

Simão de Mello was greatly downcast by this order, seeing that what the letter ordered him to carry out was the same as he had always been advised to do, and which he had always ignored, and thus his sorrow rendered him melancholy and morose. And what above all disheartened him was that the enemy had driven their mine halfway across the moat towards the bastion of "Sanctiago," which was already partially demolished by their cannonade; the evidence of these events clearly showed the fatal obstinacy with which he had rejected the counsel of the King of Ormuz, both in not sending out the galleons to fight the English ships, as in not clearing out the moat, which was the probable cause of the slow but sure ruin and loss of the fortress,—all through his fault, and not through want of courage in the soldiers.

CHAPTER XXXV

How the Persians came with a mine to the bastion of "Sanctiago," and what happened to it.

THE English never ceased to continually batter the fortress, but with little result, because the bastions were hewn out of rocks and the parapets very thick; because of this, they despaired of entering it by assault, and thought it impossible both by reason of the height of the walls as by the [extra-?] ordinary vigilance and valour with which it was defended; they therefore resolved to demolish the bastion of "Sanctiago" by driving a mine through the moat which had been heedlessly and obstinately left uncleared, and continuing with the one which had already been ruined, they drove it nearer the sea, with the water up to their knees, and reached as far as the foot of the bastion, strengthening it so that it should not be again destroyed by our artillery fire; they then pierced it half-way up with another one which they made leading to a big hole in which they placed a barrel of gunpowder, blocking up the rest very firmly with stone and lime so that the force of the explosion should not be expended backwards, leaving a touch-hole through which to fire the mine.

When this work was finished they retired to their posts, from whence the continual bombardment never ceased, and our men who were on the projecting cavalier-bastions of the Fortress suffered heavy loss from the enemy musketry, whilst ours hurt them but little owing to the trenches and gabions which they constructed during their approach.

One morning some days afterwards, the redoubts and trenches of the enemy were seen to be decorated with numerous flags and banners to the sound of many kettle-drums and trumpets. This novelty aroused great wonder amongst the garrison of the Fortress, and on the King being informed, he went up to the bastion of the bell and looking towards the enemy trenches that ran below the bastion of "Sanctiago," he saw that they had no flags neither was there any noise of music from them; because of this, he at once boldly passed the word to stand to arms, whilst over a leather jerkin that came below his knees which he wore, he put a cuirass and a stout back-piece, placing on his head a helmet encircled with a crown of smelted gold, studded with many precious stones, and taking up a steel shield and drawing the scymeter out of his scabbard he said,—"Ah Portuguese Lions commanded by a sheep of a Captain,—this is a mine under the bastion of Sanctiago! Let everyone retire from it to the side walls, and stand to their weapons, for this is the day in which your valiant arms must do what they have always done."

The King was promptly obeyed, and at ten o'clock when the enemy fired the mine, it made so frightful an earthquake and shook the walls so much, that although the soldiers were lying down they were hardly safe, because the noise was so great that it seemed as if the whole world was crashing to the ground or coming to an end; moreover the structure of the whole building was violently upset, so that a large piece fell on to the mouth of the mine, and meeting with less resistence in the wall which was blocking it up, it burst thereon, some of the beams falling upon the enemy whereby more than 600 of them were slain, whilst that portion of the moat was rendered still more choked up; besides these men, many others were burnt by the fire in the redoubts near the houses of the Master of the Horse, in which great damage was wrought.

The Persians and English seeing that their designs were frustrated, as the devices which they had prepared against us were recoiled on themselves, and that the masonry which had fallen from the bastion into the moat blocked it up still more, to the advantage of the defence, they resolved to press on with their minning; they therefore continued an off-shoot which they had made, by which means they dug up to the rubbish, and in this work they spent many days, at the end of which they appeared at daybreak one morning close to the walls, on the left-hand of the mine wherein lay the powder; they had their mantlets mounted on very thick beams made of planks so strong and well riveted, that when a large and heavy piece of iron was thrown on them from above, it burst and did them no damage; furthermore they covered them with iron plates so that they were safe from the fire which was thrown upon them, and they strengthened their sides so that the ricochets from our artillery did them no harm.

It seemed to Captain Simão de Mello that it was necessary to send another advice to the Governor of India concerning the weakening condition of the fortress, and thus he together with the Veador da Fazenda, wrote to him in detail, informing him that unless help came before the end of April the Castle would not be able to hold out. He sent Pero Gomes Azevedo with these letters and another one for Miguel de Lima the Captain of Muscat, with orders not to return until he had first seen the advice-ship leave for India with the news. Pero Gomes left at midnight in a terranquim.

During all this while the Persians never ceased their bombardment by night or day, commencing every morning at 5 o'clock and stopping at nine, whilst every evening they fired from 3 till 7 o'clock, and thus they daily cannonaded for 8 hours; this already caused us such damage, that the bastion of " São Pedro " and that of the Bell, together with the party-wall connecting the two, had the greater part of their parapets beaten to the ground; withal, however, our artillery caused them such loss that they resolved to try to enter the fortress by the ruined bastion of " Sanctiago."

By this time our men were so exhausted by their toil, that the Moors were enabled to storm that part by a sudden surprise attack, killing as many Portuguese as they found therein, although not wholly without loss to themselves, since our cannon in the bastion of São Pedro—whence they were first perceived—mowed them down in heaps from behined. On the alarm being sounded, the Portuguese ran to the bastion, where they found that the Persians were already masters of it, and all our Portuguese assembling in a confused manner began to hurl grenades, powder-pots and blunderbusses on the foe. And finding that with these fire-arms they did themselves as much harm as the enemy, they resolved to make no further use of them, and everything was left to the sword, whereby such exploits were wrought and so stubborn and cruel a struggle was waged, that there was no room to fight on either side except on corpses.

At this moment Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra being informed that the Moors were being continually reinforced and were making headway, he shouted to the men to follow him and bring grenades, and cleaving a way through the enemy, being closely followed by Miguel Pereyra Borralho, Fernam de Barros and others, they reached the ruins of the bastion, where they with their hand-grenades and the garrison of the "São Pedro" bastion and our musketeers killed so many of the Persians, that their dead bodies formed a rampart for the living at the foot of the bastion.

As soon as Dom Gonçalo and the others had taken the breach of the ruined bastion, thus impeding the entrance or exit of the enemy, he fell upon them with great fury, and cleared it in such a fashion that accompanied by Miguel Pereyra, Fernam de Barros and the rest, he forced the Moors to retire and give up their attack which had cost them so dear. Likewise the King, Simão de Mello and Balthezar de Chaves, got the upper hand of the enemy to such an extent, that none who opposed them escaped alive.[1] Elsewhere were fighting with great valour the two brave brothers Diogo Pereyra and Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo, Francisco Gonçalvez, Lourenço Alvares Chamorro, Domingos da Camara, António Leytão, Francisco Tavares, Thomé de Caceres, Ioão de Andrade da Gama, Manoel Cabaço, Antonio Mourão de Oliveyra, Bras Rodriguez Banha, Belchior Lobo, Ioão Soares, Antonio Delgado and others to whom the immortality of the name of Portuguese will supply the lack of mention of their proper names; for they all fought this day in such a fashion that there was no enemy who confronted them who escaped from the edge of their swords; these exploits were useless, and were all the more in vain by reason of the disgrace which our sins, (and not want of courage), occasioned.

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[1] Compare Monnox:—"The 17th of March the Persians having placed above 40 barels of powder in a Mine which they had made under one of the Flankers of the Castle, fired the same, and blew up the corner of the wall making a faire breach, where they gave a fierce assault until nine at night. But the Portugalls made a manfull defence, and with Powder pots, scalding lead, and other fiery instruments, did much hurt to the assailants, burning, scalding, stoning many. Sha Culibeg notwithstanding, with 200 of his most resolute men get up into one of the Flankers, which they maintayned at least three houres, but in the end were fired out, the Portugalls bestowing Powder pots as liberally as if they had come from Hell mouth."

CHAPTER XXXVI

Our men countermine a Persian Mine and make a vigorous assault in it.

In the state of exhaustion in which they were after the burden and heat of this struggle, none but Portuguese hearts could have supported the fatigue of repairing the bastion forthwith; as in actual fact the King, Simão de Mello, and the chief officers and others, all came to assist in the work of rebuilding the ruins, at nearly 8 o'clock of the night. First of all the bastion was cleared of the dead bodies, amongst which were found 50 of the Portuguese, and 400 of the enemy which having been stripped of their weapons and clothing, were thrown down on the others lying at the foot of the wall.

The Persians and English did their utmost to hinder this work of reconstruction with all their cannon and frequent volleys of musketry, whilst our men made so light of the bullets which whistled about and fell amongst them, that they picked them up and threw them out on the debris.

The whole night was spent in repairing the bastion and mounting the guns, which, as soon as the day dawned, opened fire together with the rest of the fortress's artillery, thus showing to the English and Persians the dauntless resolution with which they were being resisted; and thus the enemy continued working at the ruins, utilising the debris in the moat to make an underground passage in which they could use carts, and without leaving off this work for a moment they brought it up to the site of the first ruin.

Simão de Mello seeing withal that we could not break the enemy's mantlets nor hinder their making mines, and that if they fired them, the bastion, being shaken by the last explosion and the heavy bombardments it had suffered, could not fail to be demolished and thrown down, he prudently ordered that they should be countermined, and to effect this the entrance to the countermine was dug in the garden of the Master-Gunner's house, and the earth that was excavated from it was thrown behined the cistern of the Fortress. This work and the construction and timing of it, was entrusted to Phelippe de Affonseca.

At this time Pero Gomes Azevedo arrived from Muscat with letters from Miguel de Lima, in which he informed Simão de Mello that he had hired a ship and sent it with his letters to India, whilst two ships from Goa had arrived at that fortress, laden with rice and other necessary provisions and powder for the fortress of Ormuz itself, but that it was impossible to send in that relief because of the close blockade that the enemy had formed by sea and land.

Meanwhile the enemy were working safe from our men, because they had no exit in that part except by the principal gate, where there were numerous obstacles to surmount, as it would mean passing through the midst of many strong entrenchments heavily manned by their troops; whilst on the other side it was still more difficult because of the deep water that was there, and the ships, from which they must of necessity have been seen; and calculating on this, the enemy worked away without any mistrust, thinking themselves quite secure.

However, lest they should have it too much their own way Simão de Mello ordered that an attack should be made on them, and simultaneously a reconaissance to find out the state of their mines. To effect this, he ordered Balthezar de Chaves to reconnoitre very cautiously and thoroughly to see if he could not find a way along the foot of the bastion of the Powder-Magazine, at a time when the tide was low, by which the men could pass at high-tide. With all secrecy and diligence Balthezar de Chaves did what the Captain had ordered him, and he found that at low tide a man of his stature (he was a well-set up man) was in the water up to his groin, whilst at high tide it came above his neck; when he had informed the Captain thereof, the latter chose 200 of the bravest men that there were in the fortress, amongst whom there volunteered for the enterprise Balthezar de Chaves himself, Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra, Miguel Borralho and others of particular worth. They all confessed and communicated, and armed with swords, bucklers, pistols, blunderbusses, handgrenades, and some javelins with a staff 9 spans and a blade 4 spans long, so sharply pointed and finely tempered that there was nothing proof against their throw except a stout breast-plate, they set out one dawn at the break-of-day watch, when the tide was out; all being ordered to obey in everything Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra, Miguel Perreira Borralho and Balthezar de Chaves, each one being reminded that although any one of them might deserve a higher post, yet they should obey the orders of these three captains, giving place to their experience and the length of time which they had served; they were to advance as far as they could, and take particular heed to try and see the mines which the enemy were making. The Captains of the bastions of "Sam Pedro," "Sanctiago," "the Bell," and the Powder-magazine were ordered to remain under arms and the same warning was given to the opposite bastions that whilst our men were on their way the whole of the artillery should fire without ceasing.

Our men sallied forth with great difficulty and with the water above their waists, and whilst they went marching on, the barrage was begun, and continued with such noise and fury that the enemy were fully occupied with it, and our men had enough time to wade through the shallows and arrive safely at the mines without being perceived by the Moors, because they were so certain that we could not attack them on that side that they had no sentries there. Thus our Portuguese began valerously to slay and wound their enemies who were posted in that neighbourhood, putting a great many of them to the edge of the sword.

Seeing themselves assaulted so unexpectedly and from where they least imagined, the enemy although disordered did not lose their heads so much that they did not signal that they were being attacked, whereon they were speedily reinforced from the mines below by some companies of Turkish *Kizilbasshes*[1] who are reputed the stoutest hearted soldiers in all Persia. However as these came hurrying up to the mouths of the mines, they found their exit therefrom impeded by the quantities of planks, beams and gabions which our people had thrown down, whilst for still further stopping of their passage, we had posted at the exit the best soldiers and Captains that there were then in

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[1] "Turcos Gazeisbaixos" in the original. Other Portuguese documents call them "Casselbaxos" and the English "Cushelbasses," The Kizilbashes ("Red-Hairs") were originally tribes of Turkish stock and settled in Kurdistan on the Turko-Persian Frontier. They were of a very warlike disposition and greatly prized as soldiers amongst both Turks and Persians, forming at this time a *corps d'élite* or bodyguard for the Shahs of the Sūfī dynasty. They were of the Shiah persuasion which led the orthodox Sūnnī Turkish Sultans to remove large numbers of them from Kurdistan and forcibly to settle them at Kara-Hissar and elsewhere in Asia Minor. On the other hand, the Persian Shahs transported numbers of them to the frontiers of the N.E. province of Khorosan, where they acted as an invaluable defence against the marauding Turkman tribes. Nadir Shah (*c.* 1734) settled some of them in Afghanistan N. of Kabul, whence they spread to India and are not unknown in the ranks of the cavalry regiments of our Indian forces.



XVIIth CENTURY PERSIAN SOLDIERY
(From a photograph of a contemporary Persian miniature kindly supplied by Sir E. Denison Ross)

all India, determined to defend them to the death, whereby they killed without any difficulty more than 300 Moors whom they found in the Mine.

The Portuguese themselves then entered therein and found it to be so vast that there was plenty of room for a cart in it, and they observed that it had already been driven through the debris in the moat and was nearly half-way underneath the bastion, although they had not yet made the barrel to place the powder in; withal from the great number of iron tools and instruments which they found and brought with them, they realised the great speed with which the work was being made.

The above mentioned Turkish companies struggled in vain and with heavy loss to themselves, to help from within the mines those who were fighting with our men outside; and seeing themselves unable to accomplish their designs in that part, it being already broad daylight), they marched towards the sea-shore, resolved to leave not a single Portuguese alive. Our men in the bastion of the powder-magazine were alert, and as soon as they saw them come in view, they raked them with so many discharges of artillery and musketry that they killed many of their men, albeit the remainder breaking through the clouds of bullets, boldly reached the place where our men were, who received them with showers of hand grenades, blunderbuss and pistol-shots, through which they came charging on, recking little of the shots which were mowing them down in swathes, and they came so close that they crossed swords with our men whom they heavily outnumbered, since they were being so strongly reinforced that it seemed as if only a few of them were killed; the struggle was waged with such fury on both sides, both with firearms as with artillery, that it seemed as if the world was coming to an end.

Despite the overwhelming strength of the Enemy, our men speedily completed their inspection of the mine and its condition, after which Dom Gonçalo ordered the retreat to be sounded, which was effected by way of the foot of the bastion of "Sanctiago," although two bodies of Turks attempted to intercept their passage but were forced to retire by the resolute valour of the Portuguese in less order than they had come, leaving more than 140 heads upon the field in this last encounter. By dint of this toil and the great speed that was necessary, our men arrived on their return-journey at the foot of the bastion of the Powder-Magazine, just at the time when the tide was highest and the waves were so rough and surging that it was impossible to wade across on foot. Simão de Mello on seeing this, sent some terranquims, in which they were withdrawn to the Castle, where they were received as enthusiastically as their dashing exploit deserved, although likewise with great sorrow because of the heavy loss which we had suffered this day by the death of the valerous Captain Balthezar de Chaves, who boldly venturing accompanied by eight Portuguese into that portion of the mines where the enemy were, was cut off by the Turks who were marching to the shore, in such a fashion that he and his party could not retire, neither could our men help them owing to the large crowd of the enemy between the two detachments; and in the end these nine, cut to pieces by the hands of those infidels, gave an honourable close to the heroic deeds which that Strait and the Persian coasts had so often witnessed when their waters had been reddened with the blood of their inhabitants.[1]

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[1] According to the list of casualties given in Appendix II, Balthazar de Chaves was not killed in this (or any other) sortie, but was "cut to pieces by the Moors when they stormed the bastion of Santiago." It was apparently Pero Gomes Azevedo who met with the heroic end here described.

CHAPTER XXXVII

The Persians fire the second mine and capture the bastion of "Sanctiago."

The English and Persians were very downcast and disheartened at the heavy loss which they had suffered in this assault amongst their best men who had been selected for this enterprise; whereupon, considering the thousands of lives which this war with the Portuguese had cost them, besides so many fortresses and cities razed to the ground all over Persia, and so many palmtrees cut-down, to say nothing of the useless campaign which they had been waging in these sieges of Queixome and Ormuz for the continuation of which their powder was already running short, whilst if the siege was to be prolonged for much longer it seemed as if they would all perish at the edge of the Portuguese swords,—they cunningly resolved to ask Captain Simão de Mello for a truce, in order that if this was granted they could finish their mines during the time that the suspension of arms lasted, and then fire them at the time most convenient to themselves, after which they could storm the fortress and put to the sword those few Portuguese who were defending it with such valour.

This treason was proposed to the Khan of Shiraz and approved of by them all, and in order to carry it out they hoisted white flags both in the Persian Trenches as in the English ships; their men all climbed up on the entrenchments and waved to the fortress with white handkerchiefs.[1]

Simão de Mello was informed of this show that the enemy were making, and he notified the King and the other Captains and Councillors thereof in order that they might discuss the matter. The King on his part answered to the Veador da Fazenda that he would not treat of the buisiness in Council, as he had already said, but that withal he advised the Captain to train all the guns and muskets that there were in the fortress upon the enemy whilst they were exposed, and wreak as much havoc as possible amongst them; since he had no doubt that the enemy were not making that demonstration for our good, but only because they lacked some supplies to enable them to prosecute the war, or else they were plotting some treachery against us with some trick or other. He added that what appeared to him to be most likely was that they intended to fire the mine which they had ready, as was clearly indicated by their not going further back from the bastion of "Sanctiago," nor leaving the mantlets that they had placed in position. The Veador de Fazenda took leave of the King with this answer, and went to speak with Simão de Mello who was awaiting him in the hall, where he communicated to him what the King had warned him of, which was approved by everyone present; only he himself,—who by the Divine Will and for our punishment opposed everything which he should have done—was of a contrary opinion, although they all informed him that the loss of the fortress of Queixome had been occasioned by a similar subterfuge wherefor he should not trust the enemy's proposals but should carry on with the war, since it was now April and the relieving force from India could not possibly be delayed for much longer.

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[1] Actually, the Portuguese were the first to open negotiations for a truce, which they did on $\frac{\text{March 27th}}{\text{April 6th}}$ (see Monnox's diary, Appendix X, p. 266). All this part of the Portuguese work is unreliable and should be checked from Monnox.

To this he replied that in Queixome was Ruy Freyre and in Ormuz Simão de Mello, and that no harm could come of knowing what it was that the Moors wanted; and accordingly he sent one of our soldiers to hoist a white flag in the bastion of "São Pedro."

At this signal which was made, two Moors sallied out with another and came to the foot of the baſtion, saying that they brought a letter from the Khan of Shiras for the Captain of that Fortress. When Simão de Mello heard of this, he ordered the letter to be taken and the Moors to wait for an answer.

When the letter had been handed to the Captain it was opened, and on its being read in Council it was seen that it offered very favourable terms for a truce, asking for four Portuguese to be exchanged as hoſtages for the same number of Turks, until the terms of peace could be decided upon. The terms of the letter were so convenient, and the proposal so useful, that it was agreed that a reply should be made in a similar ſtrain, and that the hoſtages should be sent with it, because their going would be advantageous, since they could give information on their return of what was going on in the Enemy's Camp.

The Letter which was written for this purpose was given to Francisco de Britto who was one of the four who were named, the others being Vicente Carrasco, Ioão Gonçalvez and Hieronymo Tavares.[1] They arrived at the enemy's encampment, where they were very honourably received by the Khan of Shiras[2] who ordered some very good houses to be furnished and given to them, treating them with lavish hospitality, albeit there were always Moorish sentinels outside who watched them very closely; at the same time he sent four Turkish Kizilbashes with their servants to Simão de Mello, by whom they were warmly welcomed and honourably entertained.[3]

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[1] The English ſtate that the Portuguese envoys were two in number, and their names are given as Francisco Pimental and Paulo das Naos. As Monnox quotes a letter of theirs (*v.* Appendix X), in all probability he is right and the text wrong.

[2] Another error. The Khan of Shiraz was in Bandar Abbas at this time, and the operations and negotiations at Ormuz were confided to the Imām Qūlī Khan.

[3] Monnox says that the Persian Hoſtages " are two of base condition put into good clothes, but for the men the Persian dooth not care what becomes of them " !

As soon as the King of Ormuz had notice of these negotiations and the hostages that were being exchanged, forasmuch as he well knew the little faith which they were accustomed to keep in their transactions, and with the experience of so many years he could conjecture with certainty the object of their designs, he said that henceforth there was no need to bother about the fortress, for without a doubt it could be considered as already lost, since Simão de Mello trusted the Persians, who under their cloak of peace were plotting treason, lying, and robbery.

This warning, which proceeded from an upright heart and experienced judgement, was not palatable to anyone; nay on the contrary, since they desired peace so greatly, they would treat of nothing else. The Mob (always a hydra-headed monster) discussed the matter very variously, but the majority favoured the Captain's view, and some of those who approved of the peace negotiations, went so far as to make some slanders against the King in order to discredit his opinion,—yet there was not in his time (not only in Asia, but all in the rest of the World) another more brave, wise and zealous for the augmentation of this Crown.

At dawn on the following day, it was announced that the Moors were arrived with copies of the Treaty of Peace and the conditions thereof. Simão de Mello at once summoned the persons who assisted him in the Council and ordered the Moors to enter, who when they had done so and were seated, presented to the Captain a sheet of paper sealed up, and written in the Persian tongue, which being read and interpreted was found to contain some exceedingly frivolous propositions; with the sole idea that during the delay which would occur in arguing over them, they could supply themselves with powder and other necessaries for the continuation of their mines and similar contrivances, and at the same time divert our people from countermining them, as they suspected was our intention.

Their Proposals, in short, were that we should give them half of the revenue of the Customs-Houses of Ormuz and Muscat, and revive the old feudal tenure which the Kings of Ormuz used to pay to the Sultans of Persia before Affonso de Albuquerque built that Fortress, besides surrendering to them that of Iulufar with all its rents; whilst they would renounce their rights and pretensions to the island of Queixome, if we would pay to them the sum of ten lakhs of money (which amount to 500,000 patacas) forthwith, as an indemnity for the satisfaction of the expenses which they had disbursed in this war.[1]

All those who were present in the Council were greatly upset when this outrageous proposal and the injurious conditions of peace were read; and bitterly repenting of not accepting the King's advice, recognising now how useful his warnings were and the damage which had been caused by their not observing them, they very shamefacedly went to tell him of the enemy's proposals. But he very hurt and disgusted, (as was right), answered that they should leave him and begin the work of clearing out the moat of the Fortress.

When they saw the King's resolve, they agreed that the work of countermining should be pushed forward with all energy, (for they had not put a hand to it since the commencement of the peace negotiations), and that the Khan of Shiras should be told that if he wanted peace he could have it, losses for losses, by evacuating the City forthwith, and continuing the cafilas in the manner in which they formerly were conducted; if he misliked this method and proposal, he could send back at once the Portuguese hostages, when the Turkish ones we had would be returned to him.

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[1] For the real amounts bargained for, see Appendix X, p. 271.

As soon as the Khan saw this hardy resolution, forasmuch as he was a great Captain, sagacious and astute, he reflected that if the relief which our men were expecting from India should arrive, (and it could not be delay'd much longer), he would run a great risk of perishing with all his forces in that island, thus frustrating his intentions and ruining his prestige, whereby the immense efforts and expeneses which had been made in that war would be in vain; he therefore wrote another letter to Simão de Mello by one of the Hostages which he had there, saying therein that he was very desirous of finishing the war and of making a firm and lasting peace: wherefore in order to obtain an agreement over the conditions and treaty of peace, he would at once send to the Sultan the conditions proposed by either side, and that for this purpose the truce should be continued for twenty days, which would be sufficient time for the letter to be sent to the Sultan, and for his answer and the confirmation thereof by the Shah to be returned.[1]

Simão de Mello and the remainder of the Council on seeing the affability of this letter regarded the war as over and peace as assured and certain; however one morning when they were most at their ease, there came hurrying to them a soldier who was on guard in one of the galleries of the countermines, who said to Simão de Mello,—" Sir, whilst I was on the watch on my post, I felt the Moors working hard in their mines"; the Captain replied that without telling any one else of the matter, he should confirm his information on the following night, and when another soldier came to him with a similar warning, he answered him in the same way.

There was not lacking someone who forthwith went and told the King of this, who immediately went in person to the place indicated, and perceiving well what was going on, sent to summon the Captain and others of the garrison, and said to them that he had realised by experience that on their parts they were only working to surrender that fortress of the King his brother to the Persians, and by all appearences it seemed that without doubt they were negotiating with them to that effect, since all they did was to talk, and hold council after council, without taking heed or doing what they could in so perilous and cruel a war; he further reminded them that before 3 days were over they would see the bastion of "Sanctiago" razed to the ground by the mine which the enemy had made, and that if they were Portuguese and not degenerated from that name, and from the valour with which their grandfathers had entered India, and founded and always defended that fortress, they should take up their arms forthwith, and confide to them the issue of the deceitful parleys with which the enemy was diverting them.

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[1] This is rather confusing unless *Sultan* and *Shah* are meant for the same personage, otherwise the *Sultan* must be the *Khan* of Shiraz or of one of the other coastal provinces.

Whilst he was making this speech, there came two Moors from the Persian encampment playing upon shalms and kettle drums and carrying white flags; when the King saw this he wished to get up and go, but Simão de Mello and the others earnestly besought him to hear the news which they brought, to which the King consented; one of the Moors then came up to Simão de Mello with a letter in which the Khan of Shiras wrote to him in flattering terms, saying that as he had urged the Shah to confirm the peace proposals, the latter had ordered him to withdraw his army from the City, which he was accordingly now doing, and that he could be certain that peace would be signed within a few days when the Persians would evacuate the City and island.

After this letter had been read, all the bystanders were very joyful, but the King laying hold on the Moor said to him, "Tell the Khan of Shiras that I am better at divining his stratagems than he himself, and that he cannot deceive me like these children," (pointing to the others); and without saying another word he took his departure, and when they asked him not to leave until that letter had been answered, the King replied that the Moor should return for the answer on the next day, which was accordingly done; the enemy now began to withdraw from their works which were adjacent to the bastion of "Sanctiago," leaving the trenches unoccupied, and in this manner they spent the whole day. At daybreak on the following morning (which was that of Easter), the Persians began to sound their musical instruments, amongst which was a great kettle-drum. The King well knew by experience what this portended, and arming himself in great haste he ordered his men likewise to equip themselves and follow him, and accompanied by his armed retinue he went to the Hall of the Fortress, whence Simão de Mello came out to meet him and said,—"Sire, what is amiss?" The King retorted angrily "I come to answer Your Honour's friend—The Khan of Shiras. Let Your Honour order everyone to stand to their arms and take their posts; and leave two companies outside in reserve. Furthermore, let nobody remain in the bastion of Sanctiago, because without a doubt the enemy are going to fire the mine beneath it."

Simão de Mello replied that His Highness need not worry himself, for there was not yet cause for so much trouble and he could rest a little, and what he ordered would be shortly carried out. The King now more coleric than ever, retorted by asking him wether he would wish him to speak calmly on so perilous an occasion? and that in the name of his Majesty he ordered them to stand to their arms immediately.

The Captain did not wish to hear any more and ordered that the King's commands should be obeyed with all the necessary forethought and preperation, whilst the Turkish Hostages were to be kept guarded seperately under lock and key. The King gave orders for the whole of the bastion of Sanctiago to be evacuated, and the 4 largest guns thereof to be withdrawn to the flanking walls, and loaded with arquebus and musket shot, with which it was reckoned that great havoc would be wrought amongst the Persians.

It would be about 10 o'clock in the morning when these preperations were finished, at which time the Moors fired the mine, with so terrible an explosion that the earth quaked in such a fashion that no one in that vicinity deemed themselves safe; the bastion was razed to the earth, and the parade-ground of the fortress was littered with fragments of masonry which were hurled through the air in whole blocks and single bricks, without however their doing any damage to anyone. The site of the bastion was so demolished that horses could easily have surmounted it.

The Portuguese at once rushed forward to defend the place which they found already covered with Moors, whom they fell upon as furiously as their treachery deserved, and hurled them back no fewer than six times; however on each occasion their numerous reinforcements recovered what they had lost.

The King of Ormuz seeing our bravery was all in vain, carried away by his natural valour went to close with the enemy, calling on his princes and Guazil to follow him, but with him was the Captain Simão de Mello who with the Veador da Fazenda prevented him from doing so. Meanwhile in the bastions and platforms there was raging the bloodiest battle and bombardment that had ever been seen until then.

Some Turks who were pent up in the Constable's quarters, seeing that the doors were shut and the windows so high that they were unable to get out or climb down to safety, resolved to set fire to the Powder-magazine which was situated in front of them, and finding four pots of gunpowder which had been carelessly left on a stand, they set them alight and threw them at the powder-magazine which at that time was open; however no fire was caused or damage done, although the pots hit their mark, and this was regarded as a miracle because there was much powder scattered about, and a great quantity of it in the Magazine. The fighting at this spot was very stubborn owing to the vast mass of the Moors, amongst whom Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra, Miguel Pereyra Borralho, Sebastião Pereyra de Macedo, Fernão de Barros, Antonio Leytão, Diogo Pereyra de Macedo, Bras Rodriguez Banha and others performed such incredible feats of arms that they surpassed the finest in the world until the shades of night fell, when all this prowess was hidden.

Simão de Mello was warned that the enemy could take the fortress by assault from the bastion, and therefore in order to evade this catastrophe, he ordered an earthen rampart to be thrown up along each stretch of the wall and as high as possible, since it was regarded as certain that the enemy could enter the fortress, through fortifying the bastion which they had already captured.

On the occasion of this pitched battle which lasted from 10 o'clock in the morning till 9 at night, it was found from the Enemy's Muster-Roll that they had lost 800 Persians, English and Turks, of the flower of the troops which they had in their camp. Of our men there were found 85 dead, and 100 wounded, of whom the greater part died subsequently.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

The Enemy captures the bastion of Sanctiago; the harm caused therefrom; a truce is proposed.

The Persians on seeing themselves masters of the bastion regarded the war as over and the fortress as taken; they first concerned themselves with strengthening it, making some ramparts on the side facing the fortress from whence they could batter it, being protected by the two flankers of the wall; although our men raked them from the flanks with discharges of cannon and musketry which they fired at them all night long, whereby they harassed them in such a fashion that they could not fortify themselves as well as they had hoped.

As soon as the day dawned Simão de Mello and the other Captains went to seek the King of Ormuz, for they now realised to the full how wise his previous counsels had been, and the loss and humiliation which had invariably followed their neglect of them. There was likewise discussed the importance of expelling the Persians from the bastion.

In order to effect this, Dom Gonzalo da Silveyra was ordered to go with 100 men along the stretch of the wall of the bastion of the Bell, and Miguel Pereyra with another 100 along the edge of the Powder Magazine, whence they were both to forcibly disturb the enemy and endeavour to drive them out.

These two Captains sallied forth with great valour, and suddenly closing in on the enemy from both sides, they launched a violent attack which nearly drove them quite out of the bastion. However they were reinforced by an intrepid Turkish Captain[1] at the head of 1,000 fresh men, which so encouraged them that they returned to their posts and faced our men, who killed or burnt most of them with handgrenades, fire-works, and blunderbusses.

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[1] Perhaps the Shah Culibeg of Monnox (*v.* p. 138, note 1).

Meanwhile Simão de Mello was supervising the construction of two strong entrenchments within the Fortress, one in the stretch of the wall of the Bell bastion and the other in the Powder-Magazine, in each of which were mounted two cannons of 40 lbs calibre, in order to shoot over the wall upon the "Sanctiago" bastion. He likewise ordered parapets to be made in that of the "Spirito Sancto" so that its cannon could play above the fortress upon the aforesaid bastion, whereby the strength of the fortifications was increased against the bombardments which they suffered.

During this time the struggle in the bastion was so prolonged that it seemed as if not only the swords but also the bodies were made of steel, whilst the Moors thrust themselves forward as fearlessly as if the lives which its defence was costing them were of no account, growing so continually in numbers that our men were unable to expel them from the bastion however hard they strove to do so; this struggle lasted from dawn until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, without a moment's respite.

The Captain seeing this, ordered the Retreat to be sounded, which our men obeyed sorely against their wills, leaving dead on the field Francisco de Britto, of Evora, Pedro Alurs, and Pero Gomes Azevedo.

Simão de Mello at once ordered that the Turkish Hostages should be placed in the Dungeons, and that Dom Gonzalo should station himself with 50 men in the neighbouring houses, whilst Miguel Pereira Borralho with as many others should post himself in the Powder-Magazine, and that both positions should be strengthened against an enemy attack.

The Persians were afraid that as it was now mid-April, the relieving squadron which our men were expecting from India might arrive at any moment, whilst it would be dangerous for them to raise the siege, as it had already cost them more than 30,000 men during this campaign in Ormuz and Queixome alone, besides those which they had lost in the shores and Fortresses of Persia; they therefore strengthened with stone pillars and strong buttresses the mine that had destroyed the bastion, and opened three galleries therein, one in the direction of the stretch of the wall along the bastion of the Bell, another underneath the wall, towards the bastion of the Powder-Magazine, and a third straight towards the King's cistern; they worked so strenuously in this last one, which was the most important, that they reached underneath it within a few days, and drained it dry by means of some shafts which they drove up into it;[1] this reduced the fortress to a very perilous condition, and the garrison were more perturbed thereat than with all the other losses they had suffered, since it appeared to them (as was actually the case) that they would not be able to hold out without water.

The enemy considering above all how effective their mines had been, and that those beneath the wall were very close to the bastions, they wished to draw their trenches nearer, so that they could be hidden on both sides from our men; and they were able to effect this despite our ceaseless artillery fire by day and night, and the musketry which blazed away from sunrise to sunset.

Simão de Mello seeing himself in this parlous situation and the enemy so close within the gates, ordered that an assault should be made upon them in the third watch, in which every effort should be made to drive them out of their posts on the walls and bastion. All our men armed themselves to carry out this order, some sallying out by the arch which was situated above the cistern-gate and others by the bastion of the Bell; both parties attacked the enemy's posts from either side, and surprising the sentinels outside of them they cut off their heads and fired such a heavy musketry and blunderbuss-volley into the Moors, that those who escaped fled back to the bastion of "Sanctiago"; whereto our men pursued them so impetuously that they obliged them to abandon the bastion, despite the really admirable obstinacy and bravery with which the enemy defended it.

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[1] Perhaps this was the occasion on which while the English and Persians were placing the powder in the mine " the defendants opened the wall into the myne in such sorte that our people could deserne many of them within the Castle, and one of the Portugales thrust his head into the hole them selves had made into the mine, but the place beinge darke he could not perceave those within, neyther what they weare doinge, . . " but the English fearing lest they should be discovered, fired the mine prematurely.

However the enemy were so strongly reinforced, that amidst the hail of powder-pots, blunderbuss-shots, and the countless handgrenades which we showered upon them, they contrived, in spite of us, to return to the charge, forcing back the heroic Portuguese as far as the Powder-Magazine, where so deadly was the struggle, so continuous and heavy the volleys of musketry, that the enemy evacuated their positions on the wall and retired to the bastion, leaving so many dead that the blood ran down the slope of the position.

And the battle lasted with this ferocious force and fury from after midnight until the Ave Marias of the following day. When it was over, the Persians hoisted white flags, asking for a truce in order that the dead of both sides might be collected and buried.

The lack of water was continually increasing within the fortress, and this together with the scarcity of corn reduced the garrison to such an extremity, that the daily ration was only a little rice which was cooked by being moistened in salt water, or parched in the sun to the great hurt of the health and strength of our men,[1] and it was thus impossible for them to support the excessive fatigue which they had to undergo; withal their spirits were not wanting to fulfill their duty, neither did the enemy on their side desist from improving their positions, whilst the damage in ours was irrepairable, since besides those who had been killed or wounded in the campaign we had lost more than 1,400 men from sickness.

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[1] Compare Monnox's sarcastic observation,—"Besides, for victuall they have onelie rice and sault fish, two very good preparetives to a cup of good drinck if they had it."

When the Enemy knew of this, a Moor holding a white flag stood up in the bastion of "Sanctiago," saying that he wished to speak to the Captain, and to give him a letter from the Khan of Shiras. Those in the fortress answered that they would not take his letter, and that he could either get down or say what it was that he wanted.

The Moor then gave his message verbally, saying that the Khan of Shiras, in view of the state in which they were, summoned them to surrender the fortress to him, and that he would spare their lives if they did so, but that if they refused they should prepare themselves for the morrow, since he was then coming to seek it with all his power.

The only answer they made to this was that they declined to negotiate with a faithless Moor, whereon the bombardment was reopened forthwith and all the necessary preperations were made for what might occur. The few soldiers who were fit were allotted their posts, whilst the sick and wounded were taken to the bastion of the Bell in order to fire from there,—the fortress being reduced to such an extremity that they were forced to avail themselves of the sick and wounded. Everyone confessed and communicated, and after having eaten a little powdered rice, the Moorish tabors and English drums were heard at the commencement of the third watch. Simão de Mello ordered a look-out to be kept over the battlefield, whilst many swivel-guns from the casemates and re-entrants of the Powder-Magazine and "São Pedro" bastion were to be trained upon the bulwark of "Sanctiago." At this time the Moors were already drawn up under arms, and the Captain seeing their resolution, took his place amongst our men armed cap-à-pie, shield on arm and sword in hand, and made them a speech as follows:—"Valiant defenders of the Faith of Our Lord Jesus Christ; before these enemies of it and of ourselves can leave their trenches, let us go and seek them out therein! May your unconquerable arms exalt the glory of your name, rendering the name of Portugal immortal throughout all the Orient!" Barely had Simão de Mello finished this brief exhortation, when our men inflamed with Christian valour and fury, assailed the trenches along the stretch of the wall, and hacking their way through them they stormed the bastion of "Sanctiago"; in spite of the desperate resistence offered by the Moors, they hurled them down, burnt and dead, on the slope formed by the ruins of the bastion, which they occupied and defended against a prodigious number of Turks who attacked it with great obstinacy; so well did they fight that only those who were slain left their posts.

At this time the Khan of Shirás, seeing that the greater part of the day had been spent thus, and how difficult it would be for him to expel the Portuguese from the bastion, if once they gained possession of it, he decided to lead the rest of his army to the attack in person; and since both parties were now exhausted, it being ten o'clock of the night, the retreat was sounded on both sides.

CHAPTER XXXIX

Dom Manoel de Sousa reaches Ormuz with a galliot; and takes away his Mother, the Prince of Ormuz, and other Persons.

Whilst our men were taking in their quarters the scant repose which time allowed them, shortly after midnight those who were on watch saw a vessel approach from the direction of Comorão; this boat anchored close inshore, and a youth disembarked from it who came knocking on the gate of the Fortress, and said that he was Dom Manoel de Sousa son of the late Captain Dom Francisco de Sousa, and that he brought letters from the Governor of India.[1]

Simão de Mello ordered the gates to be opened for him, and at the same time sent to inform the King and others of what was happening, in order that they should come and learn what news the Letters contained.

Dom Manoel arrived when the Hall was already full of people, and the King embraced him, whilst all the other bystanders warmly congratulated him for his late father's sake. He gave to the King and the Captain the letters from the Governor Fernam de Albuquerque, and stated that since no ships had come from the Kingdom that year,[2] the affairs of India were in a very backward condition, and for this reason the relief had not come sooner: above all, they did not as yet know in Goa of the loss of Queixome, nor of the critical condition of the fortress of Ormuz, whilst it was four months since they had received any news from that Strait.

He added that he had come in the company of Constantino de Sà with twenty galliots, all very well supplied and well furnished with provisions, and manned by the best men that there were in India; that his galliot had been seperated from the Armada by a storm; however the arrival of this fleet could not be delayed much longer, and that he had come with the intention of taking his Mother away with him.

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[1] The incident here described actually took place *before* the 3 assaults of the 27-29 of April which are related in the two previous chapters.

[2] Not quite correct. The ship *Nossa Senhora da Penha de França* (Captain Diogo de Mello e Castro) had arrived at Goa from Lisbon on December 14th 1620, though "with most of the crew dead or dying." Likewise in 1621 the galleon *São Simão* came from Lisbon under the command of Gonçalo Roiz da Cunha, being the only one to reach Goa out of a Fleet of 14 vessels that had left Lisbon.

He brought 600 bales of Government rice, and 200 arobes of butter, besides 300[1] barrels of powder and 50 soldiers.

Simão de Mello thanked him for his enterprise, and told him to go and see his Mother and rest himself; he also ordered him to have the mast of his galliot lowered, lest the Moors should make an attempt upon it, and so that he could leave without their stopping him; finally, he charged him to settle his affairs in time to leave on the following night.

When Dom Manoel had been thus dismissed, the Governor's letters were opened, which stated and affirmed—both the one for the King, as that for Simão de Mello,—the great anxiety which he was in owing to his not having received letters or news from that Strait; furthermore, he had already despatched two ships laden with rice, butter, and 1,000 barrels of gun-powder, together with 20,000 pots to be filled with it there, and many other materials for war. He added that he was now sending Constantino de Sá with 20 galliots, on board of which were embarked 1,000 soldiers, and provisions to the amount of 600 bales of rice, 400 candies of corn, 200 pipes of wine, whilst each galliot carried 20 barrels of gun-powder, besides the provisions for the crew. He further stated that as no ships had arrived from the Kingdom that year, he had not sent him the galleons which there were in Goa; he desired information about what might be happening, because if the state of things necessitated his presence, he would come at once with the whole force of that State.

After these letters had been read the King could no longer contain himself, but exclaimed passionately to Simão de Mello,—"Ah, Sir Captain! How will your Honour account to God, and to His Majesty, for the loss of his fortress, when they were lions that defended them?" And turning towards the soldiers he said,—"You, and others, who have perished or will perish here, will not lose the glory which you have deserved, because of the loss of Queixome and Ormuz. He will lose it who rules you so badly, since you have only done your duty in obeying him."

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[1] Trezentos (300) in the original. It must be a misprint for trinta (30), as each galliot of de Sa's fleet only had 20 barrels of gun-powder on board. *Cf.* 22 lines lower.

There was forthwith discussed the question of what should be written to the Governor, and what account should be given to him of what had happened, and the present state of affairs; this being done, the letters were entrusted to Phelippe de Affonseca, who with ten soldiers left that same night in a light terranquim,[1] with orders to coast along to Muscat where he was to give these letters to Constantino de Sá and Miguel de Lima.

Phelippe de Affonseca duly arrived at Muscat, where he learnt that the two ships carrying the other letters, that he and Pero Gomez Azedo had taken for the Governor, had not reached India, because the Malabar corsairs had taken them off the river's[2] mouth; and this was the reason that the Governor knew nothing either of the taking of Queixome, or of the siege of Ormuz and state of affairs therein, as was shown by the letters which Dom Manoel de Sousa had brought; this latter, after landing the supplies which were destined for the fortress, and having prepared what he was to take on board, asked the Captain for leave to depart, and having obtained it, made ready with all possible despatch. He went at once to see the King, with whom he spent the whole afternoon, in which the King made him an extensive and detailed relation of all that had passed, at the end of which he gave him a diamond necklace that he was wearing, and two letters, with these words,—"Of these two letters, you will give one to the Governor of India and the other to the Archbishop, albeit I do not ask them for help. I only commend to them my son, who is here, and who I want you to take with you; on his behalf I ask His Majesty to recognise him as my successor in this Kingdom, of which he is the prince and rightful heir.[1] I remind you that I was a great friend of your father, and for this reason I entrust him to your care. And I wish you to take those four chests on board in your name, because the Prince must embark in secret." And drawing a ring from off his finger, he placed it upon that of Dom Manoel, saying,—"Take this ring in remembrance of how great a friend of your father's I was, and that you are taking the Prince of Ormuz with you; and now embrace me, because we shall never see each other again."

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[1] Perhaps this was one of the ships that had a brush with the *London's* boat. [*V.* Appendix X, p. 284.]

[2] River of Goa, presumably.

Dom Manoel parted from him with much grateful emotion, and embarked at nightfall with all his household goods, his mother, and other ladies and damsels together with their property, and some sick Captains; when everything was ready, he went to take leave of Simão de Mello, who gave him letters for the Governor, and told him that the sole hope of the Fortress lay in his good diligence, and he therefore impressed upon him the importance of going straight to Goa and telling the Governor of what he had seen; this Dom Manoel promised to do, as in effect he actually did. After this he proceeded to embark, taking with him the Prince of Ormuz, who likewise embarked disguised and incognito. It is affirmed that this galliot carried away more than 4 million (cruzado's) worth of gold, pearls, and jewelry belonging to private individuals, besides the four chests pertaining to the King.[1]

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[1] This they did. See further, p. 186.

They rowed over to the Persian coast, and so soon as they reached it, they hoisted sail and coasted along without meeting with anything worth the telling in their whole voyage, which they finished within a few days. On arriving at Goa he handed the Letters to the Governor, and gave him a detailed account of the situation of the Fortress; unhappily the Governor could send no relief as the month of May had already set in, with threats of a rigorous winter, which renders navigation perilous in those parts.

CHAPTER XXXX

The English propose a parley. The fortress is surrendered to them.

WITHIN the fortress, the work became steadily harder, whilst the efforts of the defenders diminished each day, chiefly owing to the lack of water. The burning thirst which imperilled them increased daily, mainly because their miserable rations were dry and salty. On the other hand, the putrification of the numerous dead bodies, together with the spells of intense heat which were particularly severe in that time and place, were the cause of numerous diseases, of which many of our men died. Above all what most disheartened them was their despair of the arrival of relief, which was caused by the news brought by Dom Manoel de Sousa. Withal, however, they struggled on as best they could, and even the sick and wounded were employed in the duties and positions of the healthy, owing to the few fit men that there were in the garrison.

When things were in this parlous condition, on a certain afternoon when the artillery on both sides was maintaining a continuous and heavy duel, there appeared a white flag above the hoſtile trench situated in the ſtretch of the wall of the baſtion of the Bell, and then an Englishman got up with another in his hand. The bombardment ceased immediately, and the Englishman asked them not to fire, but kindly to send him a Portuguese, with whom he could discuss a certain affair of great importance.[1]

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[1] Says Monnox: "This night [April $\frac{19}{29}$] one of the Frigots that came from Muscat for the Donna Sosa, made her escape and got away, no doubt very richly fraighted."

The Captain was at once informed of this, and he selected a certain Francisco Cardoso Pessoa, upon whom he could implicitely rely, since he was a ſtrong partisan of his, albeit he was an untruſtworthy individual in the popular opinion. This personage went to speak with the Englishman, and after conversing with him for over an hour, he returned to the fortress; where he said in public that the Englishman was a Catholic and the Vice-Admiral of the English Fleet,[2] and that he sent to say to all in general that he had received definite information in his camp of the critical condition of the fortress, and of the relieving force that was coming, which was of little ſtrength in view of the prodigous numbers of the English and Persians; furthermore, it was impossible for another ſtronger fleet to come from Goa, since the winter had already set in there, and ships would be unable to sail from that City to the Strait; they ought, therefore, to calculate wether they could possibly defend themselves much longer in the ſtate in which they were, because the Moors were no longer desirous of harassing or bombarding them, as they realised that famine, cold,[1] and minning would soon oblige them to beg for mercy; it was in the hands of the Portuguese and their Captain whether or not they wished to see their women and children in the infamous captivity of the Persians; already, their only hope of salvation was to surrender to the English, which they could do on what honourable terms they wished, and for which purpose, he, as Catholic that he was, and son of a Portuguese Mother, undertook to act as intermediary in any proposition which they should see fit to make and decide upon.

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[1] This, of course, is pure romancing. The Portuguese initiated the opening of negotiations, and contemporary copies of the original letters of the Governor and second in command to the Caſtle, asking for terms from the English, are ſtill extant in the India Office. Translations of several are in Monnox's diary. [*V.* Appendix X, pp. 285-7.]

[2] Either Blythe or Woodcock muſt be meant, probably the latter, though I have not yet come across any material which bears out the ſtatement in the text as to his being a Catholic and "the son of a Portuguese Mother." [*Vide supra.*]

Francisco Cardoso so glossed over the enemy's proposals that they were brought up before the Council and discussed therein, although the King, the Veador de Fazenda Manoel Borges de Sousa, and the soldiers, all protested that they would rather die than consent to so base a surrender being carried out; they likewise used many other forcible expressions, which clearly showed that the trials they had undergone had strengthened their courage rather than diminished it; above all, they reminded the Captain of the enemy's faithlessness in the buisiness with Ruy Freyre at Queixome, and the deceit they had practised with regard to the [mining of the] bastion, and their treacherous proposals for a truce.

Nevertheless Francisco Cardoso was ordered to go to the English, and tell them that they were to open negotiations with the Portuguese who were in their camp as hostages, and that if the conditions decided upon were favourable ones, the fortress would capitulate as their Vice-Admiral desired. Francisco Cardoso was very warmly welcolmed in the enemy's camp, owing to the news which he brought, and after speaking with the Portuguese who were there, the following conditions were agreed upon:—

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[1] "Frio" in the original. Probably a misprint for "calor," heat.

1. That the King, the Princes, and the Vizier, should leave with all their retinue, and embark with everything which they could carry with them. Likewise the Priests should leave with all their images and Church ornaments, whilst the Moors should withdraw from the battlefield and retire to the City, leaving their positions unoccupied.

2. That the white women and children should leave veiled, without being scanned or searched.

3. That the English would station their men at the gate of the fort and elsewhere to guard the Portuguese until the latter were all embarked.

4. That the Captain would leave with his weapons, and male and female slaves and servants, besides all his goods and chattels, and 6 chests, without anyone laying a hand upon him; and they were to provide him with a ship to land him in Muscat or wherever else he might wish.

5. That all the Portuguese soldiers should leave with their weapons and whatever else they could carry with them.

6. That all the rest of the people who were within the Fortress, should leave taking with them all they could carry.

7. That they would have ships ready to take all these people to Muscat.

When these terms were brought to the Fortress they were earnestly debated upon, forasmuch as those who were in favour of accepting them and surrendering the fortress, urged that it was impossible for them to hold out any longer owing to the lack of water which they were suffering from, to say nothing of the fact that they had insufficient forces to oppose to those of the enemy, and that even these would be shortly exhausted; whence they would be obliged to surrender at discretion to the enemy, who would inflict upon the prisoners the cruelty and suffering to which they would be exposed,—wherefore it was better to come to terms at a time when they could avoid the humiliations which they would otherwise suffer later on.

Dom Gonçalo de Silveyra, Miguel Pereyra Borralho, Manoel Borges de Sousa the Veador da Fazenda, Gyl do Prado, and others who were always of the contrary opinion, said that if they lacked water to drink they should use in place thereof the blood of the English and Persians that they might kill, and of which the cistern was already full, but that they should never allow the fortress to be surrendered, nor the World to say to the great discredit of the Portuguese that there were traitors amongst them, neither ought they to consent to conditions that were so insulting to their arms and name.

The discussion swayed backwards and forwards between these two opinions, until the worse gained the day and it was decided to accept the proffered terms; nevertheless those whom we have spoken of refused to sign them, and when efforts were made to compel them to do so, Gyl do Prado retorted that one swallow did not make a summer, and that therefore in order to carry out what they had signed it did not matter in the least wether his signature was attached or no, whence they might cease importuning him, as he was resolved to die rather than to sign with his hand what his heart and soul could never consent to.

Francisco Cardoso returned with the terms of surtender accepted and signed to the English camp, whence after a stay of two days, he brought back the papers signed by the English, with the assurance that they would come next day with the Khan of Shirás to receive the surrender of the fortress.

There was once a certain soldier who, (had he been alive at this time and seen all this), could certainly have done, what is related of him, namely that upon seeing any dire peril approach, he would beat with a staff upon the Tomb of the great Affonso de Albuquerque, crying aloud,—“Arise! Arise! for what thou haſt gained with so much glory for the Portuguese Name, is now being loſt!”

CHAPTER XXXXI

The Khan of Shirás takes possession of the fortress of Ormuz—The Portuguese go to Muscat.

The enemy withdrew their army back to the city, leaving the ground in front of the fortress clear of the Moors; Simão de Mello then opend the gates, which had been walled up, and at nine o'clock in the morning, the Khan of Shirás was seen to be approaching together with the English General and V-Admiral, accompanied by 4 companies of English musketeers, besides many Moorish nobles and Captains. They arrived at the parade-ground of the fortress, where Simão de Mello accompanied by his supporters and the remainder of his Council was awaiting them, holding the keys which he presented to the English general who took them and handed them to the Khan of Shirás with a great show of courtesy. There was a carpet spread on the parade ground, and the Khan of Shirás, the English General and Vice-Admiral, and other Captains, all sat down upon it.

At this moment the King of Ormuz and his Vizier made their appearence. As soon as the Khan recognized him, he got up and went towards him, and taking him by the hand, politely led him to the carpet, and sending for a velvet cushion he sat him thereon at his right-hand side, and the Vizier on his left a little further away, whilſt Simão de Mello was next to the King.

After some general compliments had been exchanged, the Khan of Shirás told Simão de Mello to order his men to be ready to embark on the following day, forasmuch as he had prepared two ships and some terradas for this purpose; meanwhile he asked that Simão de Mello, the King, Vizier, and other captains, should consider themselves as his Guests until such time as they should embark.

The English General interposed by saying that he would like to be responsible for the exercise of hospitality towards the Portuguese, since it devolved upon him by reason of their both being fellow-Europeans and Christians. The Khan of Shiras being thus thwarted in his request, he turned towards the King and asked him to favour him by honouring his tent. In this manner everyone took their departure, but only those of his faction went with Simão de Mello.

Early on the next day the enemy returned to the gate of the Fortress, thro' which they began to march out the Portuguese with their wives, children, and slaves, all with tears in their eyes, sighing deeply because of the memories of their country, houses, and goods; all those who embarked on this day were allowed to do so unmolested. Unfortunately, however, someone went that night to the Khan, and informed him that the Portuguese and their wives were taking away with them a great quantity of pearls and diamonds; because of this, on the following day they roughly searched everyone, and the women in particular were forced to endure harsh treatment;[1] in this manner they were all embarked with the exception of Simão de Mello and those of his following, to whom the Khan of Shirás said that he had a seperate ship well supplied with provisions, ready for him to set sail in at any time he wished. He embarked his property on the same day, and they all left for Muscat, where we will leave them until their time.

The Khan and his men entered the Fortress accompanied by Moorish and English clerks, who drew up an account of everything they found therein; in a narrative which was subsequently received in India it was related that the Persian found in it more than 70 million's[1] worth of money, goods and cannon, besides the huge amount that the English and Persians had [previously] embezzled.

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[1] "The Persians driving out the sicke, maimed, and burnt Christians that were not able to help themselves, that made my very heart to earne [ache ?] in my body to see it;"—(Monnox).

When he had thus taken possession of the fortress, he gave orders for the bastion to be repaired, and the moat to be cleaned out,—a thing which Simão de Mello had never brought himself to do, and which of itself was sufficient to render the fortress impregnable.[2]

He left in it 70 great guns and a garrison of 1,000 Persians under a Turkish Captain, and after fulfilling the terms which he had made with the English, he resolved to leave for Ispahan with the rest of the captured cannon which amounted to 400 guns salved from the galleons and ships, besides falcons, and all the rest of the booty that was found within the fortress.

The King of Ormuz asked the Khan of Shirás to give him a ship, since that had been the first condition of the terms of surrender, to which he replied that he could not fulfill his request because the Sultan of Persia had written him to take His Highness and his Vizier to the Court, and he durst not disobey this command, which left him with nothing but the regret of being unable to serve him.

He therefore took them with him, although before arriving at Ispahan he ordered the Vizier to be slain in Lara on the pretence that he was plotting to escape; however the real cause of the Vizier's death was not this alleged flight,—of which he was not guilty,—but the Khan's fear lest he should reveal to the Shah the embezzlements that he (the K.) had practised at Ormuz. The King earnestly desired the same end, however as even death itself shuns the most unhappy wretches as if reluctant to end their misery, the Khan arrived at Shiras with him, besides all the rest of the plunder which he was bringing from Ormuz; the Shah not only refused to see him but even ordered him to be placed in an iron cage, where he was sustained by the alms of those who passed by, until after the space of several years, some Moors begged his liberty of the Shah, and drew him from his confinement and gave him a house and ample income.[1]

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[1] 70 million cruzados presumably. See Monnox's account (Appendix X) for the English valuation. Other Portuguese estimates are to be found in Appendix V and L. Cordeiro's *Como se perdeu Ormuz*.

[2] This is confirmed by the English accounts. Captain Weddell revisited Ormuz in 1625, and afterwards wrote to the E.I. Company that "The Castell is verey well repared and somthinge better, in respect of a moate which the Persian hath new diged and sertaine lowe fronters agmented." [India Office, *Original Correspondence*, No. 1192.]

And such was the end of the wealthiest potentate and fortress which the Kingdom of Portugal (and all Europe) possessed from the shores of the Tagus to those of the Ganges.

END OF THE AFFAIRS OF ORMUZ.

CHAPTER XXXXII

Ruy Freyre escapes from the English at Surat and makes his way back to Muscat.

As already narrated, the Captain-General Ruy Freyre de Andrade was shipped on board of the English flagship, together with the two Portuguese who accompanied him; the English General subsequently sent him on board the Vice-Admiral's ship to Surat, with orders that from there he should be sent to England as a prisoner.

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[1] In 1625 Weddell reported that the King of Ormuz was living at Shiráz where the "Duke" [*i.e.* Khān] allowed him a tūmān a day and a fair house and garden; but his Wazīr "Ricenorad" [Raïs Murad ?] was beheaded for having sent his treasure to Muscat in the Portuguese frigates. [*V.* Foster, vol. 1624-29, p. 85.]

The ship duly reached Surat, where it found that the homeward-bound English vessels had already left accompanied by some Dutch ships which had been in that port; wherein the ship remained, repairing the damage which it had suffered from some cannon shots off Queixome.[1]

The Captain of this vessel was very friendly towards Ruy Freyre, owing to what he had heard of his prowess; he therefore frequently visited and conversed affably with him, finding much satisfaction in doing so, albeit he had him so carefully guarded that they dogged his very shadow, fearing lest he should escape from them and make his way to Goa, whence he would return with a force sufficient to destroy their ships in the Strait and relieve Ormuz.[2] And they were not mistaken in this, because his sole idea was to effect it without arousing their suspicions.

During the days they were detained here, there fell that of Easter, and as this appeared to him to be a suitable opportunity whereby he could effect his escape, when the Captain and others came to visit him one morning he said to them;—"Gentlemen, next Sunday is our Easter-Day. I hope that your honours—with the Captain's leave—will accept from me a dinner such as we are accustomed to eat in Portugal on that day." The Captain replied that he would be delighted, and told him he could make what arrangements he chose, whereat everyone was very

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[1] This is not quite accurate. The *Lion* (on board of which Ruy Freyre was) was not homeward-bound, but destined for a voyage to Mocha, in Arabia, for which place it duly sailed at the beginning of April. James Beversham was the Captain, or rather Master.

[2] Beversham had orders "as well per wrighting as per word of mouth, to continue a strong guard on Ruy Freyres person and constantly to releave the same by turnes to prevent whatsoever his intents, eyther escape or otherwise." [India Office, *O.C.*, 1047.]


FORTE DE SÃO·
MIERONIMO·
DAMAO·

CITY AND FORT OF DAMÃO

(*From the MS. "Livro do Estado da India Oriental" in the British Museum*)

[*face page* 174

pleased; and the General Ruy Freyre sent invitations to all the persons of quality and Captains that were absent.

He asked the Captain for leave to send one of his two black slaves to Damão, in order to obtain some Portuguese wine, olive-oil, sweets and other delicacies since the feast was to be after our fashion. The Englishman approved of his request, and in thanking him, said that he was sorry that he was not a Director of the Company to set him free, as was his own personal desire,—however that otherwise he might command him in whatsoever he wished.

Ruy Freyre immediately wrote a letter to the Captain of the City and Fortress of Damão, and another to the aldermen thereof, in which he explained his desire, and asked them to provide him with enough dishes, wine, olive-oil and sweets for his guests, who amounted to sixty; he also verbally instructed the mulato, (who was a very faithful and trusty servant), to bring the wine strongly impregnated with *dutro*. Now *Dutro* is a herb that grows in India, from which sprouts a sort of apple that has a very intoxicating effect, and anyone to whom it is given,—whether in wine, water, or food,—is unable to move for 24 hours, during which time he is quite out of his wits.

The mulato departed on his errand, which he carried through so expeditiously that he returned on Easter-Eve with two boats laden with rich wines and divers dishes; those which had been seasoned with the dutro were marked in a certain easily-distinguished way that had been agreed upon beforehand.

On the next morning which was the appointed day of Easter, the guests arrived in very cheerful mood, and found the tables already spread; they were received with the usual toasts, drunk to the sound of artillery-salvoes and trumpets, as is customary with that and other Northern Nations. The English Captain was very jovial, and Ruy Freyre still more so, because he saw how favourably his plan was maturing.

The whole assembly then sat down at one table, and the crew of the ship at another, being served by the two Portuguese with napkins on their shoulders, who took great care of the wine, each of them carrying one mug of the undiluted wine and another of the drugged, whilst a pipe of wine well seasoned with the herb was placed in the ship's waist.

The guests drank so heavily, that before seven o'clock in the evening they could have tied them all up without their feeling it, and the rest of the crew were likewise unconscious, excepting the ship's-cook, who was an Englishman and very devoted to Ruy Freyre, for whom he had made many dainties when a prisoner.

Ruy Freyre seeing that all was ready for his escape, told the two Portuguese to tell the two slaves to go along to the stern gallery and descend therefrom by a rope-ladder to the ship's longboat, after supplying themselves with oars. When he saw an opportune moment, he slipped away from his companions and after entering the boat in the same way, rowed away from the ship as fast as possible.

The other vessels in the port sighted the boat, and suspecting what was amiss, they fired some cannon shots which not being heeded confirmed their suspicions, and they launched their boats after him. Ruy Freyre seeing that they would overhaul him and that he had no weapons wherewith to defend himself, jumped overboard with his companions and swam towards the shore, leaving the boat to drift with the current which runs very strongly along this Caost. They reached land with one companion the less, who was swept away by the current and drowned, and they took the road to Damão with all speed, whereby they reached some Portuguese villages in the neighbourhood of the fortress before morning.[1]

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[1] Richard Swanley, master's mate in the *Lion*, has the following entry in his journal: "March 16.—This day night, the skiffe being

As soon as the English recovered consciousness and saw that Ruy Freyre was missing, they instructed their Factor to ask the Moorish Governor of Surat to send 200 cavalrymen to scour the countryside for him; these were despatched forthwith, and similarly great proclamations were made offering rich rewards to whosoever should capture him or reveal his hiding-place.

However since he was a good Christian and zealous in the Service of God and his King, and very disinterested, therefore God delivered him, and thus he reached Damão at 10 o'clock in the morning. He was well received in that City which presented him with 4,000 cruzados for his expenses, and he, not wishing them to make any celebrations in his honour, passed on at once without any delay to the Fortress of Baçaim.

Reflecting upon the critical situation of Ormuz, and of what effect his own presence would be in that Strait and Kingdom, and how much it imported to his Majesty's Service that he should take command of

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by the shipp's side, the master commanded the boatswaine to more the skiffe astarne. So through the boatswaines forgetfullnes it was neglected. So about midnight Capt. Ryfrera with two Portugalls more and a neger, watching their opertunity, the watch being asleepe, gott into the skiff and went ashoare. So half an hour after, the skiff was missed. Then wee made after them ashoare, but could not heare of them, for they made presently for the river of Suratt, and so gott over. The one of them was drowned; the other gott to Deman, which afterward we heard by leters which Ryfrera sent to the President of Suratt." According to a MS. in the National Library at Lisbon, the other Portuguese who made his escape with Ruy Freire was the Captain João Cardoso de Almeida. On his return to England James Beversham, the master of the *Lion*, was interrogated by the Court regarding the escape of Ruy Freyre. He "made answere that it was through the negligence of the watch; that he had sett a guard of six men with rapiers and pistolls and had given commandment that the skiff should be moord asterne, but contrary to his direccion it was left by the shippes side and he gott awaie." [I.O., *Court Minutes*, quoted by Foster, vol. 1622-3, p. 83.] Both of these English accounts substantiate the relation given by Fr. Antonio da Cruz.

that Fortress, he therefore bought a galliot, which he provided with excellent cannon taken from the Royal Arsenal, and manned with 50 soldiers supplied with the necessary provisions. He set sail at the end of April and in the course of his voyage he fell in with two galliots belonging to Portuguese smugglers who are commonly called "pepper-boxes" in India as they trade in pepper and other Indian products to Persia, against which traffic there are severe penalties imposed which are rigorously carried out. He promised these men the Royal Pardon if they would accompany him to Ormuz, swearing to them on his honour that he would bring them and their cargoes there in safety.

They accepted this offer, and in company with the two galliots he sailed to Muscat where they arrived within a few days; they were received with great enthusiasm, and forasmuch as the place was a stronghold of some importance, the Governor, inhabitants, and clergy all went down to greet him on the sea-shore, whilst the Church-bells were rung for joy; they then accompanied him to the Church of Our Lady of the Rosary, and thence to St. Augustin where he was lodged.

Shortly afterwards Constantino de Sà de Noronha arrived[1] with 14 galliots out of the 20 with which he had set out for the relief of Ormuz, and whilst waiting here for the other six which had been seperated from him, there arrived the pinnaces that were carrying the survivors of the loss of Ormuz—a sight and news which caused great sorrow amongst all, as also amazement at such a crushing and unexpected disaster.

Constantino de Sà seeing that the fleet under his command was not strong enough to retake the lost fortress, whilst the delay in Muscat was very prejudicial, resolved after taking counsel with Ruy Freyre, to hand it over to the Captain Martin Affonso de Mello who had come to take over the charge of that Fortress, and to return to Goa; Ruy Freyre was likewise resolved upon going to Goa, partly to clear himself from the accusations spread about by his enemies during the inquiry into the surrender of Queixome, but chiefly with the idea of becoming a monk, after he should have satisfied the authorities as to the manner in which he had performed his duty. The galliots of the Pimenteyros that he had met in the Gulf were dismissed, and they both embarked in a pinnace for Chaul, where they safely arrived in due course.[1]

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[1] Actually de Sá had already reached Muscat, and was preparing to leave for Ormuz when the news came that Ruy Freire had arrived at Tiwāi and was on his way to Muscat.

Simão de Mello and his partisans did likewise, albeit with a very different intention, for since the prickings of their consciences gave them a sure indication of the fate which they might expect, they passed on from there to the lands of the Idalcão, deeming themselves unsafe in ours.

CHAPTER XXXIII

Ruy Freyre arrives at Goa—What happened to him there.

THE General Ruy Freyre arrived at Goa, where he was less well received by the Citizens than he had expected, and he went to lodge in the convent of St. Augustin where he was visited by his friends, albeit the Governor Fernão de Albuquerque looked on him but coldly.

He at once comenced proceedings to clear his name in the inquiry which was about to be held into the surrender of Queixome, since there were already within the City many refugees who had come from the fall of Ormuz; with this object in view he filed his suit, the judges appointed to hear his case being Gonçalo Pinto de Affonseca who was then serving as Lord Chancellor, and Doctor Antonio Barretto da Sylva, Auditor-in-chief of the State of India. The depositions of the witnesses were taken, but no decision as to the sentence was made during the government of Fernão de Albuquerque; no sooner had the new Viceroy, the Conde da Vidigueira, Dom Francisco da Gama arrived in India, than he sent him to Muscat, as we shall see, without troubling about any formal release. The actions of both the Governor and the Viceroy were based on considerations of State, forasmuch as Fernão de Albuquerque was reluctant to deliver judgement in this case, since as Ruy Freyre had made that Fortress against his wish and opinion, he did not want to show in any way that he now approved of something that he had formerly spoken against, and that had turned out badly [i.e. The Kishm expedition]. However the Conde da Vidigueira considering the need that there was for a man so valerous as Ruy Freyre, who in doing what he did had only followed the orders and instructions which he had brought from the Kingdom, and that the issues of events are not in the hands of men nor can they be forseen, he availed himself of him owing to the lack that there was of such men, and the great experience which he had had in that war; Ruy Freyre was however already disgusted with it and resolved, as we have said, to retire from the World and become a Monk of the Order of St. Augustin, in whose convent he was lodged during all the time in which Fernão de Albuquerque was governing.

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[1] Fr. Antonio da Cruz relates that their galliot nearly foundered in a storm on the voyage, and that its preservation was attributed to the intercession of St. Francis Xavier, to whom the crew made a votive offering of a silver rudder in gratitude for their safe arrival in India, "which hangs in the Saint's Chapel at Goa."

However, the new Viceroy on his accession went to visit Ruy Freyre, and severely admonished him for his idea, telling him that this action did not become his reputation at such a time, but that on the contrary it would rebound to his own credit as well as that of the State if he returned to the Strait, and waged therein a bitter and ruthless warfare against the Persians and their allies; for this purpose he should leave forthwith in command of 6 galliots which would be armed with sufficient cannon, and these in conjunction with the 20 of Constantino de Sà's armada that were in Muscat would suffice to continue the war, for which he would have the title of "General of the Red Sea and Strait of Ormuz."

Ruy Freyre accepted the post without demur, reflecting that he could recover thereby the credit which in the opinion of various people had been somewhat diminished, and that his person would be of much importance in that war; he therefore bestirred himself in such a manner that at the end of April [1623] he set sail with the 6 galliots for Muscat, where he arrived within a few days, and was well received by all the inhabitants of that Fortress, who, as they knew so much of him, now felt themselves safe; whereas previously they had been very nervous, because the Persians, emboldened by their victories at Queixome and Ormuz, were acting so haughtily and high-handedly that they looked upon all the fortress and garrison towns of Arabia as already theirs, not thinking anyone would dare to defend them.

Withal however, as soon as they learnt of the coming of the General Ruy Freyre, although they had an immense force of terradas and terranquins in Soar (which they were already in possession of), they immediately disbanded it, evacuated some Forts that they had near Muscat, and withdrew with all the forces that they could collect to the strongholds of Corofacão, Dobba, Lima, Cassapeo, Ranuz and Iulufar[1]

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[1] Corofacao is Khor Fakkan, Dobba is Dibah, and Lima is Limah; all these are small ports on the Eastern Oman coast between Sohar and Cape Ras Musandam, whilst Cassapeo is Khasab (*v.* p. 52, note 1), Ranuz is apparently the same as Rams (*v.* p. 51, note 4) and Julfa or Ras al Khaimah has already been dealt with on p. 51, note 4). These last three are on the W. or Trucial Oman Coast.

—which were of greater strength, since they had formerly belonged to us, and yielded good revenues owing to their situations as trading-ports.

The General, seeing that the Persians at the mere rumour of his arrival were desisting from their intentions, and had retired with their fleet to Persia, abandoning to him all the fortresses that they had on the coast of Arabia Felix, leaving only that of Soar garrisoned, whilst all their strength was concentrated in Petrea as it lay close to Persia, he determined to go and seek them out in person; putting this determination into effect, he fitted out 20 galliots and 10 Lascarin tarranquins, on board of which he embarked 6 heavy guns, besides hiring a pataxo that was in the port laden with other materials of war.

CHAPTER XXXXIV

The General Ruy Freyre attacks the Fortress of Soar and takes it—He wages war in Arabia.

When the business of the Armada had been settled and after 1,000 Portuguese soldiers had embarked therein, the General Ruy Freyre ordered a gun to be fired as signal to weigh anchor, and proceeded to coast along the shore of Arabia straight to the fortress of Soar which is situated at a distance of 30 leagues from Muscat. He anchored with the whole Armada at a cannon-shot from the fort, since it had no artillery. He despatched a boat to the shore with a white flag, and a message to the Captain of the Persian garrison to say that he had come there with the intention of taking that Fortress; for which purpose he politely requested him to surrender it, because it was not his, neither had the Persians taken it from the Portuguese in fair fight, so that if he would yield it he would grant him any honourable terms that he might ask, whilst if he declined to accept this magnanimous offer by refusing to hand it over within four and twenty hours, then he would put both him and all his men to the edge of the sword.[1]

The Persian Captain boldly answered that it was not necessary to wait until the end of the 24 hours, and that he could begin to attack the fortress forthwith; for within it were 2,000 Persians whose swords the Portuguese well knew, and they would receive them with those in their hands. The General greatly appreciated this reply, and praised the valour and resolution thereof; he then assembled the Council in his galliot, to which came all the Captains of the Armada, to whom he showed how important was the conquest of that fortress for the eventual recovery of Ormuz, since it was close to it, and likewise for the war in Persia and Arabia with the conduct of which he was entrusted. For these reasons he was determined to take it, for which purpose they should decide where was the best place in which to disembark, forasmuch as that stronghold was very well fortified, having six very high bastions, in view of which it seemed impossible to take it by assault owing to the great height of the walls, but that they could only achieve their object by bombardment.

There appeared from the outside to be no better place to effect this from, than a mosque situated on the side of the lagoon at a distance of less than 100 paces from the sea. On the other side they could plant a battery near the Bazar buildings which had been constructed by Ioão de Sousa Pinel. Meanwhile the galliots should blockade it by sea, so that the defence could not hold out for long, and the conquest would be swift.

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[1] A good account of this expedition against Sohar, together with many original documents of Ruy Freyre's, containing his orders and dispositions before and during the siege, is to be found in L. Cordeiro, *Dois Capitães da India*, Lisbon, 1898, pp. 56-70.

All those assembled in the Council agreed with the General's plan, which they asked him to put into execution forthwith. At daybreak on the next day the General ordered the pataxo to stand in towards the shore and lie-to with all its guns on one side, so as to batter the fortress from the side of the sea. Meanwhile the Armada rowed hard towards the houses situated on the promotory of the Bazar of Ioão de Sousa, which was the spot where the walls were strongest, being the best of the City. The galliots pulled close in-shore where the men disembarked under cover of the artillery fire.[1] Immediately upon landing they attacked in good order some earthworks which had been thrown up by the Moors, and although the defenders soon evacuated them and fled to the fortress, yet we did not take them without any hurt to ourselves, since they killed Captain Antonio de Affonseca Sarayva and 8 other Portuguese besides him.

The General occupied them, and strengthened them by erecting some redoubts, at the same time posting Ioão de Sousa Pinel with 50 soldiers in his own houses, which he had built during the time when he was Captain of that fortress. The other Captains were stationed in the most suitable places, and he then ordered two cannon of 24 lbs: calibre to be disembarked, one of which he placed in the neighbourhood of the lagoon and the other in the Bazar.

He began to batter the Fortress, whilst the pataxo caused it great damage from the side of the sea, and since it was made of bricks and mud, within a few days a great part of it was demolished. The Arabs seeing that they were losing many people killed, and tormented by the cries of their women who begged and implored them to capitulate, were eventually obliged to yield and hoisted a white flag on the wall; we on our side replied to it with another, upon which two Moors came out, saying that the besieged wished to surrender themselves and the fortress to our men, on condition that they were allowed to leave with all their belongings. The General replied to this proposal by saying that if they left on that very day, he would grant them their lives, but that if they delayed for another day he would put them all to the edge of the sword. This forced the Moors to accept the terms whereby they were to leave for the interior on the same day, with only their side-arms and leading their women by the hand. The General then made his entry into the Fortress, the ruins of which he repaired with sailors drawn from the Armada. Shortly afterwards he wrote to Mamude Manafer, King of those parts, complaining of his favouring the Persians, albeit he well knew that they were deadly enemies of the Crown of Portugal and the King of Ormuz; after explanations had been made on both sides, a peace was drawn up and signed, whereupon after leaving in the fortress a force of 100 Portuguese together with 200 Lascarins and the necessary artillery, he set sail for the cape of Corofacão [Khor Fakkan] where he arrived after a voyage lasting 5 days. Here the General was very joyfully received, as the Captain of that Fortress was a worthy Moor, and closely related to Aly Camal who had performed such doughty deeds in the siege of Queixome and in the forays on the Persian coast.[1]

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[1] Dom Gonçalo da Silveira being the first to land: " . . . and he was the first ashore in the attack, and when the men were formed up, I ordered him to go and attack a bastion in the city wall . . . he bravely stormed it taking the position that very day, and whilst the Captains and soldiers were fighting in the streets, the said Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra was wounded by a musket shot in the shoulder." [Letter of Ruy Freire, dated Muscat 20.4.1628.]

This Moor came off to the flagship, and there handed the keys of the fortress to the General, who received them with that courtesy which he so well knew how to practise on such occasions, and to which he was the more inclined from his previous acquaintance with the Moor in Ormuz. He went ashore where the citizens and natives gave many feasts, games and dances in his honour, and afterwards he entered the fortress with 200 Portuguese arquebusiers. He stayed here for some days, putting things in order and erecting a customs-house wherein he placed a Factor and Clerk; he ascertained from the Captain of the Fortress that he had with him 400 men, and he forthwith asked the native inhabitants if they were satisfied with their captain, and would promise in his company to defend themselves against the Persians, since they had previously shown themselves so disloyal to their own King of Ormuz, whom it was their duty to obey; furthermore, altho' the latter was now a prisoner in Ispahan, there remained his son Mir Mofelaxà whom they knew well, and who had been taken from Ormuz to Goa where he had been crowned as King of Ormuz by the Viceroy of India, and who was now in Muscat; he added that if he should subsequently have any trouble with them, he would come and crush them all utterly.

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[1] See pp. 47 and 56.

The Arabs replied that they had all along been very loyal vassals of the King of Ormuz, and that whatever they had done lately in a contrary sense could be well excused, since if Ormuz with powerful forces had not been able to defend itself, how much less could they with so little against the might of the Persians victorious over the Portuguese? Likewise they were very pleased with their Captain, and the best favour that His Lordship could do them was not to deprive him of his post, the which he well deserved since he had been the first to acclaim the name of the King of Portugal. With this, the General declared himself as satisfied with the Arabs, and handed over the Fortress to this same Captain, first of all making him swear allegience (in the usual Moorish manner) at his hands to the King of Portugal, and for the upkeep of the 400 soldiers left in the fortress as a garrison, as well as for the taxes and tribute paid to the King.

After this was done, the General made preparations to attack and raze Dobba [Dibah], which was garrisoned by a force of 800 Persians; whilst he was yet 5 leagues from that fortress and ready to set sail, he received information that many people were marching on Dobba from the interior, and accordingly he delayed for a while on receipt of this news in order to ascertain what was happening; he was not left long in doubt, for it was soon found out that the Arabs of that district having heard that the General was in Corofacão, and being compelled by the Tyrannical conduct of the Persians to take up arms against him, had turned on them instead, and put all the Persians to the sword.

The General greatly rejoiced at this news, and gave splendid rewards to the first messenger who brought it; he left at once for Dobba, and on arriving within view thereof saluted it with all his guns, whilst great signs and demonstrations of joy were made to him from the fortress; he thereupon disembarked and proceeded to the fort, whilst the Arabs going before him in the streets through which he passed, spread their burnouses and hoods which they use as cloaks, for him to tread on as he went.

This welcome so assured him of their loyalty that he left them a Portuguese Captain with 50 soldiers for their protection, in order to put a stop to the dissensions amongst the natives as to who it was to be, since they were all equally deserving; and leaving a Factor in the Customs-House, he charged the Sheikh, or local Governor, and his assistants with the task of collecting the taxes due to the King of Ormuz.

Having thus left the whole Coast in peace and obedience to the new King of Ormuz, whom he had made acknowledged as such with all the solemnities customary amongst them, the General withdrew to

Muscat, as he saw that the winter had begun—during which season it is impossible to navigate along the Coast of Arabia Petrea.

CHAPTER XXXXV

The General Ruy Freyre continues the Arabian War.

The news of Ruy Freyre's arrival at Muscat, the way in which he had escaped from the hands of the English, and his capture of Soar, so cowed all the inhabitants of the districts bordering on the Strait of Ormuz, that each man's only thought was securely to hide his own women, children and goods; this applied more especially to those on the Persian coast where it was a common saying amongst them,—"Now I perceive Heaven's punishment against the Persians! Ruy Freyre is in Muscat; the Persians have no houses, children, women or goods other than what Ruy Freyre wishes to leave them." As a result of this panic they either swore allegiance to the King of Ormuz, or else evacuated the sea-shores.

As soon as the summer began, the General ordered the Armada to be got ready, and set sail in the beginning of April with a force of 20 galliots, and 20 terranquins carrying 400 Lascarins. He touched at the neighbouring fortresses and erected Customs-houses in Borca, Soadi, Soar, Alua, Amègo and Ceyfim,[1] leaving therein Factors and other necessary officials, and after visiting Corofação and Dobba he arrived at Lima.

This fortress was built on the sumit of a hill out of range of our artillery, and they did not wish to submit since there was a garrison of 400 Persian soldiers within; on the contrary, they fired some volleys of musketry into our Armada which caused us the loss of 8 Portuguese killed, besides many others wounded.

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[1] All small and unimportant fishing-villages on the Trucial and Eastern coasts of Oman.

It seemed to the General that this war was becoming unduly prolonged, so he ordered 300 well-armed Portuguese under their ordinary Captains, together with a force of 400 Lascarins under the command of Manoel Cabaço, to be disembarked in three seperate places, with orders to put to the sword all whom they should find within the fortress.

These men speedily effected their several landings, and stepped ashore amidst a storm of shot that was fired from the fortress with the intention of hindering the disembarkation. Having landed, they climbed up the hillside to the fortress, which they carried by assault in the first rush, cleaving a way with their hand-grenades. They put to the sword all those they found therein, without mercy to age or sex, and they then burnt the City and razed the fortress, not leaving anything with life in that site nor one stone upon another. All this was done with the loss of only 6 Portuguese and 12 Lascarins slain, and a few more wounded. After this bellicose fury was finished, the General sailed along the coast, and doubling Cape Mossandam he arrived at Camufa, where he was well received by the inhabitants of the City, since all its townsmen had formerly served as sailors in our Armadas of rowing-vessels at Ormuz, and they were a people who had never been unfaithful to us.

Here the galliots were provided with refreshments, and they sailed thence to Caçapo [Khasab] which place they found uninhabited, the fortress having been evacuated and the people fled to the interior. The General found that it would be very useful to fortify that stronghold, since it was situated within a beautiful bay, sheltered from all the winds, at a distance of 12 leagues from Ormuz, and that from this base they could greatly harass not only Ormuz alone, but all Persia.

He sent word to the hills whither the natives had fled, promising them pardon of their past rebellion, and swearing on his word of honour that they could return to their homes in safety. The natives, trusting upon the word and honesty of the Portuguese in general and of Ruy Freyre in particular, came down from the hills and returned to their town; the General at once ordered all our men to disembark, and began the work of strengthening the fortress with great zeal, (he being the foremost in begining and continuing the task), so that it was finished within a few days; mainly because it was made of mud bricks since there is no lime along that coast, nor knowledge of the use of it. He left therein a garrison of 20 Portuguese soldiers with their Captain, together with 100 Lascarins and a Customs-house with the necessary officials.

After having done all this, and when the Armada was already on the verge of sailing to attack Ranuz, two terranquins gaily decorated with flags sailed into the Bay, saluting with volleys of musketry and sounding diverse instruments of war. From the devices on the standards, they were recognized as belonging to the Sheikhs or Kings of Ranuz; these came alongside the flagship, and when they came on board, our men recognized them as the same Sheiks, or chiefs, as those who had been captured by Phelippe de Affonseca during the time when they had been in Queixome, and who had remained as prisoners in Ormuz waiting for their ransom; when the Khan of Shiras took that City and fortress he had made them swear allegiance to the King of Persia, giving them their liberty, and sending them laden with magnificent gifts back to their lands.

However when they learnt of the General's coming and of his delay at Caçapo, they came to seek him, in order to save themselves from the punishment which he might otherwise have inflicted on them if they had not done so. They were graciously received upon a carpet under the awning of his galliot, after being saluted by the guns of the whole squadron. During his dinner with them, he presented them with costly turbans, acknowledging in courteous terms their chivalrous conduct, and the loyalty that they had shown to the Crown of Portugal and the King of Ormuz; he added that henceforth they could rely upon the help of all the Portuguese Armadas for which they might ask, and in the name of the King of Ormuz he relieved them from all the taxes that they had hitherto been accustomed to pay, leaving only half of the four that they used to pay yearly in acknowledgement of being vassals and tributaries.

These three fortresses having been secured and strengthened he left for Iulufar, as he was informed that this city was not very firm in its allegiance to the King of Ormuz, and that there were factions within it, some for the King of Ormuz and others for the new King; however so soon as Ruy Freyre arrived there, everything calmed down, and Colimdim (nephew of the King of Ormuz) who was the Captain there, asked him to leave 50 Portuguese in the fort to quiet the people of the City; this request was granted by the General who also constructed a Customs-House therein.

And thus leaving the affairs of Arabia in peace and quiet, he returned to Muscat, with the intention of waging a ruthless war on Persia in the following year, and laying waste all the coasts thereof with fire and sword.

CHAPTER XXXXVI

The General lays siege to Ormuz—wages war upon Persia,—burns an English ship.

THE affairs of Arabia being in this condition, the General Ruy Freyre sent from Muscat, where he then was, Luis Martins Chichorro as Captain-Major of

4 galliots and ten terranquins to the shores of Curiate and Cape Rosalgate,[1] with orders to ravage with fire and sword those of the inhabitants who refused to yield; he added that if this Armada should prove insufficient, he was to inform him of it forthwith, and then he would come in person. As soon as he had despatched this Armada he wrote to the Count-Admiral Viceroy, asking him to send some galliots and soldiers wherewith to prosecute the Persian war.

About this time a terranquim arrived from the Turkish Pasha of Bassorah, bearing letters and a rich present for the General; the Pasha wrote bidding him welcome, and saying that as he had heard of the ruthless war that his Lordship was waging against Persia, and since he feared that the Persians might cross the River Euphrates as they were Masters of Babylon, which they had taken from the Grand Turk in the same year that they had taken Ormuz from us,[2] he asked him for a force of six Portuguese galliots, whose cost he would pay all the time they remained in his service; these galliots united with his Arabs would press the war as much as possible against the Persians in that part of the Euphrates.

This letter gave great pleasure to the General, who at once laid its contents before the Council, wherein it was decided that they should at once send to the Pasha the galliots that he asked for, because it was realised that they would be of great effect owing to the damage that they could cause in that region.

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[1] Curiate is Quryat, some miles S.E. of Muscat, whilst Rosalgate is Ras al Hadd, the most easterly cape of the Arabian Peninsula. Quryat had been plundered and burnt by Affonso de Albuquerque in 1507, but the Portuguese had been temporarily expelled by a native rising in 1522. They were finally driven out by the Imām of Muscat in 1649.

[2] Baghdád had been taken from the Persians by Sultan Suleiman "the magnificent" of Turkey in 1534. Shah Abbas (1586-1628), in the wars which he carried on with the Turks during almost the whole of his long reign, wrested back from them all that his predecessors had lost, making peace on terms very favourable to himself in 1623. Sultan Murad IV. regained Baghdád in 1638, after a long siege which was resisted by the Persian garrison with the utmost bravery. Murad massacred most of the inhabitants on storming the town, which remained in Turkish hands until 1918.

They were fitted out forthwith, and Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra was appointed Captain-Major of them; he was highly pleased at his selection, because it gave him the chance of revenging himself upon the Persians for the atrocities which they had comitted on the Portuguese and their women-folk at Ormuz. On board these galliots, (which were well gunned and had been chosen by Dom Gonçalo himself), there were embarked 200 veteran Portuguese soldiers, and they left in company with the terranquim bearing the General's answer to the Pasha, assuring him that he could rely upon obtaining anything of which he might stand in need from Muscat or the State of India; he advised him of this because he did not doubt that the Viceroy would have much pleasure in being of use to him.[1]

As soon as the Viceroy in India learnt of the state of affairs in Arabia, as also of what else had happened there, and of the relief force sent to Bassorah, he rejoiced exceedingly, and sent to the General a squadron of 10 galliots provided with 300 men, a large supply of gunpowder, and numerous fireworks, in addition to a ship carrying men, provisions, cables, tackle, masts, sails, canvas for making sails, and other warlike supplies, under the command of António Ferrão with the rank of Captain-Major.

These vessels reached Muscat within a few days, bearing a letter for the General, in which the Viceroy informed him of the pleasure with which he had received one from him that he had forwarded to His

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[1] Actually Dom Gonçalo's squadron consisted of only 5 galliots, although it was reinforced later. He left Muscat in January 1624 in company with a convoy of merchant vessels. His orders for this expedition, together with many other documents concerning his actions therein, are printed on pp. 72-88 of L. Cordeiro's *Dois Capitães da India*, Lisbon, 1898.

Majesty, adding that he was unable for the present to send him further reinforcements since he was busy fitting out eight galleons, which were destined to sail to Ormuz under the command of Nuno Alvares Botelho as Captain-Major, in order to seek out their European enemies; he further approved of his design to undertake a campaign against Ormuz, which he hoped God would permit to be recovered.

In addition to these vessels, the General ordered 10 galliots and twenty terranquims to be constructed, and after embarking 400 Lascarins in them, he set sail at the begining of the month of November with 20 galliots and as many terranquins, well supplied with munitions. He sailed along the coast of Arabia as far as Cape Mosandão [Ras Musandam], whence he steered for Ormuz and cast anchor with all his Armada off the point of Turumbaque; he ordered the terranquins—as being the lightest—accompanied by 4 galliots for their protection, to attack Bramim at daybreak on the following morning, and burn the city and put every living thing to the edge of the sword with the utmost ruthlessness. He appointed Luis Martins Chicorro as commander of this Armada, who set sail with it at nightfall, and had such good fortune that at the hour appointed by the General the town was burnt to ashes, and with it 400 terradas and six galliots; 2,000 Persian men, women, and children were decapitated, whilst our losses amounted only to 7 Portuguese and 10 Lascarins killed besides a few others wounded; our victorious Armada returned at 9 o'clock in the morning, since it is not more than 3 leagues from Ormuz to Bramim, whence the soldiers all came so enriched with plunder as to arouse the jealousy of those who had not taken part in this enterprise.[1]

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[1] All Ruy Freire's attacks were not equally successful, however. Weddell in a letter of April 1625 asserts that on one occasion the Persians cut off 100 Portuguese who had landed on the island to obtain water, killed 28 of them and captured 3, "including a kinsman of Ruy Freire." The Portuguese are silent on this point.

He at once sent another 10 galliots under the command of the same Luis Martins Chicorro, with orders to station themselves off the point of Cauru, whilst six terranquins which he sent in their company were to coast up and down that side of the island, leaving the galliots anchored off shore out of range of the Persian musketry. The General proceeded with the remainder to the promotory of Our Lady of Hope, leaving four terranquins off that of Turumbaque; the other ten he ordered to cruise in the sea near the fortress, lying in wait for the terradas and other craft that came from Comorão [Bandar Abbas] with provisions for it.

In this manner the General held the City and fortress of Ormuz besieged so closely for three months, that during the whole of this time not a single thing entered into it from Persia;[1] and finally, as it seemed to him that the enemy were growing careless, he ordered Luis Martins Chicorro to make a night attack upon Congo with his galliots and terranquins, ravaging it with fire and sword; likewise the same thing was to be carried out in Broço, whilst a simultaneous assault was to be made upon Bombarreca by Antonio Mourão de Oliveyra with 2 galliots and 7 terranquins; meanwhile the General with 8 galliots and 3 terranquins proceded to the promotory of Caurù.

On the morning after the two Armadas had been despatched, the General sighted a ship flying English colours, which dropped anchor off Comorão; realising that her consorts would probably make their appearance before long, and that he would then be unable to burn that ship, he called a council, as the result of which everyone confessed themselves, took up their arms, and got ready fireworks and hand-grenades; on the General making signal to weigh anchor by sounding a bass trumpet and setting his foresail, the rest of the Armada followed suit and attacked the ship, that gave them a heavy broadside from which the Armada received a good deal of damage; withal however they so plied their powder-pots and fireworks that the ship was ablaze before she had time to reload and fire a second discharge;[1] after she had burnt to the water's edge, some 80 English were rescued, from whom it was learnt that she was the same Vice-Admiral's ship that had been at Queixome, and from which the General had escaped by giving the banquet, as has been previously described.

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[1] About this time Weddell reported that "The Persian begineth to bee werey of keeping Ormuse, in respect thaye have noe shippinge to maintane trayed or defend themselves from invation of the Portingalls," who, "with about 20 sayle of friggatts have beseiged [the Castle], burnt most part of the boats alongst this coast, and hindred all supplie to there releife; whereby the Companies designe for trade in that place is not now to be prosecuted." [Foster, *op. cit.*, pp. 42 and 80.]

All these men were beheaded in cold blood with the exception of the cook, whom he treated very well in recognition of the kind usage he had received from him during his captivity; their heads were placed in a sack, and he sent this, still tinted with the fresh blood, in a terranquin as a present to the English Factor at Comorão, together with a letter in which he told him that he had done this in revenge for the English having handed over the 800 Lascarins in Queixome to the Persians, who had killed them in cold blood,—albeit they had surrendered on condition that they should be landed alive in Arabia.[2]

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[1] In the National Library at Lisbon is the certificate of the services of a certain Balthazar de Sousa who "was at Comorão in the burning of an English ship of 23 guns and at the taking of the 35 men left alive out of the 90 which she carried, on whom justice [*sic ! !*] was done; and the fusta containing B^{ar} de Sousa was the first that grappled the said ship, whilst he bore himself manfully during the fight, and was armed a knight on this occasion." [*Secção Ultramarina,* MSS. 436, fol. 501 v.] Other Portuguese MSS. credit the *Lion* with 32 guns.

[2] The English Factors at Bandar Abbas in a letter dated November 8th 1625 write: "The *Lion* was this morning utterly destroyed by the force of 20 friggotts and small boates, which boarded her within

This ship came riddled with cannon-shot, because whilst off Surat in company with three others, they had met with eight Portuguese galleons, one of which had boarded this vessel and entered some men in her, whereupon the English had set fire to some barrels of gunpowder which they were carrying and blown them all into the sea, whereby they were enabled to get clear of the galleon and escape under cover of the darkness of the night, as was learnt from the cook's confession.[1]

Meanwhile Luis Martins Chicorro laid waste the fortress of Broço with fire and sword, and burnt all the outskirts of Congo [=Kung] without any loss whatever on our side. Antonio Mourão de Oliveyra met with the same success, putting to the sword all whom he found in Bombarreca, and after burning the town he rejoined our Armada at Ormuz. The General seeing that he had been within sight of this City for more than four months, without having artillery wherewith to bombard it or sufficient men to reconquer it, he returned to Muscat victorious for that year, leaving Persia greatly cowed and damaged owing to the assaults and havoc he had wrought therein.

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shott of the castle, soe plying their fireworkes that within an howers space she was burnt to the water, and all her men (except 9 or 10 which were ashoare about the shipps bussines) lost eyther by fyre or water or both." [I.O., *Persia Records*, vol. i., p. 168.]

[1] This incident is in the wrong chronological order. The engagement off Surat between Botelho's 4 (not 8) galleons and the *Lion*, *Palsgrave* and *Dolphin*, as well as the subsequent loss of the *Lion*, took place in October and November 1625, whilst the three battles in the Persian Gulf which are described in the next chapter took place in January-February of the same year. See Introduction and Appendix VII for the correct sequence of events.

CHAPTER XXXXVII

The General founds a Customs House in the fort of Congo—what passed with the Governor Nuno Alvarez Botelho.

The Persians were reduced to such a state of abject terror, that on sighting any sail at sea they fancied it to belong to the General Ruy Freyre's Armada, and with his name they hushed their babes at the breast, whilst the peoples inhabiting the border districts of the Persian coasts obeyed him more readily than the Sultan, both because they saw themselves delivered from the intolerable yoke of the latter, as because they freed themselves from the perpetual fear in which they otherwise were.

However, the General considering that the war ought not to be relaxed in any way, fitted out 8 galliots and 3 terranquins all manned by Portuguese, with the intention of joining forces with the Pasha of Catifa,[1] and hindering the Persians from continuing the seed-pearl fishery of the Fortress of Barem,[1] which was the heaviest loss they could be made to suffer, owing to the great importance of this fishery to them.

He set sail with this force at the end of November, and sailed along the coast of Arabia, as it was not necessary for him to have a larger Fleet. Off Cape Mosandão [Ras Musandam] he met a terranquim that came from Persia with letters for him from the Governor of Comorão, asking him (in accordance with orders received from the Sultan of Persia) to suspend the war along that coaſt for the space of a year, during which interval the Portuguese might choose one of the Persian ports—whichever the General might select—wherein to make a Cuſtoms-House, to which our ships could freely come to buy and sell, and that half the Royal dues thereof should belong to the King of Portugal, and the other half to the Sultan; furthermore the Portuguese Adminiſtrator or Factor of the aforesaid Cuſtoms-House would be empowered to give passports to Persian vessels, whereby they could navigate freely with them, without fear of our Armadas.

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[1] The El-Katif or Qatif of modern maps. It is on the Hajar, or Hasa, coast of Arabia and lies some 225 miles S.E. of Koweit (Kuwait). One of the earliest trading centres in the Gulf it was founded in Sassanian times *c.* A.D. 310. The Portuguese and Turks held it at intervals throughout the 16th century, the former apparently finally losing it together with Bahrein in 1602 to the Persians. Bahrein was (and is) famous for its pearl fisheries, and was for long a bone of contention between the Portuguese and Persians.

This offer of the Persians did not seem bad to the General, when he reflected upon the considerable profits which would accrue to the Royal Exchequer therefrom. He replied to the Xariaria[1] (as they call that Governor) that he could not accede to his requeſt without firſt informing the Viceroy of India thereof; however, until this latter's decision was received, he for his part would agree to all the suggestions, and that after the year's truce had elapsed, the war would continue as before; furthermore for the erection of a Cuſtoms-House, he would choose the port of Congo wherein there would be peace for evermore, which would not be broken even if the Portuguese should attack Ormuz, whilſt from this same port the Portuguese could draw all the necessary supplies for their Armadas; all this was to be drawn up in writing, and hoſtages consiſting of four leading Moors for the security of the said port were to be brought from Persia to Muscat. He told the terranquim which he despatched with this message, that he would await an answer off Careca,[2] whither he was bound, and that he would give them a time-limit of 15 days for it, but that if they did not fulfil every detail of what he had proposed, then the whole agreement would be rendered null and void, whilst the war would be resumed in full force.

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[1] Compare Monnox:—"... *Xareeali* Governour of the Province of Moguſtan" and "the Duke [Khan] sent his Visier accompanied with Sabandar Sultan and *Xareearee*. . . ." [*V.* Purchas, vol. x., pp. 343-4.]

[2] Lareca or Larak, the island which lies a few miles S. of Ormuz and S.E. of Kishm.

The Xariaria was satisfied with all these conditions save only the one relating to the furnishing of supplies for our Armadas, but as the Persians were so exhausted by the havoc wrought along their shores, he had perforce to send his answer within a few days, consenting to all the demands; at the same time he despatched two terradas laden with refreshments, and offered the use of the port of Comorão.

At this time there arrived 8 Dutch and 6 English ships of great strength, together with 3 Moorish vessels of Surat in their company, and the General therefore left his station off the island of Careca.[1] It was not many days before our men sighted eight other ships, that were speedily recognised as being the galleons under the command of Nuno Alvarez Botelho, which had come in pursuit of the Dutch and English ships on the day before, fighting very bravely from sunrise till nightfall.

On this day the General seeing that owing to lack of wind, and with the force of the tide, the galleon *São Sebastião* captained by Antonio Telles de Menezes, was drifting away from the Armada in the direction of Ormuz, and that the English ships were heavily cannonading it, despatched to its relief four galliots carrying 120 men, who arrived in the nick of time, as there were several killed and many wounded in the galleon, including the aforesaid Captain who had had his left arm shattered by a cannon-ball.

The General himself rowed with his galliot towards the flagship wherein was Nuno Alvarez Botelho, interposing between this vessel and the ships of the

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[1] As already noted on p. 197, note 1, the events which are here narrated in the text took place in Jan.-Feb. 1628 *before* the destruction of the *Lion* described in the last chapter. [*V*. Appendix VII.]

Dutch Admiral and Vice-Admiral with which it was heavily engaged.

Nuno Alvarez not knowing that the galliot was a flagship, (since it was wearing the Royal Standard at the mizzen shrouds), hailed him with these words;—"Ah! soldier Captain of the galliot! Take this galleon in tow until you bring me alongside one of these enemy ships," to which the General replied that he would do so with pleasure. At this moment, one of his soldiers told Nuno Alvarez that the Captain of the galliot was no other than the General Ruy Freyre; as soon as he heard this, he went to the prow of the galleon and called out to the General, who was asking for a cable, and asked his pardon, saying that owing to his old age he had not been able to recognise him; both of them tarried so long exchanging compliments, that finally their soldiers had forcibly to remove them from the perilous positions in which they were.

About this time the wind freshened, and our Armada bore down upon the galleon *São Sebastião* that for the past eight hours had been fighting against six English ships; simultaneously 2 Moorish vessels came from Comorão laden with fireworks to throw upon our Armada, but the General Ruy Freyre realised their object, and in order to forestall their plans he rowed against them, ordering his galliots not to board them. The Dutch[1] seeing the galliots approaching, and being afraid of meeting with the same fate as the English

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[1] English in point of fact, and there was only 1 fireship. The English account reads,—"The same morning Captain Weddell had fitted a Portuguese Vessel (which had been formerly taken with some Cockernuts) and purposed to have fired her thwart the Admiral's Hause, she being appointed to come between the Dutch Admiral and the *Jonas*; But thro' Disaster or rather Negligence in Darby the Master, who came not up according to the appointed Place, she was chased by the Frigats, and she having but ten Men in her, being of no Defence, they were forced to set her on fire, far from the Fleet, and so the Men betook themselves to a Barge, which was left for their Safety, by which means the General's Project was disappointed." [Lediard, *Naval History of England*, London, 1735, p. 479.]


Bandar Abbas (Gombroon)
Reference
3 fathom line
Sandbanks
Rocks
Fort
Church or Chapel
Anchorages
Castle
City
HORMUZ
Nª Srª da Penha
Nª Srª da Esperança
Turunbagh
KISHM I.
LARAK I.
Scale.
1 0
miles
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Sketch Map to illustrate Actions between the Anglo-Dutch and Portuguese Fleets, February 1625.

(Based on Admiralty Chart of 1912.)

ship which had been burnt, embarked in their two long-boats after setting fire to the two ships which were soon completely destroyed. Our Armada fought with the enemy for 3 days, at the end of which they fled away out of the Strait whilst our galleons went in pursuit of them, whereby these nations lost a great deal of the prestige that they had hitherto possessed with the Persians.

The General remained off the island of Careca, awaiting the answer from the Xariaria, which was delayed for the fifteen days, but then the Treaty of peace was brought confirmed by the Sultan in accordance with what the General had put forward; this latter stated that he would inform the Viceroy thereof, and on receipt of his answer he would go in person to establish the Customs-House in Congo, and that meanwhile there was to be a suspension of arms between the Portuguese and Persians throughout the whole Strait, and this settled he set sail for Muscat.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

The General Ruy Freyre returns to Persia—Establishes a Customs House in Congo—News arrives from Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra.

When the General reached Muscat at the end of April, he at once sent a galliot to the Count-Admiral at Goa, advising him of the state of affairs and of how important it was that he should confirm the conditions of the peace treaty which he was sending him, in consequence of the increased income to the Royal Exchequer which would result from the port of Congo being suitable for Portuguese shipping.

After despatching this advice-boat, he sent António Ferrão as Captain of 5 galliots to the Strait of Mecca, to wage therein the most ruthless war that he could, with orders that if he met with any ships which were unprovided with passports, he was to take out the best portions of their cargos and burn the vessels together with all the Moors on board them;[1] the object of this ferocity was to induce them to pay freitage duties in the Customs Houses of the King of Portugal, or at least to make them take out passports and register therein what cargos they might have on board for Mecca. António Ferrão also received orders to visit the King of Càxem,[2] and offer him all the assistance and help from our arms of which he might stand in need, and that if he requested aid it was to be given him. Furthermore, he was to see if on the way thither he could not perform some exploit in the port of Aden, so that the inhabitants might learn that the name of Portuguese was still to be feared in those parts.

When António Ferrão had left, the General at once despatched a warning via the Count to the Portuguese ships, in which he informed them of what our galleons had done, and advised them that they could safely come to the Strait of Ormuz as there were no longer any Dutchmen there, but that those which were sailing for India should steer clear of that coast since he had sure news that the enemy were making for Surat, and that they should go straight to Chaul for their better security.

About this time there arrived at Muscat a galliot from the squadron of Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra, which brought letters of his from Bassorah, in which he informed him how he had sailed along the River Euphrates and its neighbouring coast, taking with him 20 terradas of the Pasha's in addition to his own galliots, and that he had ravaged the banks of that River with fire and sword, and burnt and razed all the forts, whilst he was now threatening Babylon and preventing the Persians from crossing over from one side of the river to the other; in order to continue his efforts, he asked for more galliots, and men for those that he had with him, as he had lost 60 men killed through battle and sickness. He added that the Pasha had shown himself to be very grateful for the relief sent him, and that he had punctilliously and generously fulfilled his obligations with regard to the payment and maintenance of the soldiers, and he asked that some Portuguese merchant vessels should be sent to visit that port, where they would find a warm welcome.[1] Almost at the same time the Viceroy's answer arrived, confirming all that the General had done or might do in the straits of Ormuz and the Red Sea, as well as the negotiations and treaty of peace with Persia.

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[1] The actual paragraph in Ruy Freire's orders for the expedition ran as follows: "If you should chance to meet with any Persian or Arabian terradas without Passports at sea, you will order the crews to be beheaded and the vessels to be burnt." [*Dois Capitães da India*, p. 72.]

[2] Probably Kishin on the Arabian coast, opposite Socotra.

He at once prepared a force of 10 galliots and 4 terranquins with which he set sail in the direction of Ormuz, and duly reached the fortress of Congo where he was very joyfully received and whence he sent advice to the Governor of Comorão of his arrival, and told him to come to the fortress in order to settle the procedure of affairs.

The Answer came very speedily since the distance is not more than four leagues, and the Governor made his appearence early the next day; when he came on board the General's galliot, he received a salute of many guns since he was a person of great authority, and in virtue of his position as Governor of all the Persian coast from Cape Iasques to Niquilù.

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[1] A letter of thanks from the Pasha-Governor of Basra to the King of Portugal thanking him for the aid afforded against the Persians, is printed on pp. 82-4 of *Dois Capitães da India*. Dom Gonçalo made a great impression on the Turks by only accepting sufficient money from the Pasha to pay his men, returning the balance with a notification to the effect that he had come to defend his friends and allies and not to trade or make money. His flotilla inflicted several defeats on the Persians under "Manculibeque" [= Imām Qūlī Khan who had commanded at Ormuz] and relieved the siege of Basra. He rejoined Ruy Freire off Ormuz in November 1625.

When the usual courtesies had been exchanged, and after dinning exceedingly well, the General presented the orders which he had received from the Viceroy to the Governor, who received them with proper respect and handed them to his Guazil for him to translate, and this done he read them, and since he saw no alteration therein from what he had originally proposed, he remained satisfied. The only additional stipulation the General made, was that in case the Dutch or English should ever take a Portuguese vessel either on a voyage to or from Congo, or anchored therein, or in sight of it, the enemy would not be allowed to carry it off, but if they took it the Governor would be obliged to return it to its owner without anything missing therefrom. The whole was drawn up on two documents in Portuguese and Persian, of which a Portuguese translation was given to the Governor and a Persian translation to the General.[1]

Shortly afterwards there arrived the four Moors who were to remain as hostages, and who were recognized by the Vizier of the King of Ormuz who was accompanying the General, as being noble and influential men, whereupon the General sent ashore a Factor and Clerk for the Customs-House with a comission to issue passports, leaving him for that purpose a Seal of the Royal Arms of Portugal, wherewith to seal them.

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[1] This is in distinct opposition to the English version of these negotiations, which is: "Ruy Freery, reigning [ranging] with three gallions and 20 frigotts in the Gulph, presented the Duke [Khān] with 600 tomans and required the restitution of Ormus; or if not that, then the free custom of all goods that the Portugalls should land in all places or ports there, and free trade without molestacion of the English or Dutch; all was denied them." [Letter of the Factors at Bandar Abbas 15.2.1632.]



MUSCAT
(From the MS. "Livro do Estado da India Oriental" in the British Museum)

When this Customs-House had been founded, he despatched 3 galliots carrying 200 men to Dom Gonzalo da Silveyra, with letters of thanks for his good procedure in that campaign; at the same time he wrote to the Pasha proferring him further assistance, and stating that if it should prove necessary, he would come in person with all the forces that he had in Muscat, whither he now returned with the Moorish hostages, since there was no longer anything for him to do in those Straits that year.

CHAPTER THE LAST

The General goes to God—His death.

The General at once proceeded to busy himself with the work of fortifying Muscat, and thus he constructed a platform or battery beyond the fort at the entrance of the haven, wherein he mounted some very heavy guns; in the same way he strengthened the batteries at Quilbù and the gardens near Cabaço, whilst he erected blockhouses on the tops of the hills up which the enemy might climb, placing guards in them, whereby the place was rendered impregnable, chiefly on account of the cannon which he had sited in the most important positions.[1]

The Customs-House of Congo now began to function and merchants came thither from all parts, so that today the revenues thereof yield more than 200,000 cruzados yearly to His Majesty. When matters were in this state, a request arrived from the Conde de Linhares, Viceroy of India, for reinforcements to be sent to the aid of Dom Francisco de Moura who was on his way to recover the fortress of

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[1] For photographs and drawings of the massive Portuguese fortifications at Muscat *vide* Danvers, vol. ii., p. 69, and A. Wilson, *Persian Gulf*, Frontispiece and p. 230, Plate XV.

Mombaça, which the General immediately complied with, sending 4 galliots amply provided with men and munitions.[1]

At the same time as this order was received, Antonio Ferrão returned, bringing with him all the galliots which he had set out with, richly laden with booty, as well as another ship similarly laden; he had burnt six other vessels and laid waste all the environs of Aden, besides landing some raiding parties in the gulf of Maçùa prior to making peace with the Sheikh of the " Palheyros " [=straw or hay lofts].[2]

Dom Gonçalo da Silverya had also returned, being destined to succeed to the post of Captain-Major of the Strait of Ormuz. Within a few days there came another message and order from the Viceroy, instructing Ruy Freyre to come with the largest Armada that he could collect to the bar of Goa, where he would find him with a Fleet ready to set sail against Paleacate, —a fortress founded by the Dutch on the Coast of Meliapor at a distance of 5 leagues from São Thomé.[3]

In fulfillment of this order, he embarked 320 veteran soldiers of the best that there were in Muscat on board 8 galliots well gunned with heavy cannon, and at the beginning of January, 1631, he set sail for Goa where he arrived on the 2nd of February, (feast-day of Our Lady of the Purification), dropping anchor in the roadsted opposite the fortress of Aguada, to the sound of a great salute of cannon and musketry.

The Viceroy immediately sent off to welcome him and request him to disembark, which he did on the Viceroy's quay in the presence of all the populace of the City, who came to see him owing to the fame of his Courage which was celebrated throughout the East; likewise the Mayor and Corporation came to receive him and escorted him as far as the Palace, where the Viceroy received him in the first hall and took him within to his veranda, where after being seated upon equal chairs, the Conde de Linhares with great politeness offered the General out of his own purse anything of which he might stand in need.

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[1] The loss and recapture of Mombassa is dealt with by Faria y Sousa, *Asia Portuguesa*, Lisboa, 1666-1675, tom. iii., part iv., chapters xi. and xii.

[2] I cannot fathom the point of this allusion. Maçua is probably Massowah, then the port of Abyssinia, now in Italian Eritrea.

[3] For the Dutch in Paleacate at this time, besides the works of Foster and Danvers, see MacLeod, *De Hollandsche Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië* 1602-50, vol. i., pp. 451-493, and vol. ii., pp. 9-16. There is a large-scale map of the Dutch fort of Geldria on p. 122 of vol. i.

When the General had taken his leave he went to the monastry of Saint Augustin accompanied by the same throng, and those who were absent on this occasion visited him the following day as likewise did all the clergy.

However in March there came tidings of the disastrous death of the Governor Nuno Alvarez Botelho in Malacca, and of the destruction of the greater part of his Armada, and of the fact that the men who had survived had gone to China; since Botelho had been instructed to come to the Coromandel coast and join the leaguer of Paleacate with the 30 galliots under his command in the straits of Malacca, the Viceroy was forced to abandon this enterprize for that year, and to change the destination of the voyage to Cochim in order to pacify the Malabar coast. He therefore despatched the General Ruy Freyre de Andrada with his eight galliots back to Muscat, where he arrived at the end of May, and was received with great enthusiasm.

In the following September he was siezed with some very severe fevers, which nothing could cure, and not only so, but he came to die of a dysentry that attacked him at the same time;[1] leaving the State of

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[1] He was already ill in January 1633, as may be seen from the following extract: " . . . although the news of Ruy Freire's health is not good, which causes the Count anxiety." [Letter of P^{e} Antonio

India plunged into deep sorrow at his death, and the world in general, and Persia in particular, filled with the immortal fame of his courage.

And thus in little more than the space of four years the State of India was bereft of three of its moſt notable Captains and Columns; namely,—on the 5th of Auguſt 1630, Conſtantino de Sà de Noronha in Ceylon; on the 6th February 1632, Nuno Alvarez Botelho in Malacca, (as may be seen in the second part of this work); and in this September of 1633 Ruy Freyre de Andrade in Muscat.[1]

He was interred in the Church of Saint Auguſtin, below the High Altar in a grave flagged with mud bricks, without any of the numerous people whom he had aided and advanced in India, erecting a grave-ſtone and inscription to him, whereby their and our successors might know the place where so renowned a Captain lies buried.

And since he lacks this, may the reader's
devotion supply the omission with
the prayers due for his soul.

(? ¿ ?)

THE END

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de Vasconcellos, dated Goa, 20th January 1633.] On Jan. 2nd 1633 the Viceroy had written to the King saying that Ruy Freire was "very sick." [*Livros das Monçoēs*, Livro 30, folio 263 v.] An English account gives his death as taking place in December 1632, but this is certainly an error. [*V.* Foſter, vol. 1630-33, p. 295, note 2.]

[1] This is not accurate. Conſtantino de Sá was defeated and killed in September 1630 during his ill-fated expedition to Uva. Nuno Alvarez Botelho was blown up with the Dutch ship *Walcheren* which he had taken off Jambi on May 6th 1630, whilſt Ruy Freire died at Muscat in September 1633 as ſtated. It was thus in less than 3 (not more than 4) years that "India Portugueza" had loſt its 3 moſt notable Captains.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

The King's Letter for Ruy Freire de Andrade, containing the Instructions for his expedition, January 15th 1622.

Books of the Monsoons, Book 12, fol. 566—Translation.

I the King make known to you Ruy Freire d'Andrade, nobleman of my household, that being informed of how for some years past foreign European ships have entered the Strait of Ormuz with the design of opening up trading and commercial relations with Persia, albeit that the real right of the conquest, navigation and commerce of those regions belongs to me alone, it appeared to me that for the better preservation of this same, as well as to thwart our enemy's designs and assure the security of the Fortress of Ormuz and the merchant vessels that resort thither, and for other considerations of my service, I ought to send an Armada of capital ships to the aforesaid strait of Ormuz, where, in conjunction with the usual fleet of rowing-vessels which is stationed there, it could oppose any enemies who might endeavour to enter therein, and drive them away from those seas; furthermore by the satisfaction that I have of your person—expecting that you will always give me a good account of whatever I entrust to you, as you have hitherto tried to do on all occasions in my service on which you have been present—I was pleased to nominate you as Captain-Major of the said Armada, in the ordering of which, both during the course of the voyage as after your arrival in the Strait of Ormuz, you will keep the following instructions.

(1.) As soon as you leave the bar of the City of Lisbon, which by the Grace of God will be in this next month of February, according to the order I have issued,[1] you will warn the Captains of your Armada of the name of the Saint which they are to use on each day of the week, because this cannot be done daily at sea and it is convenient that they should know each other by the name, since it might happen that you should encounter enemy ships and receive damage from them, if they were not distinguished in this manner; and as it is extremely important for the object with which I am sending you that you make the whole voyage with all your Armada in company together, I have ordered the Captains thereof to be told to accompany you and follow your flag and lantern by day and night, without seperating from you upon any pretext whatsoever, under pain of codign punishment; I likewise order you herewith, and under the same penalty, that you will keep in company with them, awaiting or rallying those that shall have need of this, in such manner that the Armada proceeds together during the whole voyage, which you will make as far as the Cape of Good Hope by the same route as that taken by the [East-India-] ships, taking particular care that the soldiers punctiliouslly go to confession and behave themselves well; and in order to render them skilfull in the use of their weapons so that they can fight well when the occasion arises, you will make them mount guard in each ship every day, and ensure that the Captains and other Officers take special care to practice them therein.

(2.) After doubling the Cape of Good Hope, you will steer your course for Moçambique, and without entering the harbour you will anchor off the islets of Santiago and São Jorge, whence you will send a skiff to the fortress to ascertain the Captain's news and the state of affairs there, as also of the mines of Monomotapa;

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[1] Craesbeeck gives the date of departure as April 1st [see p. 2], but Ruy Freire in a certificate of services given by him to Dom Gonçalo da Silveira gives the date as April 2nd 1622, which is probably correct.

and should it prove necessary for you to afford him some assistance, you will do so in so far as you can without interfering with the recourses for your own expedition; you will likewise remit to the Captain my Letter which you are taking for him, and will ask him for experienced and trustworthy pilots who can take you straight to Muscat, and should there not be any you will proceed to Muscat or rather Mombaça for this purpose, forasmuch as it is understood that in this latter place there are many pilots skilled in this navigation; and in the event of your being forced to touch at Mombaça, you will provide yourself with water and other necessaries, as you can do with more facility than at Moçambique; if during the time in which you are anchored between the islets of Santiago and São Jorge, you are assailed by some westerly gales so that you are unable to ride at anchor or run a risk of losing your anchor, then you will enter within the bar of Moçambique, but you will not for this reason make any delay whatsoever, and you will resume your voyage at the first opportunity, leaving to the Captain of Moçambique a copy of my letters which you are taking to the Viceroy of India, for him to forward them on to the latter by the first available boat, and as soon as possible, so that he may know of your going to the Strait of Ormuz and give the necessary orders for the upkeep for the Armada which you are taking.

(3.) On leaving Moçambique, in case that you have to touch at Mombaça, you will navigate with the due care required by the numerous banks which there are off that coast, and on arriving at the fortress you will provide yourself with all necessaries without entering within, for which purpose you carry another letter for the Captain similar to the one for that of Moçambique; and if you are forced to enter, you will do so over the bar of Tuaca and on no account in that of Mutuapa, and leaving the pilots which you brought from Moçambique, you will ask for others to take you to the strait of Ormuz, whither you will steer your course with all possible care and diligence.

(4) On reaching Cape Rosalgate [Ras al Hadd], you will touch at the roadstead of Teve [Tīwai] in order to refresh the men, and provide yourself with supplies; whilst there you will send for the Sheikhs of Calayate[1] and Curiate [Quryat] assuring them that you will not seize them nor do them any harm, and you will ascertain from them wether there are any European enemies' ships cruising in that strait, and if so, which, and how many they are, and of what strength, and wether they have trade in any port; and should the Sheikhs be unable to give you sufficient information, and the time not premit of your returning to Muscat with the whole Armada, you will dispatch information to the Captain for that fortress by sea and land, sending him my letter for him which you are also taking, in order that he may at once send you some reliable person from whom you can obtain information of the ships which cruise in the strait, and pilots who know the coast of Persia well and can take the Armada where you have to go.

(5.) If, from the information that you receive, you find that there are some foreign ships in Jasques or any other of the ports of that strait, and that the Armada which you are taking is strong enough to seek them out forthwith, and give them battle with the expectation of winning a victory over them, then you will do so without loss of time, or giving them an opportunity of receiving information of your arrival, or of making their escape; and attacking them in good order you will endeavour to let none of them escape you, and against those that are captured you will proceed as against pirates, in the manner which my laws lay down in such cases. And since I have ordered that there should be friendly intercourse between my vassalls and those of the King of Persia, and at present there is an Ambassador of his at my Court and another of mine in Persia,[1] you will give out that the war which you are to wage will be only upon foreigners wether they be upon the sea or land, and not upon the Persians or other vassalls of the Shah, with whom you will maintain a perfectly friendly intercourse without giving them a just opportunity to declare war or break the peace.

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[1] Kalhat, or Qalhat, a port some 30 miles N.W. of Cape Ras al Hadd. Taken and sacked by Albuquerque in 1508, it was nominally under Portuguese suzerainty for the next century. For Quryat, see p. 192, note 1.

(6.) When this undertaking is accomplished (which may God in his Mercy be pleased to prosper) you will retire to Ormuz, in order to cruize in that strait and in that of the Red Sea, as will be detailed hereafter.

(7.) If, from the information that you receive from the Sheikhs of Calayate and Curiate and from the persons that the Captain of Muscat sends to you, you understand that in order to safely attack the enemy ships, a greater force is necessary than that of the Armada which you are taking, you will go straight to Ormuz in order to reinforce yourself there with the armada of oared-vessels and any other capital ships that can be collected together, so that you can more safely seek to attain your object; and showing the Captain of this Fortress this instruction, you will exchange those of your men who are sick or inexperienced for others from the garrison of the Fortress, and after providing yourself with any necessaries, you will at once and without any delay go in search of the enemy in whatever region they may be, and you will bring them to action as has been already stated; and in order that the Captain of the Fortress shall give you the men, ships and other things of which you may stand in need, and that the Vedor de Fazenda shall supply you and pay the soldiers and costs of the Armada, and both of them assist you in all that is necessary for the better effect of the enterprise for which I am sending you, you will take with you letters of mine which you will give them, handing likewise to the Captain the second copy of the Letters for the Viceroy, in order that he may forward them on with all speed.

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[1] *I.e.* Sherley from the Shah at Madrid, and Don Garcia de Figeroa from the King of Spain and Portugal at Ispahan.

(8.) When you are ready in Ormuz to undertake an expedition, you will consult on the conduct thereof with the captain of the Fortress and Vedor da Fazenda as well as the Captains of your Armada, in order that with their views you may better resolve and carry out what befits my service; so long as I think fit and do not send orders to the contrary, you are to serve as Captain-Major of the Armadas of the strait of Ormuz, being only subordinated to the Viceroy of India in what concerns the Armadas and the governance thereof; and the captain-Major of the oared armada of the same strait is to be at your orders in everything, as I am sending to tell him in the letter you are taking to him, that you will give him as soon as you arrive, or will send to him if he is absent, and you will be answerable for his personal conduct, treating him with due consideration so that I may be the better served.

(9.) If at the time when you enter the strait of Ormuz, enemy ships have not yet arrived therein, you will exercise all possible care and watchfulness to ensure knowing when they do enter, and you will be ready to go at a moment's notice to seek them out in conformity with the considerations and precautions previously noted, because if you can strike them before they reach Persia it will be the better for all concerned; after this undertaking is finished, you will cruize in the same strait during the whole of the summer, dividing up your Armada in the way which will most conduce to its security and that of the ships that navigate therein, taking particular care to seize those which come from India laden with pepper and other commodities embezzled from my Customs.

(10.) When the time arrives for you to winter in Ormuz, after first repairing those ships that have need of it, you will proceed with those that are fittest for the purpose, to cruise in the entrance of the strait of the Red Sea, in order to hinder the navigation thereof by the ships which are unprovided with passports, and you will remain in that region so long as your presence is not needed in the Strait of Ormuz; and the portion of the prizes which are taken that belongs to my Exchequer is to be expended in the maintenance of the Armada, for which purpose it will be issued on receipt by the paymaster thereof;[1] and should you fall in with ships of the Moghul carrying passports, or some of the King of Achem, you will proceed with them as the Viceroy of India may direct you, as I am writing to him that he is to do, with due considerations which effect my Service; if before you receive any orders from the viceroy about these ships carrying passports, you meet with some belonging to the Mogul that have them, then you will not treat them harshly even though their passports are not correctly made out; and if they are not carrying passports, I charge you to deal with them as you think best having due regard to the circumstances that may arise, as it is best to dissimulate with them for the present since we do not wish to give that King any cause to declare war upon the State at this time in which it so infested with European enemies; and you will have this same consideration in dealing with the ships belonging to the King of Achem, so long as he is at peace with the state and the ships are his own, because it is very important to prevent him from joining forces with the foreigners who cruize in the seas of Malaca against that city, as he sometimes has done.

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[1] Interesting confirmation of this paragraph is afforded by the following extract from a letter of the English President and Council of Surat to the Company, November $\frac{15}{25}$ 1620: "Four gallions of warr from Lisbone do lye in waight in the Gulph of Persia for our ships; which gallions were a part of ten sent out of Lisbone in anno 1618 [*sic*] and winterd at Sophola [= Sofala], then went into the Red Sea to intercept the junckes, thereby to reduce the Indians into conformity and subjection, intending to remayne thereabouts and live upon prizes."

(11) You will return to the Strait of Ormuz with the comencement of the monsoon, so that if the enemy should resort thither you can oppose their plans in the manner previously described, forasmuch as this is the principal object in my sending out the Armada which you are taking; and you will constantly inform me of what you are doing and what is happening, both by the land-route via Ormuz as by the sea via India.

(12). And because my Intention and Will is that this Armada is to be kept in the Strait for so long as it is needed there, I am writing to inform the Viceroy of India thereof by the letters which you are carrying, so that he may send you the necessary orders both for the payment of the pay and expenses, as for the repair of the ships and provision of munitions and supplies; and the Captain of Ormuz and the Vedor da Fazenda are to be given similar orders, and you will coöperate with everyone to ensure that this is duly carried out, and that the Armada is always ready and may be of use; and in case one of the captains of it should be lacking, you will promot another temporarily in his place, sending information thereof to the Viceroy of India so that he can nominate what captain he wishes.

(13) Copies will be given you of all the Letters which you are to take besides these Instructions, so that you may know what they all contain.

Marcos Rodriguez Tinsco made it in Madrid on the 15th of January 1619, Francisco de Lucena had it written.

APPENDIX II

List of persons who were slain by the Moors during the campaign in Ormuz.

Bibliotheca Nacional de Lisboa—Secção Ultramarina. Requerimentos, Caixa XI—Translation.

Luis de Moura Rolim, son of Leonel de Moura, killed by a musket ball in the cavalier-bastion.

Balthazar de Chaves, native of the town of Chaves, Captain of the bastion of Santiago which was the scene of the fiercest fighting, was cut to pieces by the Moors when they stormed this bastion.

Manoel de Mello, illegitimate son of António de Sampayo administrator of Villa-frol, was killed on the occasion of the storming of the said bastion.

Luiz Alvarez Pereira, son of Nuno Alvarez Pereira, was killed by a cannon-ball on the same bastion before it was taken.

Gaspar Ferrão, a married man of Ormuz who leaves a wife and children, was cut to pieces during the aforesaid assault; whilst Ignacio Homem was killed by a musket shot on the wall of the fortress, having previously served as Captain-Major of the ships in the Strait.

Alexandre de Moraes, brother of the Alcaide-Mor of Alfrozirão, was killed by a bursting cannon-ball which cleft him in twain when the first mine under the bastion of Santiago exploded.

Francisco Dias who had been captain of a ship in the Strait, died from 3 wounds received whilst in the bastion of Santiago when the first mine exploded, having refused to retire after receiving the first two wounds until he fell dead from the third, fighting bravely.

Pero Gomes Azevedo, native of Sacavem on the outskirts of Lisbon, was killed during the incident of the said mine, whilst descending through the breach made by it in the wall in order to attack the Moors who were begining to enter through it.

Friar Rodrigo, Monk of the Order of St: Augustin and native of Viseu, was slain in a sortie which was made from the fortress upon the trenches of the enemy, after killing many of them with great valour.

Vicente Carrasco who came from the Kingdom as purser of Ruy Freyre's galleon, or another of his squadron, and then served as purser of the Armada, was killed in the explosion of the first mine of the bastion of Santiago, after fighting bravely.

Francisco de Brito, native of Evora was likewise killed during the course of the war, as also were Thomas Godinho, Luis Gago a married man of Ormuz, and João Frois who had come from the kingdom as master of the pataxo [urca] in Ruy Freyre's squadron, and fought with great valour; and Francisco Ribeiro, a married man of Ormuz, was likewise slain on the top of the wall by a gun-shot.

Similarly, many other common soldiers who fought bravely were killed.

APPENDIX III

Simão de Mello's account of the siege of Ormuz.

Printed in L. Cordeiro *Dois Capitães da India*, 1898, pp. 36-39 — Translation.

I, Simão de Mello certify that I took over the fortress of Ormuz on the 27th of January of the present year of 1622. And on the 30th of the same month, 7 ships and 2 pinnaces of the English appeared in sight of it. And on the 31st they blockaded the fort of Queixome which surrenderd within 8 days, and, on the 21st of February of the same year, 150 terradas and 2 ships carrying numerous Persian soldiers came with the English ships to land their men on the island of Ormuz, and since it was not possible to prevent their disembarking and sacking the city, as our men were few and ill-armed owing to the fact that the greater part of them had come from Queixome without their arms of which they had been deprived by the English, thus they laid siege to the said fortress, the Moors by land and the English by sea, which lasted for 2 months and 12 days; the enemy drove numerous tunels under the market square until they reached the foot of the wall of the said fortress, demolishing the bastion of Santiago and part of the bastion of São Pedro with the mines which they made, whilst we on our side countermined them all without going beyond the wall, where they fired them; all this while the soldiers did their duty until they had captured the bastion of Santiago from us owing to our lack of men since many were dead or dying of disease and war; since the buildings on the aforesaid bastion were at a higher level than the Fortress proper, they killed from them many of our men who were walking about in the fort, both on the walls as below, until there remained to us only a palisade built of sandbags beneath the very buildings on the bastion; we defended ourselves behined this and behined a blocked-up archway that we could hold on to in the event of the enemy gaining the palisade from us, for the Moors had already by this time laid two mines under the Cavalier-bastion and one under the cistern where they were, and yet another one was being driven under the palisade of sandbags itself. In this situation the soldiers and married men mutinied against me and siezed me, I being dangerously wounded in two places in the head and without the power of moving my right arm, and they all together yielded the fortress to the English, since they promised them their lives which the Moors would not have done. And forasmuch as Dom Gonçalo da Silveyra was one of the five fidalgos who had come from Goa in my company, in the succour-fleet of 12 vessels with which I arrived at Ormuz, and the English having blockaded the bay of Queixome with their ships and launches and many Moorish vessels, when I was endeavouring to send thither a small craft to see if it could get through with some munitions and letters for Ruy Freyre de Andrade, the firſt person who volunteered to make this so risky voyage was the said D. Gonçalo, who swore to me that he would either perish in the attempt or land his cargo of 12 barrels of powder in Queixome; he had only one companion with him since there was not room for another in the boat, and this exploit would have been enviously regarded at a former time, but on this present occasion it was admonished by those who had moſt reason to praise to it. And despite all these drawbacks he got through to Queixome with great risk, and brought me news of the condition which the fort was in. And two days later I sent him with nine vessels and some terradas and terranquins to try to get in close to the fort of Queixome, so that our men might save themselves on board our boats rather than surrender to the English, which he accomplished with great skill, but it could not have been possible for the Captain of the Fort to effect his retreat thus, as he made no attempt to do so. And he subsequently took part in opposing the Moors' entry into the City, when he received a musket-shot wound in the leg, and after he had retired to the fortress I entruſted him with the poſt of Captain of the baſtion of Santiago which was the moſt perilous position in the Fortress, on account of the mines which the enemy drove under this baſtion only, and here he was wounded for the firſt time in the feet, hands and face of which he was ill for many days without being able to move, and whilſt he was ſtill unfit I sent him to conſtruct a redoubt in the ruins of the baſtion of Santiago, at a time when the wall thereof was already fallen to the ground with 3 mines which had been made againſt it, so that he might countermine from the fort 2 other mines which the Moors were making againſt the baſtion; this he did with great courage and zeal in His Majeſty's Service, thus preventing the Moors from driving their mines any further, and he defended the sandbag redoubt for many days, and in the final mine with which they gained the bastion from us he was the first person to rally to defend it, whence he returned wounded with four arrow and one lance wound in the face, and a sword-cut in one leg. And the Moors placed powder below the very palisade that I had ordered him to construct in the ruin of the bastion, which they fired without any loss to our side, by the Goodness of God. And on the other opportunities which arose, he performed his duty to the full, never excusing himself from doing anything which I ordered him to do in His Majesty's Service; and on the occasion of the mutiny which broke out against me in the Fortress, he came to me and offered his services, being very badly wounded, and since I saw him in that condition I ordered him to withdraw.

And because he now asks me for this justification of his Services, I have made it out truthfully and thus I swear it on the Holy Evangelists and by my signature below, and it goes sealed with the seal that I use.

Muscat, the 3rd of July 1622.

(Sgd.) SIMÃO DE MELLO PEREIRA.

APPENDIX IV

Letter of Manoel Borges de Sousa written from Ormuz during the Siege (28th April 1622).

Document printed in L. Cordeiro: *Como se perdeu Ormuz*, pp. 205-8.

To Fernão de Albuquerque, of the Council of His Majesty and his Captain General and Governor of the State of India, etc.—2nd duplicated dispatch of the Vedor da Fazenda of Ormuz.

If Your Lordship has not seen a Letter of mine for many days, do not blame me, for certainly it is not my fault, as the Captain tells me nothing about the bearers who take his, and thus I wrote one on the 21st of February which I subsequently duplicated twice, sending it to Muscat in a terranquim that was afterwards taken by the pirates; besides the time has left me infinite work and little pleasure, owing to my great sins.

On the 20th of February, the second Sunday in Lent, the vassals of the Shah together with the English occupied the city of Ormuz without it costing them a drop of blood.

So soon as they set foot on shore, it was evacuated, all the inhabitants retiring to the fortress, and they forthwith began to tunnel under the ground straight towards the Fortress until they reached the walls, where they began to undermine them by the bastion of Santiago, under which they placed gunpowder at various times and thereby demolished it on to the ground.

And today they got possession of it in the second attack which they made in force, after considerable loss on both sides, which cost us the greater part of our men killed or wounded.

And not satisfied with this, they made another mine under the bastion of São Pedro, by which means they also demolished a part of it.

What they have achieved, those will say who know the danger in which we are placed for lack of men, since they are dead in such quantities that I dare not speak of it.

As for the roadstead, those who go [with this] will tell you of its present state. On the last day of February, they began to bombard the galleons with cannon which they brought ashore, so that they were damaged and spoiled in their rigging, masts, and hulls, whereupon boats came one night and set the galleon *São Pedro* ablaze by means of fireworks.

The fire reaching the cables, cut them, and she drove with the current in the direction of Comorão, having on board 6 bronze cannon and as many more of iron which it had not proved possible to take out of her; whilst they were taking out the guns, the boats came up, and they could not hinder them from either the

Fortress or the galleons because there were no vessels to thwart them, since six had gone to Soar with the needy and sick.

Two days after we had all withdrawn into the Fortress, the vessels were all brought in and laid up, and it was agreed by the assembled Captain, Captains of the galleons, masters and Pilots, on being asked wether the galleons were capable of sailing to Goa that they were not able to do so, owing to lack of Officers and the damage that they had received,—and this they all swore upon the Missal. And when the resolution that the Captain had to send me was agreed to, I set about unshipping the guns with the greateſt speed that was possible. I had taken out of the galleon *São Pedro* 3 bronze guns and 10 or 11 of iron, and I had drawn 19 bronze ones from the galleon *São Martinho* leaving one only in her, besides 4 or 5 of iron which I was in the process of taking out when she was scuttled owing to the great damage she had suffered; and from the galleon *Todos os Sanctos* in which Dom Manuel de Azevedo had come, I drew out 38 bronze guns, and likewise 27 of bronze from the galleon *Victoria*, and whilſt these two galleons were drawn up close in-shore (in my opinion being ſtill available for service provided they were extensively repaired), there came an English spy to find out whether there were ſtill any men on board the two galleons that were lying in a place whence the pirates could not carry them away,—if they tried the same thing that they had done againſt the galleon *São Pedro*,—unless the current drove them.

Upon receipt of this news it at once began to be rumoured that the English were determined to come and burn them, whilſt the vassals of the Shah were to attack us from all sides in great force when the mine was fired, whereon it was resolved, after the necessary preparations had been made, to re-assemble the junta, with the object of deciding wether the two galleons *Sanctos* and *Victoria* which had come from

Goa should be scuttled, as close inshore as possible in order that we might be able to make use of their timbers, as also because it was realized that they were still a refuge for many, which they subsequently ceased to be (as was afterwards seen) when they were sunk.[1]

When their crews—both seamen and soldiers—had been withdrawn, we continued to provide for them with great difficulty at such a time, and some died and many others fled.

I would that I had time to tell everything, whereas I am now writing this in the midst of hourly alarms and excursions. A certain Francisco da Silva, son of the Town-clerk of Diu, going out on a cruise for two months on the 26th of January, disappeared or fled with 25 soldiers; on the 22nd of February, one Lourenço Alvares Chamorro did likewise, he having been on a cruise during nearly all the time in which D. Francisco de Sousa was serving as Captain, although he had disarmed on the completion of the expedition,—and many others have deserted in the same manner.

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[1] Wilson in his account of the destruction of the galleons says a certain Philips " hearing that they had got the Ordnance out of their ships while it was yet day, went in resolutely and discharged his sacar, being lowe water and the ships aground, shot one . . . throrow her Skeg or Run, close by the water . . . and when the water [tide] flowed her hold filled, the water ebbing again shee cleane overset, and brake all her fasts that shee had on the wall, which were Cables and Hawsers. This ship was the . . . *Todos los Santos*, shee was of burthen 1500 tunnes, and carried in her 45 pieces of Ordnance of Brasse, the least whereof was Demiculvering. This ship was the cause of the rest oversetting which lie by her with their toppes in the water. Her Vice-Admirall was named *Nostra Senhora de Victoria*, being of burthen 1400 tunnes with 40 peeces of Ordnance. The Vice Admirall unto Ruy Frera was named *Saint Martin* which lieth sunke by her being of the same burthen, and the like force Ruy Frera his Rere-Admirall being a Flemming of burthen 400 tunnes with 22 peeces of Ordnance named *Saint Antoine de Cosso*: she stands almost upright, but bulged close under the Castle wall. Then Ruy Frera his Admirall [*São Pedro*] which was fired, lieth 3 leagues from Ormus at Combroone sunke under water . . . being of burthen 1400 tunnes, and 44 peeces of Ordnance. Shee had iron peeces in her hold, and a great deal of Shot. There was also a galley sunke under the wall which had 3 peeces of Ordnance." [Purchas, vol. x., p. 341.]

The cannon which there are in this Fortress have not strong enough gun-carriages as they are very boisterous and heavy pieces, and since the bastions are paved, it causes them to break both the wheels, stocks and axles of their under-carriages on recoil; and in truth there were only 28 large boards of argelim-tree wood, [to place underneath them ?] measuring 7 or 8 ells thick, which were insufficient to endure the constant strain of the artillery fire; and what is worse is that the curtains of the walls have not sufficient space to allow for the recoil of the cannon which thus cannot be employed in them; and the same thing happens in the bastions, for as the guns are so fierce they rebound to such an extent that in the last of them, they not only knock down the walls, but even fracture and burst asunder, whilst some tumble down.

Wheels and boards for the pieces which I have mentioned, will be very necessary, if God in His Divine Mercy does not forsake us in spite of my sins, for our men are few and thoroughly cowed, and if the Armada delays it will place us all in great jepordy.

As I have said in my previous letters everything has been exhausted. The Fortress is well supplied with rice only because so far the stock has been and is being used; the Captain D. Francisco de Sousa had a quantity stored within this Fortress, and we were waiting for the monsoon at the beginning of the year as this was the usual time when we supplied ourselves with everything we wished, and thus today we lack butter, meat and salted fish which are usually imported, whence the men die and there is general want.

100 Hogsheads of Biscuit were placed in the 5 galleons as provision for the months of January and February, both for the seamen and soldiers, and subsequently they used about 20 in the Queixome business and other maritime expeditions and 40 were left in the warehouse, paid for by a ¼ of the money that was taken from the

funds of the Misericordia. It seemed best for the present to keep the biscuit for the sick, who it is said do not ordinarily amount to 80, whereas today I can affirm that they exceed 300. Pray God that He will not forsake us of His Divine Compassion. Furthermore during the month of March, or rather for part of it, some was distributed to the men in their quarters, and there now remains about 20 pipes, even though there are daily issued to the men in the bastions two hogsheads together with 4 pipes of arrack that I bought in this ship at so excessive a price, that I will say that 3 measures which I left were sold at 5 larins each. A chicken is sold for 3 pardaos (when one is found), and the rest I will leave to be related by those who go with this, for as I say I do not know if I have time to dilate any further.

Well I know that if God Our Lord sustains us until the arrival of the Armada, my life will end, not only on account of this toil and anxiety but also because of the unhealthiness of this land for those who are as old as I am.

Your Lordship will decide who to send to occupy my post, for without doubt I shall die shortly. May God preserve Your Lordship as he is able. From Ormuz on the 28 of April 1622.[1]

Manuel Borges de Sousa.

APPENDIX V

Letter on the Surrender of Ormuz.

Praised be the Most Holy Sacrament,

Idem, pp. 208-9. Most Illustrious Sir,—I have written to Your Lordship 2 or 3 times already concerning my ruin, and other matters. And because everything which occurs to me is a favour of God, I will only speak now of that of Ormuz, which is more to be felt and bewailed than all the losses of the World.

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[1] I am aware of the clumsiness of this translation, but the original is almost incomprehensible in parts, perhaps owing to it being written under such difficult circumstances.

And I do it because I fear that as all that is Portuguese is wanting and heedless, peradventure there will be none who may wish to inform you of the Truth.

Ormuz was abandoned by all the inhabitants of their own free will, without anyone driving them out of their houses.

The Fortress was breached with mines of gunpowder that left the enemy an entrance thereto, on the 12 of May, and it was entered without any resistance and to the everlasting shame of those who were within it, since they did not wish to be blown up and hoisted a white flag, at which the English were greatly astonished, heaping many insults upon the Vedor da Fazenda and Simão de Mello (who are now in Muscat) calling them traitors to their King.

They found in the Fortress 40 odd *candis* of silver, one *candil* of seed-pearls, infinite gold, countless bales of silk and cotton, drugs and provisions,—all of which the English and Persians divided like brothers.

Four of their ships remain in Ormuz; two went away; the people who escaped they sent in two small ships to Muscat.

This was related to us here in Sinde [Laribandar] by a man who was with them during the whole monsoon of the war, in one of the two "pepper-box" ships which they took last year in Niquila, this man being landed in the . . . of this port with letters which were immediately sent to the Moghul.

There also arrived here this June, 3 ships belonging to Jorge de Sousa who had met in the Arabian Sea with Ruy Freire, who had fled from the English in Surrate and came in a vessel manned with 10 or 12 of his Captains; he obliged this Jorge de Sousa to promise to accompany him to Ormuz, which he willingly did, but when he found the black news in Muscat he released him.

They said that he and Conſtantino d'Eça were ſtill there, undecided what to do, and Conſtantino d'Eça was boldly ſtating that he was not going any further than Muscat, because he had no orders from Your Lordship, so that whilſt waiting for new orders, all will be loſt.

Praise be to God, may He guard Your Lordship as I pray him . . . in Ormuz 3 of June of 622—The . . . of Your Lordship, Friar João da Conceição.

To the senhor Governor of India, whom God preserve.

APPENDIX VI

Certificate of the Reliefs despatched to Ormuz.

Idem, pp. 210-11.

I António Saraiva de Lucena, Clerk of the Rolls, certify that I examined the Pay-sheets and Muſterolls of the Armadas prepared during the time of the Governor of this State, Fernão de Albuquerque, and that it is shown from them that the Armadas which he despatched with relief to Ormuz were as follows:—

In March of '620 4 vessels left for the said Fortress in the squadron of D. Francisco de Sousa, who entered therein with 99 persons, total coſt 942 xerafins, 1 Tanga & 40 reis.

And on the 20th of April of '620 Francisco Ribeiro left for the said Fortress in a pataxo and 3 vessels carrying 177 persons including officers and seamen—total coſt 2,401 xerafins, 1 Tanga and 20 reis.

And on the 6th of April of '621 D. Manoel de Azevedo left for the said Fortress as Captain-Major with 2 galleons, at the coſt of this City, carrying 278 persons including the Officers and seamen,—total coſt 6,753 xerafins, 1 tanga and 40 reis.

And on the 24th of November of '621 Simão de Mello left as Captain-Major for the said Fortress with 299 persons in 10 vessels which coſt altogether 6,409 xerafins, 1 tanga and 20 reis.

And on the 2nd of April of '622 Constantino d'Eça de Noronha left as Captain-Major with 447 persons in 17 vessels which cost 9,795 xerafins, 3 tangas and 20 reis.

And as this was asked of me I issued it in Goa on the 23rd day of September of '622=Francisco vaz did it=(sgd:) António Saraiva de Lucena.

Doctor Bento de Baena Sanches, Lord Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Goa and Auditor General of the Civil Cases, and Judge of the Court of Appeal in these parts of India etc: —I make known to those who see this my Certificate of Proof, that the signature appended to the foot of the above Document is that of António Saraiva de Lucena, Clerk of the Rolls of this State of India, according as I am informed on the word of the Clerk who signs this, for which reason I hold it proved and for the certainty of the same, issue this present. Given in Goa, signed by me and sealed with the Seal of the Royal Arms on the 3rd of January of '623. Paid for this 20 reis +4 for signing. Manoel Preto had it written=Bento de Baena Sanches= without seal *ex causa*=Gonçalo Pinto da Fonseca.

APPENDIX VII

A Summary and very trustworthy Narrative of what happend to the Armada of the Captain-General Nuno Alvares Botelho during the space of one year, counted from the 9th of December 1624 *until the following 9th of December* 1625*—written by a Priest of the Order of Sancto Agustinho*[1] *who was present throughout.* (*dated*) *9th December*, 1625.

The Captain General Nuno Alvares Botelho left the Kingdom for this State of India on the 25th of March 1624, with his merchant ships and 6 State galleons,[2] and after a prosperous voyage during which they kept in company the whole way, he reached the bar of this City of Goa, metropolis of this eastern State, and anchored therein with the whole of the said Armada on the 2nd of September of the same year; all the crews came and arrived so healthy, and this arrival was so speedy and so fortunate, that the inhabitants of the said city could not remember another like it in previous years, and many considered that it was so timely as to warrant the general assumption that God was wishful to grant us many favours against our European enemies, who were monopolising the commerce and persecuting the new Christianity in these regions;—may it please His Divine Majesty that it may come to pass as we hope from his infinite Power.

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[1] At the end (*q.v.*) it states that it was "written by one of the Captains of the Armada."

[2] The ships were the *Chagas* (flagship) and *Quietação*, and the galleons were the *São Francisco*, *São João*, *Santo Antonio*, *Santiago*, *Conceição*, and *São Paulo*. See Quintella, *Annaes da Marinha Portugueza*, ii., pp. 209-10.

The Viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, Count-Admiral, on the arrival of this relief, at once proceeded to concert measures for the fitting-out of a powerful Armada against the European enemies, who were assembling in the 'hole' of Surat prior to sailing from there to raise the siege of Ormuz and help the Persians to keep that stronghold, which they had taken from us with the help of those same enemies, and which the Captain-General Ruy Freire held besieged with some vessels that he was crusing with in that Strait. And after doing what could be done in fitting out this Armada, it was found that we could not muster sufficient strength to cope with the enemy upon equal terms, wherefor it was decided to rely upon what there was, trusting that God would help us in his Infinite Mercy, and that the valour of the Captain-General Nuno Alvares Botelho and the other Captains, besides the stout-heartedness of our soldiers would make up for our lesser strength.

And thus the Captain General Nuno Alvares Botelho left this bar of Goa for the North on the 9th of December of the same year 1624, with 6 fighting galleons and with orders to wait in the roadstead of Bassein for 2 more which were on the point of being completed there, and in the meantime to take in the supplies which he still lacked, and which were to last for 3 months; and owing to the delay of the two galleons and the time spent in taking the provisions on board, the said General did not leave that port of Bassein until the 6th of January 1625 with 8 fighting galleons; these were his Capitaina [flagship], and Almiranta [Admiral or 2nd in command's ship] having on board as Admiral Francisco Borges de Castel-Branco; the galleon *São Sebastião* whose Captain was Antonio Telles de Menezes; the galleon *Trindade*, Captain

Francisco de Souza de Castro; the galleon *São Salvador*, Captain Francisco de Thoar da Cunha; the galleon *Santiago*, Captain Simão de Quintal de Carvalho; the galleon *Misericordia* Captain Francisco de Costa de Lemos; the galleon *Sancto Antonio*, captain Antonio Godinho Coelho.

Having first received sure news that there was no enemy ship in Surat, whilst 12 European enemy vessels had gone to the Strait of Ormuz, he quickly steered his course for Muscat, in accordance with his Orders; he met with many contrary winds, and so tempestuous that they could well be compared with those of the land of Natal, and the main top-mast and yard of his flagship were broken thereby, and finally the mainmast was split; nevertheless as it was late and since he feared he might miss the enemy, he did not wish to delay himself by making repairs, or taking water on board, (albeit there was such scarcity of it in the whole Armada that it was many days since the [full ?] ration of a pint had been issued), and thus without anchoring or touching anywhere, after passing within hailing distance of Muscat, he passed on to Ormuz, sighting that island and 12 enemy ships[1] in Comorão, on the 10th of February. It seemed to him that he could attack them that same day and thus he steered towards them, but night came on and the wind dropped, whilst the tide ebbed, so that he anchored very close to them, spending the night in making preparations for the battle; he set sail in the third watch with all the Armada, and when the day had dawned he sighted the 12 enemy ships that steered likewise towards him tho' with great reluctance and (as was afterwards learnt) with boastful promises to the Persians that they would soon bring our ships in as prizes before them; on our General making the signal to engage, all our Armada proceeded to attack the enemy, and the Dutch Flagship which was in the van on this day, saluted him with a blank shot to which he replied with a cannon-ball, whereon the battle was joined with all imaginable fury; the wind was very little and in favour of the enemy, which was the reason that we on our side could not board them.

The Dutch Flag-ship and Vice-Admiral's ship[2] engaged in a prolonged duel with our General's flagship which was the principal object of their attack, whilst the action continued uninterruptidly from before sunrise until after sunset; the enemy flagship was so maltreated that she was towed out of action by her boats, with a list and with her yards shot down, and their Vice-Admiral-ship's flag was furled, which some took as a sign that the Captain thereof had been killed.[1] The galleon *São Sebastião* thrust itself well in amongst the enemy as did also *Santiago*, whilst our Almiranta was board on board with a ship[2] and captured one of its flags; likewise all the other Captains fought bravely on this day and throughout the whole action, and it is certain that if there had only been a wind enabling us to board them, then the enemy would have been completely defeated on this day.

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[1] These were the English ships *James* (48), *Jonas* (44), *Eagle* (22) and *Star* (27) with the pinnaces *Spy* and *Scout*, and the Dutch ships *Zuijdt-Holland* (46), *Nieuwe-Bantam* (46), *Dordrecht* (24) and *Weesp* (24). The remaining two ships were "Moorish" merchantmen from Surat who had come in company with the English vessels.

[2] The *Zuijdt-Holland* and *Nieuwe-Bautam*.

When the action began in the morning, the General Ruy Friere (who commands in that strait) made his appearance with 3 vessels from the direction of Ormuz, and with these he engaged 3 enemy pinnaces that were coming from that side, which after firing several shots at him joined the main body of their Fleet. On Ruy Friere coming up within hailing-distance of the General Nuno Alvares Botelho, the latter passed him a hawser in order that he might tow him alongside one of the enemy ships, (which he could not otherwise board, on account of the calm); the General Ruy Freire did as he was told with wonderful courage, but in spite of his efforts he could not achieve his object because the enemy were already sheering off, until finally they took to flight with all sails set and made for Comorão, which is nowadays a Persian Fortress situated on the seashore opposite Ormuz; the General Nunalvares Botelho pursued them, firing at them until nightfall, and the enemy having thus withdrawn to beneath the shelter of this fortress, the General anchored close to them. On this day they had killed 4 of his men and wounded 20, amongst which was a certain Dom Fernando [illegible] from a cannon shot which struck him in the leg as he was standing amidships, close to the General who was likewise wounded by a splinter in the leg; but this did not prevent him from fulfilling his duty, as he went round the Armada that night in an almadia [canoe] in order to ascertain what damage had been done and to give the necessary orders for reorganization; he found that Antonio Telles,[1] the captain of the galleon *São Sebastião* which was the stoutest-built of all,[2] had been badly wounded in one of his arms, as also was Dom Francisco Manuel in the breast, and he therefore ordered that Simão de Quintal de Carvalho should take over the galleon *São Sebãstião*, whilst his place in the galleon *Santiago* in which he had come should be taken by Manuel Quaresma Carneiro, and that all should make ready for the following day, whilst the weapons, sails and tackle were to be overhauled and repaired in all the galleons.

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[1] It was not the Dutch Vice-Admiral that had been killed, but the Dutch Admiral Adolf Becker in his flagship *Zuijdt-Holland*. [See the *Dagh-Register*, I., p. 158.]

[2] This was the Dutch ship *Dordrecht*. A fuller description of this incident—the sole instance of boarding in the action—is to be found on p. 158 of the Batavian *Dagh-Register*.

As a result of this battle there were many killed and wounded throughout the Armada, including the Master of the Almiranta, the pilot of the *Mizericordia* and the Master-Gunner of the *Sancto Antonio* amongst the Officers. And as regards the amazement which it caused amongst the Persians who were eagerly watching the battle from the Fortresses of Ormuz and Comorão and along the sea-shore, one cannot speak of it, since they stood amazed with their fingers in their mouths as is their habit when stupified, and it was afterwards learnt that it seemed to them that they saw the mouth of Hell open, and in truth the battle was one of the most extraordinary ever fought upon the ocean, no matter where it might be.

At daybreak on the following morning which was that of Ash-Wednesday, there was a strong wind and boisterous sea, so that neither our Armada nor that of the enemy could get at each other or renew the action on this day; and since the [main-] mast of the galleon *São Sebastião* had been damaged by cannon shot after already being strained on the voyage, owing to the rigging having been shot away it went by the board, carrying with it the mizenmast, which disaster greatly encouraged the enemy to give battle to our Armada,[1] because they had learnt that this galleon was the next ſtrongeſt after the flagship. And thus on the day after Ash-Wednesday, although our Armada felt the lack of this galleon (which altho' the beſt in it was rendered useless owing to its want of [main-] maſt and sails), the General Nuno Alvares Botelho weighed to receive the enemy who were already bearing down to attack us, having refitted themselves thanks to the advantages afforded him by the Persian Fortresses from which they were succoured; the second battle began at sunrise and laſted until nightfall without the fury of it abating for a moment on either side. They killed in the opening of the action the Almirante Francisco Borges and the Captain Francisco de Thouar da Cunha, captain of the galleon *São Salvador*, and as the enemy percieved that only the flagship was really formidable they made every effort to deſtroy it, thinking that this would give them the victory, and thus it was assailed throughout the entire day by 7 ships from whom it received much hurt in the maſts and shrouds, but they were no less damaged for they never fired a broadside but it was repaid them, so that more than 1,500 cartridges were expended on that day alone in our General's galleon, until finally the enemy, tired of the ſtruggle, drew off at nightfall. On their retirement towards the fortress of Comorão, they saw the galleon *Trindade* drifting in that direction because of its damaged ſteering and the ſtrong currents flowing; they therefore bore down upon her and speedily reduced her to a sorry plight, albeit she was valiantly defended (for so long as she was not helped) by the captain Francisco de Sousa de Caſtro, as I can teſtify having been an eyewitness of all that occured. Our General tacked on her in order to relieve her, and I do not know how the flagship could tack without sails, because it had only a ſtrip of the foresail left and was without sheets; however he succeeded in relieving her and rescued her by dint of heavy broadsides from the enemy who then withdrew with him in pursuit of them and firing after them until they retired, or rather fled. As on the first day, the wind dropped soon after nightfall and our Armada anchored perilously close to the sand-bank of Ormuz as there was no other alternative.

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[1] Antonio Telles de Menezes who lost his right hand in this action, subsequently became Capitão-Mór of the "Armada de Alto-bordo" in India, and fought several actions against the Dutch fleets which annually blockaded Goa from 1636-1640. He was Governor of India, 1639-1640.

[2] Says a contemporary English account printed in Foster, *op. cit.*, she "had been built upon a carack at Cochin . . . only for to make a battery and to be a barracado to the rest of her Fleet. She was saker, if not whole-culverin profe in her lower works. This ship did more spoile unto our Fleet than any three of their ships taken together."

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[1] An English narrative ſtates: ". . . To our comfort and their sorrow, we saw their reare-admirall rowle by the board her maine-topmaſt, with part of her mainemaſt, and alsoe her foretopmaſt." The account given in Lediard says ". . . their Rear-Admiral's Main-maſt was shot by the board . . . in short all their eight ships were so torn and battered, that they had neither good Maſts, Sails nor Yards, to help themselves with, nor tight Sides to bear sail upon."

On this day they killed 20 men in the flagship, including the Pilot-Major, and wounded 37 besides the Master, Master's-Mate and Master-Gunner, whilst the General was likewise wounded by some flying splinters, from which God delivered him with special favour, since he was always where the shots flew thickest, animating the crew everywhere with rare coolness, courage and intrepidity, whilst in all the other galleons there were also many killed and wounded. If on this day the galleon *São Sebastião* had only had masts to enable it to play its part, either the enemy would not have left the shelter of the Fortress of Comorão or else they would without a doubt have come off much worse than they did the first day; however, even as it was they lost one of their ships which was uselessly expended as a fireship,[1] and they were badly spoiled and left with the indignity of having sought safety in flight. During this action the Captain-General Ruy Freire twice sent men to the flagship of the General Nuno Alvares Botelho in order to make good his losses in killed and wounded; and it must be noted that in the midst of the battle, the General Nuno Alvares took care to ask personally each one of the Captains of the Armada how things went, hailing them from spar deck amidships, and on learning that the almirante was dead he entrusted the temporary command of his ship to Antônio da Cruz, and similarly promoted Manuel Diniz to fill the vacancy in the galleon *São Salvador* caused by the death of Francisco de Thouar, The Captain-General Ruy Freire and the Captain General Nunalvares Botelho both considered that the armada was exposed to great risks being anchored so close to the Ormuz sandbank, and thus they decided that it should get under sail with the land-breeze and steer to Larak, where we could also refit and provide ourselves with supplies, and thus they set sail just before dawn with poop-lanterns lit as a challenge to the enemy; when day had dawned the enemy likewise weighed, but never attacked,

[1] This was the *John*, a former Portuguese ship which had been taken whilst on the voyage to Chaul on the 11th November 1624. It was of 250 tons. The account in Lediard blames Darby the Master for her failure, but Weddell and Minors (mate of the *Eagle*) both blame John Johnston the Master of the *Eagle* for failing to guard the fireship as he had been told, owing to "contempte or cowardize, which are the two basest ornaments in warr." [*V.* Foster, p. 54.]

although our Armada was only going under foresails whilst they had more sails set, and thus making short tacks in order to proceed slowly, we anchored in Larak discharging our artillery as a challenge to them to come on, but they without attempting to do so returned to their usual anchorage in Comorão.

On this day the General Nuno Alvares ordered Dom Francisco Coutinho to take command of the almirante galleon, as he had volunteered to do so, and he appointed Antonio Telles to act as Admiral of the Armada when he should have recovered from his wounds sufficiently to be able to occupy this post; concerning the astonishment which the battle caused amongst the Persians, I will only say that if the first had left them fairly stupified, this one alarmed them even more, because of the bravery shown by both sides therein, and owing to the fire and shots that belched forth from the flagship, as likewise from all the other galleons her consorts.[1]

And as regards the repair and refitting of the Armada, we met with many insuperable difficulties in it, as there was not a sound mast left, nor wood for the repair thereof, neither sails or rigging, and a great lack of officers: the Council was assembled and there were present at it, the General of the Strait Ruy Freire de Andrade and all the Captains of the Armadas of capital ships and oared vessels; and in view of the said difficulties, and because it was likely that a storm might arise which would cause the loss of the whole Armada in that island, (especially as 4 rowing-vessels had been lost a few days previously) they were of the opinion that the Armada should go to Muscat in order to refit, as there was a supply of Timber and cordage there wherewith to do so. However the General Nunalvares and the General Ruy Freire resolved between themselves that they would stay where they were for another 2 or 3 days, and that they would try and get a spy to find out the enemy's intentions, after which they would go to Corfacão [Khor Fakkan], a haven in Arabia, there to take in water of which they had extreme necessity, and that they would then decide what was to be done next, and Dom Francisco Coutinho agreed with this view. Yet although they made every effort to get hold of a spy, it was not possible to do so since the enemy were very much on their guard. When the four days had passed, and the wants of the Armada rendered it very necessary that the resolution of its going to Corfacão should be carried out, the General was so loath to leave his position that he ſtayed there for another 10 days, conſtantly provoking the enemy by frequent discharges of his artillery, until finally they set sail on the 23rd of February, Eve of the feaſt of St. Mathias, with 14 ships,—11 of theirs and 3 of the Moors. The General immediately made signal for the whole Armada to weigh anchor and went out to meet them, trying to cut across their course so that they would not be able to get away without fighting; they avoided doing so on that morning and evening, and on the following night the weather became so ſtormy that, in iminent peril of being driven ashore on the Persian coaſt, both fleets ſteered on the same tack. At day-break the weather moderated and our General reformed our Armada whilſt the enemy did the same to their's, and they began to near each other from mid-day onwards; the enemy tried to get to windward by weathering our flagship, in order to enable them to continue their voyage, whilſt the General ſtrove to prevent them by sailing as close to the wind as possible. As the galleons *Trindade* and *São Salvador* (in which was the General's brother-in-law Dom Sebaſtião Lobo) were badly damaged and all the others had been very roughly handled, he made every effort on this day to ensure that the Armada kept its order and formation, rallying all his ships when scattered, and owing to his want of officers he took particular care personally to attend to this, because, as events subsequently showed, the happy issue of the day depended upon our keeping in order.

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[1] The English accounts state that the allies fired some 11,000 cannon shot and broke 7 or 8 of their guns, whilst 20,000 shot were fired in the 3 fleets. Another account states that 16,000 shot were fired on the first day alone, and 17,000 on the second. The *James* alone fired 2,022 shots on the 3 days.

The fight began on both sides at one o'clock in the afternoon, the flag-ship bearing the brunt of the action which laſted until half an hour after nightfall, when the enemy fled, extinguishing the lights of their poop-lanterns, falling away to leeward and bearing up astern of the flagship from which they all received great hurt. At two hours before sunset the English flagship withdrew badly damaged,[1] hauling down the square flags in our sight, and it did not return to the battle again; it was therefore presumed that this signal meant that their Commander had been killed, and it would have been a great success if we had been sure of this, because it was he who was present at the capture of Ormuz.[1] In this third battle and last day of meeting the enemy, our Armada did not receive any important damage, since only in the galleon of Dom Sebastião Lobo were two men killed and 8 burnt, whilst there were 2 slain in the *São Sebastião* and 9 in the flagship, including the Captain thereof and Jeronimo Botelho, the General's nephew, and Braz Correa captain of an oared vessel, which loss although in itself it may be considered severe in view of our weaker force, yet it is not much considering the long time that the action lasted, and what it might have been expected to amount to in such a fierce battle. The three chief men killed on board the flagship were all slain in the ship's waist by one cannon ball, and all three fell down at the General's feet and were shattered in such a manner that pieces of their flesh flew in his face; there were also 20 others wounded in this same flagship, (which was the vessel that bore almost the entire brunt of this action owing to the damaged state of the whole of our Armada), whilst the general was also wounded in a shoulder and thumb.

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[1] The *James*, Captain James Weddell. The English version says that *James* had her rigging so cut that she could not be worked, but dropped behind. "This fight for the time was the hotteſt of the three, and hotter it would have proved, had not the approaching darkness of the unwelcome night cryed a requiem to our bloudy resolutions."

The Armada of oared vessels could render no assistance on this day, owing to the gale, and on the contrary it was placed in dire peril thro' trying to follow the capital ships, and thus it was not present at this final action; nevertheless the soldiers which the General Ruy Freire left in the flagship and in the other galleons were of great help. And this in short is what really happened in these three battles in which these two Armadas fought, almost as if board and board, and in such a manner that it is believed in this East that there have never been their equals on these seas.

Says Minors: "Our Admirall with the *Jonas* and three Hollanders, gave them a brave farewell, which continued untill seven at nighte, at which time the Portingales stood in for Suar [Soar] and wee one our course for India."

[1] Weddell was not killed in this action but lived to have a long and eventful career, in the service of the E.I. Company and also of the "interloper" Squire Courteen, one of whose squadrons he took to India in 1636. In 1637 he visited Goa and Macau, taking with him on his return from the latter place (after an unsuccessful attempt to open up trade with China), some artillery for the Portuguese forts at Goa.

It is not my desire to specify details concerning the individual praises due to those who were present in these battles, but only to relate sincerely what I saw with my own eyes during these engagements of our Armada with the English and Dutch enemies; however I must observe that it was a most astonishing thing to see the two Generals Nunalvares Botelho and Ruy Freire de Andrade (the first time that they met on this occasion) talking to each other in the midst of the first battle as if they had been in some garden, albeit that the enemy so soon as they saw them conversing, aimed all their shots at them, whilst they were thus speaking the one from on board the flagship and the other from his oared vessel, which they continued to do for a long time until they had finally decided between them what they were going to do; and on a relative of the General Nunalvares Botelho trying to persuade him to get out of the way of the shots that were raining upon both of them, he took it so badly that he motioned him away from him as if he was a stranger and no friend of his, whilst God who favours bravery kept them safely sheltered from the Peril in which only the protection of Heaven could defend them.

As soon as their first battles were over, the two Generals discussed the buisiness of sending information concerning the results and losses thereof to the Viceroy, and this they did in full agreement, informing him clearly and Truthfully of all that had occured; and after this third battle the General Nunalvares sailed towards the coast with his victorious Armada since the enemy's fleets had fled from him, and ten days later he had sight thereof and of the haven of Corfacao which is situated in the Arabian coast. From here he sent advice to the Viceroy concerning what else had happened, and of the great hunger and thirst which they had endured, besides the damage received in the fights. He was not able to inform the General Ruy Freire about this message, since the distance between both was too great to be overcome, and thus it was only the General Nunalvares who wrote (because he thought it necessary to do so), asking for further orders to enable him to carry on with the war as would most benefit this State [of India], and in the meantime he remained here awaiting the response.

And finally in concluding this story of these three battles it must be said that this was the first time that the Dutch and English joined themselves together against us,[1] their joint force being composed of 12 very large ships, including two 'capitanias' and two 'almirantas' which were each of them armed with 56 guns, whilst the three smaller ships which are rated as pataxos [=pinnaces] had 20 guns, which is the same number as that carried by most of our galleons in which we had a great want of competent gunners and seamen. The enemy on the other contrary were very strongly manned, and fought protected by sandbanks, and with the favour and assistance of three Persian Fortresses, whither they withdrew after the actions, and were animated against us and supplied with everything of which they had need; whilst our Armada was without anything from which it could repair itself, because all the spare stores that there were had been used up in the first action, so that after the men had been exhausted by fighting all day they were compelled to spend the night in the work of mending the sails and rigging, and fishing the masts; yet in despite of all this toil they always fought bravely, forcing the enemy to do likewise, and putting them to flight and pursuing them, breaking their spirit and lowering the prestige in which they had been held all over the seas of this Orient, besides killing many of their men and doing much damage in their ships, whilst our men became more courageous and experienced. And the best result of all this was that owing to our Armada having the upper hand, these same enemies did not attack Muscat, as it is regarded as certain that they had intended to do, in addition to taking in silk at Comorao and raising the siege of Ormuz. Furthermore they were prevented from seperating in order to plunder our shipping, and they also lost the monsoon of their contracts, from which it follows that they must have suffered heavy losses in their profits and strength, which in all probability would have been still greater if they had not fled defeated from our Armada as related above.

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[1] This is, of course, a mistake. As early as 1602 Lancaster and the Dutchman Joris van Spilbergen had combined to waylay a Portuguese

And moreover our Armada could have done still greater things, if it had been able to repair and refit itself with the same facility that the enemy repaired their ships, in which case it would have been enabled either to defeat them com-

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"carrack" in the Straits of Malacca, whilst by the terms of the Treaty arranged in 1621 the English and Dutch maintained a combined "Fleet of Defence" to cruise against the Portuguese. One of these Anglo-Dutch squadrons of the Fleet of Defence fell in with part of the India-bound Armada of Dom Francisco da Gama, the Conde da Vidigueira, off the East African coast south of Moçambique, and defeated him with the loss of 3 of his ships after a running fight of 2 days (July 22-23 1622.)

pletely or to pursue them so closely that they would have been forced to lose the profits which they come to seek in these ports and which they gain from the prizes that they take; and we would further have been able to prevent them from uniting to besiege any of our Fortresses, or trying to prevent the voyaging of our ships to the Kingdom, as they have done before now.

And although it was not possible for us to make good our damage so that we could follow up the enemy as we ought, yet withal our fortresses are now freed from the fear of suffering further losses, and are for the present secure and safe from the suprise attacks against them which we were formerly afraid of, whilst our reputation has recovered a great deal from the decline in which it was owing to the freedom with which the enemy navigated and made prizes, commercial contracts, and profits at their pleasure, wether they were few or many, which the Moors now understand will not be the case in the future provided that the Armada is kept up as it ought to be; and it is obvious that if it could cruise in force on these seas, the enemy could not sail them without keeping up larger squadrons and higher expences, and they would obtain fewer prizes, whilst the navigation of our own merchants would be rendered much easier, and more profitable to the vassalls and to the Royal Customs;[1] these are all points which I think I ought to touch upon, as they all depend upon the upkeep and conservation of this Armada, each one in its own particular way.

After everything had happened as is narrated above, the Council was assembled in Corfacao for the purpose of deciding upon what was to be done with our Armada, being in the state previously described as a result of the three actions, and it was the unanimous opinion of everyone that it should go to Muscat to refit and to wait there for the Viceroy's Orders, and that in consequence of the lack of men, money, munitions and necessaries, they would have to wait for all these before they could make an attack upon Ormuz: furthermore, since the General Nunalvares had already done what he had come to the Strait to do, (which was to give battle to the enemy fleets and expel them therefrom), and since owing to the want of munitions of war they could not contemplate returning to the attack on Ormuz until these were forthcoming, he assented to the general opinion that the Armada should proceed to Muscat to refit, but with the resolve of preparing it as quickly and as thoroughly as possible to enable it to return speedily to Ormuz; and thus it would be ready to carry out the Viceroy's orders when they came, or to fight the enemy again if they returned after refitting themselves—although it was thought to be most unlikely that they would return, owing to the damaged condition in which they had left,—or rather abandoned and fled from,—the Strait.

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[1] These remarks are to a large extent borne out by Sir William Foster, who in summarising the effects of the Portuguese Naval Activity in 1624-5 writes: "The activity to which the Portuguese were stirred by the blow (the loss of Ormuz) threatened grave consequences for English trade in those seas. Fortunately the Dutch . . . came to the rescue of their co-religionists; but even then the ships of the two nations were forced to keep together for mutual protection and to move only in strong fleets."

The Captain General Nunalvares Botelho therefore left the haven of Corfacao with all his Armada for the fortress of Muscat, in order to wait there for the relief which was coming from India, and meanwhile to refit as best he could; on arriving at the fortress of Muscat the Council was convened there in order to decide what ought to be done next, and it appeared to the General Ruy Freire and to the Captain of the said Fortress Martim Affonso de Mello, as well as to the Vedor de Fazenda and to the majority of the assembled captains, that the best thing to be done was for the General Nunalvares Botelho to go to Goa with the whole of his Armada in order to refit there; however, he himself would not consent to this as it was expressly against the orders which had been given him, and it seemed to him that for the present it was more important to ensure the complete safety of Muscat than anything else. Nevertheless he dispatched two of the galleons which were most disabled[1] in order to refit in that place, himself remaining with the other six in Muscat.

Whilst he was thus occupied in Muscat, news was brought him that the Viceroy had despatched assistance,[2] whilst at the same time he received information from Francisco Muniz, Captain of Bassein, that the enemy were refitting in Surat preparatory to returning to the Strait; it appeared to him that he ought to go to meet and secure the relief-force at Cape Rozalgate, for which place he at once set out with the six galleons, and falling in with this succour he returned with it to

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[1] The *São Sebastião* and the *Trindade*. [Letter of the Viceroy of India ult. February 1626.]

[2] During April in a ship and in the galleon *São Pedro* under the command of Gaspar Gomez "who was formerly chief Inspector of Dockyards and Pilot-Major of this State."

Muscat; here, however, owing to the scant fertility and value of the land for materials wherewith to repair a fleet, and owing to insufficient recourses and want of time and many other drawbacks, he could not refit as well as he needed; but he repaired the six[1] galleons in so far as he was able, and left Muscat with them on the 24th of August in order to go and await the enemy's fleets off Surat, which is their usual rendezvous, both in the case of ships coming from Europe or the South, and where these enemies have already established their headquarters; and arriving off the coast of India on the 20th of September, he learnt that there were already five English and Dutch ships in Swalley's Hole, and without recking of the fact that he had only four galleons with him, (owing to the other two[2] having been shipwrecked through the severity of the weather and their own bad refit, for the winter storms were still raging in the seas of this coast), of the which four only two were of considerable strength, he resolved to go at once to seek out the said five enemy ships; on the way, he fell in with a Moorish ship off Bombay, which was coming from Mecca, and having captured it together with all its cargo and 400 Moors that were on board, he sent it with the Auditor, Factor and Purser of the Armada, and other Officers, and with all its cargo (without showing that he valued it) to be handed over to the Veador da Fazenda who was at Bassein, where it was declared a good prize; and continuing his voyage towards Surat, he sighted 13 paguels of the Moslems of Malabar, carrying 4,000 Moors, and he took them and forced them to anchor under his guns, and on our Armada of oared vessels of the North arriving in the evening, he handed them over to the Captain-Major thereof, so that he might take them also to the Veador da Fazenda since he could not afford to delay with the said paguels, nor was he able to keep a proper watch over them at night with the galleons.

On arriving off Surat he sighted the five enemy ships and a galliot with top-sails that was with them in the hole, and casting anchor off the bar opposite them, he discharged his cannon at them as a signal to come out, and as they did not wish to do so, he resolved to go in and attack them (for which purpose he first proceeded personally to sound the channel and sandbanks in the entrance); since, however, the wind during those days did not allow him to carry out his intention, and being desirous of provoking the enemy to fight by all means in his power, and to make them either do this or lose their reputation, he bid them defiance in a written challenge signed by himself, which the captain Simao de Quintal nailed to the gates of the Fortress of Surat by his orders; the said enemies did not come out to fight, but three very powerful English ships were sighted out at sea,[1] and he immediately weighed in pursuit of them, in sight of their consorts who were in Swalley's Hole, and attacked them and put them to flight in confusion, after fighting all that afternoon against them with only his flagship and on the two following nights with the galleons; boarding them, setting them on fire, and capturing flags, drums, launches and much other booty from them, until at the end of three days they disappeared in flight, with every likelihood of one having been lost owing to the havock which had been wrought in it,[2] whilst the others did not return again to the port of Surat, which is the seat of their trade, so that they likewise suffered loss in this way.

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[1] Should be 7, as although the *São Sebastião* and *Trindade* had gone, the *São Pedro* had arrived.

[2] Three others to be exact. The *Santiago* was wrecked near Danu, the crew and most of the guns being saved; the galleons *Mizericordia* and *Sancto Antonio* were wrecked near Bombay. [*Livros das Moncoes*, Liv. 22, fol. 116.] The 4 galleons left with the Captain-General were the *São Francisco* (Capitanea), *São Francisco* (Almirante), *São Salvador* and *São Pedro*.

And three months after these enemy ships had been thus routed, and whilst the General was in the port of Bombay whither he had gone to refit, an enemy ship came to this region in order to waylay the vessels which usually come from Mombaça, Moçambique, Pate, Muscat, Bassorah and elsewhere about this time to touch at Bassein and Chaul on their way to Goa, as they usually have succeeded in doing since these vessels are but weak: no sooner had he heard of this enemy ship, than he embarked in the galleon *São Salvador* (which was the only one that could sail as the others were on the careen and so forth), and setting sail in this vessel he sighted the enemy ship and gave chase to it, pursuing it until it disappeared out of sight for it was able to escape from him as it was very light; however it did not return again to these parts, where the said galleon constantly cruised on guard, until all the above-mentioned vessels had entered the port in safety, not one of them having been taken since this Armada started its cruise.

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[1] *Palsgrave*, *Dolphin* and *Lion*.

[2] This was the *Lion* which, although boarded by the galleon *São Pedro* under Gaspar Gomes and nearly taken, escaped by blowing up its poop, but only to meet its ultimate fate at the hands of Ruy Freire's squadron near Bandar Abbas on 8th November 1625. [See also p. 196.]

And subsequently when 10 enemy ships assembled in Surat, and the Viceroy was informed thereof, it seemed to him that these galleons were no longer safe in Bombay, for which reason he ordered the General to repair to Goa with them at once, but he, considering that this would involve a loss of prestige and that it was a waste of time as it was impossible to form an Armada this year, objected to this order, and took upon himself the responsibility for the safety of the galleons, refitting them again, and placing some cannon ashore on an islet in order to protect them and enable him to continue repairing them; the Viceroy approved of all this and the galleons were refitted, and the men embarked therein, obedient and ready to serve the King in everything, without their indulging in brawls and mutinies (a very unusual thing in these parts); and in this manner he now remains awaiting the order which the Viceroy will send him together with some galleons which are to come from Goa as reinforcements,[1] and then he will do whatever he may be ordered; and it is difficult to believe with what fear and circumspection the enemy proceed, and how Fortune has changed in regard to them for hitherto we have fled from them and now it is they who flee from us, and whereas they always used to scatter in order to prey on our shipping, they now all go together without daring to seperate which causes them grevious loss, and if this Armada is continued, as also the resolution with which its crews fought, it will not be possible for the enemy to continue to come to these ports.

And what I would stress in concluding this narrative is that, even leaving aside mention of the trouble which the General Nunalvares had in carefully and expeditiously bringing his Armada to this India all together on the same tide, as well as the troubles which he soon encountered in fitting out this Armada in Goa, yet for a year and a half (speaking of the whole time in which he was serving on board ship) he did not quit this galleon, to which I can testify as an eyewitness, he having battled therein five times in eight months, and so desperately that the like was never seen before, or could be on few seas of the world; furthermore he has thrice worked at the repairing of this Armada, never failing to toil therein, and watching over the crews with infinite prudence and care, spending all his substance on them, and running into debt more than he can afford. And with all this and much more going on, his heart is so firm in its resolve to continue the war in defence of this State, as if he thought that God had granted him his life for this purpose.

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[1] These galleons were the *São Sebastião* (40), *São Jeronimo* (40), and *Reis Magos* (24). [Letter of the Viceroy of India, ult. Feb. 1626, *L.d.M.*, Liv. 22, fol. 117.]

And this is as much as can be stated shortly and pithily of this Armada, taking the period of the discourse thereon as one year only, counted from the day in which it left Goa, and leaving aside what happened before that, since it is not my intention to deal with anything else than what I was actually present at, which I do sincerely and truthfully; and may it please Our Lord to give us henceforth still greater victories, for his own Glory as for the remedy of this State, and to which I will also refer if I happen to be present at them, as I was present at all these, without missing a single one of them. May all be in praise of God, who is the Author of all good, and to whose infallible Providence everything is subjected. From Bombay on the 9th of December of the year one thousand six hundred and twenty-five.

(Sgd) One of the Captains of the Armada.

APPENDIX VIII

Translation of the Cartel in which the Captain-General Nuno Alvares Botelho challenged with his Armada the English and Dutch Fleets that were in Swalley's Hole.

Nuno Alvares Botelho, Knight-Commander of the benefices of Sancta Maria de Mirandella, São Julião de zurara, and São Miguel of São Riade of the Order of Christ; of the Councils of Portugal and the State of India, Captain-Major of the Armadas of the ships from the Kingdom and of the galleons of the relief-force, and Captain General of the Armadas of Capital ships on the seas of this State etc.; I make known unto the Generals of England and of Holland, that after the battles which I gave to them during the past February in the Sea of Ormuz, I made ready in Muscat for the purpose of coming to await them off this coast, as I did in the vicinity of Dabul and Chaul where their ships usually make their landfall, and being informed that they had stood out to sea without appearing off the coast and were gone into this anchorage and hole wherein



NUNO ALVAREZ BOTELHO

(*From a woodcut in Faria y Sousa's "Asia Portuguesa"*)

[*face page* 248

they now are, I wished to seek them out for the purpose of challenging them to battle, as by this my Cartel I do defy them;[1] and I will wait for them off this port during the space of three days from the date of this missive, in order that the valour of each one may be seen outside the sandbanks which prevent me from entering to attack them. And whereas the said Generals have more ships with them than I have, they will not be able as soldiers to excuse themselves from accepting this Challenge, and if one of the said Generals should be unable or unwilling to accept it, I hereby challenge the other, swearing on my solemn word of Honour by the Life of my King and Lord that I will not give him battle with more ships than those with which he comes out to meet me; and if within the next three days, which are those of spring-tides and fit and opportune for them to come out of the hole, they do not do so, (which I do not expect) then it will be clearly understood that they have failed in the said Challenge and that the fault is theirs. And to enable them to come freely out of the Hole, I will stand out to sea. And in order that this Challenge may come to the notice of all, I have ordered this Cartel to be affixed upon all the Public places of the City and Fortress of Surat etc:

Passed in the flagship under my signature and seal, and with my Arms, on the 16th of October of 1625.

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[1] There were in Swalley's Hole the English ships *Jonas* (44), *Anne* and *Scout* under the command of the Surat Factor, Wm. Kerridge. There were also three Dutch ships—*Goude Leeuw*, *Heusden* and *Walcheren*. Botelho only had his four storm-tossed galleons (see p. 245, note 2), but the Dutch and English declined to come out.

APPENDIX IX

Richard Swan's Account of the fights off Jask.

India Office Marine Records, vol: xxx; printed in *Foster*, vol: 1618-1621, pp. 220-225.

December 16. "In the morning our admirall with the masters of his fleete went abord the prize and carried two barrells of powder, some tarre, and other combustible provisions, intending with her to laie the Portingall admirall thwart the halse and soe to burne both together. The prize thus prepared, and all our shipps fitted, wee bore up with the men of warre, whose fleete consisted of two Portingall galleons bigger than the *London*, [*São Pedro* and *São Martinho*] and two Flemmish shipps, one much about the burthen of the *Hart* [the *São Lourenço*], the other [N^a S^{ra} *de Conceição*] lesser than the *Robucke* or *Eagle*; their generall Ruy Frere de Andrade, the vice-admirall John Boralio [João Boralho]; the Dutch [*sic !*] shipps commanded one by Antonia Musquit [Mezquita], the other by Baliazar de Chaves. But it fell calme untill evening, and the current sett us so neere them that they reached us with their ordinance. All night wee kept under sayle. Being, the 17th in the morning, by reason of the land turne [=breeze] to leeward of them, they waied their anchors and, setting saile, made towards our fleete, which attended their comming, albeit they had and carefullie kept the benefitte of the wind. About nine the fight began, which continued nine howres without intermission. In the afternoone, a fine gentle westerlie sea winde blowing, and wee to windward of them, their admirall whether of necessitie to repaire some defect about his rudder, or of policie for some conceipted stratagem, anchored; and to the eastward of him, his vice-admirall [*São Martinho*] and the greater Flemming [*São Lourenço*], the lesser [N^a S^{ra} *de Conceição*] to leeward of all, stopping his leakes. Now, as aforesaid, all our fleete being to windward of them, was the prize called unto to put in execution what was before determined upon, in great hope our fire designe would have taken its intended effect; which yet, most likely beeing both too soone fired and foresaken of those which had it in charge, prooved altogether a fruitlesse project, driving cleere of all ther ships to their rejoycing, our disgrace and our imployers losse. Our expectations thus deceived, and they continuing still at anchor, wee all foure shippes, keeping the wind and turning too and againe close ahead of them, raked them, especially their admirall, through and through fore and aft with our severall broadesides, receiving from them only their prowe and bow peeces; out of whom, as I passed to the northwards in the *Roebucke*, two unfortinate shotts cut asunder the weather leechropes of her foresaile and foretopsaile in the middle depth of both sailes; which renting, with our boate ahead and all other our best indevours wee could not make her staie, but were inforced after o [illegible] for reparation of our sailes to bear up to leeward betwixt them and the shoare; in which interim their three greatest shipps plaied upon us with the whole of their broadsides, yet (to God onely bee the praise) with lesse hurt than I could have imagined. Thus having compassed the three last mentioned ships and luffing to rejoine with our owne fleete (which all this while, houlding the benefitte of the wind, plaid upon the Portingalls with their great ordnance as fast as with so manie musketts). I had gotten to windward of the smaller Flemming; who standing of [f] as I did, until he had brought the fired ship directly betweene him and mee, then turned taile and steered with all the sailes hee could make right afore the wind alongst the shore to the eastward; whome to rescue, the other three set saile, now so gentle that the *Hart*, passing alongst their broadesides, received from some of them few, from others none, either great or small shotte. But our fleete, at present reunited, desisted their farther chase (the darknesse of the night and the generall wearinesse challenging a surcease from so toylesome a worke) and anchored after midnight in their before usuall roade. In this fight the *London* and *Hart* received verie littell hurt in their hulls and tackling; lesse or none amongst their men. The *Eagles* mainemast was shot in five places, whereof four quite thorough, and one John Banks lost his right arme. I in the *Robucke* had one Edward Browne slaine with a great shotte through his head, a peece of whose skull, together with some splinters of the same shotte, wounded Mr Thomas Waller, one of my mates, in the foreheade to the losse of his left eie; also John Phenix, boatswaines mate, and Robert Hepworth, coxons mate, both lost the use of their right hands. Never in so long a fight did I heare of so little hurt as upon our partes. Blessed be the Lord of Hostes, who was with us, and the God of Jacob, who was our refuge. I cannot trulie particularize their hurts and losses, save by report of our merchants: that John Boralio, their vice admirall, and another captaine were slaine, with thirty or forty Portugalls out of their admirall (for Mores they account not in the number of their men); the rest yet unknowne."

[On December 18th the English stood into Jask road, and landed their money and goods on the 19th-22nd. On this latter date the Portuguese received reinforcements of men and munitions from Ormuz and after several abortive efforts, battle was again joined on the 28th.]

"*December* 28 (Innocents daie). Perceiving the drift of this (now) Fabius Cunctator, wee omitted no oportunitie to give him battell; and about nine of the clocke, the Lord sending us apprettie easterlie gale, our fleete weighed and put all things in order for Fight. The *London* and *Hart* anchored within a cables length and halfe from them upon their broadsides, and so indured the hotest burden of this second daies fight; for no sooner were they at anchor but that it fell calme and so continued all daie, insomuch that the *Robucke* and *Eagle*, who being somewhat aſterne and ſtearing neerer the shoare with intent to anchor, one upon the bowe of the Portugall admirall, and the other upon the bowe of the vice-admirall, could not, notwithſtanding all diligence used, come to doe anie service in half an houres space; and no sooner were wee within the levell range of our ordinance from them then that (not a breath of wind to bee felt and a current againſt us) wee were conſtrayned to anchor or drive further of.

But our broadsides once brought up, the great ordinance from our whole fleete played so faſt uppon them, that doubtlesse, if the knowledge in our people had beene answerable to their willing minds and readie resolutions, not one of these galliounes, unles their sides were impenetrable, had escaped us. About three of the clocke in the afternoone, unwilling after so hotte a dinner to receive the like supper, they cutte their cables and drove with the tide (then setting weſterly) untill they were without reach of our gunnes; and then their frigatts came to them and towed them awaie wonderfullie mangled and torne; for their admirall in the greatteſt furie of the fight was inforced to heeld his shippe to ſtoppe his leakes, his maintopmaſt overbord and the head of his mainemaſt. The greatter Flemming [*S. Lourenco*] both his topmaſts and part of his bowspritt shotte awaie. The lesser Flemming [*Nª Sʳª de Conceição*] never a shrowde ſtanding, never a topmaſt. The Vice-admirall [*São Martinho*] (who both daies did us moſt hurt) escaped beſt, for moſt commonly this daie he had one or other of their shipps betwixt him and us. Wee kept them companie all night, in hope the next morning to have given all or some of them their pasports. But surveying our shotte and finding small ſtore left (notwithſtanding that by some happie miſtake the *Eagle* had a double proportion, out of which the other shipps were in part supplied), and withall having to consideration the voyage wee have to performe, wee resolved our returne to Jasques for the speedie dispatch of our worthie imployers busines there, and desisted their further chase, leaving them doubtlesse glad men, the two greater shipps towing at their sternes the two smaller. The number of their dead and wounded men in this conflict I cannot report, as not having during our staie at Jasques certainely heard so much as their arrivall at Ormus or elsewhere. One [*sic*] our part were slaine and wounded these ensuing: In the *London* Henrie Crane, John Gore, slaine; our Admirall wounded, Peter Robinson wounded, and both afterwards died; William Hall and John Muskett both hurt, yet perfectly recovered. In the *Hart* Walter Davie slaine; Edmund Oakley, but though lame recovered. Great shotte of severall sorts spent in both fights; *London*, 1382; *Hart*, 1024; *Robucke*, 815; *Eagle* 800; the totall, 4021."

[Swan was master of the *Roebuck* and all dates in his journal are, of course, old style.]

APPENDIX X

Monnox's MS. " History at large of the taking of Ormuz Castle."

India Office: *Original Correspondence*, vol. 8, No. 1032.

First Consultation.

At a consultation in Swally Road, the fourteenth of November, 1621. commission was given by Master Thomas Rastell President, and the Counsell of the Merchants of Surat, to Richard Blithe, and John Weddell bound for Jasques (a Persian Port) with five good ships and foure Pinnaces (whereof the *London*, and Pinnace *Shilling* under Captaine Blithe; the *Jonas*, *Whale*, *Dolphin*, *Lion*, with their Pinnaces the *Rose*, *Robert*, and *Richard*, under command of Captaine Weddell) to set sayle with the soonest opportunitie towards Port Jasques, and to keepe together in such sort as they should thinke fittest for their defence against the common enemie; and seeing the Portugals had disturbed their trade by the ſlaughter, mayming and impriſoning of their men, and had made ſundry aſſaults againſt their ſhipping, that therefore it ſhould be lawfull to them to chaſe and ſurprize whatſoever veſſels pertayning to the Ports and Subjects under the Vice-roy of Goa, thereof to be accountable, &c. And if they met with any of Decannee, Dabul, Chaul, or any Port belonging to the Samorin of Calecut, to arreſt them upon account of juſt pretences for goods robbed and ſpoiled &c. without imbezeling any part thereof, that full reſtitution may be made after ſatisfaction on their parts rendred: A ſixt part of goods gotten from the Portugall to be diſtributed, and their perſons to bee reſerved priſoners, that in exchange our Countrimen by them miſerably captived[1] may be delivered: to haſte their lading and diſpatch at Jaſques, if poſſible within thirty dayes: and ſeeing the reinforced Enemie Ruy Frera with his Armada of ſixe Galliones and other ſmall Veſſels are attending on the Perſian coaſt, in likelihood to aſſault their Fleet, that therefore it ſhould be lawfull not defenſively alone, but offenſively to await all advantages, even in their owne Ports if there be apparance of performance approved by generall counſell warrantably to be undertaken, &c.

Roy Frera the Portugall Admirall.

Second conſultation.

In Coſtack [Kuhiſtak] Road, the ſixe and twentieth of December, 1621. A conſultation was holden aboord the Jonas, whereat were preſent John Weddell, Richard Blithe, Edward Monoxe, William Baffin, and many others. The Can or Duke of Xiras had by his Miniſters deſired the aide of their Ships againſt the common Enemie the Portugall. The Articles being tranſlated into the Perſian Tongue were diſpeeded by Xareeali Governour of the Province of Moguſtan towards the ſaid Duke who was then upon the way towards Mina[b]; the ſumme whereof followeth.

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[1] This refers to the crew of the *Unicorn* wrecked off the coaſt of China in June 1620, moſt of whom had been captured by the Portugueſe of Macau.

Causes moving the English in those parts and Ports to assist the Persian: first a secret force from the Persian detayning the English goods on shore and not allowing carriages as before; which also would have broken out to an open imbarging with danger likely to their persons, goods and libertie. Secondly the open often force and hostilitie (whereof the former Voyages testifie) from the Portugall.

For so much as by severall conferences had with divers and sundry of the Chan or Duke of Xiras his Miniſters and chiefe Commanders in the present warres, we have well observed they are fully determined and resolved to require the aide of our ships and people in this intended Expedition for the vanquishing not onely the Portugall Armada, but likewise for the taking and surprizing of the Iland and Caſtle of Ormuz: and we are very confident they will use their indeavours to inforce us unto the said service by imbarging our goods upon the shoare: which we have well underſtood by the Governours refusall to furnish us with Camels to bring our goods from Mina[b] to the Port; Edward Monox late Agent, propounded whether they might undertake that service or no. The proposition being well debated, and the Factors commission from Surat warranting to right themselves of the great losses and hinderances suſtained by the Portugall, interrupting their peaceable Trade both in India and Persia, (the laſt yeers attempt of Roy Frera againſt Captaine Shillings Fleet at Jasques, to the losse of that worthie Commander, and other his Majeſties Subjects being yet fresh) and for so much as the Persian now seeketh our aide (and in manner forceth it) it is good to thinke on such conditions as may be for the public benefit, and not to omit this opportunitie of a peaceable and profitable trade, the same to be sent unto the Chan in these Articles.

They made a virtue of necessitie.

Articles.

Firſt, in case God shall be pleased to deliver the Iland and Caſtle of Ormuz into the hands of the Persian by our aide, the moitie of the spoile and purchase of both to remaine to the English, the other moitie to the Persian. Secondly, the Caſtle of Ormuz to be delivered to the possession of the English, with all the Ordnance, Armes and Munition thereto belonging, and the Persian to build another for themselves at their owne charges. Thirdly, The Cuſtoms to bee equally divided, the English to bee for ever Cuſtome-free. Fourthly, That all

Persian victorie in Arabia.

Chriſtian Captives should be at the English disposing, the Musselmans at the Persian. Fiftly, The Persians to bee at halfe the ships charge for victuall, wages, weare and teare, and to furnish them at his charge with sufficient Powder and Shot. Divers other Articles were concluded to be presented to the Chan; After his coming to Mina, Maſter Bell, and Maſter Monox, the eight of Januarie were sent to him and entertained with a sumptuous banket: a great feaſt and triumph was also made for the joyfull newes of the Kings taking in of a great Countrie in Arabia, and of Aweiza[1] the chiefe Citie of that Countrie.

Note

The next day the Duke sent his Visier accompanied with Sabandar Sultan and Xareearee with answer to the former Articles: The firſt was approved: For the second, the Caſtle should be equally possessed by both till the Kings pleasure were knowne. The third granted, provided onely, that the Kings and Dukes goods from India should also passe cuſtom-free. To the fourth, they made reservation of the two principall Captaines Ruy Frera Captaine of Kishme Caſtle, and Simon de Mela Captaine of the Caſtle of Ormuz, till the Kings pleasure knowne. Other Articles agreed on, and ordered also that no change of Religion should be admitted on either side; and charges of Powder and Shot to be divided: The Duke and Maſter Bell signed, and presently the English goods were laden on the Dukes owne Camels on fire coſt, which before no money could procure.

Opposition.

On the tenth we turned to Coſtack. We got aboord and acquainted the Comanders with the successe of our Journey, which being divulged and made known amongſt the severall ships Companies, it seemes they consulted together with one voice to refuse the businesse: the *London's* companie beginning, fifty or sixty appearing therein, Captaine Blithe taking much paines to suppresse their disorder, and in the end prevayling with them, they promising to goe whither he would. The other ships in a day or two were in like opposition, alleaging it was no merchandizing businesse, nor were they hired for any such exploit, nor could hee tell whether it might not be a breach of the peace (said a favourer of that Religion) till proteſts being made againſt each ships companie, what with feare to lose their wages, and promise of a moneths pay, they at laſt yeelded.

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[1] Possibly Ahwaz on the Karun River, one time capital of the Province of Khuziſtan (although this is not in Arabia proper).

Kishme Castle yeelded.

Gombrone.

The nineteenth of Januarie we set sayle toward Ormuz, where we arrived the two and twentieth, and that night anchored in sight of the Towne, about two leagues from the Caſtle, in expectation that the Enemies Armada, conſiſting of five Galeons and some fifteene or twenty Frigats, would have come forth to fight with us. But they hailed so neere the Caſtle that wee could not come at them. Which we perceiving, and underſtanding that our vowed Enemie Ruy Frera was in his new erected Caſtle of Kishme, the next day wee addressed our selves towards the said Caſtle, where we arrived in fit time to save both the lives and reputations of the Portugals, not able long to hold out againſt the Persian seige, and willing rather to yeeld to us. The firſt of February they yeelded both their persons and Caſtle after many meetings and treaties into our possession. The fourth, we set sayle towards Gombrone, where we were royally feaſted by the Duke, who was discontent that Ruy Frera was not delivered to him, nor some of the Moores, contrarie to my liking, especially for the Moores; the Duke dissembling his discontents, in regard of further need of our helpe at Ormuz, and after his feaſt veſting all the English present according to their qualitie.

Ormuz besieged.

The ninth of Februarie, we set sayle towards Ormuz with about two hundred Persian Boats great and small with two Frigats in our companie, and in them five and twenty hundred or three thousand Persian Souldiers of all sorts, and anchored that night about two leagues

The Citie forsaken.

from the Castle. The next day before noone the Persians were all landed, and marched in a confused manner towards the Citie, which they entred as farre as the Mydan or Market place without meeting resistance. Which Market place they found barricadoed against them, and defended with Shot and Pike of the Portugals. But the Persians soone made way, and the Portugals like so many sheepe tooke their heels into their Castle. One Persian onely which first entred was slaine with a Pike, and he which slue him lost his head in the Market place, his heels being too heavy to carrie it away. Some eight or ten more, found scattered in severall houses of the Citie, were in the same places executed.

Strength of Ormuz.

The Persian Generall named Einam culibeg [Imām Kūlī Beg] at his first entrance into the Citie placed his Captaines and Souldiers in severall places of the Citie, and proclaimed upon paine of death every man to looke to his quarter, and none to fall on pillaging. Which some infringing were severely executed; he hanged some, cut off eares and noses of others, and others he bastinadoed even for trifles. Yet within two or three dayes after shops and houses were broken open, and every man wearied with carrying and recarrying spoiles all day, and sleeping so securely at night, that easily the Portugals in a sallie might have slaine many. The same night we entred, I tooke possession of a very commodious house to settle a factorie there, which for convenience of roomes I think exceeds any Factorie the Companie hath. But on the thirteenth it proved too hot for me, being set on fire in the night by one of the Masters mates of the *Whale* with other his Consorts after I was in bed, carelesly with Candles romaging for pillage, and firing a roome in which were goods given me by the Generall. But the winde favoured us, so that the house was not consumed. When I consider the strength of the Citie, and almost of every house, being a little Castle, I cannot but marvell that the Portugall would so

1621 February. soone abandon the same. But it seemes they feared the Persian would have intercepted their way to the Castle, or that the Moores their neighbours would have betrayed them.

The 19 ditto Mr. Smythe and his mate Bur[c]h[e]s of the *Jonas*, Mr. Porie purser of the *Dolphin* and Richard Brewton masters mate of the *Whale* came viett [(*sic*) with ?] armes into my chamber in the Companys house (by Captain Weddell his order as they afyrmde) to take inventorie of what was there and to seale the same upp, which I would not resist least some falce reporte might be raysed of me to my hindrance or disgrace before the Honourable Company, and for that it may appeare before them and the world whither there was any great cause I should be soe injuriouslie dealt withall to have soe foule and open a disgrace putt upon me, I have hereunder inserted the partyculars of what they there found, which was all I had scraped together in 9 or 10 dayes space I have bin on shoare in Ormus, the most wherof was given me by the Persian Genneral together with divers things of better value dispersed in severall romes in the house I tooke possession off, wherof some was fyred and burnt as is formerlie touched and related; the rest was stolne and conveyed away by divers of the unrulie shipps company breakinge and spoyleinge every doare, cubbert and chest, or whatsoever els they found locked, even to my owne lodginge chamber doare, and did from severall romes carie away to the value of 100 *li.* sterlinge or more in things I had seene besides what I had not seene in chambers that remayned locked and sealed, which was not done by one or two, for I thinke there was scarse one English man on shoare that carryed not away little or much oute of the house; but the breaker open of my chamber doare was Mr Husse one of the masters mates of the *Jonas*, yonge Woodcock, the masters sonn of the *Whale*, with two more with them whose names I know not, which fower I found pillaging in my chamber.

Particulars taken of the things in the house.

The inventorie verbatim as the pursers themselves did take the same is viz. wherin is inserted divers things I brought from aboard the shipp with me:

imprimis one Taffata quilt and bed upon a cott
one Taffata bed and vellet pyllow
one ? Sapeta in it pans etc. of brasse
one old sadle and a chiest with old things
two pyllowes and one guilded scritora [*Port*;—escritorio=writing desk] with nothing in it
one other scritora with nothing in it
one chest of old things of smale value

Found in a great chiest viz.

one blue silke chamblett [camlet] coate
one white chach [*shash*=turban] with gold ends
two old white shashes
one bagg sealed up with silver and gold in it, the qts. [contents] not knowne
one greene chamlett coate
one white silk coate and one cuberd clo[th] [ ] wrought with silke
one blue cuberd cloth border silke
one white cuberd cloth border silke
one sadle plated sylver and guilt
one sylver parrett
two silck quyltts
one red vellett coate
one smale vellett p[y]llow
one white shash
one red cuttany co[ate]
one standish of m[torn]
fower taffeta bannars
one coate of white silck
two carpetts, one brass lamp and bason
one paire guilded stirrops
three guilded trays (china)
one guilded scritore and one sylver spoone
another scritora qt. [containing] viz.
six [torn] sylver, two smale spoones, 12 smale pearle and 3 stones and 1 rub [torn], one [ ] covered with silver and one bagg qt. books

one silver cupp and certeine gold lace wrap
[ ] remnant of taffeta

[Remainder of liſt is illegible.]

Port. Admirall burned.

The foure and twentieth of February our men by a ſtratagem of fire burned the *Saint Pedro*, quondam Admirall of Ruy Freras Fleet, which indangered all the reſt, but the Tide carried her off to Sea; and her Reliques by the Arabs and other Countrie Boats were towed on shoare at Gombrone, and some Iron Ordnance and Shot taken out of her burnt Carkasse.[1] At this exploit the Duke much rejoyced.

from 24 Feb. to 17 March nothing considerable.

From the 24th February untill this present day beinge the 17th of Marche my daylie and almoſt howerly imployment hath bin such that I have not the tyme to note downe any thi[ng] in this my Journall, neyther in truth hath there occurred any thinge worth the writeinge, but now my other imployments in the Companys service beinge taken from me, I shalbe at the more leysure to comitt what passeth to writeinge, but not to lett passe the nomynation of those who have sett me at this lybertie (though I know not by what Comission they doe it), the parties are Captain Blyth and Captain Weddell, with whom discoursinge this night after supper of the disposeinge of such goodes as we had gotten together in this cittie, I tould them I thought it beſt to gett the same over to Gombroone where was Armenyan merchants would buy it all, which motion was by them mislik[ed], but after many speeches pro and con to tedious nere to recite, Captain Blyth told me

A quarrell about parting of the plunder.

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[1] "Soe certaine of them agreed and got things ready that night with their fireworks in each Barge, they went and boorded Ruy Frera his ship, and set her on fire which in lesse than a quarter of an houre was all in a light flame. But in the firing of her in our Barge unfortunately having a quantitie of Powder in one of the Lockers one of the fireworkes being flung againſt the ship ſtrucke againſt some Iron, and rebounded back againe and ſtrucke into his body that flung it, and tore out his ſtomacke that he died withall, set the powder in the Locker on fire, and blew one man cleane away, burning sixe others very shrewdly." [Purchas, vol. x., p. 340.]

I had nothinge to doe with the busynes as it conserned me not, to which I replyed, I know not to the contrary but I had more to doe with it then he, for I was the Companys factor, soe was not he; to which he gave me the lye, for I was dismissed my place and had not nor should not have further to doe with any busynes of theirs, and withall threatned to have me carryed aborde and used me verie coanslie and vildly, revilinge and miscallinge me at his pleasure, which with patience I must for a tyme be contented to beare; but a man that hath to deale with such people had need of more then an ordinarie messure of patience and my praier shalbe that God will encrease that smale meassure I am indued with for such tyme as necessity constreineth me to live amongest these kind of Sea-G.

The seventeenth of March the Persians having placed above forty barels of Powder in a Mine which they had made under one of the Flankers of the Castle, [Santiago Bastion] fired the same, and blew up the corner of the wall making a faire breach, where they gave a fierce assault till nine at night. But the Portugals made a manfull defence, and with Powder pots, scalding Lead, and other fiery instruments did much hurt to the assailants, burning, scalding, stoning many. Sha Culibeg notwithstanding, with two hundred of his most resolute men got up into one of the Flankers, which they maintayned at least three houres, but in the end were fired out, the Portugals bestowing Powder pots as liberally as if they had come from Hell mouth. The same day the Citie was set on fire in divers places, as it was reported, by the Generals command, for that the Arabs lurked therein, and could not be gotten forth to doe any service. Wee lay here foure or five thousand men in a barren Iland which yeelds nothing but Salt of it selfe, and I knowe not what policy the Generall had to send away all the Rice, and our provision for victuall and water wholly to depend on the Continent, so that if a Fleet of Frigats had come,

Breach and assault.

Barrennesse of Ormuz.

Water.

as was expected, they must have famished in the Iland; the Countrie Boats not daring to adventure to and from the Maine. The raine water in Cisternes abroad daily wasted and waxed brakish, no care being taken to fill therewith the Jarres and Cisternes whiles it is good, provided almost in every house for that purpose.

1621 Marche Persians observe noe order being unskillfull

This people are very ignorant of the right practice and proceedinge in warr, for they observe noe order nor good decorum therin, which had they don, they would not soe easlie have bin beaten oute of the Castle againe, for as the old proverb is, they entred without feare or witt, for when the Portugale came to the push of the pike with them, they had never a pike to answer them and soe with shame were constreined to give back and lost that with dishonour which they might have mainteyned with creditt.

Other defects in the Persians their warrs

want of powder, &ct.

Should the English forsake them they would be worsted

Other defects I see and observe amongest them, which are the verie sinewes of warres, and such that I cannot but wonder that one of the wonders of our age, Sha Abas, should send out an army soe weaklie provided of money, armes, munition, shipps and all necessarie furniture and instruments of warr. For the first I think the chief of the Dukes treasure was consumed in one moneths pay unto our shipps and I feare we shalbe forced to stey for the rest till he make money of some of the spoile he hath gotten. And for armes and munition they have no other then smale peeces, bowes and arrowes, their swords by their sides, and some of the chief of them have coates of male. Their provision of powder was such that when they had blowne upp the Castle, they had scarse powder to plye their smale shott to enter the breach, and yet they were furnished with 20 or 25 bar[rels] from our shipps. They had not so much as one scalinge lader to asist their entrance, but warr succeeds not where such loose counsells and previsions goe before. Should we now forsake them they would soone be at a stande; yett asociates in warr doe looke for performance of conditions, which they have broken with us in severall things; wherfore it were but juſt in us to leave them to their selves; but English men are ever to honeſt for such actions. Yett I feare, when all is don, we shall but serve their torne and when they have effected their desiers, we shalbe served with reverssions and what them selves please; but good reversions doe sometymes content patient men; yett breaches of promises and nonperformance of conditions should be spoken of in tyme, which I feare is omitted.

Portugals ships sunke.

Till the three and twentieth, our Ordnance from the shore so galled the Vice-admirall [*São Martinho*] and Reere-admirall [*Santo Antonio*] of Ruy Freras Fleet, that they and the Galley are all three sunke close under the Caſtle wall; and the laſt night the Admirall that came laſt from Goa, [*Todos os Santos*] yeelded her broad side to the mercy of the water, having learned the same of her Consort [*N^a S^{ra} de Victoria*] who the night before shewed her the way, and so all the Portugall Armado are come to ruine: These laſt two ships I thinke were voluntarily loſt by the Captaines policy, to leave the Portugals without meanes to escape the more manfully to fight it out. Some thinke they sunke by hurts received from sunken Rockes in haling them so neere to the Caſtle to be out of danger from our Ordnance; and others, by leakes from our Shot:[1] how ever we saw the deſtruction of them that were designed inſtruments for ours; for which great mercy of the moſt High towards us moſt sinfull men, his holy Name be ever praised and magnified.

March 27

The English imprudence in deserting and weakening the Caſtle of Kissone.

I have formerly noted some particulers of the Persians impudent proceeding in the course of this warre. I may as well touche some thinge of our owne. I thinke there is no man soe weake of underſtandinge to thinke that the Vice Roy and other Portugall magiſtrates of Goa will suffer soe famous a thinge as is their Caſtle of Ormus to be loſt for want of succors, and wherein conſiſted that succor but in sendinge a sufficient Armado to beate our Englishe shipps oute of their seas, which is not impossible to be don, but might be made mor diffycult a great deale were the course taken that might be taken to fortifie the Caſtle of Kissone with suche platformes and ordnance as are requisitt, which would be a good defence and succour for our shipps in case of extremity, but inſteed of makeinge that Caſtle mor fitt for defence both of it selfe and our shippinge then it was while the Portugall possessed it, it is made now more unfitt, for the beſt ordnance is brought from thence hether whear they doe no good at all; also the smale ſtore of powder and shott was gotten there is likewise brought away and the Caſtle left poore and naked of ordonance or other munitions. We lull our selves asleepe in securitie and cry Peace, Peace, before the warre is trulie begun. I feare before the Caſtle of Ormus be posseſt eyther by Persian or English, we shall singe a new songe, or els I will say we have bin more fortunat in the success then prudent in our proceedings; but if it prove otherwise, the dishoner wilbe more to our selves and nation then some of us doe dreame off. I would that those whom it conserneth more neerly then it dooth me would leave lookeinge after a little paultrie pillage in Ormus and looke to this busynes of greater consequence. I could touche divers other things I see are omitted, but I hope for better matter to fill my paper withall. Even as I had finished the above written, newes was brought me that some of the Portugals were come out of the Caſtle to treat of Peace, whereupon I made my repaire unto the Generals Tent to underſtand the truth of the business where I found our two Commanders sitting, by whose countenance I well perceived that my coming was not very welcome unto them. But to requite them before our departure, both they and I perceived that neither of our being there was acceptable to the Persian. Yet there we sate almoſt an houre in expectation of the Portugals comming, which was purposely de-

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[1] Compare Appendix IV, pp. 225-6, and note 1.

Great ordinance brought from thence

and plunder more minded then safetye &ct.

Portugall Treatie.

Persian doubting.

ferred in hope we would have avoyded, but Night approaching, and the Persian perceiving we purposed to ſtay the Messengers comming, at length he was brought in. Who entring rudely without any great complement, delivered as extravagant a Speech or Message, yet with a kind of forced voyce as though he had been the prologue to some Play. The effect of his Speech was this: His Captaine had sent him to kisse the hands of the Generall, and to know how he did, (this was his Complement) and for what cause hee moved this Warre againſt him, for the Portugals were the Persians friends, and so had beene for many yeers, and now for so small a matter, onely for a Well or two of Water that so great Warre should bee made, and the antient League and friendship which had beene betwixt their King and the King of Persia, and the people of both Nations should bee extinguished. Besides, his Captaine nor the Inhabitants of Ormus, was not to bee blamed for what Ruy Frera had acted at Kishme, yet were they willing so farre as might ſtand with the honour of their King to purchase their Peace: which they need not doe either through feare or want, for they had within their Caſtle one thousand able men, and provisions both of Victuals and Water to serve them for many moneths. Besides, they expected daily new succours from Goa. And if the Persian did thinke to get the Caſtle by force, hee would find it a hard matter to accomplish: for they were resolved to Fight it out to the laſt man.

Cause of the Warre, Portugals intrusion on the Persian, by Ruy Frera at Kishme, &c.

The latter part of which speech being onely Portugall bravadoes, was not pleasing to the Persian. Wherefore the Generall willed him to declare the cause of his comming, to which hee answered, his Captaines desire was to know what the Persian would have. To which the Persian replied he would have their Caſtle, and that was it he came for. With which speech the Messenger was dismissed (without so much as being offered a cup of wine, had not I caused one to bee given him) but notwithſtanding what is here related, I cannot be perswaded but he came with a more subſtantial message then he delivered, which he omitted by reason of our being there, wherunto he was formerly inſtructed by Sha Cullibeg, in whose house hee was at leaſt an houre before he was brought to the Generall. Wherefore I feare some siniſter dealing of the Persian, which in five dayes will bee discovered: the Portugall dismissed. Our Captaines by their Interpreters moved privately their private businesse to the Generall, to which he gave no great eare, but in conclusion his answer was, they would deferre that businesse till some other time: yet himselfe had written to them in great haſte, that day to furnish him from the ships with a quantitie of powder, that night to attempt the blowing up of the Caſtle: for their mines were all readie, and they wanted nothing but powder. Which requeſt of his, our Captaines were so forward to consent unto, that presently they brought on shoare foure and thirtie barrells of powder, for which their forwardness I feare the companie at home will give them but little thankes.

Another treatie.

The eight and twentieth ditto. I went in companie of the Commanders to the Generals Tent for that wee underſtood two chiefe men of the Portugals were in Sha Cullibeg his house, where they had been in conference with the Persian foure or five houres; unto which treatie none of us were called, nor by any meanes made acquainted with it, which increased our suspition of the Persians fraudulent dealing with us. Wherefore comming unto the Generall, wee made knowne our dislike of the manner of proceeding, for wee were partakers in this warre with you, wherein wee had hazarded our lives, ships, and Merchants goods: besides the hinderance wee sustained by the losse of our Monson: and as wee were partakers and associates with them in the undertaken enterprise, wee ought likewise to be of Counsell with them in all treaties and proceedings, and therefore desired to know what they had done, or what they

Note: the English enforced by present occasions to engage themselves in this warre.

entented to doe, to which he answered they had done nothing, neither would he so much as drinke a cup of water without acquainting us therewith; which was a prettie complement where all his actions shewed nothing lesse. But we muſt bee content to undergoe all with patience, yet were it not for our Merchants and their goods that are in the countrie, and subject to whatsoever they will impose upon them, wee could remedie this businesse well enough, and bring the Persian nolens volens unto another reckoning: but we are tied from that, and therefore muſt of necessitie be subject to accept the measure they please to lay upon us, which I feare will prove unmeasurable ill: yet they tell us all things shall be to our owne content, but howsoever, it is vied and muſt now be seene. About noone this present day, seeing many pike and shot, all Arabs in the ſtreet, which formerly I have not seene so armed, desiring to know the cause, at length I perceived they were ranged on both sides the ſtreet, called the Mydan or Market place, where shortly after passed two Cavaliers of the Portugals, attended with their Pages and Servants, to the number of sixe or eight, whereof one carried a faire Quintasol over the two Cavaliers, who were accompanied by the Sha Cullabeg and other chiefe men of the Persians, and conducted to the house of Agariza of Dabul: whither though unsent for, or uninvited, I also addressed my selfe, where unexpected, I found the Persian Generall accompanied with other chiefe men, his Assiſtants and Counsell, into whose presence I entruded my selfe. The Generall gave mee a kind welcome, and caused me to sit downe next unto him, which I would not refuse, for that the Portugall should see our Nation was in grace and favour with them, where being set, having done my dutie to the Persians firſt, I after saluted the Cavaliers which was requited with like complement; with whom I had some discourse of matters nothing pertaining to the present occasion, for that I would not presume to talke of that, till the Persian himselfe did firſt miniſter the occasion: which was not before wee had eaten Third treatie. a Persian collation of Pilaw, &c. Which being done, the Generall demanded the Portugals what was their requeſt or desire, to which they answered, the Captaine of the Caſtle had given them inſtructions in writing but his desire was they should propound the same unto the Duke himselfe, if they might bee permitted to goe unto him, who is now at Gombrone.[1] To which the Generall replied, it was more then he durſt doe without firſt acquainting the Duke therewith, by which I well perceived they were onely delayes and diſtractions on both sides, and to gaine time for effecting their severall designes. Then the Portugals proceeded to their usuall complayning againſt Ruy Frera as a private man and without order from the King his maſter had presumed to doe that which he had done, and to excuse themselves, demanded what reason or juſtice it was to punish the Father for the Childrens offence: besides the matter in it selfe was small, onely for a Well of water or two, to which the Persian Generall replied againe, let the cause be what it would, they had moved warre againſt the King of Persia and his Subjects, for which their Caſtle of Ormus muſt make satisfaction: wherefore if without more bloudshed they would surrender their Caſtle and come forth into the Citie, they should finde good quarter and bee well used; to which the Portugals made answere, they had no Commission from their Captaine to treat of any such matter, with which they were dismissed. Notwithſtanding the deniall was made to the Portugals requeſt for going to the Chan, yet the same night they had License and were sent unto him to treat their businesse with his Excellencie. The certaintie of the Treatie I had no means to know, yet what I heard reported shall be here inserted. First, their demand was that the Duke would vouchsafe to withdraw his Siege from their Castle and suffer them to enjoy the same as in former times, in consideration whereof they would give him two hundred thousand Tomans in hand, and also the rent annually they had in former times given to the King of Ormus out of the revenue of the Custome house; which as hath beene reported unto mee is but one hundred and fortie thousand Rials of eight per annum, but some report, they offer the Chan besides the two hundred thousand Tomans in hand, as much yeerely; and his demand was five hundred thousand Tomans in hand (which amounteth to 172413. pounds ten shillings seven pence sterling, or thereabouts) the yeerely rent of two hundred thousand Tomans.[1]

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[1] This passage is one of several affording clear proof that Imām Kūlī Khan was *not* the Khān of Shiraz, as he is always termed by English writers.

New breach. The second of Aprill, the Persian with the ayde of the English did blow up two other Mines, with which was made a very faire and passable breach, wherein they might have entred without any great difficultie: but there was no assault given thereunto at all. The passage of this businesse being well observed, Captaine Weddell and my selfe made our repaire to the Persian Generall, to understand his purpose and resolution; who to excuse the backwardnesse of his people in not assaulting the Breach, told us it was very difficult and not to bee entred; of which we were contented to give him the hearing, howbeit we were offered the contrarie, for that an English youth who is servant to the Master of the *Jonas*, more bold then any Persian, went up the breach to the very top of the Castle wall: who told us the way was as easie as to goe up a pair of stayres, and spacious enough for many men to goe up a brest.[2] Wherefore wee demanded to know his resolution for further proceeding: who told us within three dayes he would be fitted for another Mine, and I beleeve

Bold Boy.

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[1] The Toman is the Persian tūmān, a coin which had a contemporary value of £3 6s. 8d. in English money.

[2] Presumably this exploit was carried out at night.

it well; for his mining is for Gold, not to make breaches unlesse it bee breach of promises unto us, which he can doe daily; for of late they performe with us in just nothing, yet all this cannot warne us to be circumspect to looke unto our selves.

April 2, 1622

For the better confirmation of part of the above mencioned this evening our Cap[tain] received a letter from the Duke which was verie large, but want of a sufficient interpreter hindreth me from insertinge the same verbatim; yett the chiefe pointes was, *viz*: first, he signified how that two Portugalls sent as messengers from the Captain of the Castle of Ormus had bin with him and had offred him money (but how much he writes not) and desierd conditions of peace from him and that they may injoye their Castle and freedom of trade as in former tymes, to which the Chan made answer it was not in his power to make any conditions of peace with them withoute consente of the English who were confuderats with them in the warre; to which the Portugales replied they knew the English would be willinge to make peace with them, to which purpose they had written them letters and sent them into their Castle, but that was eyther the Chans suggestion or els a flatt lye of the Portugales, for there was never any such thinge intended on our parts, but the Persian is well acquainted with Portugale lies, for he hath had them of all Cullours, and soe comon that now the Persians is as expert in that facultie as them selves; but as the Chan writes in his letter he did not beleeve any thinge they said; wherfore he desired the aide of our shipps and people the best we could to prevent bothe their escape and also that no boates nor fregates come to them to bringe them any succours, for he resolved to maintaine his word and promise towards us and lett them and their money perrish, for he knew them to be a perfidious nation. This was the effect of the Chans letter, which I perswaded our Comannders to answer first to cleare them selves of the falce imputation of

The Duke promiseth to performe his articles with the English.

offringe eyther Treatie off Peace or any thinge tendinge to peace with the Portugall eyther by letter or otherwise; neyther would they accept of any conditions whatsoever, but were resolved to prosecute the warre both against Portugalls and their Castle to the utmost of their power, and likewise to desier the Duke to hold his resolution and promise with us, for we knew the necessity of the Portugale to be such within the Castle that he could not longe hold oute, and that his Excelencie should be well assured that what was conditioned on our parts should faythfullie be observed.

The greatest hurt the Portugall did unto the Persian in assaulting the Castle was with Powder pots, wherewith many were scalded and burnt: for prevention whereof the Chan hath now sent over store of Coates and Jackets made of Leather, which indeed are nothing so subject to take fire as are their Callico Coats bumbasted with Cotton wooll. But as the English proverbe is, The burnt Child dreads the fire, for notwithstanding their Leather coates, there was none so hardie to attempt the breach that is now made (albeit much more easier to enter then the last was) further then to pillage certaine balls of Bastas and other stuffes which were fallen downe from the Baricado, the Portugals made for their defence against the Persians shot: in this adventure one lost both his armes taken away with a great shot, by which meanes hee was faine to come backe againe without any Bastas or other Pillage.

Pitifull pillage.

Aprill

The 5 ditto the Gennerall sent for me to his tent, where when I came he shewed me a letter directed unto Simon de Melles Captain of the Castle of Ormus superscribed by Francisco Pimental and Paulo Dasnaos, which two were sent to treat with the Chan as before is mencioned and by him detayned and kept prisoners and not suffred eyther to retorne nor yett to write the success of their busynes other then as followeth (which was the effect of their letter).

Letter from Portugalls messengers intercepted

Sir,

Till this present Thursday we have not had meanes to write unto you and now haveinge obtained that libertie, you shall please to understand we are well used by the Chan and want neyther victualls nor housroome in greater plenty then when we were with you; yett we desier the onyons of Egipt (which was, as I interprett the same, notwithstandinge the Chans good cheare, they wish them selves in the Castle againe), in requitall whereof they recomended likewise to his kinde usage those which weare in the Castle with him for pledges in their roome (which are two of base condition put into good clothes, but for the men the Persian dooth not care what becomes of them). They write further how the Chans secretaries tould them so much of the Castle wall was fallen with [*sic*] the last mines were blowen upp that they must needs surrender the Castle into their hands, and withall shewed them the Chans Firmane wherin he had given them lycense to depart with their lives whither they would. Then, as it seemes, beinge doubtfull to obteine his libertie Pimental, writes to a friend of his that he found opportunitie to send away a chiest and a scritore of his wifes which he left in the house of the Quedor [Vedor]. Then he concludes desieringe to be remembred to the Fathers and that they would remember them unto God; and this was the effect of the letter which was presentlie sent into the Castle; but albeit the Gennerall sent for me to read the same; yett he had the transcript therof in Persian sent him from Gombroone with the letter, by which I well observe their warynes in their dealinge, for before he would suffer the letter to be delivered he would see whither it were agreeable to the copie sent him, which he needed not much to doubt, for that, contrarie to the custom of eyther Portugale or Englishe, the letter was sent open and unsealed and soe cautulouslie indyted that no exceptions could be taken at it, and as I suppose, written rather by direction of the

The Persian and Portugalls wiles to deceave each the other.

Persian then volentarilie from themselves. I cannot tell yett which of them will gett the best, but I am sure two craftie nations are mett together in a parley; but now the Portugall begins to doubt his dealinge and surely will trust him no farther than necessitie compells him. Albeit two fugitive Portugals well vested by the Chan were sent to tell them how honourable the Chan had delt with them, and besides their good vests the Chan had given them 20 Tom [an] in money, in which vests and with instructions from the Gennerall what they should say, they were sent like two stayles[1] to cale more larkes, but the others were soe fare from stoopinge to those baites that they reviled their metamorphised companions and also shott at them, by which meanes they durst not stay to shew their gey coates any longer, but those two fine parrott[s], though changed in feathers, yett had not forgotten in their owne mother tong[e] to revile their owne countriemen, caling them Jewes and other base nam[es], and withall tould them within four dayes the Castle would be taken by force from them and then all their heads should bee cutt off, to which one made answer, it was no matter, yett they should die Christian.

Aprill 22 newes of powder.

In the midle of this raylinge discourse newes was brought to the Gennerall of 10,500 manes [of] powder then arived from Bahrine, with which bothe he and I were better pleased then to heare the Renegados and their cuntrie men to rayle one upon th' other, for now wee shall shortlie see the Persian resolution, for if his parley have bin otherwise then onely to gaine tyme for the cominge of this pouder, then are wee likely to have but an ill matche of it, for notwithstandinge all his letters and promises he will deceive us in the shutting upp of the busynes. But I would accompt him a wise man could tell us how to prevent it if they wilbe soe perfidiouslie mynded towards us. And therefore, as I have said before, it is vied [=hazarded] and muſt now be seene. And I hope the sett will not laſt longe but in few dayes we shall see whither we shall be winners or loosers by the hand.

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[1] Old spelling of stalls, decoy-birds. [Note by Miss Anstey.]

7th An hole inſtead of a mine sprung but

The 7th ditto the Persian Gennerall was verie desirous to have a nother mine sprunge which indeed might more properlie be caled a hole then a mine, which they had digged or scraped in the loose ſtones and rubbishe which fell from the Caſtle wall by [? when] the former mines were blowen upp, wherunto the English weare verie unwillinge for two reſpects: firſt, for that juſt over the place ley cotton sackes burninge, wherby they could not withoute great danger carrie in the pouder, and besides it would be to no purpose for ther was no thichnes of earth over head that the pouder could worke any effect to the betteringe of the breach which was it the Persian aymed at. Besides they could worke them selves no further in unlesse they should discover them selves to the enemy; but such was the erneſt desier of the Gennerall to have it effected that our people gave way therunto. But while they weare placing the pouder the defendants opened the wall into the myne in such sorte that our people could deserne many of them within the Caſtle and one of the Portugales thruſt his head into the hole them selves had made into the mine, but the place beinge darke he could not perceave those within, neyther what they weare doinge, which the English seeinge and fearinge they would proceed further, haveinge placed to the quantitie onelie of two barrells of pouder without ſtopeinge the mouth of the hole, sett fier therunto, which although it effected not what the Persian desired, yett in the opinion of many, it could not but doe much hurte to the Portugales within the Caſtle, for that it broke the wale in upon them.

noe good done therein

8 An other letter to the beseged

The 8 ditto came a letter directed unto the Captain of Ormus from the captive Portugales in Gombroone, namely Francisco Pimentel and Paulo Dasnaos, the contents therof was viz:

Yeſterday beinge Sonday we received yours, which comeinge to our hands, we made our repaire to the Chans Courte purposeinge to have aquainted him with the contents therof, but the Chan beinge displeased with us would not admitt us audience. Yett for other kind usage, we want it not, and doe againe intreat the like for the Persians that are pledges for us with you; and as in my former I desier to have my chieſt and scritora sent away by the firſt conveyance unto my wife, and if you please to write us your mynds plainlie that we may know wherto to truſt, we shall take it thankfullie. In the meane tyme we desier the Fathers to recomend us in their praiers to God and soe we reſt.

Aprill 9 The 9 ditto a whole culverin shott from the Caſtle was shott into my lodgeinge chamber wher it did some hurt to my houshold implements, especiallie china ware; but it was Gode's providence I was not in the chamber, which had I bin, I could not have escaped without some mischief, for that ſtones, tymber and shott fell all downe upon and aboute my table wherat I doe usuallie sett to write, insomuch that the lyd of the great chieſt ſtandinge by was rent in two peeces with the same (for which deliverance God make me ever thankefull).

A Portugall escaping out the Caſtle declareth their diſtress

12 The 12 ditto came a Portugale unto the Persian Gennerall whoe escaped oute of the Caſtle and declared the great wantes and weake eſtate the souldiers were in, in generall, insomuch that daylie did dye 6, 7 or 8 of the flux, which is chieflie occasioned through drinkinge their corrupt water for the smale quantitie of water which they have in their siſternes is growne soe brackish and sault that it infects them all with the flux; and besides the badnes of it, they are put to such ſtreite allowance that many dye with thirſt. Besides, for victuall they have onelie rice and sault fish, two very good preparetives to a cup of good drinck if they had it. Notwithſtandinge all which the Persian deferrs, yea I may say, waſteth tyme in makeinge new mines, wherof he hath no lesse than 3 in hand at this

but the Pertian Generall doth nothing.

present, as if he would blow upp all the Castle. wale rounde aboute before he will make his entrie. I cannot tell wherupon he builds this delay, but in my opinion it is dangerous, for should succours come he may change, eyther be put from his siege or els make longer worke to gett the Castle then he is aware off. And I am well assured, would he have given assaulte the second tyme the mines were blowne up, but halfe soe resolutelie as at the first, he had bin in possession of the Castle at least 10 dayes since, but the troth is the Kishelbasses[1] are not to be blamed, for they were as ready and as resolute then as at the first; but the Gennerall would not suffer them to goe on. I cannot conceive the end of this distractinge of tyme unless the Chan be willinge to accept the conditions offred him by the Portugale and onelie attends the Kings approbation therunto, without which I presume he dares doe nothinge, which if he obtaine, it may justlie be feared our parts will fale shortt of our expectations. It may be also he stands in doubt, the riches of the Castle consistinge most in treasure and jewells. A good part therof may be conveyed and imbezaled by his owne souldiers, but that I cannot conjecture how he can prevent by his procrastynation of tyme, but shalbe subject to that as well hereafter as now. But to conclude my opinion of this point. I thinke he workes chieflie upon the necessitie the Portugall is in, and that the expence of a few dayes will bringe him into such weake estate that of necessitie he must be faine to surrender the Castle and then him selfe, I meane the Gennerall, may safelie enter with his select Company and therby possess the spoyle intyrlie to them selves and pay us with a revertion in posse. This day, beinge in discourse with our Comanders, Captain Weddell and Captain Blithe, I understood from them selves how they

100 Barrells pouder lent the Persians.

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[1] *I.e.*, Kizil-bashes,—Persian-speaking Kurds of Turkish origin. They formed the picked troops of the Shah's Army. See p. 142, note 1.

had lent the Persians oute of their shipps upwards of a hundred barrells of pouder. I know not how their shipps are ſtored, but methinks the quantitie is much to be spared, speciallie in this place, but more especiallie at this tyme when they may howerlie expect their enemys to come about their eares. And their courtecie is very slenderlie rewarded by the Persia[n], for they cannot gett the quantitie againe they lent, and yett he is now well ſtored; besides, they are faine to take pouder much worse then their owne.

The twelfth at night one of our Frigots namely the *London's*, being appointed to her quarter for keeping in of the Portugall Frigots, that none of them should make escape riding single and alone by her selfe, the Portugals perceiving it, sent off two of her Frigots which clapped her aboord but found her too hot for their handling, and therefore forsooke her; with what hurt to themselves I know not, but of the *London's* men were slaine two outright, and seven more hurt and wounded. And had not their blackes that rowed the Frigot forsaken them, they would have put hard to have surprised the surprisers.

1622 Aprill 12.
Captains sell the Companys goods

It seemeth ſtrange unto me to see the Comanders and their Pursers forwardnes to sell away the Companys goods so much under value as they doe. Indeed weare they goodes that were unvendable for the cuntrie or that the Company had not Factors of their owne in Persia they might have a fitt excuse for what they doe, but the goodes they sell or have to sell is brought by experyenced merchants and are chosen for this markett and therfore I see not what reason they have to convert them into money, 20, 30, yea, some 40 in the hundredth under what would be made of them would they but attend the cominge downe of the Companys servants to receive them, or els take some course to send them unto them, which might have bin done would they have bin advised by such as are better aquainted both with the comodities and the cuntrie then eyther Comaunders or Pursers who are meerlie cheated by a rogue broker or two for what price the brokers doe sett upon any comodity, that they sell it for, and those brokers are bribed by the buyers to sett what price them selves list, soe that by the ignorance of th' one and knavery of th' other the Honourable Company are flatlie and plainlie cozened.

Moores at laſt delivered according to covenant.

Persian perfidie.

The fourteenth Ditto, the Persian sprung another of his Mines wherewith a very enterable breach was made but no assault given, nor yet shew of entrie made: but the troth is, hee was forced to blow up the Mine before his time. For the Portugal from within the Caſtle was come so neere unto him, that hee was in doubt he would have defeated the same before he could place his powder. The fifteene Ditto, came another fugitive from the Caſtle who confirmed the report of the others who came from thence in like manner before, and with all how the two Frigots which fought with our single Frigot above mentioned, came from Muscat wherein was the deceased Don Francisco de Sosa, late Captaine of the Caſtle his sonne, who came purposely to fetch away his Mother and other women that are in the Caſtle. Those Moores in the Caſtle of Kishme who yeelded themselves into our hands upon the inſtant requeſt of the Generall, were (partly with their owne consent) delivered unto him, whom hee promised should have pardon for the errour they had fallen into, to serve the Portugals againſt their owne King and Countrey, and that they should also be provided for and have imployment in the then intended expedition for Ormus. Which promise of his both to them and us in their behalfes, hee seemed to ratefie by using some of the principals in our presence and gracing them by other seeming curtesies: notwithſtanding all which, the next morning hee cut off eightie of their Heads, and those which he had made so fine in new Veſts to the number of five or sixe of the principall, he sent them over to Coombrone to the Duke, by him to receive their fatall Sentence. Which was not long deferred, but they were made to drinke of the same Cup their fellowes had formerly drunken of. Meer Senadine[1] who was the chiefe Captaine of them, was executed by the hands of Sherie Allie Governour of Mogustan, who had married his Daughter, which hee performed upon his Father in law with as much willingnesse as if he had beene his mortall Enemie.

Second assault.

The seventeenth Ditto, they sprung another Mine adjoyning to the first Mine was sprung, wherein was placed about sixtie Barrels of Powder, which tooke not the effect which was expected, for it flew out at the side and carried part of the Wall out with it, but strucke nothing at all upward, whereby the first breach was very little bettered, which was the thing the Persian aymed at, yet was it sufficient to give him encouragement to make his second assault, which was done with at least two thousand Souldiers, who very resolutely ranne up the breach into a part of a Bulwarke which they might wholly have possessed that very instant, had they not at first made such haste to runne their resolution out of breath; insomuch that onely eight or ten Portugals and a few Negros, made them onely with their Rapiers to give ground and to retire themselves unto the very outward skirt of the Bulwarke, where they had not roome for fortie men to stand in the face of their Enemie, yet there they barracodod themselves. Which before they could effect to their purpose, the Portugall plyed two or three Pieces of Ordnance from one of his Flankers that lay open unto them, in such sort, that they sent some scores of them to carry newes unto their Prophet Mortus Ali, that more of his Disciples would shortly be with him. Which accordingly was effected and proceeded chiefely out of their owne ignorance and dastardly Cowardise; for had they not made their stand in that place, but entred pell-mell with the Portugals into the Castle, with the losse of halfe those men they lost that day, they might have gayned the Victorie, and with much less paine unto themselves, who from that time the Mine was blowne up (which was about nine of the clocke before Noone) the whole day stood flocking together in the Sunne without either meat or drinke, which was sufficient to have killed halfe of them; notwithstanding the Portugals made very slender resistance. The most that was done was by the Negroes, whom the Portugals did beat forwards to throw powder Pots, with which many of the Persians were pittifully scalded and burnt. Had I not seene it, I should hardly have beleeved that such had beene the grosse ignorance of the Persian, that having two breaches, the one not much inferiour to the other for his entrance, that he would apply all his Souldiers to the assault of the one and none at all to the other. Besides having provided at least eightie or a hundred scaling Ladders, never so much as brought one of them neere unto the Castle walls. But such as their proceedings are, such is also like to be their successe. For his Souldiers hang in a cluster upon the breach just as a swarme of Bees upon a tree or bush that want a Hive; or like a flocke of Sheepe at a gappe, where none is so hardie to enter, and the Portugals to put them out of that paine gleaneth away foure, five, sixe, sometimes more at a shot; insomuch that I cannot but pittie them to see it.

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[1] Probably the Miragonadim, of the Portuguese text. See Ch. XIII., p. 53.

Portugals poore estate.

The eighteenth Ditto, the Persian continued his assault but with more paines to himselfe then hurt unto the Portugals. The last night two Captive Negroes made signs unto the Persians that they were desirous to come unto them, so the Persians let downe ropes unto them and so plucked them up unto them, who declared that the Captaine of the Castle had gotten a hurt on his head with a stone, and how there were not above a hundred Souldiers in the Castle able to manage their Armes, their water growne scant and daily worse and worse, which also increased mortalitie amongst them: how there is likewise difference among themselves, being of different opinions, some holding it best to adventure their escape by Sea with those Frigots they have, others are contrary minded, and hold it more honour to sell their lives at the

Desperate Counsels.

dearest rate and defend their Castle so long as they may, and when they can no longer, then to put their Women and Children with all their treasure into a house, and blow them all up with Gunpowder (that the Turks should neither injoy their wealth nor abuse their Wives) which done, they would thrust themselves pell-mell with the Persians, and so end their dayes.

The nineteenth Ditto, at Even being the third day the Persian that had lien resting himselfe in the breach, never offering to advance himselfe, did then set forward, whereby he got himselfe better footing and possessed himselfe of all the Bulwarke, and forced the Portugall to forsake the same and retire himselfe further within the Castle; in which conflict many of the Portugals were wounded and scalded with fire Pots, wherein the Persian is now as cunning as themselves, though many of them have payed deare for their learning. In the said conflict

Quanto doctior tanto nequior. Yet this is the Persian praise that they are good Swordsmen, the Turks fearing to come to handblowes with them.

were likewise foure Portugals slaine and their heads brought before the Generall to witnesse the same. Wherein all the Persians are very well seene; for I doe not thinke there is any Hangman in all Germanie that can goe beyond them in that Art; for he no sooner layeth hold on his Enemie, but presently at one blow with his Sword, off goeth his head, and then with his Knife he thrusts a hole either in the Eare or through one of the Cheekes, and so thrusting his finger in at the mouth and out at the hole in the cheeke, brings sometimes two, three, or foure of them before the Generall together, in such sort that not a Butcher in East-cheape could doe it better. But if (as commonly it happeneth) that these Heads of their Enemies so taken in the warres be sent to the view of the King of [*sic!*—or] Chan, then are they no lesse cunning to flea off the skinne of the whole

Frigot escapeth.

head and face and stuffe the same with Straw like a football, and so send them by whole sackfuls together. This night one of the Frigots that came from Muscat for the Donna Sosa, made her escape and got away, no doubt very richly fraighted. Her consort was chased in againe, which was likewise going: that which escaped, being haled by the Arab Boates, that lay in wayte to intercept their going, used the Watchword usuall betwixt the English and Arabs, which was onely Ingres Ingresses; which Watchword hath never beene changed nor once altered since our first attempting the businesse. Wherein both Persians & English are much to be blamed; for by the common use of that one Watchword, the Portugals have come to the knowledge of it, and have made good use of it to their owne benefites, which is their gayne and our losse.

One Watchword no Watchword. Frigot taken.

The twentieth Ditto at night, the other Frigot above mentioned offering to escape, was taken by the *London's* men in her Frigot and Pinnace. She was sent to carry away the Almirante named Luis de Britto, a kinsman of the Viceroy of Goa, whom the Captaine of the Castle would not suffer to depart: wherefore the Portugals which were taken in her, being fearefull of the successe of the Castle, and that it was not able long to hold out, for safetie of their owne lives being seven persons, held it their best course to adventure their escape in the said Frigot, and in the night stole her away, and were taken as above mentioned. The one and twentieth Ditto, the Persian made preparation and shew, as if at once they would make short worke to possesse themselves of the rest of the Castle; but where we expected to see them put the same in execution, I perceived that they and the Portugals were in parley together, wherefore I addressed my selfe to know the cause of so sodaine an alteration; and as I was fitting my selfe to goe unto the Persian Generall for that purpose I incountered a Messenger from our English Commanders who sent me word, that a Boat

Parley.

from the Caſtle was gone with a Flag of truce aboord their Ships, and they desired my company aboord with them to underſtand what the businesse was; and comming aboord the *London*, found two Portugals with Letters from the Captaine of the Caſtle and from the Almirante, contayning, viz.

There hath beene such antient friendship betwixt the Portugals and the English, that considering the Warres which at this present wee have in this place, wee ought one to underſtand the other, for it seemeth to me when I see the Mines are made by the Moores, that onely by your ayde Warre is made againſt me, with which one of my Bulwarkes is gotten from me; wherefore your Worships would bee pleased to doe me the favour to bee a meanes to make Peace betwixt me and those Moores, if the same shall ſtand with their and your good liking, provided it bee in that manner, that I lose not my credit, neither your selves leave to gaine Honour in a Time so favourable unto you; Thus not else our Lord Keepe you, &c.

Symon de Mela Perera.

This Fort is so beset and oppressed, that the Moores require us to deliver the same up on Composition, the which wee will not doe by any meanes, for when wee shall bee forced to make Composition wee will call your Worships: for it is not reason we should treate with Moores where you are present. For wee hold it better to deliver our innocent Women and other unnecessarie people, to the rigour of our Weapons, then to the clemencie of the Moores, and for that the knowledge hereof should not bee wanting to your Worships, I have written this besides what accompanieth the same from the Captayne, and for what else you desire to know you may informe your selves from this msesenger, to whom you may give the same credit as unto my owne person, and so God keepe your Worships, &c. The firſt of May 1622.

De V. S. Luis de Brito Dareto [*sic*].

The request of the Portugals contayned in their severall Letters on the other side, being had to consideration and commiseration had of them as Christians, it was resolved to give them a comfortable answer unto their demands; which in effect was as followeth, but want of time the businesse requiring expedition, would not permit to keepe Copie of the said answers which was first unto the Captaine Simon de Melles, to give him notice of the receit of his Letter, and whereas the chiefe point therein was, that we would bee Terceras [mediators] for them to procure them such conditions of agreement with the Persians, as that might be to the saving of the lives of so many Christian soules as were with him in the Castle; our answer was, that such had been our care to provide for them, that it was in our owne power to grant that request, which we were not onely ready to doe, but likewise to shew them any other curtesie, or performe any Christian dutie towards them that might anyway tend to their good. Therefore advised him to set downe his Demands, and send the same unto us with as much brevitie as was possible, and to the like purpose and effect was our answer unto the Almirant his letter, with which the two Messengers were dispeeded in one of our owne Barges, who returned with another Letter both from the Captaine and Almirant, that viz.

English Clemence to the Portugals.

Copie of y^{e} Capt^{s} Letter unto y^{e} Commanders.

I have received the Letter of Your Illustrious Lordship, and as this business is of so much importance, it is necessary for Your Illustrious Lordship to do me the favour of giving me time until tomorrow night, when I beg of you to send [for ?] the terms of surrender. And I ask that notwithstanding my having written by return, you will allow me two days grace for consideration thereof. And if I had realised that this war had been made by the English gentlemen, I would have written to them in the first instance, without dealing with the Moors; but as I learnt that Quexome [Kishm] had been left to the Turks, I thought that only for [? favour of them ?] was Your Illustrious Lordship waging war upon us, and this was the reason for which I wrote to you, wherefor I beg your Illustrious Lordship to assure me of your kind intentions when the time [? for such] arises. I am certain of this, as also of being protected against the treacherous attacks of the Turks, of whose untrustworthiness I am well aware. Our Lord etc:

[P.S.] Tomorrow night Your Illustrious Lordship will do me the favour of sending for the terms.

(sgd) Simão de Mello Pereira.

The Vice Admirall his second Letter.

Illustriss^{ns} I kisse the hands of your S^{s} for writing unto me; and beleeve me I esteeme the same as becommeth a Gentleman, whom adverse fortune in the warres hath no whit disanimated. The Captaine hath writ unto you, and all the Portugalls recommend themselves, and doe desire you, and I for them, that you will deal with them as Christians, and the Nation who so many times have joyned in Armes with them against the Moors. Tomorrow shall you see in what manner they desire to bee dealt with all, God keepe you with all the rest of your company &c. Primo May 1622.

De V. S. Luis de Brito Bareto.

Aprill 22, 1622 The necessity of the busynes soe requiringe the Comanders and my selfe would not loosse so much tyme to write any other answer unto the said letters,[1] least the Persian should take advantage of the oportunity and sodainlie press in upon them and put them all to the sworde, wherfore we addressed our selves unto the Persian Gennerall to be suiters unto him in the diſtressed Chriſtians behalfe, that he would hold his promise with them of a faythfull truce for two dayes, in which tyme wee might treat with them of such conditions as should as welbe behoofull and benefitial for the Persian as for our selves and that there might be no more effution of bloud of neyther side; but cominge to the Gennerall his verie countynance expressed his discontent, and it was not longe before it was uttred from his mouthe. The cause, proceedinge rather from his jelosie and ill conditions and actions of their owne then from any juſt occation offred on our parts, and was this, that the same night were two fregatts and one boate sent off from the Caſtle supposed to convey the tresure therof unto our shipps, which misconseived opinion was altred (at leaſt in shew) by our Commanders and my owne solemne proteſtations, that there was noe such matter and that the boate which came to our shipps from the Caſtle was one of our owne barges, but they brought nothinge with them but three Portugalls sent by the Captain of the Caſtle and the Almyrante with their letters which we offred to shew them, and also the parties that brought them was then settinge in our barge attendinge their answer, which we would not give them without firſt aquaintinge him off all passages and treaties with them, which we desired his approbation unto, withoute whose knowlidge and consent we would doe nothinge, wherwith he seemed a little better contented then at firſt; after longe debateinge of the matter, at length my selfe and a Persian gentleman with me was appointed to goe with the Portugalls to the Caſtle and to treat the busynes with the Captain of the Caſtle etc. But our comission was verie shortt, though nothinge sweet, for the Portugall, and was that they should surrender their Caſtle and depart onelie with their wearinge apparell, without armes or money; but when wee came to our barge to imbarke our selves for the Caſtle, the Portugalls in the barge utterlie refused that the Persian gentleman should goe with us, with whom they would have nothinge to doe, not so much as to admitt him eyther into their company or to have any Treatie at all with them, which when I underſtood, I sent word to the Gennerall, and withall to know his pleasure whether he were content that I should goe unto the Caſtell to deliver my shortt and sower message, which he refuced, unless the Persian appointed to goe with me might also be admitted; wherfore the Portugalls departed allone and I retorned to the Gennerall; but before we had bin there one hower the Portugalls were retorned with lycense for the Persian gentleman to come with me, and also they desired that our Vice Admyral (Mr. Woodcoke) might come allonge with us; soe with consent of the Gennerall we went all three of us to the Caſtle gate, but were not admitted to goe in, where we mett with Sigr. Lewis de Britto, the Almyrante of the Portugalls accompanyed with five or six Cavalliros, but did not see the Captain; for the trueth is the under Captain and souldiers had mutyned againſt him and deteyned him as prisoner, soe that all our conferrence was onelie with the Almyrante and his speech chieflie adresse[d] unto Mr. Woodcocke, our Almyrante or vice Admyrall, the greateſt part thereof soe private that but for being Mr. Woodcockes interpretor some tymes to deliver his answer, I might safelie sweare I knew but verie little of what was spoken; but the moſt I am sure was verie little to the purpose of our chiefeſt busynes; but the whole scope of their conferrence was how to convey aborde some tresure out of the Caſtle, from which I diswaded Mr. Woodcocke, for that a smale matter soe conveyed might prejudice our imployers twenty times more then the value thereof, if it should by any meanes come to the knowlidge of the Persian. Besides I tould him such private conferrence would breed miſtruſt in a people soe suspicious as is the Persian, wherfore I desired him both to forbeare his private conferrence, alsoe not to meddle in soe dangerous a busynes, wherupon, to conseale the same from my knowlidge, he told me they talked of other matters, wherin, as by the sequence of the busynes, it plainlie appeared he intended to delude me and deceive our Honourable imploiers, for the conclution of their conferrence was how that that eveninge a boate should com off from the Caſtle with a flagg of truce and the *Whales* barge should lye redie to receive her and to protect her on board the said shipp free from the danger, not onelie of the Persians, but likewise from all other English, which accordinglie was put in execution, but in such a base and vile manner as I thinke hath seldom bin hard off, *viz.* The said boate beinge offred a verie fitt oportunitie of escape by meanes of the Chans approach that afternoone, upon whose cominge and the manner thereof with his fregats and cuntry boates, every mans eyes were occupied, and at his landinge was great guninge and tryumphe, wherin the Caſtle would seeme not to be shortt of others in that curtecie; wherfore they saluted the Chans arivall with certeine ordinanace, in the smoke wherof this boate before mencioned put off from the Caſtle, both unsuspected and also unspied off any but the *Whales* boate that ley in waite for her, untill such tyme as shee had boarded her and weare carryinge her away, which being espied by other of our shipps companys and boates, they chased after them, but before any other boate could come neer her, the barges gynge [gang=boat's crew] of the *Whale* had taken oute the tresure that was in the Portugall boate into their owne barge which by certaine relation of the Almyrante him selfe, who sent the same, was to the value of 40,000 Rialls of Eight in Larees and 10,000 sherafins in gold, beside jewells and other things of great value, all which was shared and imbezled by the abovesaid barges gyngg and contrarie to the orders of the sea passed by their Admyrall, and carried aboard off their owne shipp. The tydings therof beinge brought unto the Commanders, we posted what we could to gett aborde, but before we came all the treasure ets. was imbeazled and hidden from the view of Commanders or others save such as had shamelessole shared the same amongst them selv[es], of all which as yett no more appeareth then 7,000 peeces of gold and a smale quantety of jewells to the value of [blank] or theraboute, but the 40,000 Rialls of Eight in Larees, not one of them appeareth, and had we not come as we did, and Captain Weddell used some dilligence to find it oute, I feare nothinge of that which was found would ever have appeared that our imployers should ever have bin a penny the better therby; but the said treasure beinge found, it was in question amongst our selves whether we should acquaint the Persian therwith or no, to which both Captain Weddell and Captaine Blythe weare verie ernest bothe to aquaint them therwith and alsoe presentlie to carrie the same on shoare and to divide it with him; but the troth is I was quite off a contrarie opinion unto them for two reasons: First, for that the busynes had bin soe ill carried, I did not thinke it fitt to be our owne accusers unlesse we perceived that the Persian had notice off it. Secondlie, for so much as the Persians are verie backward with us in our monethlie pay, haveinge sued them three moneths in this action and [? received] but one moneths pay, I held it reason to defaulke with them so much as their part should come unto off what was taken, if the same did chance to come to their knowlidge. But just as we weare proceedinge to sett downe the severall opinions of the Consultation, newes was brought us how Meer Abell Hassan [Mīr Abdul Hasan] and Pulott Beg, two of the Chans chiefe men, weare at the shipps side, by whose comeinge the Consultation was broken upp, and supposinge their hastie comeinge was onelie for that busynes, we held it then but follie to goe aboute to conseale the same from them, wherfore we left it open upon the table to salute their entrance. But such was their subtilltie that they would take no notice or make any shew at all that they had any knowlidge thereof, but that their comeinge was onelie to conferr with us of busynes of some importe from the Duke their maſter, and if the Captains would be pleased to goe on board, their cominge would be very acceptable unto the Duke, which the Captains the rather inclyned unto, for that we had never an interpreter aborde to enterprett for them. And cominge on shoare to the English house, they began with a longe speach, how kindlie the Duke did take the severall services and helps we had given them in this their warr, and how the same on his part should neyther be forgotten nor goe unrewarded in a larger measure then eyther he had promised or was bound unto. The next was to make knowne the Chans resolution to proceed both to the invation of Sware [Sohar] and Muscatt and therfore that they should not suffer the Portugall to depart into any of those places. The third and laſt part of his speech was moſt base and verie dishonourable, tendinge to this purpose, that we should betraye into their handes after they weare under our protection the Captain and five or six more of the principall of the Portugalls alledginge it would be much to the Chans honour to have them to present unto the Sha Abas, which vilde dishonourable motion, when I heard, I absented my selfe, hateinge my eares for beinge guiltie of hearinge of the same, and much more the tongue that could utter soe odyous a busynes, and for my farewell toled them I would not be guiltie of such a thing for the house full of gold.

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[1] Purchas has omitted the 1st of these 2 letters from his précis of Monnox's journal, and has inserted the 2nd in the wrong place, thus making nonsense of his paragraph on p. 361.

The 23. Ditto, the Portugals (whose meere necessity and pittiful eſtate wherein they were, had forced them to surrender their Caſtle upon any conditions, whereby they might have any hope at all to save their lives, which ſtood then in great hazard to be spoiled by the Persians) sent this morning to give notice unto us, they were contented to put themselves into our

Portugals in Ormuz yeeld to the English.


ANGAO.
QVEIXOME
ASCALIMAS.
LAREQ

(From the MS. "Livr

Persians partialitie.

Rascall rudenesse.

hands, on condition that we should give them means to be transported either for Muscat or India, which was promised them and Captaine Blith with my selfe went as hoſtages into the Caſtle, to see the setting of them out, and the Persian promised that not one Souldier, or man of his, should enter the Caſtle till they were dispended and sent away, and how that onely three of them and three of us, or our people should sit at the gate to see that they should carry nothing of valew with them: which on their parts was so neerely seene into, that moſt basely they searched and abused the very women. But the King of Ormuz together with his rich Vesier, their Treasure, women and servants were all conveied over the wals or breach, and not an English man either called or suffered to see what they carried out with them: and not onely these, but all other Moores and Banyans with their Treasure and beſt things, conveied forth the same way: yea, whole bales of goods, Cheſts, and Suppetas, with God knoweth what in them, carried over the breaches. And no sooner were the Gates open to passe out the Portugals, but there was at leaſt fortie Persians here and there in the Caſtle, yea and some of the ruder sort of the English also, whose comming in I may juſtly feare was cause the Persians came in with them, judging themselves as worthy of that liberty as our people.

Pittifull pillaging.

Good Ordnance in the Caſtle.

The 24. Ditto before noone, the Persians and English began to pillage in such sort that I was both grieved and ashamed to see it; but could devise no remedie at all for it: the Persians driving out the sicke, maimed, and burnt Chriſtians that were not able to helpe themselves, that made my very heart to earne in my body to see it; and in the evening, the Chan in person came as it were in triumphing manner to see the Caſtle, and to view the great Ordnance, whereof there are neere upon three hundred peeces of Brasse, the moſt of them Cannon, Demicanon, Culvarin and Demiculvarin, part whereof were Ordnance belonging to the Gallions, the reſt belonging into the Caſtle; which purchase if wee can possesse, will be the greateſt matter will fall to our share. This evening the Commanders and my selfe desiring to remaine in possession of the Church, whither wee had conveied some quantitie of Plate and money, for the better and safer keeping thereof from being imbezelled, our motion was utterly denied by Pullot Beg, who told the Commanders in plaine tearmes, they might lye without the doores: whereat they grew in choler (as they had juſt cause) and so we came all three of us out of the Caſtle together: the Captaines went aboord their shippes, and my selfe to the Citie; but the Sea being up, and want of a Boate ſtaied me at the Caſtle wals till it was neere midnight: at which time came no lesse then sixtie Persians by their owne report, sent by the Chan to watch that no Arabs should come and convey away any of the Ordnance that lieth upon the Sea ſtrand; but I feare if the truth were knowne, their comming was to cut the poore Chriſtian throates, that lay at the Sea side for want of Boates to carrie them away, if they had not found them to be guarded by the English; or else to see that we should not convey away any of the Ordnance aforesaid: our chiefe businesse this day was to see the poore Chriſtians dispeeded out of the Caſtle, the greateſt number of them so weakened with severall sorts of maladies, but chiefely with famine, and many so noysome both to themselves and others with their putrified wounds and scaldings with Gunpowder, and so pittiful were their severall complaints and cries, that it would have moved a heart of ſtone to pittie them; yet such was the dogged nature of the Persians, that they drove them and hunted them out of the Caſtle like so many dogges, pillaging many of them to the very shirts.

Persian inhumanity.

Aprill 25, 1622

The 25 ditto the Comaunders and my selfe absented our selves from the Caſtle and I used such means that the Chan was made aquainted with the cause therof and how discourtiouslie

The difference reconsiled twixt the English and Persians

The Chans faire promises to the English

Poulott Beg had dealt with us, wherupon the Chan comaunded him to repayre to the Comaunders and to reconsile him selfe unto them, which was don in such sorte that the Captains came againe on shoare with him, and weare by him brought unto the Chan, who used them with verie great respect, and that eveninge him selfe in person went aborde the *London*, chiefleie to see the shipp, which when he had don, that night imbarqued him selfe for Gombrone and soe towards Xiras, and at his farewell filled the Comaunders with so many good woords and faire promises of future curtecies to our nation that if he performe but the halfe of that he promised, it wilbe sufficient, but lett the busynes be rightlie weighed, we have deserved much more than I feare he will performe towards us, for by our meanes he hath atteyned both to that honour and that benefitt that without us and our assistance he would never have bin able to atteine unto.

26. Great havock made in the Castle takeing the spoyle

dores &ct. sealed up broke open

The 26 ditto we repayred againe unto the Castle wher we found such havocke made and so many chiests and suppettas broken open and whatsoever of value was in them carried away that a man would thinke if halfe the camp had bin given their libertie freelie to take the spoyle, in soe shortt a tyme they could hardlie have made soe great havock; and yett ther was a guard of English to prevent the same; but it is to apparent that those men did more hurtt then good in that place and attended more their owne private gaine then the publique good of the Company. But the better to prevent the same, our care and traveile was that day to seale upp all the doares and warehouses that had any thinge in them, many wherof the next daye we founde broken open and all the goods carried away, which calling to question, the Englishe accused the Persians and the Persians the English, in such soort that it is very aparent they were bothe faultie; and for prevention of the like, we caused Poulett Beg to place a watchman of his owne at everie doore, for the trothe is our owne people could not be trusted, but doubtlesse some of them are well feathered and have allredie made their vioge [*sic*] and therfore need not care how soone they goe home.

The 27. Ditto at Even, we licensed the Portugall to depart to the number of 2500. men, women, and children, to whom we gave a passe to free them from molestation, in case they met with any of our ships at Sea: also our two prises the *Robert* and *Shilling* to passe them in, with victuals and water necessary to the voyage; and besides these, wee sent away upwards a hundred persons maimed and sicke, that could not be dispeeded for want of shipping.

2600. persons sent away by the English.

May 7. Gatherd the pillage together of what left

Thies ten dayes last past my imployment hath bin continewallie in the Castle to see the gatheringe together of such pillage, treasure and merchants goods as accrew to our share of the spoyle therof, or to speake more properlie of that which the Persians oute of their superfluetie have left behinde them, for I may boldly affirme ther was not a chiest scritorra, box nor cannester in twenty that was not broken open before the same came to our view, by which it may be judged what comfortt a man could take to be a surveior of such ruines where little remayned except pillage, wherof our masters can have no benefitt, but to some who are chief sharers in that comoditie it bred content inough, wherin they could spend their tyme from morninge till night in romadginge and gettinge together of the same, neglectinge busynes of greater consequence, viz., first, the siftinge and finding oute the treasure inbeazled by Mr. Woodcock and his shipps company, as is partlie before mencioned, for which cause the Persian denyeth us the openinge or shareinge of the treasure ets. remayninge in the lodginge, which if it have not bin conveyed away as th' rest hath bin, it will somwhat help our ill bargaine of th' other. Secondlie, their backwardnes is such to sollicitt for their two moneths pay that is yett unpayed, that it is not so much as once thought off, but I feare their slacknes in

Mr. Woodcock and shipps company imbesallinge treasure, the Persians deny the English &c.

Account of brasse guns omitted to be taken account of

Comanders for private gaine neglect the Companys interest in makeing tymely demands &c.

that busynes will be cause that some must be suiters for the same at the Chans Courte before it be procured, for the last tyme they moved the same, they were told of an accompt that they are to cleare, which accompt I feare will carrie away a good share of the said pay and the longer it is suffred to rove, the worse it is like to be; and it is now ten dayes past and yett no course taken to see what this accompt is nor what is cominge unto us. Thirdli[e], the brasse ordynance both of the Castle, also of the shipps, are more worthie of a survey and divition then old clothes for pillage, which is not once looked after nor scars[e] thought upon. These severall things which I conceave to be our busynes of greatest import and ought first to be looked after are deferred to the last. God grant that these delaye[s] torne not to our masters losse, which by severall passages there is great cause to suspect and I feare some will have more to answer for then the importe of all their pillage will amount unt[o]; and for my owne part when soe farr as I durst I have moved these things to the Comanders as most worth the first place in their imployment, I have bin answered with a demaund what I would have them doe, whither they should fale oute with them and soe loose all, which word of fallinge oute I doe not soe well understand, for in my opinion a man may demaund his right of resonable men withoute fallinge oute with them, but if they will, withoute cause or justice fall oute with us, to abridge us off our right in the chief matters, I would rather hazard the loosinge of all then by protraction of tyme onelie to save a little pillage, which when most, will not amount to 1500 pounds put in hazard the looseinge of 25 or 30 thousand pounds, especiallie when all their actions proclayme their purpose and intents therin, which, did not the Comaunders make them selves willfullie blinde, they may see aswell as other men. But as Sallomon seyth, guifts doe blinde the eyes of the wise, and as I have seene, the guifte of a carpett, quilt, girdle and hanngers or such things as som men would scorne to take have blinded both their eyes and understandinges from doeinge that their places doe requier, which God graunt it turne not to their owne overthrow in the end; and for the present I am sure it will torne to the losse of our employers.

The King of Ormus was poore, and lived chiefly upon his 140,000. exhibition from the King of Spaine, and some helpes from the Custome-house in reservation of some pettie Customes. In romaging there amongst his Papers was found this Letter written by him to the King of Spaine; the translated Copie whereof I here present.

The Letters which for three yeeres last past I have written unto your Majestie, both by Sea and Land are as yet unanswered, which I daily expect; for the same doth much import this Kingdome of Ormus and service of your Majestie, under whose protection I have life and meanes thereof. In June last, 1620, arrived at this Fort the foure Galleons, of which is Captaine Generall Ruy frere Dandrada, who fitted himselfe with all things necessarie to goe and attend the comming of the English Ships at Jasques, which accordingly he did; of whose successe therin I shall not need to treate in particular, which is done by himselfe by this Post, who is sent at my charge and his; yet thus much I will say, this Gentleman laboured all that was possible to keepe the English from carrying away their silke, wherein hee performed the uttermost of his dutie, like a resolute and valiant Captaine: but by tempest and stormie weather his Ships were more separated then his enemies, by which occasion they had opportunitie to carry away their silke, which cost the life of their chiefe Commander, who was slaine in the fight, in which also died two of our Captaines.

An excuse framed in behalfe of the Captain. The storme was within their fearefull hearts.

By this occasion, and in the time, the Captaine Generall was incumbred with the English, the King of Persia commanded his Vassalls to send people into Arabia, to bring the same under his subjection, beinge without any to give him impediment: Yet before they went I required the Captaine of this Fort, also the Veeder Dafazenda, [Vedor da Fazenda] to send some Frigats in favour of the Arabs (who are your Majeſties Subjects) that might defend them: for without such ayde it was not possible for them to defend themselves: and for this effect came thither certain Xegues [Sheiks] to demand succour, which was not granted them; but the moſt the Captaine did, was to enjoyne mee to send a kinsman of the Queene my wife, whom presently I sent, spending therein more then I was able or had to spare: yet his going was to no effect for want of Frigats, which onely might hinder the Boates wherein the Persians passed over, for which cause this day the King of Persia is become Lord of Arabia; and I also feare that verie shortly hee will come againſt this Fort, because of all this Kingdome no more is left mee, save onely this Iland of Salt without water to drinke: for all things pertaining to the suſtenance of mans life, come from such places as the King of Persia possesseth. The losse and overthrow of this Kingdome of Ormus proceedeth altogether from the Captaines your Majeſtie placeth therein, who for their particular intereſt, are content to dissemble and consent that the Kingdome bee taken, without coſt of bloud, or labour unto the King of Persia his Miniſters, and this is so apparent that I need not write thereof, but that which I will speake with truth is, if that your Majeſtie bee pleased, that this Kingdome and Fort shall enjoy either peace or meanes to subsiſt, you muſt send such Captaines as are no Merchants, because the Mariners which might serve in your Majeſties Navie to keepe this ſtreit, are all imployed in the Captaines Ships and Frigats, which hee onely imployeth in Trade of Merchandise, in which Ships serve likewise the Souldiers of the Fort, insomuch that many times it is left with very few. But so long as this continueth, there shall ever bee wanting both Mariners and Souldiers to your Navy, to defend

Ormus, an Iland of Salt without water.

Ill Captaines

and keepe this Iland from the power of the King of Persia, which at this day hath more then a thousand Boates, and is commander of this streit more then is your Majestie, and all by the fault of those Captaines, which for twentie or five and twentie yeeres past have served in this place. Those in former times contented themselves with the gaine of fortie or 50000. Cruzados for their three yeeres service, but now they are not contented with 200000. Likewise in former times they had onely two Shippes when most, but now they have foure and as many Frigats, and there is nothing wanting unto them; but it seemeth not just, that to satisfie the covetousnesse of one, who aymeth at nothing but his owne profit, the weale publike should perish, and that every one should have but little that onely one may live to injoy much. From hence is growne and groweth all the evills of this Kingdome, proceeding from such Ministers as are placed by your Majestie, granting unto them the command, which heretofore the Kings my predecessours ever held. But I am now brought so low, and such as are under mee, that we remaine altogether unable to repaire the necessities that are daily offered, as appeareth by this of Arabia; by which your Majestie will bee forced to make warre, and continuall warre by Sea against this enemy, for that by Land you have no power to conquer him, who is not contented with the taking away the firme Land of this Kingdome altogether, with the Iles of Barem [Bahrein] and Kishme, but further, in confidence of his great number of Boats, having none to resist him, hath taken from us Arabia, which was the onely remedie of this Iland. Of the truth of what hath herein beene spoken, your Majesties Ambassador Don Garcia de Sylva (God sending him well to your Majestie) shall be a good witnesse, to whose report I referre mee, and to all others which goe from hence; God keepe your Majesty. Ormus the twelfth of February, 1621.

Kishme, or Quixome.

Mamede Xâ Rey de Ormus

English of Do. Letter

I doe well observe by the severall contents of the above written letter that Ruy Frere Andrade was eyther the penner therof or penned by his directions, wherin in those passages which concerne himselfe, like a proud, vaine-boaſtinge Portugall, he setteth oute his owne prai[s]es, which he could not soe currentlie doe as he desiered in the pointe conserninge his fight with our shipps at Jasques without the help of a moſt notorious lye, and is wher he writes his shipps were more scattred by violence of a ſtorme then our shipps weare, which was the cause we carried away the silke (yett with the losse of our Chief Captaine slaine in the fight). True it is that worthie and ver[ie] valliant Captain Shillinge was by an unfortunate shott wounded in the fight, yett lived 8 or 9 dayes after; but his woundinge was cause the fight surceaſt at such a tyme when 3 of Ruy Frere his 4 galliones ley bord and bord one foule of another, not a man scarse appearinge in the one of them and verie seldom a shott cam from them when Captain Shillinge in the *London* ley within piſtoll shott of them and gave them many a hurtfull shott, but beinge calme could not make the shipp to wor[ke] to his minde, wherfore he anckored by them and giveinge directions to clapp a hauser to his cable to bringe the shipps broad syde to ply upon them was taken with that fatall shott that caused his death and their escape, for that night he run away and was no more seene, and our shipps contynewed in the roade of Jasques at leaſt 17 dayes after and there in that tyme tooke in their silke and other merchandiz and soe departed towards Suratt. Now if this was a ſtorme it was onelie the thundringe of our shott that was soe terrible bothe to this brave Captain and his associates that he nor they durſt not looke oute of their shipps holds to see what weather it was.

Account of the fight with the Portuguez at Jasques

Points to excuse the English assiſting the Persian againſt the Portugall

Now there are other pointes in the said letter will helpe to excuse us in this our enterpriz and assiſtinge the Persians to invade this Caſtle and Iland, if the ſtate of England, by the inſtygation of the Portugalls or Spanierds should diſtaſt the same to which purpose I will keep the original letter that is under the King of Ormuz his owne seale or Chapp for the better atteſtation of the truthe thereof.

To this Letter, I have added the translated Copies of divers other Letters, for the Readers more full satisfaction.

A Certificate made by sundry Portugalls, how the Treasure, Jewells, &c. belonging to the King and his Vizeer of Ormus, which were secretly conveyed out of the Caſtle of Ormus by the Persians.

We whose names are hereunder written, do certifie our knowledge how that Byram Aga with other Turkes, by the commandement of their superior, went unto the house of the Goasil, [Wazir or Vizier] within the Fort to watch the goods that there remained; also the money and riches which was therein at the time when the Fort was delivered up unto the English. And the same night many other Turkes by the Trenches of the Bulwarke, named Saint Iago, unseene of the English, by the breach in the Ciſterne adjoyning to the said Trench, and also through the said Trenches conveyed much riches belonging to the said Gosil, and King of Ormus, and also of their women and kinsfolkes. In witnesse of the truth wee have hereunder written our names: Ormus the twentie five of May. 1622.

Balthisar Carborius. Utte Vallente. Franco Gomes. Salvador de Campos. Iodo. Vallente. Batta Javs, &c.[1]

A certificate from the Portugalls, of their kind usage, wherein was performed more then was promised them.

Wee all, whose names are here under written and mentioned, Housholders and Souldiers, Inhabitants of Ormus. Viz. Pe. visente Serentnio rig. & Salvador de Campo, provider of the holy House, and Balthesar Francisco, chiefe Physician, and Don Antonio da silva soldado, and Visente Vallente, and Antonio Autunes, and Gaspar Soares, and Francisco Gomes, and Jacamo Artiquo, and Baltasar Borges, with others doe witnesse, how it is true the English Captaines have performed their promise made upon yeelding up of the Castle, by giving two of their owne ships or pinnasses to carry away all the people whither they would goe, also by defending them, that at no time neither Moore nor Infidell should doe them any hurt: and forasmuch as the said Pinnasses could not containe all the people, the same being dispeeded, they procured and did whatsoever from them might be expected to accommodate the sending away in safetie of such as remained, to which end and purpose they requested Boats and Mariners, from the Persians, but the Moores, as enemies to all Christians, refused to give either Mariners or other helpe: whereupon the English Captaines resolved, without being thereto any way oblieged, to send one of their owne Frigats, with three small Boats with thirty or forty Englishmen well armed for our safety and until we should bee safely landed in some secure place; yea by the Grace of God in Musquate it selfe without any impeachment or Embargo by the Turkes, and more they have given hospitality to our sicke and wounded, which are neere about two hundred at the least, whom they have sustained and cured with as great care and diligence, as if they had beene their owne brothers, without being therunto bound nor comprehended in the agreement. Also those, which at this present remain sicke, and not in case to bee sent away, being to the number of thirty or forty, they have taken up their charge, both to feed and also to cure, till such time as we can send Boats for them, and others of the Country which remaine here, the Boats not being able to carry any more. And as the said English Captaines have done more for us than they promised, and given us more than wee could expect, we remaine oblieged to answere their favours and friendship aforesaid: whereupon wee doe promise and bind ourselves that are here present, to intreat with much faithfulnesse, love, and amitie those English which for our good and safetie doe goe in our company, that none shall doe them evill or offence, neither in their goods, nor yet in their returne, that they may safely and freely both passe and returne with their said Vessells, who are not tied to stay longer for the Boats wee are to send for our said people, that here remaine then three dayes naturall. In witnesse of the truth, the above named with others have joyntly subscribed their names, May the twenty five, 1622.

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[1] The majority of these names are too baſtardized to be identified.

A Letter written from Ruy frera dandrada, and sent aboord the *Jonas*, by one of his Captaines, named Alfonso Borgea, at our first arrivall neere the Castle of Keshme.

Courtesie is the daughter of Nobilitie, as ever it hath beene found in the English Caveleers, from which I inferre that in these occasions may be drawne the same example, whereby in Europe may bee made publike your valours, and unto his Majestie may bee presented the great service [that] unto him is done: that from the estimation thereof may arise to bee made a good peace and conformitie, which wee will all write into India to that effect, as ministers of the same, if it shall seeme good unto you. Therefore wee request you not to move warre in favour of the King of Persia, thereby to diminish the glory of your Nation, with which so many times they have helped us against the Moores, whereby wee gained Lisbone in the dayes of King Don Antonio the first [*sic* Affonso Henriques], and afterwards King Don [? João I] second, was aided by the Duke of Lancaster in the action of Castile: but if these obligations are small on your part, and that ours now may bee made greater, in which wee will remaine, if you will but suffer us to prosecute our warre against the Persian, without your valorous spirits hindering what wee are able to sustain, and thereby impeach the commerce in Spaine to the hindrance of both Nations, and to the damage both of Shippes and Merchants of which I doubt not, when his Majesty shall bee advised in what manner the English doe carry themselves, so that wee may reserve our dissentions for other voyages, in which by valorous contending may bee satisfied those wrongs that cannot well bee remembered in such times as these are, and for that the same may with due interest and conformitie of both Nations English and Portugalls, I returne to put you in remembrance of the above written, which ought to be discoursed with good understanding, as a matter in which your Worships may amplifie and advance the generositie of your Nation, and retaine us as friends unto your affaires, giving us motive to procure in acknowledgement of this benefit all peace and quietnesse, and if you shall disesteeme the same, the first wee hope for is no more then to provide our selves to die, defending that with Armes, we have gotten by Armes, &c. the first of February, 11. 1622.

Ruy Frera Dandrade.

Another Certificate of the kind usage of the Portugalls.

We, the Captaines, Souldiers, and Inhabitants of the Castle of Ormus, now in the possession of the English doe say and affirme for truth, that they the said English have performed all what was promised by them, and more in giving us shipping of their owne to transport us for India with victualls and all things else necessary, and delivered us from the hands of the Turkes who sought our destruction, and also suffered us freely to passe out of the Castle with our apparell and bedding, and needfull money in our pockets. And commanded our sicke and maymed people to be cured by their owne Surgeons, sending them daily food in great abundance, and would not suffer any of the Moores to hurt them in any case. In witnesse of the truth wee have here under written our names: Ormus the seventh of May, 1622.

Joan de Mello. Coſtodio Pimentel.
M. de Samperas. Symao de Mello.

A third Certificate.

Let it bee graunted, that the warres and offences received therein provoke a man to revenge, notwithſtanding wee cannot deny unto your Worships, and unto all the reſt of your Company, how much we are indebted for the good intreatie shewed unto these which yeelded themselves unto you: and it shall for ever live in our memories those benefits, for which when time and fortune shall miniſter occasion, wee will endevour to shew our selves gratefull with other, no lesse tokens of love due unto a Nation, which ever have been so affectionated towards us: and evill be to him that hath caused discord betwixt us, for it evidently appeareth how greatly the English and Portugall Nations do love together, and it doth well appeare wee doe all of us adore one onely God for notwithſtanding the warre, you doe use so many principles by the which it is not greatly to bee marvelled at, that in you there are such good workes, and in us such a thankefulnesse as may bee eternall, with a great desire that all discord may cease, and that wee may returne to the antient amitie in which I hope, and in the noble word and qualitie of your person and persons, and for that I will not bee further troublesome unto your Worships, both in curing and suſtaining these poore people that are with you, I have sent these foure Boates to fetch them away; and if it shall seeme good to your Worships, and the reſt with you, to continue your former courtesies unto the end, in performing the word of Conquerors and Chriſtians, as formerly you have done, now at this present to give them a guard, that they may come safe from the Moores; for that like yeelded they have neither Armour to defend themselves, nor yet ſtrength to use them, if you like noble Conquerours give them not to convoy; in whose word I am confident: Thus as your servant in what your Worships wil command mee, I reſt.

Soar 27. of July, 1622.
Amaro Roiz.

The Persians deceave the English in the plunder and oute them of the Caſtle

The proceedings of Poulett Beg in the Caſtle are such as if he purposed we should have no share therin, for albeit they have had the firſt rifflinge and pillaginge of every house and rome within the Caſtle, yett now when the Comaunders and pursers have shared with them what appeareth to be of any value they are noe sooner gon from that rome to another but ſtreitway the rome laſt searched is deliverd into the cuſtodie of a Cushelbas [Kizil-bash] for his lodginge, wherunto an English man muſt not so much as looke afterwards, though happelie much better ſtuffe may be left behind then is taken forth, for who can soe narrowlie looke into a place peſtred with chieſts, jarrs, bags of rice, wood, ets., but that much treasure may be therin unspied, which if it be, all that falls to the Persians share. But howsoever, we are like to be thruſt oute off possession of every roome therin, that when we come to place men to remayne in the Caſtle, they muſt lie withoute dores; and when I moved this to the Comaunders who would not of them selves take any notice therof, Captain Weddells answer was they had all the Church to them selves as if the Church were a fitt place to lodge men in, as well it might, had it a cloiſter as many Churches hath, which this hath not; but such like answers I have for any thinge I speake off, which maketh me both wearie to speake and more greeved to see the abuses are dayly offred unto us.

Captains takeing no notice thereof

May 15

The busynes in the Caſtle drawinge to an end and Poulett Beg, the Chans Chief Commissioner for that busynes, his departure divulged to be

Poulett Beg the Chans Chief Commissioner would make the Company the Persians debtor

Tomans 20000 [*sic*] charged as purloyned by the *Whales* company

within four dayes, it was then more then tyme to repaire unto him for our monethlie pay, or at least to com to [illegible] with him, which account was such that wheras we expected to receive from him a thousand or 1200 Toman, he made us asmuch or mor in his debt, which I allwayes feared. The cause of soe great difference in account was his chargeinge us with 2000 Tomans of the Visiers money purloyned by the *Whales* company, wherin is shewed [illegible] of Mr. Woodcock his private discourse at the Castle with the Portugall Almyrante before mencioned; and howbeit this weare to great a burthen for our masters to beare by the default of one shipps master and his company. Yett could I wish that this weare all, but I feare this is not the 10th part of the losse that our imployers susteine therby, for this one ill composed action of his bread such a jeloucie in this mistrustfull people that all our practizes tended to nothinge els but to deceive them, that to make them selves of the suerer hand they tooke their owne tyme and meanes to deceive us of the chief things, and what they have since afforded us is onelie the least part of their owne reversions, wherwith we must rest contented, not knowinge how to help our selves.

The Captaines make demaunds for the Companys 15000 [*sic*] Tom:

The account of Poulott Beg and his unresonable demaunds beinge made knowne unto the Comaunders, it moved them to choller, and then must an account of demaunds be made to answer his demaunds, wherin amongst the rest was 1500 Toman demaunded for our parts of cotton woole, rice, copper vessells, ets., carried away by the Persians oute of the Cittie, wherof we had no share at all. The greatest part therof might have bin prevented at first for a word speakinge, but neyther th'one nor th'other would open their moueths therin, though daylie for at least a moneth together they see these thinges carried away before their faces, and now when it is too late they can see the errors of their owne remissnes. First for the cotton woole. Now we have tyme fittinge to reimbale our silkes we have not a handfull in store to performe that busynes withall. Next for rice. Would they have loaden one of their shipps therwith, they might have had it for carringe abord, and yett within these few dayes I have heard great complaintes for want of rice for their owne provision.

The account to and with Poulott Beg beinge canvassed to and fro and severall meetings to smale purpose, it was at length determyned that he should leave oute his frivolous demaund of the Viziers money imbezled as aforesaid and we should leave our demaunds of a far greater some to countervayle the same, which was also held frivolous, seeinge we weare voyd of all meanes for recoverie or satisfaction, upon which account he rested content to allow us for three moneths and ten dayes pay for our shipps. Yett upon the cleeringe the account with him I see ther is allowance but for three moneths, soe the ten dayes, that amounts to 200 Toman, is cutt off, I know not why nor wherfore. God graunt ther be plaine deallinge in it.

3 mo. pay allowed by the Persians

Noe share in Castle given to the English nor the ordnance

Now concerning the Castle. For ought I can see we are like to have neyther share nor comaund therin, no not so much as to take a survey of the ordynance, munition and pouder remayninge therin, wherby we may know what to clayme or hereafter to demaund account off, which beinge the chiefe matter and should first have bin looked after, was referred to the last, and in the end answer was given nothing coud be don therin without the Chans order, with which answer Poulott Beg hath left us, and now our people have scarse libertie to looke into the Castle, which end I ever feared it would com unto.

Thus haveinge made a brief relation of the most remarkable matters that have hapened in the Siege and Conquest of Ormus and the Castle therof and haveinge seene the desolation therof together with the banishment of her late inhabitants the Portugalls, ets., I cannot chose but sett downe and wonder what people and

An account and description of the Island and Castle conquered

off what minds they weare which were the first inhabiters of soe barren and discomodious an Iland that affordeth nothing of it selfe but salte. Yett as it hath bin related unto me by Portugalls of the best experience, borne and bred in this barren place, that the Iland was inhabited by the Mores upwards of 300 yeares before any Protugalls came here and at certeine seazons of the yeare was the seat royall of one of the Kings of Arabia Felix, whose successors 115 yeares since gave enterteinment unto the Portugalls upon such conditions as was then covenanted and agreed upon betwixt them. Since which tyme the said King and his successors have ever lived amongest them and have mutuallie governed the Iland and other territories theron dependinge tyll of late yeares the Portugall, knowinge him selfe to strong for the weak kinge, did not onelie usurp sole comaund and authoritie over this Iland, but likewise underhand tooke bribes of the kings substitute governors of his other territories to protect them from the obeidience of their lawfull kinge, wherupon with their slight obedience, they afforded him as slender account of his revenews, wherby he was kept verie poore amonge them and used mor like a Portugalls slave then an Arrab Kinge. But now those differences are ended and the poore Kinge is gon to present his head to Sha Abas and the Portugalls to present their new service unto their old Vice Roy, wher I leave both th'one and th'-other; and soe ends my shortt storie of them. beseechinge the Almightie to give us grace that we may ever be thankfull for his great mercies towards us in giveinge us the victorie and lettinge us to see the confution of those that never ceased by all plotts and meanes possible to bringe confusion to us and our designes; but the same pitt they digged for us are they fallen into them selves, which judgment lett ever fall upon our enemyes and the enemyes of our profession.



CHAUL
(*From the MS. " Livro do Estado da India Oriental" in the British Museum*)

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APPENDIX XI

Personalia.

Ruy Freire de Andrade.

"He was a proper tall Gentleman, swarthie of colour, sterne of Countenance, few of words, and of an excellent spirit, he had lived here in India many years." This lucid description by a contemporary Englishman, reveals the man better than any painted portrait. According to a document attesting his Services which exists in the Torre do Tombo at Lisbon, Ruy Freire had "served for 10 years in various parts of India, embarking in 10 fleets of Malabar and the North," prior to undertaking his expedition to the Persian Gulf in 1619; his first important services were rendered whilst in the command of a naval squadron which was ravaging the western coast of India in the neighbourhood of Thana and Bassein during the years 1612-1613. During this latter year he raised the siege of Damão, driving off the attacking forces of the neighbouring Rajah of "Sarceta" with great slaughter. In 1614 he was promoted from Captain of Damão to the captaincy of Chaul, which city he also delivered from siege. He was apparently present at the commencement of the unsuccessful attacks by the Vice-Roy D. Jeronimo de Azevedo against Downton's squadron at Swalley in 1615, but does not seem to have participated in the actual fighting. At the end of October 1616 he commanded the Fleet of the North which operated off Diu, Chaul and Bassein, returning to Goa early in 1617. Shortly afterwards he proceeded to Europe, where the King made him a Knight of the Order of Christ with an anual income of 200 *cruzados* [ducats] a year, payable in India, in recognition of his services. He was also selected to command the squadron sent to the Persian Gulf in April 1619 in order to drive out the English from those regions, which he swore "on the sacrament" that he would do. At this time he was only 28 or 29 years old according to the *Commentarios.* At an inquiry held at Goa, 1622-3, into the loss of Kishm and Ormuz, he was absolved from all blame by the Viceroy in March 1623, principally because "the Arabs respect and the Persians fear him so greatly"; his acquittal was endorsed by the King in January 1624, who shortly afterwards made him Knight-Commander and Alcaide-Mór of Villa de Rey in the Bishoprick of Guarda. He returned to the Persian Gulf in 1623, making his headquarters at Muscat, and after retaking Sohar, Dibbah, Khor Fakkan and other ports from the Persians, harried the Persian and Arabian coasts from Cape Musandam to the Euphrates until Peace was concluded with the Shah. Although the Viceroy frequently commended him for his zeal and bravery, he also complained many times of his indulging in private trade to the detriment of the Royal Customs, and depleting the treasury to pay his troops. When remonstrated with by the Captain of Muscat, he replied with characteristic impetuousity that so long as there was water he would swim, and then let what would happen, happen. A man of undoubted courage, energy and ability, his knightly fame is tarnished by the savage massacres of Persian women and children which disgraced his operations in the Gulf. The barborous execution of the crew of the *Lion* in November 1625 remains an indelible blot on his career, especially in view of the courtesy and consideration with which he had been treated by the English, who had saved him from the hands of the Persians. Not unnaturally there was intense indignation in England when the news of this atrocity became known, and it was debated by the E.I. Company whether or not to mete out the same measure to all Portuguese Prisoners who might fall into their hands, but this proposition was wisely rejected, and it was determined only to execute Ruy Freire himself if the opportunity offered. But with the exception of this strain of cruelty, his chivalrous conduct in other respects, and the disinterested zeal he displayed in the service of his country and King, cannot but command our admiration.

Dom Gonçalo da Silveira.

Fourth son of Dom Alvaro da Silveira and Donna Beatriz Mexia, and one of a familly of 18 ! Went out to India in 1619 with Ruy Freire's Fleet and was placed in command of the galleon *São Martinho.* In the autumn of 1620 he was arrested and sent to Goa by Ruy Freire with whom he had quarelled over some mutinous soldiers. In 1621 he served in a squadron on the Malabar coast, and returned to Ormuz with Simão de Mello in November of the same year. In January 1622 he twice ran the English blockade of Kishm and got messages and provisions through to Ruy Freire. During the siege of Ormuz he was placed in command of the bastion of Santiago, the most dangerous and exposed part in the Castle, in the defence of which he greatly distinguished himself, being 4 or 5 times wounded in the face, arms, and legs. Being sent to Muscat on the capture of the Fortress in May 1622, he remained there throughout the year, unlike most of his companions, the vast majority of whom had returned to India. He broke up a threatened Persian attack on Muscat, being severely wounded in a sea-fight near Sohar, and took a prominent part in the recapture of that stronghold in 1623, being the first man ashore. He served under Ruy Freire in the Gulf from 1623 to 1628, taking command of the expedition to Basra 1624-25, during which he inflicted a severe defeat on Imam-Qūlī Khān, the captor of Ormuz in 1622, and on his Kizil-bash tribesman. In 1626-27 he took part in the expeditions of Ruy Freire against some recaltariant sheiks of Dibbah, Bahrein and El-Katif. In 1628 he returned to Goa, where he served in the Armada of Nuno Alvares Botelho, accompanying him on his celebrated expedition to Malacca in 1629. He served in the destruction of the Achinese fleet off Malacca, and was present at Botelho's successful attacks on Dutch and English ships at Jambi in 1630. He then proceeded to Macau, and thence to Japan, where he resided for six years and rendered great services in the annual embassies to the Shōgun's Court at Yedo. Early in 1638 he left Macau for Goa on board the English ship *Dragon*, commanded by none other than James Weddell, who had commanded the English forces at Ormuz 16 years before. We may be sure that these former doughty opponents (now allied against the Dutch!) had many an interesting conversation on the events of the famous siege. In 1639, Dom Gonçalo left Goa for Lisbon on board the galleon *São Bento* which reached Portugal after a long and painful voyage. Soon afterwards he died in Lisbon, unmarried, disfigured with many wounds, and imensely rich, leaving his wealth to his brother D. Antonio a poor Alemtejan Friar, and to his sisters Francisca and Maria, both of them twice-married and with large famillies.

Fernão de Albuquerque.

Became Governor of India on the death of the Vice-roy D. João Coutinho, Conde de Redondo, on 10th of November 1618, and governed until the 19th of December 1622. At his accession he was 70 years old, having lived in India for the last 40 years; he had been captain of Colombo, Ceylon, Damão, Goa, and Councillor of State, as well as having served as Captain of Malacca for 3 years and been the possessor of a captaincy of the annual voyage to Japan. Despite his great age and increasing infirmities, he rendered loyal and efficient support to Ruy Freire, of whose proceedings he wisely disaproved. Shortly after handing over the reins of office to the Conde da Vidigueira, he died at Goa on the 29th of January 1623, and lies buried in the Church of Nossa Senhora da Serra. According to his successor, his simple habits and unostentatious apparel had tended to lower his prestige in the eyes of the Natives, who expected pomp and pageantry from one in his position.

SIMÃO DE MELLO.

Simão de Mello Pereira (to give him his full name) distinguished himself in various campaigns on the Malabar coast and elsewhere, from which he acquired the reputation of being a good soldier.

In 1614 he was despatched to Mombassa as Captain of that Fortress, and in this capacity he was alleged to have suppressed a dangerous revolt by siezing and beheading 3 of the ringleader chiefs. In a letter dated the 22nd of February 1622, Fernão de Albuquerque explains that the chief reason that he had sent Simão de Mello to Ormuz was that " he has a very pliable nature and is better able to accomadate himself to the difficult character of Ruy Freire than any one else." This hope was not destined to be fulfilled, and Simão de Mello—though not lacking in personal courage—showed himself to be unreasonably jealous of Ruy Freire, and singularly foolish, if not actually treacherous in his conduct of the defence. The mutiny in the Castle which took place in the last days of the siege was supposed to have been got up at his own suggestion, but, wether this was so or not, it is certain that it was not he but Luiz de Brito, the almirante, who conducted the final negotiations for surrender to the English.

After Ormuz had fallen, Simão de Mello did not dare to return to Goa, but fled to Chaul via Muscat, and thence to the territories of the Ādil Khan, King of Bījapūr. Strenuous efforts were made by the Viceroy to sieze him, or bribe the King into giving him up, but although he was dodged by spies for some years, he escaped their hands and proceeded to the Choromandel coast, where he was last heard of in a Hermitage at Negapatam in 1625,—perhaps having turned Fakir. Meanwhile he had been executed in effigy at Goa, whilst Luiz de Brito had been beheaded for the part he had played in the surrender.

DOM JOÃO DA SILVEIRA.

Captain of a galleon in the squadron of Francisco Miranda Henriques which proceeded to Malacca in 1615. In the course of a fierce engagement with an enormous Achinese Fleet, Silveira's galleon was blown up and he himself taken prisoner. However the enemy had suffered so heavily, that the King of Achin released Dom João da Silveira in the hopes of placating the Governor of Malacca whose near relative he was. In this he was successful, and a peace was patched up. Silveira however indulged in very riotous behaviour during his stay at Malacca, on one occassion bursting into the Cathedral with an armed bodyguard of Japanese, and insulting the Bishop, Dom Gonçalo de Silva. This drew upon him the wrath of the King, and he was arrested and thrown into prison at Goa in 1618, to be released two years later and sent to Kishm where he died.

CONSTANTINO DE SÁE NORONHA.

First comes into prominence as a passenger on board the ship *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios*, that formed one of a squadron of 5 ships and 2 urcas which left Lisbon for India on the 7th of April 1614. The *Remedios* had a very painful voyage as far as Socotra which was reached when there were 700 sick on board and most of the crew in open mutiny. Not being able to beat up to the island, the ship endeavoured to make Mombassa, but was in a fair way to being lost, when D. Constantino in the ship's boat gave chase to and secured two local fishing boats which piloted the vessel safely to Magadoxo and thence to Mombassa, where she wintered, proceeding to India in the next year. De Sa was appointed General of Ceylon in 1618 and henceforth his name is bound up with the history of the island in which he fought for many years. Although despatched to Ormuz with a relieving force in April 1622, he displayed no undue haste, and the siege was over before he arrived there. At the subsequent inquiry into the loss of the place he (like Ruy Freire) was absolved from all blame, chiefly because his presence was required in Ceylon, where the inhabitants were clamouring for his return. He subsequently conducted several campaigns against Raja Singha in one of which he burnt Khandy, but eventually he undertook a reckless and ill-planned expedition against Uva, and his army was ambushed and destroyed by the Singhalese on his return. Constantino himself was amongst the slain, and was deified after his death by the Singhalese under the name of Kusal neti Deiyo.

Nuno Alvarez Botelho.

Son of Diogo Botelho and Donna Maria Pereira. His Father had been Governor of Tangier, and Brazil, and Ambassador to the court of Savoy. He himself served in the fleets operating off the coasts of Portugal and Morrocco, from 1598 to 1616. In 1617 he went to India in command of the ship *Nossa Senhora da Guia* returning next year in the same vessel. Whilst serving in Africa he had apparently fought a duel, or otherwise quarrelled, with a certain captain Fernão de Landim de Sande, for which he was sentenced to 2 years penal service in one of the African forts. This sentence was never carried out, and he was formally pardoned of the offence in 1620, and on March 21st of that year he left Lisbon for Goa in the ship *Nossa Senhora de Paraizo* as Captain-Major of a fleet of 4 ships. The *Paraizo* wintered in Mombassa as did also one of her consorts the *Santo Amaro*, which was wrecked off the bar. Nuno Alvarez succeeded in salving much of the guns and rigging of the lost ship, and proceeded to Bombay in May 1621 with the *Paraizo*. He returned to Portugal next year in the same ship, reaching Lisbon on November 9th 1622. As a result of his Services in India he was granted the commandry of Santa Maria de Mirandella, in the Bishoprick of Braga, of the Order of Christ, and made a member of the Council of Portugal. In 1624 he was appointed Captain-Major of a fleet of 2 ships and 6 galleons which left Lisbon for Goa on the 18th of March 1624, all safely reaching their destination on the same tide in the begining of September,—a thing unknown for many years; his pilot-major João Pereira Corte Real deserves a large share of the credit for this feat of navigation. As narrated in Appendices VII and VIII he proceeded to the Persian Gulf as Captain-General of an Armada of 8 galleons, and fought three stubbornly-contested actions against a superior Anglo-Dutch Force. This is the only example in the history of Portugal's naval wars with the Dutch and English in the East, of an inferior Portuguese force successfully engaging a superior enemy without losing a ship (I do not include single ship actions). Although the Portuguese losses in men and material were heavier than those of the allies, yet their morale in no way suffered, and they were enabled to recover a great part of their lost prestige. Botelho's reputation was still further enhanced by his successful engagement with 3 English ships off Surat in October 1625, in view of an Anglo-Dutch Force in Swally Hole which made no attempt to interfere. The high opinion his enemies held of him, is clearly shown by the fact that when a strong Dutch squadron passed Botelho's galleons "all tottered and torn" after this last action, they evaded fighting him. During the whole of the time that Botelho was on the West Coast of India, 1625-1628, the Dutch and English invariably moved in strong combined fleets and with the utmost caution, which they never did before or since. Even the news of the Amboyna Massacre which split the Anglo-Dutch Alliance to its foundations elsewhere in India, did not suffice to seperate them here. In 1626 Botelho was not able to effect much owing to his inferior force, and in October a large Anglo-Dutch squadron burnt the little village of Bombay. In 1628 his fleet lost heavily from a storm in the Persian Gulf, and in 1629 having become co-governor of India he set out on his celebrated expedition to Malacca which he relieved from the siege of the Achinese. In April 1630 he sailed up the Jambi River and took and burnt 3 Dutch and English vessels. On coming down the river he met the Dutch ship *Walcheren* off the bar on May 5th and set her on fire after a desperate action. Whilst trying to rescue one of his consorts which had fallen foul of the Dutch vessel, his own galliot blew up and he was slain. He was buried at Malacca. The King of Spain was greatly concerned at his loss and granted many favours to his wife and son.

APPENDIX XII

GLOSSARY

(Includes only such words as are unexplained or untranslated in the text.)

Alcaide-Môr. A word of Arabic origin, originally signifying Castellan. Later Mayor or Provost of a Town or castle.

Almiranta. The second in command's or Vice-Admiral's ship.

Almirante. The 2nd in command of a Fleet, or Vice-Admiral.

Armada. Fleet or squadron of ships. *Armada de Alto-Bordo*= High Seas Fleet, or Fleet of Capital ships.

Cafila. Arabic *qãfila*, a caravan. Also applied to fleets of small coastal trading-vessels.

Capitania. Ship of the Captain-General of a squadron or fleet. Flagship.

Capitão-Geral. or simply *Geral.* The Commander of a Fleet or Army. Admiral, and Captain-General.

Capitão-Mór. Captain-Major. Generally used of a more junior officer than Captain-General.

casados. Burghers or townsmen. Married inhabitants of a place. The single men were *soldados.*

charamellas. Shalmes or reed instruments of music of Moorish or Arabic origin.

Condestavel. Lit. Constable. His post corresponded to that of Master-Gunner in English ships.

Fidalgo. Originally *filho d'alguém,* lit. "son of Somebody." Spanish "Hidalgo." Man of gentle birth.

Guazil. Wāzīr or Vizier. Chief Minister of Moslem Potentates.

Lascarin. Persian *lashkar,* "army" or "camp." Applied by the Portuguese to their native auxiliary troops.

Ouvidor. High Judicial Officer. Auditor.

pangayo. Coastal trading vessel employed by the Mohamedan traders of E. Africa. A smaller kind of Dhow.

pataca. Small silver coin of varying value, same as the dollar or "piece of eight."

pataxo. Swift two-masted sailing ship. Corresponds to the English pinnace of the XVIIth century.

terrada. Persian *tārrada* or *tarrīda.* Small single-masted shore-boats.

terranquim. Presumably a species of *terrada.*

Urca. Corresponded to the Flemish and Hamburg "hulks," as the English termed them. Usually about 500 tons.

Vedor or *Veador da Fazenda.* Overseer, Inspector or Comptroller of the revenue. Was nominally indipendent of the Civil or Military Governors of a place and was responsible for the proper collection and expenditure of the Revenue.

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(P.) *Chagas* (ship), 231 *n.*

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(E.) *Dolphin* (ship), 88 *n.*, 130, 197 *n.*, 246 *n.*, 254, 260
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